JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is a revision u/s 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act by the judgment-debtor against an order dismissing abjections to the execution of the decree. 2. The decree in question was passed on the 14th June, 1937, in the Court of Small Causes at Rangoon. The decree-bolder obtained a transfer certificate to the Court at Sultan pur on the 21st January, 1938. The first application for execution was made on the 23rd August, 1941, namely more than three years aiter the date of the decree and the receipt of the transfer certificate. Act No. X of 1937 (The Tempo- rary Postponement of Execution of Decree Act, 1937) had been passed in the mean- time. It came into force on the 1st Janu- ary, 1938, and ceased to have force from the 31st December, 1940. As the decree- holder did not file the process fee, the first application for execution was consigned to the record on the 18th October, 1941. The second application for execution made in March 1943 was consigned to the record in April 1943. The third application which has given rise to the present revision was filed on the 14th May, 1943. The judgment-debtor objected that the decree was time-barred. The lower Court, how- ever, overruled this objection and the present revision application has been preferred against the order. 3. In revision it has been contended before me that the transfer certificate under which the decree was sent by the Rangoon Court for execution to the Sultanpur Court lost its force after lapse of one year in view of the provisions of paragraph 181 of the Oudh Civil Rules, corresponding to paragraph 172 of the old Rules, and consequently the transferee Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree on the basis of that transfer certificate. I am unable to accept this contention. It is not denied that inspire of the decree not having been executed, either wholly or partially, the transferee Court did not certify to the transferor Court the fact of non-execution, as required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Proce- dure. I am of opinion, therefore, that the transferee Court was not deprived of the jurisdiction so long as it did not choose to certify the fact of non-execution u/s 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am of opinion, therefore, that the transferee Court was not deprived of the jurisdiction so long as it did not choose to certify the fact of non-execution u/s 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, argued on the strength of paragraph 181 that as the application for execution was made after the expiry of one year from the date on which the decree was received, the transferee Court was bound to return the papers to the transferor Court, jind though the Court did not follow the directions contained in this paragraph, nonetheless it ceased to have any jurisdiction to execute the decree. I cannot agree tfeat the provisions of para- graph 181 are so mandatory as to override those of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which a transferee. Court continues to retain its jurisdiction as long as it does not record a certificate u/s 41. In Mohammad Shakir v. Jugul Kishore (1925) 28 O C 169 Mr. Dalai, as an Additional Judicial Commissioner, expresred a similar view in regard to the provisions Section 41. He held that according to law and sound practice jurisdiction of the Court to which execution is sent ceases only when that Court sends a certificate to that Court which passed the decree u/s 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He recorded a similar opinion as a Judge of the Allahabad High Court {See Shiam Lal Vs. Koerpal and Another, AIR 1925 All 179 . A similar inference may fairly be deduced from a decision of a Bench of this Court in Mst. ]ilai v. Abdul Rahman A I R 1929 Oudh 76, I am, therefore, of opinion that the fact that the transferee Court did not comply with the provisions of paragraph 181 (c) of the Oudh Civil Rules in not returning the record to the transferor Court after the expiry of one year as required by that paragraph, it did not divest itself of the jurisdiction to execute the decree. 4. Next it has been contended that there is nothing on the record to show that the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist and thus the provisions of Act X of 1937 could not exempt the decree from the bar of limitation. 4. Next it has been contended that there is nothing on the record to show that the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist and thus the provisions of Act X of 1937 could not exempt the decree from the bar of limitation. It is agreed by both parties that if the judgment-debtor is an agricul- tutist, then the decree-holder would be entitled to the benefit of the period during which Act X of 1937 remained operative. In his objection to the execution of the decree the judgment-debtor did not clearly raise the point that the decree was time-barred on the ground that he was not an agricul- turist. Judging from the state of record it seems that the point was assumed or overlooked by the parties and by the Court. As there is no material on the record to enable the Court to come to any conclusion and as the fact is denied by the judgment-debtor, it appears to be expedient in the interest of justice that the lower Court should, after giving an opportunity to the parties arrive at a finding whether the judgment-debtor is or is not an agricul- turist. 5. Accordingly I allow this revision application and remand this case for decision to the lower Court in the light of the directions indicated above. The lower Court will decide the question of limitation in the light of its finding upon the question of fact, namely whether the judgment- debtor is or is not an agriculturist. Costs will abide the event.