JUDGMENT Henderson, J. - This appeal is by the Plaintiff. He instituted the suit in order to obtain a declaration that the election of Defendant No. 1 as President of a certain Union Board was void. He succeeded before the Munsif but that decree has been reversed on appeal. In order to understand the three grounds upon which the election has been attacked certain facts require to be stated. In accordance with the rules framed by the Local Government for the election of President, the Circle Officer convened a meeting on the 22nd of May. It failed for want of a quorum. There is no procedure for the adjournment of a meeting for a stated period. Under r. 29, proviso (iii), if further steps are to be taken in the matter, another meeting has to be convened. As the Sub-Divisional Officer refused to extend the time, the last date for holding it was May 27th. It was actually held on May 26th and Defendant No. 1 was elected Chairman. 2. The legality of the proceedings is now attacked on three grounds (1) that the notice given was insufficient; (2) that the meeting was held at a certain place outside the Union in defiance of the rules (it was held in the Kaunia Dak Bunglow) ; and (3) that Defendant No. 6, who attended the meeting and voted, was not a member of the Board. The suggestion of the Plaintiff is that the person really nominated was another Kasimuddin, Defendant No. 9. 3. The Defendants contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. It is alleged that the District Magistrate has been given exclusive jurisdiction subject to revision by the Commissioner. The Courts below have differed on the point. 4. I have no hesitation in accepting the decision of the learned Munsif. If the jurisdiction of the Court is to be taken away, this must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms. Under secs. 17A and 17B the jurisdiction of the Courts to interfere with the election of members of a Union Board is expressly taken away. There is no such provision with regard to the election of Presidents. The proper inference, therefore, is that it was the intention of the legislature to preserve the jurisdiction of the Courts in connection with this matter. 5. There is no such provision with regard to the election of Presidents. The proper inference, therefore, is that it was the intention of the legislature to preserve the jurisdiction of the Courts in connection with this matter. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the jurisdiction of the Courts was taken away by certain rules made by the Local Government under sec. 101 of the Act and published in the Calcutta Gazette on the 10th of July, 1941. 6. Now, the rule-making power under this section is conferred on the Local Government to carry out the purposes of the Act not to enable them to defy the legislature. When the jurisdiction of the Courts is preserved by the Act itself, it is not open to the Local Government to take it away by rules made under the power conferred by this section. If and in so far as they purport to do so, they are ultra vires. The rules are in fact a mere copy mutatis mutandis of sec. 17B. 7. Taking the Rules as they stand, however, I do not interpret them to mean that the jurisdiction of the Courts to decide questions of ultra vires is taken away. 8. For these reasons I hold that the decision of the learned Munsif on this point was right. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with the merits of the case. 9. I will first consider the third objection to the effect that Defendant No. 9 is the gentleman who was nominated by the Local Government. This is a question of fact and the learned Subordinate Judge has decided it definitely in favour of the Defendants. I am satisfied that there is no ground which would justify my interference with this decision. The Plaintiff relied solely upon the terms of the Gazette Notification. I do not pretend to understand how Defendant No. 9 was in a position to throw any light on the question or what the learned Munsif means when he characterises the evidence as false. The fact is that both Defendant No. 6 and Defendant No. 9 live in a village called Bichhandai. The Plaintiff could merely allege that the full name of the place, where Defendant No. 6 resides, is Khorda Bichhandai. There was, therefore, nothing in the Notification itself to suggest that it does not refer to Defendant No. 6. The fact is that both Defendant No. 6 and Defendant No. 9 live in a village called Bichhandai. The Plaintiff could merely allege that the full name of the place, where Defendant No. 6 resides, is Khorda Bichhandai. There was, therefore, nothing in the Notification itself to suggest that it does not refer to Defendant No. 6. There is evidence to the effect that it does and the learned Subordinate Judge was justified in finding to that effect. 10. The other objections refer to the time and place of meeting. Dr. Sen Gupta's first argument was that the rules made for the conduct of meetings apply. If they do, there is no escape from the position that they were not complied with. 11. The learned Subordinate Judge held that these rules only apply to regular meetings of the Board and have no application to the special meeting convened by the Circle Officer for the election of President. The interpretation of the rules is certainly not free from difficulty. Some of them cannot possibly apply. But the matter appears to be settled by the proviso to r. 12 which is in these terms: Provided that the provisions of this rule and of r. 11 shall not apply to a meeting convened for electing a president or a vice-president. 12. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that these rules are intended to govern, so far as they can be made applicable, special meetings. 13. The result, therefore, is that it must be held that the conduct of the Circle Officer with reference to the time and place of the meeting was irregular. But in view of the provisions of sec. 17C of the Act it cannot be held that the proceedings were void. That they ought not to be set aside will be apparent from the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge with which I shall now proceed to deal. 14. If these rules do not apply, the Appellant would have to show that the conduct of the Circle Officer with reference to the time and place of the meeting was unreasonable. From this point of view I should find it impossible to interfere with the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. I would merely add this. I have already pointed out that the last date for holding the meeting was the 27th. From this point of view I should find it impossible to interfere with the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. I would merely add this. I have already pointed out that the last date for holding the meeting was the 27th. The Circle Officer, therefore, had to consider that, if he did not take speedy action, he would be depriving the members of the Board of the privilege of electing their President. It further appears from the evidence that the grievance of the Plaintiff was not that the members were unable to attend at the time or place appointed but that he himself would have been glad of a little more time to canvass for votes. 15. I asked the learned Advocates on both sides to address me on the question whether any useful purpose would be served by restoring the declaration of the Munsif at the stage. The position is that all the members of the Board are bound by it with the result that there would be no President. Though the Munsif cannot compel the District Board to take action I am certainly not prepared to assume that that body would shirk its responsibilities under sec. 8. The fact remains, however, that the Board will cease to exist in a few months. To make the declaration now would really serve no useful purpose. 16. For all the reasons stated above the appeal is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.