JUDGMENT Lodge, J. - A Rule was obtained by two accused persons, Bideshi and Lattu on the Chief Presidency Magistrate to show cause why the convictions and sentences on the accused under sec. 380 of the Indian Penal Code should not he set aside. The material facts are that these two accused persons were sent up on chalans which stated that they had committed theft from a shop known as Taltola Cloth Store and thereby committed an offence punishable under sec. 380 of the Indian Penal Code and that each of them had abetted the other and thereby committed an offence punishable sec. 380 / 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The chalans were apparently received by the Chief Presidency Magistrate on the 3rd July, 1945, but on the 3rd July, 1945, the prosecution not ready and the case was adjourned to the 17th July, 1945 for evidence. On the 17th July, 1943, both the accused persons were present in Court. According to the description given by the learned trying Magistrate the learned Magistrate explained to the accused the nature of the charge. He did this before any evidence was recorded because the accused were not defended at that stage by any lawyer. The accused persons told him that they were guilty. Thereafter the learned Magistrate examined one witness for the prosecution. While he was examining this witness a pleader appeared in and wished to defend the accused. The learned Magistrate explained that the trial was over and that the accused had pleaded guilty. The pleader stated that it they had pleaded guilty they must have done so because they were unable to understand the allegations made and the pleader prayed that the Magistrate should examine prosecution witnesses and then take the plea of the accused. The learned Magistrate, however, convicted the two accused persons on their own plea and sentenced them each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six weeks. Against that conviction and sentence a Rule was obtained by the two accused persons. When the Rule was issued we also issued a Rule upon the petitioning accused to show cause why their sentences should not be enhanced. The two Rules have been heard together. Under sec. Against that conviction and sentence a Rule was obtained by the two accused persons. When the Rule was issued we also issued a Rule upon the petitioning accused to show cause why their sentences should not be enhanced. The two Rules have been heard together. Under sec. 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is clear that where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by a Presidency Magistrate on such plea there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence. Presumably therefore revision also will not lie where non-appealable sentences are passed on a plea of guilty properly taken except as to the extent or legality of the sentence. The real question is whether there was a valid plea of guilty on which a Presidency Magistrate was justified in convicting the accused. Sec. 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that where an accused in a warrant case appears before a Magistrate the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant, if any and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Sec. 254 of the Code provides that when such evidence and examination of the accused have been taken and made, or at any previous stage of the case, if the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence triable as a warrant case the Magistrate should frame a charge in writing against the accused. As the trial was by a Presidency Magistrate the Magistrate was not required to reduce the charge to writing. The Magistrate was entitled, therefore, if he had material before him from which he could form the opinion that the accused had committed an offence, to frame a charge and call upon the accused to plead to that charge. It is obvious that the Magistrate must have some material before him other than the mere police chalan before he can be of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence. In the present case the only material before the Court was the police chalan and the conversation between the Magistrate and the accused prior to the taking of the plea of guilty. In the present case the only material before the Court was the police chalan and the conversation between the Magistrate and the accused prior to the taking of the plea of guilty. If the statement of the accused to the Magistrate was the material on which the Magistrate felt justified in framing a charge and taking the plea of the accused, that statement ought to have been reduced to writing or, at all events, the Magistrate should have made a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused as provided by sec. 363(2A) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case the statement of the accused was not reduced to writing, and no such memorandum of the statement of the accused was reduced to writing and signed by the Magistrate. In my opinion the Magistrate had no material before him on which to frame a charge and on which to take the plea of the accused. In these circumstances the Magistrate ought not to have taken the plea of the accused ; and later when the accused's pleader prayed that evidence be first taken and thereafter the plea of the accused be taken, the Magistrate ought to have granted the prayer. 2. In this view the Rule obtained by the Petitioners should, in my opinion, be made absolute and the Rule issued by this Court suo motu should be discharged. The convictions and sentences passed upon the Petitioners should be set aside and they should be retried by some other Magistrate according to law. The Petitioners may be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Chakravartti, J. I agree.