JUDGMENT B.K. Mukherjea, J. - The appellant before us is the present mutwalli of a wakf estate created by one Golamuddin Fakir of village Jora in the district of Bogra, some time in the year 1920. It was a wakf-alaulad, and a large number of annuities were provided by the founder for the members of his family. The first mutwalli after the death of the wakif was his eldest son Abdul Gani Fakir, and during his term of office some of the annuitants whose dues were not paid instituted suits against the mutwalli and recovered decrees for various sums of money. These decrees were put into execution, and the executing Court directed realisation of the decretal dues by appointment of a Receiver. Several Receivers were appointed in succession, and one of them was the present appellant Kader Ali Fakir. During the time that Kader Ali Fakir was a Receiver, the respondents who were the landlords in respect of a tenure appertaining to the wakf estate brought a suit for recovery of arrears of rent due in respect thereof, and obtained a decree. To this rent suit, the mutwalli Abdul Gani Fakir was not made a party, and the only defendant was Kader Ali Fakir who was then the Receiver. 2. The decree-holders have now applied for execution of this decree, and this is resisted by Kader Ali Fakir who raised a number of objections under S. 47, Civil P. C. The trial Court held that the decree-holders were entitled to have the dues paid off from other funds in the hand of the Receiver, and if in this way the dues were not satisfied they would be at liberty to proceed by way of attachment and sale of the property in arrears. Against this decision an appeal was taken to the Court of the District Judge of Pabna and Bogra by Kader Ali Fakir, and during the pendency of this appeal, he was removed from his office as Receiver. At about the same time, Abdul Gani Fakir was also removed from his office as mutwalli and Kader Ali Fakir became mutwalli in his place under the terms of the wakfnama. Kader Ali Fakir prayed for and obtained leave of the appellate Court to prosecute the appeal as mutwalli. The learned District Judge on hearing the appeal modified the order made by the trial Judge. Kader Ali Fakir prayed for and obtained leave of the appellate Court to prosecute the appeal as mutwalli. The learned District Judge on hearing the appeal modified the order made by the trial Judge. He held that the tenure in arrears being wakf property, the landlords decree-holders could not proceed by way of attachment and sale of the same, and that the proper mode of execution was by appointing a Receiver under S. 51 (d), Civil P. C. He further held that the decree-holders were at liberty to proceed against the Receiver personally. A Receiver has since been appointed in pursuance of the order of the District Judge, and he is in possession of the wakf property. 3. Kader Ali Fakir has now come up on appeal to this Court against the decision mentioned above. The respondents decree-holders have filed cross-objections and taken exception to that part of the order which disallowed their prayer for proceeding against the property in arrears by way of attachment and sale thereof. Mr. Hiralal Chakravarti, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has raised two points in support of the appeal. His first and main contention is that the landlords decree holders not having made the mutwalli of the wakf a party to the rent suit which was brought against the Receiver alone, the decree in that suit could not bind the wakf estate and was not enforceable either by way attachment and sale of the wakf property or by appointment of a Receiver in respect to the same. The other contention is that the decree against the Receiver could not be executed against him personally. 4. Now, it cannot be disputed that a Receiver as such does not acquire a title to the property in respect to which he has been appointed Receiver. The ownership remains in the parties to the suit, and the Receiver takes charge of and holds the property as an officer of the Court during the litigation. It is undoubtedly true that under O. 40, R. 1 (d), Civil P. C., it is competent to the Court to grant to the Receiver all such powers of bringing and defending suits as the owner himself has; and it has been held by this Court that when the appointment is made under O. 40, R. 1, and full powers, as indicated in cl. (d) of that rule are conferred upon the Receiver, the Receiver is entitled to bring and maintain a suit in his own name: vide 25 Cal. 642 William Robert Fink v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh ('98) 25 Cal. 642 and 34 Cal. 305 Jagattarini Dasi v. Nabagopat Chaki ('07) 84 Gal. 305. As was explained by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee in 34 Cal. 305 Jagattarini Dasi v. Nabagopat Chaki ('07) 84 Gal. 305, the powers of a Receiver must be deemed to be co-extensive with his functions and he cannot conveniently perform the function of bringing a suit for the protection and preservation of the property which is the subject-matter of the litigation except on the hypothesis that he is sufficiently interested in the subject-matter committed to him to sue in respect thereof, by virtue of his office, in his name. 5. We do not think, however, that simply because a Receiver is authorised to defend suits, it gives a new privilege to a third party plaintiff and entitles him to bring a suit against the Receiver alone ignoring the persons who are the owners of the property and who are in law necessary parties to such suit. The appointment of a Receiver does not in any way affect the rights of a third party creditor who has claims against the persons over whose property the Receiver has been appointed. If such creditor files a suit, he must make his debtors parties to the same. The only difference that the appointment of a Receiver makes is that if the property in the hands of the Receiver is intended to be affected by the result of such a suit, the Receiver has got to be made a party after obtaining leave from the Court, and this is to be, by way of addition to and not in substitution for the parties who are primarily responsible: vide 14 C. W. N. 653 Jotindra Nath Choudhury v. Sarfaraj Mia ('10) 6 L. C. 214 : 14 C. W. N. 653. 6. In the present case, the person primarily responsible for payment of the rent due to the landlords in respect of the wakf estate is the mutwalli, and consequently he was a necessary party to the rent suit. Unless he was made a party defendant in the suit, the decree could not possibly bind the wakf estate. 6. In the present case, the person primarily responsible for payment of the rent due to the landlords in respect of the wakf estate is the mutwalli, and consequently he was a necessary party to the rent suit. Unless he was made a party defendant in the suit, the decree could not possibly bind the wakf estate. We are not impressed by the argument of Dr. Sen Gupta that the principle enunciated in the two cases mentioned above, namely, 25 Cal. 642 William Robert Fink v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh ('98) 25 Cal. 642 and 84 Cal. 305 Jagattarini Dasi v. Nabagopat Chaki ('07) 84 Gal. 305, applies not only where the Receiver files a suit, but also where he is sued by a third party. There is a good deal of difference between bringing and defending a suit. The Receiver may not effectively bring a suit for the preservation and protection of the property in his charge unless he is allowed to sue in his own name, and the authority to sue must necessarily carry with it the requisite power of representing the estate, without which he could not discharge the function; but when the plaintiff who is a third party brings a suit, the authority to defend the suit as owner does not certainly require the striking out of all other parties, who are according to law necessary parties to the suit, and making the Receiver the sole defendant in the suit. The Receiver can very well discharge this function by being added as a party to the suit, and this is the proper procedure which is and has been followed in all such cases. 7. We hold, therefore, that the decree which the respondents obtained against the Receiver alone could not bind the wakf estate in the absence of the mutwalli who was not made a party to the suit, and the decree, therefore, could not be executed either by attachment and sale of the wakf property in arrears or by the appointment of a Receiver as contemplated by S. 51 (d), Civil P. C. The other order of the District Judge that the Receiver is personally liable obviously cannot be supported. The Receiver being sued by virtue of the office cannot certainly be made personally liable. The present appellant, as said above, is not now the Receiver of the estate. The Receiver being sued by virtue of the office cannot certainly be made personally liable. The present appellant, as said above, is not now the Receiver of the estate. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside and the execution case will stand dismissed. We understand that the Receiver who was appointed in pursuance of the order of the lower appellate Court is now in possession of the wakf estate. If the Receiver has taken advance of any money from the decree-holders for the purpose of enabling him to save the property from being put up to sale under the Revenue Sales Laws, that money must be refunded to the respondents. If the Receiver has funds from which the money can be paid, we direct that it should be paid forthwith: otherwise, the Receiver will remain in possession till the money is paid in full to the decree-holders. The appeal is disposed of as indicated above. We make no order as to costs in the appeal in this Court. The cross-objection is dismissed without any order as to costs in this Court. Blank, J. 8. I agree.