JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiffs in a suit for rent of a korfa or under-raiyati holding, and the question is whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to rent at the rate claimed. The claim was laid at the rate of Rs. 30 per year and was for the years 1299 to 1302 M. E.=1937 to 1940. The total amount of rent claimed, including cess and damage, was Rs. 138-10-6 pies. The Plaintiffs based their case on a solenama decree which was passed on the 6th of January, 1938, in a previous rent suit between the parties (Rent Suit No. 1073 of 1932). The solenama is Ext. 2 in the case. The learned Munsif decreed the suit in full, but on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed that decision and held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover rent at the rate of Rs. 13 per year, which was the rent recorded in the Settlement Roll prepared in connection with proceedings under Part II of Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The lands are situated in a noabad taluq in the District of Chittagong, and it is not disputed that the provisions of Part II of Chapter X are applicable. The facts which it is necessary to refer to for the purposes of this judgment are shortly these: It appears that in the year 1925 the Defendants executed a kabuliyat in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of the disputed lands agreeing to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 53 per year. This kabuliyat was for a term of nine years. In or about April, 1930, however, the record-of-rights was finally published along with the Settlement Rent Roll under Part II of Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, in which the Settlement Officer settled the rent of this korfa tenancy at Rs. 13 per year. The record-of-rights is Ext. A. Shortly thereafter, a fresh kabuliyat was executed bearing date, the 24th July, 1930, by which the Defendants agreed to restoration of the old rent of Rs. 53 in lieu of the rent of Rs. 13 so settled. This kabuliyat is Ext. 1. Thereafter there was rent suit, Suit No. 1073 of 1932, in which the Plaintiffs claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 53. 53 in lieu of the rent of Rs. 13 so settled. This kabuliyat is Ext. 1. Thereafter there was rent suit, Suit No. 1073 of 1932, in which the Plaintiffs claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 53. This suit was finally disposed of in terms of a compromise, and under the compromise decree which passed on the 6th of January, 1938, and is Ext. 2 in the case, the parties agreed on a rent of Rs. 30 per year. It is on the basis of this compromise decree that the present suit has been instituted. On behalf of the Defendants it is contended that the solenama decree is unenforceable, and the contention is rested on a variety of grounds. In the first place, it is said that it contravenes sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in so far as it effects an enhancement of rent from Rs. 13 to Rs. 30. It is further urged in this connection that the compromise decree is therefore, hit by the provisions of sec. 147A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Finally it is said that the compromise decree created a new lease, and, therefore, required registration and in so far as it had been registered, it was inoperative. 2. On the first point, it is necessary to consider what was the original rent with which the rent settled under the solenama decree should be compared. On behalf of the Plaintiffs it is contended that the rent recorded in the settle proceedings under the Bengal Tenancy Act was a mistake, as is shown by the fact that a fresh kabuliyat was executed by the parties shortly after the publication of the record-of-rights, restoring the old rent. The answer given is that after the rent was settled and entered in the record-of-rights as finally published, it was conclusive, subject to the provisions contained in Part II, Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act for correction of the entry. There is a good deal of force in this argument. It is necessary only to refer to the recent decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Kumar Chandra Singh Dudharia v. Midnapore Zemindary Co., Ltd. 46 C. W. N. 802 (1941). It is not open, therefore, to the Plaintiffs now to say that the rent was not Rs. 13 as recorded in the Settlement Roll, but Rs. 53 as mentioned in the earlier kabuliyat. It is not open, therefore, to the Plaintiffs now to say that the rent was not Rs. 13 as recorded in the Settlement Roll, but Rs. 53 as mentioned in the earlier kabuliyat. 3. That raises the question whether it can be said that by Ext. 1 a new tenancy was created in lieu of that which was the subject-matter of the settlement proceedings. My attention has been drawn to the terms of the lease, and I do not think that it is possible to say that a new tenancy was created by it. The very fact that the kabuliyat refers to the rent settled in the record-of-rights as erroneous and professes to rectify the error, shows that no new tenancy was intended to be created. The object of the kabuliyat was merely to revise the rent. Mr. Rakshit on behalf of the Plaintiffs Appellants points out that by the kabuliyat certain instalments were granted for payment of the annual rent, and further, that the tenancy was described as a korfa holding with a right of occupancy. I do not think, however, that this meant the substitution of a new tenancy for the pre-existing one. Occupancy right had already been recognised in the settlement record, because the tenants had in fact acquired that right by custom. As regards the instalments, that made no variation in the total rent paid, and that is not, therefore, a circumstance which is sufficient to show that a new tenancy was intended. 4. It follows, therefore, that the validity of the rent fixed under the second kabuliyat of the 24th July, 1930, Ext. 1, will have to be judged on the footing that the previous rent was Rs. 13. If that be so, there can be no question, and Mr. Rakshit in fact does not dispute it, that the kabuliyat must be regarded as hit by sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 5. In addition to this, there is a finding of the lower Appellate Court that this kabuliyat Ext. 1 was never acted upon. The position consequently is that the solenama decree cannot but be held to have enhanced the rent from Rs. 13 to Rs. 30. What, then, is the result? This enhancement clearly exceeds the limits allowed by sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 1 was never acted upon. The position consequently is that the solenama decree cannot but be held to have enhanced the rent from Rs. 13 to Rs. 30. What, then, is the result? This enhancement clearly exceeds the limits allowed by sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. If this enhancement had been effected by a contract, the contract would have been void for more than one reason,--in the first place, because of the quantum of the enhancement and secondly, because the contract was not in writing and registered. Mr. Rakshit, however, contends that the contract here was merged in a decree and that made a difference, and he says that the position will not at all be affected by reason of sec. 147A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sec. 147A provides as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 3 in O. XXIII, in Schedule 1 to the Code of Civil Procedure, if any suit between landlord and tenant as such is wholly or partly adjusted by agreement or compromise, the Court shall not order an agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall not pass a decree in accordance with such agreement or compromise unless it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the terms of such compromise or agreement are such that if embodied in a contract they could be enforced under this Act. 6. Pausing here, it may be stated at once that the terms of the compromise by which the rent was enhanced from Rs. 13 to Rs. 30 were undoubtedly such that if embodied in a contract they could not be enforced under sec. 29 of the Act. The question is whether, although this is so, the compromise decree may be regarded as wholly void. It is urged on behalf of the Appellants that in passing the compromise decree the Court acted with jurisdiction, though it might have acted wrongly in the exercise of such jurisdiction. On the other side, it is urged that sec. 147A could give jurisdiction to the Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise only if the compromise was not in contravention of any provision of the Act. Either contention has judicial support in its favour. On the other side, it is urged that sec. 147A could give jurisdiction to the Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise only if the compromise was not in contravention of any provision of the Act. Either contention has judicial support in its favour. On the one hand, there is a decision of Coxe and N. R. Chatterjea, JJ., in Sarjugsharan Lal v. Dukhit Mahato 17 C. W. N. 496 (1913), in which it was held that a compromise decree which was in contravention of sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was a nullity. On the other hand, there is a case,--Ishan Chandra Banikya v. Moomraj Khan 30 C. W. N. 940 (1926) decided by B. B. Ghose and Graham, JJ., in which the case of Sarajugsharan Lal v. Dukhit Mahato 17 C. W. N. 496 (1913) has been expressly dissented from and the later case has been followed in several other cases such as Krishna Lal Sadhu v. Pramila Bala Dassi I. L. R. 55 Cal. 1315 (1928) and Nagenbala Dassee v. Sridam Mahato I. L. R. 59 Cal. 513 (1931), though in those cases no reference is made to sec. 147A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. There is also a Special Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Askaran Baid v. Deolal Singh I. L. R. 9 Pat. 527 (1929) in which that Court has refused to follow the ruling in Sarajugsharan Lal v. Dukhit Mahato 17 C. W. N. 496 (1913) and has held in unequivocal terms that a compromise decree passed in contravention of the provisions of sec. 147A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is not a nullity and cannot be impeached in a subsequent suit for rent between the parties. 7. In view of this divergence of opinion, I might have referred the present case to a Division Bench in order that the Division Bench might make a reference to a Full Bench, but the trend of decisions both in this Court and in the Patna High Court seems to be overwhelmingly against the view indicated in the case of Sarajugsharan Lal v. Dukhit Mahato 17 C. W. N. 496 (1913) and I do not think I should serve the interest of either party, after the matter has been fully argued before me, in remitting them to any further hearing or hearings. I must consequently hold that, although the compromise decree did contravene sec. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it must still be given effect to unless it could be displaced on any other ground. 8. Mr. Imam Hossain Choudhury has indeed urged another ground for displacing it, that is, that the compromise decree has not been registered. This would be a valid objection, if it could be shown that by the compromise decree a new lease was created. I have not been however, referred to any terms in the compromise decree which show that it was not in respect of the same tenancy, for which the kabuliyat of 1930 had been given. All that was done to modify the rent of the holding and leave the tenancy otherwise unaffected. There is, therefore, no scope for the application of the ruling in Nazar Ali v. Indra Kumar Sutar (7) or Atul Krishna Bose v. Zahed Mondal (8) in either of which cases, it will be seen, it was definitely found by the Courts that a new lease had been created by the compromise decree in question there. 9. The result, therefore, is that the appeal must be allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court set aside and those of the trial Court restored. The Appellants will be entitled to their costs of this appeal. Leave to appeal under sec. 15 of the Letters Patent is asked for, but though I have refused to refer the case to the Division Bench, I do not think I should refuse leave. Leave is accordingly granted.