JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This is a revision u/s 115 C. P. C. It arises out of proceedings under the Debt Redemption Act for amendment of a redemption decree obtained from the Court of the Civil Judge, Fyzabad, by Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh against Ram Prasad Singh, Shlam Dutt Singh and Ishwar Singh, mortgagees. 2. The mortgage, on which the redemption suit was based, was executed on 19th July, 1911, by three persons, who subsequently sold the property on 15th February, 1921, by means of a sale deed to Bachcha Singh, Kuber Singh and Avadhesh Singh. Kuber Singh died, and in the redemption suit Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh represented the entire interests of the original mortgagors A preliminary decree Was passed on 27th May, 1925, but as nothing was paid, the decree was made absolute on 21st July, 1928, and in execution of it the property was purchased by Ram Prasad Singh at a Court auction Before the sale could be confirmed Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh applied for amendment of the decree u/s 8 of the Debt Redemption Act on 28th February, 1941. The application was opposed by the mortgagees. They pleaded that no amendment was possible, because the decree had been satisfied by auction sale, and in any event the Debt Redemption Act did not apply to the decree, as the transaction, on the basis of which it was passed, did not amount to a loan as denned therein. None of these grounds of objections prevailed, and the result was that Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh's application was allowed, and the decree was amended. 3. The objections urged in the Court below have been repeated before us by the learned Counsel for the mortgagees applicants. The argument that the relationship of a debtor and a creditor between the parties to the redemption suit ceased as soon as the property was sold at auction can be disposed of shortly. Clause (1) of Order 34, rule 8, C.P.C. clearly provides that a mortgagor is entitled to redeem the mortgaged property till the confirmation of sale in spite of the fact that he failed to pay the decretal amount within the time allowed by Court. Clause (1) of Order 34, rule 8, C.P.C. clearly provides that a mortgagor is entitled to redeem the mortgaged property till the confirmation of sale in spite of the fact that he failed to pay the decretal amount within the time allowed by Court. Upon such redemption the Court is enjoined to order the defendant to deliver up all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property and if necessary to retransfer it and put the plaintiff in possession. Neither a final decree nor an auction sale, therefore, operates to extinguish the mortgage security or the right to redeem. It is argued that after the sale the mortgage ceased to exit, and since there was no objection under Order 21, rule 90 within the time allowed by law, the confirmation of sale remained a mere formality and it must automatically follow by reason of the provisions of Order 21, rule 92, C. P. C. The subsistence of the right to pay, it is added, does not necessarily imply the subsistence of the debt as such. I have carefully considered the provisions of the Code and have arrived at the conclusion that this line of reasoning is fallacious u/s 89 of the Transfer of Property Act both the right to redeem and the security were extinguished as soon as an order absolute was made That section ; has now been replace by Order 34, rule 5 which does not speak of any extinction of the mortgage security. In fact the right to redeem the mortgage security is expressly kept alive till the confirmation of sale. It follows that the mortgage itself subsists UD to that time. Section 8 of the Debt Redemption Act provides for amendment of a decree under which an agriculturist or a workman is "liable to pay". The liability under the decree must be deemed to continue so long as the mortgage upon which it was based is not finally extinguished, and it must, therefore, be held that there was no satisfaction of the decree by a mere sale. I am satisfied that Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh were entitled to obtain amendment if there was no other bar to the entertainment of the application u/s 8. 4. Having cleared the ground I would now proceed to deal with the next point urged on behalf of the mortgagees which needs a fuller examination. I am satisfied that Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh were entitled to obtain amendment if there was no other bar to the entertainment of the application u/s 8. 4. Having cleared the ground I would now proceed to deal with the next point urged on behalf of the mortgagees which needs a fuller examination. Section 8 of the Debt Redemption Act empowers amendment of "a decree to which the Act applies." By the phrase "a decree to which the Act applies" is meant a decree passed either before or after the commencement of the Act "in a suit to which the Act applies" vide Section 2, clause (6), A "suit to which the Act applies" means any suit or proceeding relating to a 'loan". See Section 2, clause (17). A "loan" is defined .by Section 2, clause 9 as follows "loin" means an advance in cash or kind made before the first day of June, 1910, recoverable from an agriculturist or a workman or from any such person and other persons jointly or from the property of an agriculturist or workman includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance, but does not include an advance the liability for the repayment of which has, by a contract with the borrower or his heir or successor or by sale in execution of a decree, been transferred to another person or an advance by Central or Provincial Government or by a local authority authorised by the Provincial Government to make advances or by a co-operative society or by a scheduled bank ; Provided the it an advance recoverable from an agriculturist or from an agriculturist and other persons jointly shall not be deemed to be a lean for the purposes of this Act, unless such advance was vide to an agriculturist and other persons jointly. 5. The argument on behalf of the applicants mortgagees is that though the transaction would have constituted a 'loan', if the original mortgagors were still the owners of the equity of redemption, it is not a 'loan' since the liability for repayment of' the advance was transferred to Bachcha Singh and his co-vendees in 1920. 5. The argument on behalf of the applicants mortgagees is that though the transaction would have constituted a 'loan', if the original mortgagors were still the owners of the equity of redemption, it is not a 'loan' since the liability for repayment of' the advance was transferred to Bachcha Singh and his co-vendees in 1920. There is no doubt that a transaction which would otherwise amount to a loan would cease to be a loan, where the liability for repayment of the advance has, by a contract with the borrower or his heir or successor, been transferred to another person. In what case then can the liability for repayment of an advance be ever transferred to another person by a contract with the borrower. 'Obviously it is impossible for the debtor effectively to transfer the liability to another person by his own independent action, for the liability to the creditor would still continue and could be enforced against the borrower in spite of the contract. The other contracting party in such a case would, I conceive, be a mere agent, and whatever may be the rights between the parties to the contract they would not -operate to extinguish the borrower's liability. The only case where the legal obligation to discharge the debt can be transferred to another person is where the liability was on the property of the borrower and the property was subsequently transferred to another person. In such a case the person, who for the time being becomes the owner, has also the liability to discharge the loan. The obligation of the agriculturist or the work- man borrower may thereupon effectively cease. The use of the words "by a contract" appears at first sight somewhat to militate against this interpretation, but I am unable to visualise a transference of liability by a mere contract between the borrower and another person independently of the creditor. Since the legislature could scarcely have "contemplated a tri-partite contract, the word "contract" must be taken to signify a transfer for valuable consideration. Whenever, therefore, a liability of a borrower for the repayment of an advance is extinguished and that of another person is brought into existence by virtue of a transfer for valuable consideration, the transaction ceases to be a loan within the meaning of the Act. Whenever, therefore, a liability of a borrower for the repayment of an advance is extinguished and that of another person is brought into existence by virtue of a transfer for valuable consideration, the transaction ceases to be a loan within the meaning of the Act. Some support for this view may be derived from the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Allsop and Hamilton, JJ. in Aittar Singh v. Mahabir Pal Singh LR 1944 All 528 : 1944 OA (H C) 174 : AW R (H C)174. The relevant passage may be cited here with advantage It may be argued that a conveyance of property is not a contract and that the words we have quoted from the definition of a loan could not apply to any transfer of property, but only to the transfer of a personal liability We are not aware, however, of any way in which a personal liability could be transferred by sale in execution of a decree, and we, therefore , conclude that the term "contract" was not used in a strictly technical sense by the legislature. It seems to us that the legislature in using the term "contract" meant to include transfers or conveyances which at some stage or other involved a contract between the parties. A contract, however, must be for consideration. However we stretch the meaning of the term "contract" we cannot include within that meaning any transfer which does not involve the payment of consideration. We conclude, therefore, that a transfer by means of a gift cannot be a transfer by which the liability of the borrower is transferred to another person within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Act. It seems to us that this interpretation is also, in all probability, in accordance with the principle underlying the provisions which we have quoted. It seems to u that the intention of the legislature was to prevent a person securing a benefit which he had not deserved. Any person who accepted a transfer of property for consideration with the knowledge that there was a charge upon it would mike allowance for the payment of that charge when he fixed the price which he was willing to pay. Any person who accepted a transfer of property for consideration with the knowledge that there was a charge upon it would mike allowance for the payment of that charge when he fixed the price which he was willing to pay. Hiving obtained the property at a lower price, because it was subject to a charge, there would be no reason why he should benefit by being allowed to repudiate the charge. He should not be allowed a benefit in two ways. On principle as well as on the plain meaning of the term 'contract" we think that a gift cannot be included among the transactions which operate to transfer the liability for the repayment of an advance within the terms of the definition. 6. The other head of transfer of liability, namely that by sale in execution of a decree, has been referred to in the aforementioned case as also in Pirthi Nath v. Raj Dutt 1944 OA 87 : AWR (CC) 87 : OWN 144, as affording some clue to the intention of the legislature. I cannot visuaise the sale of liability in execution of a decree, unless it be the sale of a property burdened with a debt. There does not appear to be any reason for drawing a distinction between cases where the liability to repay an advance is transferred by voluntary alienation of properly and those where such liability devolves on the purchaser at an auction sale in execution of a decree. The latter head of exclusion, in my judgment, clarifies to a great extent the import of the words used in the former head. 7. If the interpretation of the definition of loan as given above is correct, it would be obviously immaterial to consider whether or not the transfer by which the obligation to repay the advance devolved upon another person contained any express reference to the liability. It is to be observed that the sale of 1920 in the present case says that the subject matter of the transfer is free from any encumbrances apart from the one which is recited therein. The mortgage so recited has no connection with that upon which the redemption decree was based. Legally the liability for the payment of the mortgage nevertheless became, by virtue of transfer, the liability of Bachcha Singh and Avadesh Singh. The mortgage so recited has no connection with that upon which the redemption decree was based. Legally the liability for the payment of the mortgage nevertheless became, by virtue of transfer, the liability of Bachcha Singh and Avadesh Singh. It is clear, therefore, that the transaction ceased to be a loan, and the transferees cannot avail themselves of the benefits of the Debt Redemption Act. The fact that the purchasers of the property which was avowedly sold free from encumbrance could by reason of the covenant of title, still sue the transferors for making good the loss occasioned to them in meeting the encumbrance is, to my mind, besides the point for what would be sought to be enforced in such a suit would be not the repayment of liability for the advance, but the liability for breach of a covenant. 8. The learned Counsel for the opposite- parties has sought to interpret the definition contained in Section 2, clause 9 in a radically different manner. According to him a loan remains a 'loan' so long as the debtor is an agriculturist, and it is immaterial whether the applicant u/s 8 or Section 9 is the original borrower or his transferee. The transaction in this view is taken out of the definition only when the liability for repayment is transferred to "another person" that is a person other than an agriculturist or a workman. It is also "pointed out that the transference of liability as contemplated by the latter portion of the definition is not confined to a transfer by the borrower or his heir but is also extended to a successor, a term which, according to this submission, is not inappropriate to describe a transferee of an agriculturist borrower. Such an interpretation of Section 2 will render the exclusion clause altogether redundant and I do not think it is possible to understand the definition in this light. The word "successor" used in conjunction with the borrower or his heir, in my opinion, signifies a successor on testacy or possibly by gift but not a successor in the sense of a transferee for consideration. The word "successor" used in conjunction with the borrower or his heir, in my opinion, signifies a successor on testacy or possibly by gift but not a successor in the sense of a transferee for consideration. The fact that the transferee of the liability is designated by the words "another person" does not indicate, to my mind, that the legislature intended to confine the expression to a non-agriculturist or a non-workman, for if such was the intention, one would expect a somewhat different language. The object in making the exclusion was to debar all persons who were not originally the debtors but who have, as a matter of business transaction, acquired the property and thereby taken upon them- selves the liability to discharge the debt. The words "another person" therefore, I believe, are used in a comprehensive sense comprising all transferees of liabilities regardless of the consideration whether they are agriculturists, non-agriculturists, workmen or parsons of any other description or domination. In Pirthi Nath v. Raj Dutt2. I had occasion to express a similar opinion and to say that the test for determining whether a transaction did or did not amount to a loan was not whether the contract was express or implied but whether there was a transference of liability. I am still of the same view. The following passage from that judgment may be reproduced as an additional reason : The position would (Otherwise, I conceive, become absured, because a man, who purchases encumbered property, would be excluded from the benefits of Act XIII of 1910, if the seller mentions in the deed that the vendee shall pay the encumbrances but if a man sells the property which is subject to a mortgage and says nothing in the deed regarding the payment of it by the vendee, the latter would be entitled to all the privileges which the Act confers, despite the fact that in actual practice the result of both the deeds is identical, and the vendee is in either case legally bound to discharge the loan. I would be reluctant to place an interpretation upon Section 2, clause 9 which must lead to a conclusion so unjustified.... 9. A Division Bench of this Court, consisting of my brothers Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. I would be reluctant to place an interpretation upon Section 2, clause 9 which must lead to a conclusion so unjustified.... 9. A Division Bench of this Court, consisting of my brothers Ghulam Hasan and Madeley, JJ. in Muneshwar Bux Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh 1944 O A 307 : AWR (CC) 307 : OW N 505, acted on the principle of Pirthi Math's case, namely that when there is a transference of liability from the transferor to the transferee, the debt ceases to be a loan within the meaning of Section 2 (9) and on a parity of reasoning they held that in ceases where the liability had been transferred the transferor rendered himself disentitled to the benefits of the Act, 10. Since the suit in which the redemption decree was passed did not relate to a 'loan' I held that Bachcha Singh and Avadhesh Singh were not entitled to obtain amendment of the redemption decree, I would, therefore, set aside the order of the Court below and allow the revision with costs. Kiul J. I agree. 11. Order We allow the application with costs. The order of the Court below amending the decree is set aside and the plaintiffs application for amendment is dismissed. Application allowed.