JUDGMENT Mukherjea, J. - These two analogous appeals are between the same parties, and they are both directed against an appellate judgment of S. Sen Esq., District Judge of Howrah, dated the 6th May, 1944, reversing an order of the Munsif, 3rd Court of that place, by which he dismissed two petitions of objection preferred by two sets of judgment-debtors, in a proceeding for execution of a rent decree, under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The facts lie within a very short compass and may be stated as follows:-- The decree-holder who is the Appellant in both the appeals is the proprietor to the extent of three annas and four gandas share of a certain zemindary property under which there is a putni held by the judgment-debtors. The Appellant obtained a decree against the Respondents in Rent Suit No. 511 of 1942 for arrears of putni rent for the year 1345 B. S. and a certain portion of 1346 B. S. This decree was put into execution in Rent Execution Case No. 192 of 1943 of the Court of the Third Munsif at Howrah and the decree-holder prayed for execution of the decree by arrest and detention of the judgment-debtors under sec. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. This application was resisted by two sets of judgment-debtors who filed two separate applications under sec. 47 of the CPC and their contentions were of a two-fold character: In the first place, it was argued that as it was open to the decree-holder to proceed against the tenure in arrears, a portion of which was still available for sale, any other form of execution was barred under sec. 168A (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The other ground taken was that the decree-holder was not entitled to pray for arrest and detention of the judgment-debtors as the requirements of the proviso (b) to sec. 51 of the CPC were not complied with. 3. The trial Judge overruled both these contentions and allowed the execution case to proceed. On appeal the decision was reversed and the execution petition was dismissed. 51 of the CPC were not complied with. 3. The trial Judge overruled both these contentions and allowed the execution case to proceed. On appeal the decision was reversed and the execution petition was dismissed. The District Judge who heard the appeal agreed with the trial Court in holding that the fact that the decree-holder could still proceed against the tenure in arrears did not stand in the way of his applying for any other form of execution which was not barred under sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. He held, however, that the explanation attached to the proviso to sec. 51 of the CPC read along with sec. 168A (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, would entitle the judgment-debtors to claim that all other properties, movable and immovable, belonging to them, save and except the tenure in arrears, should be kept out of account in assessing their means to pay the decretal dues, and if this test was applied the decree-holder would not be entitled to the remedy prayed for under proviso (b) to sec. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in these appeals. 4. It is not disputed by the learned Advocate who appears for the Respondents judgment-debtors that sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not bar any other form of execution available to the decree-holder, under the ordinary law, by which he can attempt to realise the decretal dues without attaching and putting up to sale any property of the judgment-debtors, other than the tenure or holding in arrears. The consequence, therefore, is that it is open to the landlord decree-holder to execute the decree by way of arrest and detention in prison of the judgment-debtors and the propriety of the decision of Henderson, J., in Bahadur Singh Singhee v. Sanyasi Charan Ghosh 47 C. W. N. 287 (1943) has not been challenged before us. 5. The only point for our consideration is whether the requirements of proviso (b) to sec. 51 of the CPC have been complied with in the present case, and the controversy centres round the point as to whether under the explanation attached to the proviso read along with sec. 5. The only point for our consideration is whether the requirements of proviso (b) to sec. 51 of the CPC have been complied with in the present case, and the controversy centres round the point as to whether under the explanation attached to the proviso read along with sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Court should leave out of account all the other properties of the judgment-debtors save and except the tenancy in arrears for the purpose of arriving at a decision as to whether he has the means to pay the amount of the decree. There is no question of any contumacious or dishonest conduct on the part of the judgment-debtors, and it is not suggested that the case would come under the proviso (a) to sec. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court can, therefore, order arrest and detention of the judgment-debtors only if the Conditions of proviso (b) to sec. 51 of the CPC are complied with and it is proved to its satisfaction that the judgment-debtors have sufficient means to pay the decretal amount and they are refusing or neglecting to pay the same. 6. For the purpose of finding out whether the judgment-debtor has means to pay the decretal dues, the explanation attached to the proviso to sec. 51 of the CPC requires that the Court should leave out of account any property which by or under any law or custom having the force of law is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree. The District Judge took the view that as tinder sec. (1) (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no property, movable or immovable, belonging to judgment-debtors other than the tenancy arrears could be attached and sold in execution of the rent decree, all these properties should be left out of account in calculating their means to pay the decretal dues as laid down in the explanation to sec. 51 of the CPC referred to above. We do not think that having regard to the interpretation that has put upon the language of sec. 168A of the gal Tenancy Act in a number of decisions of this Court, this view can be accepted. 51 of the CPC referred to above. We do not think that having regard to the interpretation that has put upon the language of sec. 168A of the gal Tenancy Act in a number of decisions of this Court, this view can be accepted. As was pointed out in Anil Kumar Basu v. Roy Biman Behari Mitra 48 C. W. N. 344 (1944), it is a settled principle of law that in construing an Act, the Court of law has got to ascertain the intention of the legislature from what the latter has chosen to indicate either in express words or by necessary implication. Sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act is undoubtedly an encroachment upon the ordinary rights of the decree-holder and there is no rant for extending its scope beyond the exact words used in the section. A Judicial Tribunal has always to give effect to the plain language used in the statute even if it is of opinion that the consequences are such as could not have been contemplated by the legislature. The express language of sec. 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act limits the prohibition contained in that section to the attachment and sale of any property of the judgment-debtors other than the tenancy in arrears. A mere attachment without sale has been held not to come within the mischief of the section. 7. As the explanation attached to the proviso to sec. 51 of the CPC speaks only of attachment, and not of attachment and sale, we think that in calculating the means of the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal debt, the Court should not leave out of account properties belonging to the judgment-debtor which, though they might not be sold, could be attached in execution of the decree. 8. The result, therefore, is that these appeals are allowed. The order of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and the case sent back to the trial Court in order that that Court may arrive at a proper decision as to the means of the judgment-debtors to pay the debt as laid down in sec. 51 of the CPC and decide finally whether an order for arrest and detention in prison of all or any of them should be allowed under law. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Sharpe, J. I agree.