JUDGMENT Chakravarti, J. - The only question involved in this appeal is whether the plaintiff had established his right to pre-empt an undivided share of a certain bill which defendant 2 had sold to defendant 1. The trial Court held that the plaintiff had not made out his right. On appeal the lower appellate Court held that he had. Thereupon defendant 1, the vendee, has preferred the present second appeal. It is not disputed that the plaintiff is a cosharer of the taluk to which the bil appertains. Neither is it disputed that defendant 2 is also a cosharer and that he sold a 7 gds. share in the bil to defendant 1 by a document executed on 11th November 1939 and registered on 15th November following. The plaintiff's case is that on 2nd December 1939 when he was sitting in the Bar Library in Sunamganj town, a letter was brought to him by his officer Khatib Ali from one Gani, and that from that letter he obtained information of this sale. His further case was that as soon as he came to know of the sale from the letter, he jumped out of his seat and exclaimed three times the words "Shafi, Shafi, Shafi". He then collected certain witnesses and went to the local criminal Court where defendant 2, the vendor, was present and there he performed the second talab by saying that he had already exclaimed "Shafi, Shafi, Shafi" when he had come to know of the sale and that he was demanding conveyance of the property to him. 2. The defence was that the plaintiff who lived in the same bari with the vendor defendant 2, had all along been aware of the sale, and that the demonstration in the Bar Library and subsequently in the criminal Court was a mere got-up show for the purpose of creating evidence of a formal exercise of the right of pre-emption. The trial Court which dealt with the evidence in some detail and gave a circumstantial account of what happened in the Bar Library, held that the whole affair was a "neat execution of a pre-arranged plan." Everybody was appearing just when it would be necessary under the law for him to appear; everybody was behaving just as it was necessary for him to behave if the plaintiff was smoothly to exercise his right. The trial Court also referred to several other circumstances and particularly to the evidence of one Nalini Babu, a pleader, who spoke to what happened as regards the second talab. The learned Munsif does not seem to have held that what was alleged to have happened in the Bar Library and in the criminal Court, did not actually happen but he. held, as stated already, that it was a got up affair. The learned Munsif further held that the plaintiff had been even previously aware of this sale, and lastly that in any event the plaintiff had not performed the second talab in accordance with law inasmuch as in making the demand he had not specified the property sufficiently or at all. It was, according to him, also doubtful whether the second talab had been performed in the presence of the real vendor; and since it had not been performed either on the land or in the presence of the buyer but only in the alleged presence of the seller whose identity was doubtful, it was not possible to hold that it had been performed in the manner the law required. 3. On appeal this decision was reversed by the lower appellate Court. That Court held that the finding of the learned Munsif to the effect that the happenings at the Bar Library and the criminal Court were pre-arranged could not be accepted. In the second place it held that on the evidence, read in a rational way, it was clear that the plaintiff had sufficiently specified the property, and thirdly, the Court held that the learned Munsif had been in error in supposing that the presence of the buyer was essential if the second, talab was to be exercised effectively and in accordance with law. The learned Judge observed that no particular formula was necessary for the performance of either talab and what had been done by the plaintiff was sufficient. In taking this view he purported to follow the statement of the law said to be contained in Sir Dinsha Mulla's well-known handbook. 4. As far as the learned Judge's criticism of the trial Court on the latter's supposed insistence on the presence of the buyer is concerned, it may be said at once that the learned Judge was doing the learned Munsif an injustice. 4. As far as the learned Judge's criticism of the trial Court on the latter's supposed insistence on the presence of the buyer is concerned, it may be said at once that the learned Judge was doing the learned Munsif an injustice. The learned Munsif had not said that the presence of the buyer was essential. What he had in fact said, was that the second talab on this occasion not having been performed either in the presence of the buyer or upon the land concerned, it was to be seen whether it had been properly performed in the presence of the vendor; and he went on to hold that it could not be said with certainty that the person before whom the ceremony had been performed was defendant 2. This finding, it must be pointed out, was reversed by the learned Judge who held that the person to whom the second talab was addressed was indeed the vendor defendant 2, and that position must now be accepted. Dr. Sen Gupta, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has urged before me two points. In the first place, he contended that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge was not a proper judgment of reversal inasmuch as he had paid no attention to a number of circumstances on which the trial Court had relied in support of its opposite conclusion. In the second place, Dr. Sen Gupta contended that even if the findings as recorded by the learned Judge were to be taken as correct, they were not sufficient to warrant a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Even on taking the most favourable view of the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff, it was perfectly clear that neither of the two ceremonies had been performed in accordance with law. I am bound to say that Dr. Sen Gupta's complaint about the judgment is well founded. The learned Subordinate Judge seems to me to have attributed to the learned Munsif things which he had not said and on the other hand disregarded a number of material considerations upon which the latter had relied. But since, in my view, Dr. Sen Gupta succeeds on a more fundamental point, it is not necessary for me to pursue this matter further. 5. With regard to the legal validity or sufficiency of the two talabs as performed in this case, Dr. But since, in my view, Dr. Sen Gupta succeeds on a more fundamental point, it is not necessary for me to pursue this matter further. 5. With regard to the legal validity or sufficiency of the two talabs as performed in this case, Dr. Sen Gupta's contention was that the first talab was not performed in the manner contemplated by the Muhammadan law. What the plaintiff had in fact said was merely that he was the shafi, which meant that he was a cosharer or the pre-emptor. This, Dr. Sen Gupta contended, was not sufficient to constitute a valid talab-i-mowasibat. Although no particular formula was necessary, it was necessary that the pre-emptor should use some words to the effect that he intended to pre-empt and was preempting. In my opinion, this contention is plainly correct Reference was made by Dr. Sen Gupta to a passage occurring in Ameer Ali's well-known work on Muhammadan Law, Edn. 4, Vol. 1, page 597. This passage lays down the requisites of a valid talab-i-mowasibat, and it runs thus : If a person were to say 'I have claimed my Shufa' or 'I shall claim my shufa' or 'I do claim my Shufa,' all these are good, for it is the meaning and not the style or mode of expression which is here considered. But if he were to say to the purchaser 'I am thy Shafi' or pre-emptor, it would be void. The reason of this distinction is evident, as a mere statement of a fact does not evince any desire on his part to avail himself of his right. This passage seems to refer precisely to the situation which one finds in the present case. The intending pre-emptor had said nothing more than that he was a shafi; and since he stopped there, he did not perform the first talab in accordance with law. Dr. Sen Gupta's second contention was that the performance of the second talab too was deficient in that although it was made in the presence of the vendor, the plaintiff had not proved that the vendor was still in possession of the property demised. This matter is again concluded by authority and reference may be made to another passage in Ameer Ali's work on Muhammdan Law, at p. 598, Vol. 1, of the same edition. This matter is again concluded by authority and reference may be made to another passage in Ameer Ali's work on Muhammdan Law, at p. 598, Vol. 1, of the same edition. The passage runs thus: In order to perform this ceremony the pre-emptor must take some witnesses with him to the vendor, if the property sold be still in his possession. This passage, like the earlier one quoted, is based upon the statement of the law as contained in the Hedaya which is to the following effect: It is therefore necessary afterwards to make the Talab Ishhad wa Takreer, which is done by the Shafee taking some person to witness - either against the seller, if the ground sold be still in his possession. 6. The rest of the passage need not be quoted. But I may set out the reason given in the Hedaya for the rule above quoted. The reason is given in the following words: The reason of this is, that both the buyer and seller are opponents to the Shafee in regard to his claim of Shuffa; the one being the possessor, and the other the proprietor of the ground; and the taking evidence on the ground itself is also valid; because it is that to which the right relates. If the seller have delivered over the ground to the buyer, the taking evidence against him is not sufficient, he being no longer an opponent; for having neither the possession nor the property, he is as a stranger. 7. This specific provision contained in the Hedaya, it seems to me, concludes the point. Sir Dinshaw Mulla's book on Muhammadan law, which is not on the same scale as his other works, presents the subject only in outline and his statement of the law on the present question, while correct so far as it goes, is not complete. It was, however, argued by the learned advocate for the respondents that if such was the law relating to pre-emption, this law was in clear conflict with the Muhammadan law of sale. He contended that in applying the Muhammadan law of pre-emption, it is sale as contemplated by Muhammadan law which should be regarded; and sale under Muhammadan law, he continued, could not be complete till possession had been delivered. He contended that in applying the Muhammadan law of pre-emption, it is sale as contemplated by Muhammadan law which should be regarded; and sale under Muhammadan law, he continued, could not be complete till possession had been delivered. Assuming that the law by which the transaction should be judged must always be the Muhammadan law, to which proposition neither this High Court nor the Privy Council has assented, it seems to me that there is no conflict as suggested by the learned advocate. It does not seem to be essential that there should be a delivery of possession in every case where property is transferred. At any rate, it does not seem to be required for the purposes of the law of pre-emption that the sale should have been completed by delivery of possession. All that is required is that in the intention of the parties, the vendor's title to the property should be deemed to have been extinguished or committed to sale beyond re-call, and the law applicable would be the law by which the parties intended the transaction to be governed. It may also be pointed out that quite a variety of circumstances are conceivable in which the vendor might still be in possession although sale, as contemplated by Muhammadan law, including delivery of possession, had already been completed. One such contingency would be a lease back. But however that may be, there is a specific provision in the most authoritative works on Muhammadan law directly bearing on the law of pre-emption, and that provision requires that if the second talab is to be performed in the presence of the vendor effectively, the vendor must still be in possession of the land sold. It may be presumed that the law givers who laid down this law were aware of what the Muhammadan law of sale was; and, in view of this specific and direct provision, I consider it unnecessary to go further a field in order to seek out and resolve supposed conflicts. In my view, therefore, the second talab was defective for the reason that the vendor in whose presence it was performed was not proved to have been still in possession of the property. 8. Dr. Sen Gupta in the third place contended that the second talab was also defective inasmuch as the subject matter was not sufficiently described. In my view, therefore, the second talab was defective for the reason that the vendor in whose presence it was performed was not proved to have been still in possession of the property. 8. Dr. Sen Gupta in the third place contended that the second talab was also defective inasmuch as the subject matter was not sufficiently described. He did not say that the property required to be described in any particular way: all that he contended was that the pre-emptor should describe the property in a way which would make it possible for others to identify it. This, he contended, had not been done in the present case, and he referred to the evidence of Nalini Babu, mentioned earlier, who stated that there had been no talk about the property. It is true, however, that the plaintiff in his cross-examination tried to repair the damage done by his examination-in-chief and introduced specific details with regard to the property. The trial Court had contrasted his evidence in the cross-examination with that in his examination-in-chief and also with Nalini Babu's evidence; and that Court had concluded that the plaintiff's attempt at improvement in the cross-examination was an afterthought. The lower appellate Court, in holding that the property had been sufficiently described, did not take into consideration the circumstances on which the trial Court had relied. I have been taken through the evidence by Dr. Sen Gupta and I am unable to say that were I to decide this question of fact from that evidence, I would have held in favour of the plaintiff. This, I do not forget, is a second appeal, but in any event, the lower appellate Court's finding is not a proper finding of reversal. If Dr. Sen Gupta does not succeed in proving that the property had not been sufficiently described, neither does the plaintiff succeed in establishing, in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the finding, that it had been so described. 9. It is however unnecessary for me to direct a remand on this point or to consider the matter further, since a single deficiency in the performance of either of the talabs is sufficient to nonsuit the plaintiff. 9. It is however unnecessary for me to direct a remand on this point or to consider the matter further, since a single deficiency in the performance of either of the talabs is sufficient to nonsuit the plaintiff. The right of pre-emption, as has been pointed out, and as is stated in the Hedaya, is an exceedingly feeble right; it gives one the power of disseizing another who has acquired a property in a bona fide manner for good value; and if it is to be exercised, the ritual of the talabs must be observed to the letter. The right is strictissimi juris and the slightest deviation from the formalities required by law will prevent its accrual. The two deficiencies which I have already pointed out are quite sufficient to frustrate the plaintiff's attempt at pre-emption in the present case. Dr. Sen Gupta also attempted to advance a further argument on the footing that defendant 1 was himself a cosharer of the property, not because he had any share in the taluk to which the bil appertained but because he had a share in another taluk to which the bil also appertained. This point was mentioned in the written statement but does not seem to have been further pursued. In the circumstances I am unable to entertain it in second appeal. But as Dr. Sen Gupta, succeeds on the other ground, it is immaterial that this ground fails. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. The appellant will have his costs of this appeal from the appearing respondents.