JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The principal question involved in these appeals does not appear to be covered by any reported decision and if the present instance be the first where it has come up before a Court of law, it is certainly surprising that it should not have come up earlier. There are six appeals arising out of a single suit for rent brought by a purchaser of an entire estate at a revenue sale against a common undertenant in disregard of the intermediate tenure which, he alleged, had been duly annulled. The question is whether he was entitled to annul it, but to state the problem in that broad and simple form is to give no indication of its difficulties. There is also a subsidiary question as to whether the tenure had in fact been effectively annulled. 2. The suit was in respect of six jamas and as six decrees were passed, there were six appeals to the Court of Appeal below and six have been preferred here. 3. The facts were never seriously disputed and whatever little controversy there was having been disposed of by the findings, the position is now clear. It appears that two revenue-paying estates, bearing Touzi Numbers 355 and 394, were held by certain Mondals in different separate accounts. Of those, Account No. 4 in each of the Touzis was held by a body of persons who may conveniently be described, after its leading member, as Kumud Nath Mondal's group. Similarly, Account No. 5 in each of the Touzis was held by the group of one. Jugal Chandra Mondal. Two other separate accounts, No. 18 in Touzi No. 355 and No. 19 in Tousi No. 394, were held by one Radhabinode Mondal, but in the year 1902 he created a tenure in respect of his whole interest of 15 gandas in the two Touzis as also his interest in several other estates, tenures, and rent-free lands in favour of the Kumud and Jugal groups. One of the terms of the lease or settlement was that the lessees would be bound to pay the revenue payable on account of the shares settled with them out of the rent charged. One of the terms of the lease or settlement was that the lessees would be bound to pay the revenue payable on account of the shares settled with them out of the rent charged. No default was committed by the lessees in respect of this revenue, but they failed to pay the revenue due on account of their own shares for the January kist of 1932 and in consequence the whole estate was sold on the 20th June, 1932, under the provisions of sec. 14 of the Revenue Sales Act. It was purchased by the Plaintiff, but he has been found to have been a mere benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups. The position, in part, therefore is that the estate was purchased by the very co-sharers for whose default it had been sold. 4. The Defendant in the present suits is a subtenant under the tenure created by Radhabinode Mondal, but he is also the present representative or successor-in-interest of the latter, being the executor and trustee of his estate and he holds the sub-tenancy, it appears, in that capacity. In other words, Radhabinode appears to have held sub-tenancies in respect of certain lands of which the proprietory title belonged to himself and which, along with other lands, he had settled by way of a tenure with the Kumud and Jugal groups. Those sub-tenancies are now held as a part of his estate by the Defendant. The Plaintiff alleges that he annulled the tenure created by Radhabinode and is seeking to recover rent directly from the Defendant on that allegation. The position, on all the facts of the case, therefore, is that certain co-sharers of an estate who purchased it at a revenue sale held for their own default, are claiming to be entitled to annul an intermediate tenure created not by themselves but by another co-sharer who was not in default. The position, on all the facts of the case, therefore, is that certain co-sharers of an estate who purchased it at a revenue sale held for their own default, are claiming to be entitled to annul an intermediate tenure created not by themselves but by another co-sharer who was not in default. Accordingly, the question of law which falls to be determined is: where a co-sharer of an estate, holding his interest under a separate account and also the interest of another co-sharer by way of a tenure, duly pays the revenue in respect of the latter which, under the terms of his lease, he was bound to pay but commits a default in respect of his own sharer and himself purchases the estate when it is sold for such default, is he entitled to annul the tenure, created not by himself but by the non-defaulter co-sharer, towards whom his obligations as a lessee as to payment of the revenue he had fully discharged ? 5. The task of answering this question is fortunately simplified in the present case by certain unities and identities which are apparent. Since the Plaintiff is a mere benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups, the real purchasers at the revenue sale were they. It is they who are trying to annul the intermediate tenure, but that tenure is held by themselves. The person seeking to annul the tenure and the person whose tenure is being sought to be annulled are thus one and the same. Again the Defendant although sued as a sub-tenant, is also the legal representative of the co-sharer who had created the tenure. In other words, he combines in himself the two capacities of the sub-tenant and the non-defaulting proprietor whose interest was extinguished by the sale and the tenure created by whom is being sought to be annulled. If these unities to which proper regard does not seem to have been paid by the Courts below, be borne in mind, the main question arising in the present case would seem almost to answer itself. 6. The facts of the present litigation may now be stated. 7. Some years after his purchase, on the 15th of April, 1936, the Plaintiff commenced six certificate cases against the Defendant to recover arrears of rent for six sub-tenancies for the Bengali years 1339 to 1342. 6. The facts of the present litigation may now be stated. 7. Some years after his purchase, on the 15th of April, 1936, the Plaintiff commenced six certificate cases against the Defendant to recover arrears of rent for six sub-tenancies for the Bengali years 1339 to 1342. The Defendant resisted the Plaintiff's claim, but by his order, dated the 29th June, 1937, the certificate officer allowed it. This order was, however, set aside on appeal by the Additional Collector on the finding that annulment of the intermediate tenure had not been proved and this decision was upheld successively by the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue by orders dated the 21st of January and the 5th of May, 1938. Thereafter on the 17th April, 1939, the present suit was brought. 8. As many as four defences were set up by the Defendant. He pleaded in the first place that the Plaintiff was not the real purchaser but only a benamdar for the defaulting proprietors who had fraudulently purchased the estate in his name and therefore he was not entitled to annul the tenure as he claimed to have done. In the second place, he pleaded that the tenure which covered other properties besides the lessor's interest in the two estates could not legally be annulled only to the extent of the latter. Thirdly he pleaded that the tenure had not in fact been annulled; and his last plea was that in any the Plaintiff's claim up to the year 1342 was barred by limitation. 9. The Courts below gave effect to these defences except the defence of limitation which the trial Court accepted only with respect to the year 1339 but the Appellate Court did not consider. But they dismissed the Plaintiff's suits on their findings on the remaining questions in issue. It was held that the Plaintiff was a benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups and being thus in the position of defaulting proprietors who had themselves purchased the estate, was bound to take it subject to all encumbrances under the provisions of sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act. It was next held that the law did not allow a partial annulment; and lastly it was held that annulment in fact had not been proved. 10. The suit, as stated above was accordingly dismissed by both the Courts and thereupon the Plaintiff preferred the present six appeals. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act. It was next held that the law did not allow a partial annulment; and lastly it was held that annulment in fact had not been proved. 10. The suit, as stated above was accordingly dismissed by both the Courts and thereupon the Plaintiff preferred the present six appeals. 11. Of the questions raised in defence to the suit, as enumerated above, the second, the last and the factual part of the first no longer survive. On behalf of the Plaintiff, the position that he was a benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups was accepted before me while, on the side of the Defendant, the contention that a part of the claim was barred by limitation was not repeated. It was also conceded that in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Khamankari Dasi v. Rani Harsha Mukhi Dasi 47 C. W. N. 583 (1943) rendered since the Appellate judgment in the present case was delivered, the objection as to the validity of a partial annulment could no longer be sustained. 12. Of the remaining two defences both of which were canvassed in these appeals, the one by which the fact of annulment was denied may be taken up first, because if the tenure was not in fact annulled, so far as form went, it would be unnecessary to consider in the present case, whether the Plaintiff was entitled in law to annul it. The tenure, in the absence of annulment, would continue. 13. Two modes of annulment were pleaded in the plaint, viz., service of notices on the owners of the tenure and proclamation by beat of drum, but Mr. Das who appeared for the Appellant, conceded that in view of the findings of the Courts below, he must cease to rely on them. It seems to have been suggested before the lower Appellate Court that even if the modes of annulment, specifically pleaded, failed, collection of rent from other tenants should he held to amount to notice of annulment, but since there is no evidence as to who those tenants were, the suggestion was not pursued in this Court. It seems to have been suggested before the lower Appellate Court that even if the modes of annulment, specifically pleaded, failed, collection of rent from other tenants should he held to amount to notice of annulment, but since there is no evidence as to who those tenants were, the suggestion was not pursued in this Court. The Courts below also considered whether the institution of the present suits would itself operate as an annulment of the tenure, but they concluded that these suits could not avail the Plaintiff inasmuch as a suit for rent against under-tenants would operate to effect an annulment only if the owners of the intermediate tenure were parties to the suit and since, in any event, the annulment would take effect only from the date of the suit which, clearly, could not support any prior claims. In the result they held that during the period of claim, the tenure subsisted and consequently there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 14. Mr. Das did not challenge the correctness of any of these findings as they were, but contended that there was another circumstance which the Courts below had overlooked, vis., the institution of the certificate proceedings, and that action of the Plaintiff, he submitted, clearly amounted to an annulment of the tenure. I am of opinion that this contention of Mr. Das is correct. The substance of the decision of this Court in the case of Kumar Arun Chandra Sinha Bahadur v. Sarojit Sen Gupta 37 C. W. N. 866 (1933) is that when the purchaser of a superior interest becomes entitled to annul an intermediate tenure, a demand of rent directly from an under-tenant in the presence of the tenure-holder constitutes an effective election to annul the tenure. It is true that the decision is one under the Putni Regulation and was given in relation to a suit. But the rights of a purchaser at a putni sale are in this respect of precisely the same extent and character as those of a purchaser at a revenue sale and if a demand for rent by way of a suit constitutes an effective election to annul, there is no good reason why the same demand by way of a certificate proceeding should not have the same effect. It is again true that the holders of the tenure sought to be avoided must be parties to the suit or proceeding. The Exhibits filed in the case are not on the record and I am unable to ascertain if the Kumud and Jugal groups were impleaded in the certificate proceeding. In all probability they were not, but that omission is of no consequence, since the finding is that the Plaintiff is their benamdar and therefore the Plaintiff's presence in the proceeding was their presence. The position, though somewhat farcical, was that the Kumud and Jugal groups, acting in the name of the Plaintiff as purchaser of the estate, were demanding rent from the sub-tenant in their own presence as holders of the tenure. There was perhaps little or no meaning in the purchasers annulling a tenure held by themselves, but the proceeding cannot be said to have been defective in respect that the persons interested in the tenure were not present. 15. Mr. Mookerjee contended that since the Kumud and Jugal groups had not been proved to have actually been parties to the certificate proceeding, it could not be held that by that proceeding the tenure had been annulled. I do not think that this contention is open to the Defendant. His own case was that the Plaintiff was a mere benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups and he did his best to induce the Court to accept it. Having succeeded, he cannot now run away from the consequences which, perhaps, he did not foresee. Since he himself insisted that the Plaintiff was a benamdar, he cannot complain if that case is accepted and the legal consequence of the relationship applied to the facts of the case. 16. The certificate proceeding, however, could not effect an annulment earlier titan the date of its institution which was the 15th of April, 1936, corresponding to the 2nd Baisakh, 1343. It follows that the Plaintiff's claim for the years 1339 to 1342 must in any event fail. 18. It remains to deal with the principal question which is whether the Plaintiff, which means the Kumud and Jugal groups, was entitled in law to annul the tenure. It follows that the Plaintiff's claim for the years 1339 to 1342 must in any event fail. 18. It remains to deal with the principal question which is whether the Plaintiff, which means the Kumud and Jugal groups, was entitled in law to annul the tenure. In the facts of the case, it would seem to be a question of a wholly unreal character, because the persons whose tenure is being sought to be annulled and the persons who are seeking to annul it are one and the same. There is thus no question here of a co-sharer purchaser trying to annul a tenure held by a third party and originating in a grant from a non-defaulting co-sharer. Nor is it easy to see what practical interest the Defendant sub-tenant may have in resisting the Plaintiff's claim to recover rent from him by setting up the intermediate tenure. His sole interest is that his sub-tenancies may remain to him, but those are not being sought to be disturbed; and his sole liability is to pay rent for his lands and nothing more is being sought to be enforced against him. If he is not bound to pay rent to the Kumud and Jugal groups as purchasers at the revenue sale, and proprietors, he is bound to pay it to the very same persons as the tenure-holders. If the tenure is held to have been annulled as the Plaintiff prays, the sub-tenant ought not to be under any risk of having to pay his rent twice, once to the Plaintiff and again to the tenure-holders, since the former has been held on the sub-tenant's own contention to be a benamdar for the latter. In the circumstances there seems to be little sense in the Defendant's insisting that the real Plaintiffs, if they wish to recover rent from him, must do so in their character of tenure-holders and cannot do so as proprietors. 19. But since the question was argued with strenuousness and at some length, I would disregard the unreality arising out of the special facts of the case and deal with the point of law on its merits. Apart from annulment, there could not be an extinction of the tenure by merger, since it extended over properties other than those appertaining to the two estates purchased by the Kumud and Jugal groups. Apart from annulment, there could not be an extinction of the tenure by merger, since it extended over properties other than those appertaining to the two estates purchased by the Kumud and Jugal groups. The question of the legal right to annul does, therefore, arise, although the practical result of its existence or non-existence may be nil. 20. In examining that question, I would put the Plaintiff on one side, since he is only an encumbrance, serving no other purpose than entailing a recital of his inconsequence each time he is referred to. With the Plaintiff eliminated, the essential facts are that the estates were purchased by certain co-sharers who held separate accounts and for whose default they were sold. After their purchase, they claim to have annulled a tenure held by themselves under another co-sharer whose share of the revenue they were bound, under the terms of their lease, and which they had duly paid. The default was in respect of their own shares; but it is not found that the default was intentionally or fraudulently committed. 21. It would, I believe, make for clarity if I indicated at this stage one question which might have been raised on the above facts but was not. The Defendant, besides being a sub-tenant represents the proprietory interest of the co-sharer who created the tenure claimed to have been annulled; indeed, even as a sub-tenant he represents that co-sharer. But he did not put forward any defence based on his rights as a co-sharer proprietor. It was not contended by him that there was in this case such a lapse from that standard of good faith and candid dealing which one co-owner owed to another that the purchase by the Kumud and Jugal groups be held to be a purchase on behalf of all the co-sharers and that the proprietory interest of Radha Benode being thus saved from extinction, the tenure created by him would be saved with it from annulment. A defence on those lines was suggested in paragraph 9 of the written statement but was not further pursued in the course of the trial. A defence on those lines was suggested in paragraph 9 of the written statement but was not further pursued in the course of the trial. The whole resistance actually offered by the Defendant to the Plaintiff's claim was in his capacity of a sub-tenant; and while in the Courts below the ground urged was that the purchase in the name of the Plaintiff was a fraud and the real purchasers being the Kumud and Jugal groups, they must, as defaulting proprietors, take the estate, subject to the tenure, before me the defence was placed, inter alia, on the ground of the supposed duty of an intermediate tenure-holder to maintain the lease and protect his sub-tenant against paramount claims. The Kumud and Jugal groups, it was urged, were bound to see that the tenure subsisted and the Defendant, holding under the tenure, was not put in jeopardy. 22. On behalf of the Appellant, it was contended by Mr. Das that the question was concluded by the plain terms of sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act. Under that section, read with sec. 37, a co-sharer purchaser of an estate, sold for its own arrears, would acquire it free from all encumbrances and with power to avoid all under-tenures, subject to certain exceptions which were not here material, provided he held a separate account opened with him under sec. 10 or 11 of the Act. The real purchasers in the present case held separate accounts, as the Courts below had found; but the special rights arising to them out of that incident under sec. 53 had been overlooked. 23. Mr. Das further contended that even if the matter were to be decided according to the principles which the Courts had applied as between co-sharers, it was not enough, in order that an equity might arise against the purchaser, that he happened to be a co-sharer but it was further necessary that he should have been guilty of something unfair, something amounting at least to sharp practice. There was no evidence in the present case that the purchasers had deliberately defaulted in paying their share of the revenue: their failure might have been clue simply to want of means for the time being. There was no evidence in the present case that the purchasers had deliberately defaulted in paying their share of the revenue: their failure might have been clue simply to want of means for the time being. Besides, the sale was not caused by that failure or at least by that failure alone; between the default and the sale there were other causes, more directly contributing to the sale, such as the failure of the other co-sharers to purchase the defaulting shares in accordance with the offer which must have been made to them under sec. 14 of the Act. 24. In the last place, Mr. Das contended that the purchasers owed no duty to maintain the under-tenure which had not been created by them, nor any duty towards the sub-tenant whom they had not inducted. 25. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr. Radhika Ranjan Guha simply contended that he who sought equity must do equity and must come with clean hands. Since the real purchasers had themselves been the defaulters, their hands were unclean and they could claim no right to annul any under-tenure. 26. Mr. Rama Prosad Mookerjee, who followed Mr. Guha first put forward an extreme contention which he appeared subsequently to abandon. That contention, as far as I could understand it, was that sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act did not refer to sales contemplated by sec. 37, but referred to sales held under sec. 14 which were entirely different in character. Both were sales of the entire estate, but while the sale contemplated by sec. 37 was the sale of an estate "for recovery of arrears due on account of the same," the sale held under sec. 14 was only for recovery of arrears due on account of a share. That distinction, it was urged, would appear from sec. 13 where the word "estate," occurring in the third line, was said to mean only a share of an estate. It was accordingly contended that since sec. 53, which excepted co-sharer purchasers holding a separate account from its operation, did not itself define what their rights were, those rights were to be sought for elsewhere in the Act; but since sec. 53 only contemplated sales held under sec. 14 and since sec. It was accordingly contended that since sec. 53, which excepted co-sharer purchasers holding a separate account from its operation, did not itself define what their rights were, those rights were to be sought for elsewhere in the Act; but since sec. 53 only contemplated sales held under sec. 14 and since sec. 37 did not apply to such sales, there was no provision to be found anywhere in the Act which provided that a purchaser at a sale held under sec. 14 would acquire the estate free from all encumbrances and with power to annul under-tenures. The result, Mr. Mookerjee contended, was that the exception was of no avail and there was no power to annul under-tenures, conferred by any other section of the Act, which the exception might be said to save. 27. Mr. Mookerjee also contended that in any event the purchasers, as holders of the tenure, were bound to maintain it and to protect the rights of the sub-tenant. 28. It would be convenient to dispose of Mr. Mookerjee's first contention first, although, as stated above, he himself did not persist in it in the end. It was somewhat surprising to hear it argued, at this time of the day, that a sale under sec. 13 or sec. 14 could be held, simply because a certain share or shares were in arrears. As long ago as in the year 1913 it was held in the case of Indra Mani Dasya v. Priyanath Chackrabarty 18 C. W. N. 490 (1913) that the word "estate," occurring in the third line of sec. 13, .meant the entire estate and not a separate account--a decision which I pointed out to Mr. Mookerjee; and the principle that no sale even of a share can be held unless the estate as a whole has become liable to be sold for arrears of revenue has been affirmed and re-affirmed in cases too numerous to mention, among them being, to take two cases from two ends, the decision of this High Court in Balkishen Das v. Simpson I. L. R. 25 Cal. 833 (1898) and the decision of the Privy Council in Krishna Chandra Bhowmick v. Pabna Dhana Bhandar Co., Ltd. 36 C. W. N. 277 (1931). A sale under sec. 14 is also a sale for recovery of arrears due on account of the estate; and sec. 833 (1898) and the decision of the Privy Council in Krishna Chandra Bhowmick v. Pabna Dhana Bhandar Co., Ltd. 36 C. W. N. 277 (1931). A sale under sec. 14 is also a sale for recovery of arrears due on account of the estate; and sec. 37 makes no distinction between such sales and sales where are no separate accounts but applies equally to both, as the language of the section clearly shows and as indeed was held in the case of Jogendra Narain Roy Chowdhury v. Rai Kiran Chandra Rai Bahadur 28 C. W. N. 315 (1918). Similarly, I can find no ground for holding that sec. 53 applies only to sales under sec. 14. The language used in the section is simply, "any recorded or unrecorded proprietor or co-partner who may purchase the estate" and there is nothing in this perfectly general language to limit such purchase to purchase at any particular kind of revenue sale. Again, as already pointed out, it is a mistake to suppose that a sale of an entire estate under the provisions of sec. 14 is a special type of sale. Whether the sale is directed, in a case where there are no separate accounts, immediately on the occurrence of a default or whether, in a case where separate accounts exist, the sale is directed after the preliminary procedure laid down in secs. 13 and 14 has been gone through, the sale must be held in the same manner and, when held, will bean the same incidents and have the same effect. There is no rational ground for distinguishing between one class of sales from the other as regards the applicability of sec. 53 and in fact the section was applied, in all the reported cases that can be found except one, to sales which not sales directed under sec. 14. 29. My view therefore is that sec. 53 applies to all sales of an entire estate, held for its own arrears, and not merely to sales directed under sec. 14and that as regards the rights of a co-sharer purchaser, the section may and should be read along with sec. 37. I may add that a sale under sec. 14 is not a special kind of sale and has no incidents peculiar to itself, but is just the same kind of sale as one notified straightaway under sec. 6. 30. 14and that as regards the rights of a co-sharer purchaser, the section may and should be read along with sec. 37. I may add that a sale under sec. 14 is not a special kind of sale and has no incidents peculiar to itself, but is just the same kind of sale as one notified straightaway under sec. 6. 30. It need hardly be pointed out that in expressing the above view of sec. 53, I have taken into consideration only its first part and not the second which deals with sales of estates for arrears other than their own. 31. Turning now to the points sought to be made by Mr. Das, I am not at all sure that his second contention is sound. I am aware that even after the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Deonandan Prashad v. Janki Singh L. R. 44 I. A. 30: S. C. 21 C. W. N. 473 (1916), it has been held by this Court in a number of cases that where a defaulting co-sharer purchases an estate at a revenue sale, the remaining co-sharers can make an equitable claim to a reconveyance only if there was some unfairness or sharp practice. See, for example, the cases of Khurshed Ali v. Dina Nath Sarma 29 C. L. J. 402 (1918) and Ram Prosad v. Ram Jadu 40 C. W. N. 1054 (1936). Sitting singly, I am bound by those decisions which were decisions of Division Benches, but I may be permitted to express, with respect, my doubt as to whether the principle stated does not exceed the limits set by the Judicial Committee. 32. Nor do I find it easy to agree with Mr. Das that if the default was caused by poverty and not committed by design, the purchaser would have better rights against subordinate interests. If the principle be that a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong and if the weapon which the purchaser seeks to use against the subordinate interests became available to him only because his own default had caused a sale, it cannot make any difference that the purchaser did not acquire the weapon by deliberate manoeuvres, but it was placed in his hands by his very misfortune. In either case, the holders of subordinate interests are equally free from blame and equally entitled to insist that those above them shall do their duty. I cannot also agree that the real, or at least the only, cause of the sale was not the default. Other factors undoubtedly contributed, but none of them was a breach of duty on the part of anybody else and at the beginning of them all was the default of the purchaser, of which the other factors were consequences. It is not, however, necessary for me to pursue this matter further, since the present case falls to be judged not by the rights which co-sharers who have not purchased may have against the co-sharer who has, but by the rights, if any, which a subordinate tenure-holder or a sub-tenant has against a co-sharer purchaser, or, to put it in another way, the rights which the latter has against the former under certain specific provisions of law. 33. Principles of equity are entirely beside the point, since no equitable rights are claimed but only rights under a statute. I have therefore nothing to consider on Mr. Guha's contention that he who seeks equity must do equity and the purchasers in the present case have not done it. The sole question is whether the purchasers have the right they claim under sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act. If the section confers the right and provides for no qualification the right is absolute and the legislature must be understood to have put considerations of equity on one side. 34. No decided case was cited before me by either of the parties and as far as I have been able to investigate, none can be found in the books which cover the point. There are certain cases in which rights of encumbrancers or under-tenure-holders were considered, but they are of no assistance, since the co-sharer purchaser did not hold a separate account. See, for example, the cases of Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Pearce Mohun Mookerjee 16 W. R. 136 (1871) and Rath Behari Bose v. Purna Chander Mozumdar I. L. R. 15 Cal. There are certain cases in which rights of encumbrancers or under-tenure-holders were considered, but they are of no assistance, since the co-sharer purchaser did not hold a separate account. See, for example, the cases of Mahomed Gazee Chowdhry v. Pearce Mohun Mookerjee 16 W. R. 136 (1871) and Rath Behari Bose v. Purna Chander Mozumdar I. L. R. 15 Cal. 350 (1888) relied on by the Courts bellow, as also the cases of Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhury v. Nawab Salimulla Bahadur 12 C. L. J. 336 (1918), Alun Manjee v. Ashad Ali 16 W. R. 138 (1871) and Satyendra Nath Banerjee v. Krishnasakha Kar 35 C. L. J. 185 (1920). In one case, viz., Syed Mohammad Husain Khan v. Sheo Shankar Persad Singh 16 C. W. N. 817 (1911) also referred to by the Courts below, there was a separate account, but it was an account opened under sec. 70 of the Land Registration Act and therefore outside the purview of sec. 53. The question of the rights of a co-sharer purchaser who held a separate account, opened under sec. 10 or sec. 11 of the Revenue Sales Act, is res Integra. 35. In the present case it was not disputed before me that the purchasers held separate accounts opened under sec. 10 or sec. 11. A copy of the order-sheet in one of the cases in which an order for opening a separate account was made under sec. 10 was actually filed in the trial Court, but an application which is on the record shows that it was not marked as an exhibit as the prayer was made at a late stage. There is also an admission in the written statement,, although the section is not mentioned but, in any event, the argument before me was on the basis, accepted by both parties, that the purchasers held separate accounts such as are referred to in sec. 53. It appears to have been the same in the Courts below. 36. What then are the rights of the purchasers in the present case under that section? The ground has already been cleared to a certain extent by my decision on the first contention of Mr. Mookerjee. I have already held that sec. 53 applies to all revenue sales of an entire estate and must be read along with sec. 37. 36. What then are the rights of the purchasers in the present case under that section? The ground has already been cleared to a certain extent by my decision on the first contention of Mr. Mookerjee. I have already held that sec. 53 applies to all revenue sales of an entire estate and must be read along with sec. 37. In what manner it is to be read was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Mt. Sham Kumari v. Raja Rameswar Singh Bahadoor I. L. R. 32 Cal. 27: s. c. 8 C. W. N. 786 (1904) where they observed: It seems to their Lordships obvious that this enactment cannot be construed in such a way that it shall not operate as a proviso to, or qualification of 37. 37. Sec. 37 is the general section defining the rights of the purchaser of an entire estate at a revenue sale. It provides, to quote only the material portion, that subject to certain exceptions, the purchaser of an entire estate sold for recovery of its own arrears shall acquire the estate free from all encumbrances and shall be entitled to avoid and annul all under-tenures. To this general provision sec. 53 enacts an exception and provides that if the purchaser be any recorded or unrecorded proprietor or copartner, he shall by his purchase, acquire the estate subject to all its encumbrances existing at the time of the sale and shall not acquire any rights in respect to under-tenants or raiyats which were not possessed by the previous proprietor at the time of the sale of the estate. There is a distinction between encumbrances and under-tenures, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of Turner Morrison & Co. v. Monmohan Chowdhury 36 C. W. N. 29 (1931), but though sec. 53 does not in terms say that a proprietor or co-proprietor purchaser shall not be entitled to annul any under-tenures, the last clause of the section is perhaps a paraphrase of that language and may be said to contain the prohibition. But the section also enacts an exception to itself and its reference to a purchaser who is a recorded or unrecorded proprietor or co-partner is qualified by the phrase "excepting sharers with whom the Collector under sec. But the section also enacts an exception to itself and its reference to a purchaser who is a recorded or unrecorded proprietor or co-partner is qualified by the phrase "excepting sharers with whom the Collector under sec. 10 or 11 of this Act has opened separate accounts." To such sharers the benefit of sec. 37 is preserved and their rights are to be found in that section. The effect of sec. 53 therefore is that a co-sharer holding a separate account opened under sec. 10 or 11 of the Act, is not affected by the disability imposed by it and if he purchases the estate, he is entitled, as much as any stranger purchaser, to get the full benefit of sec. 37 and acquire the estate free from all encumbrances as also with power to annul all under-tenures, barring those excepted by the section. 38. It will be noticed that in dealing with co-sharer purchasers, sec. 53 makes no distinction between defaulters and non-defaulters: the only distinction it makes is between co-sharers who held separate accounts and those who did not. When it imposes a restriction, it speaks simply of "any recorded or unrecorded co-partner"; and when it excludes certain co-sharers from the operation of its provisions, it speaks of them simply as "co-sharers with whom the Collector, under secs. 10 and 11 of this Act, has opened separate accounts." The limitation, therefore, is not confined to defaulters, nor is the exclusion confined to non-defaulters. If the co-sharer purchaser be one who held no separate account, he acquires only a limited interest by his purchase, although he may not have been a defaulter; and, on the other hand, if he held a separate account, he purchases with the full rights provided for by sec. 37, although he may have been a defaulter himself. What the policy of the Legislature was in making a provision of this character is not clear, but with the policy of the law the Court is not concerned. 37, although he may have been a defaulter himself. What the policy of the Legislature was in making a provision of this character is not clear, but with the policy of the law the Court is not concerned. The law must be construed as it stands and the effect achieved by the language used is, on the one hand, not merely to prevent defaulters from taking an unjust advantage of their own wrong but to prevent non-defaulters as well for obtaining the full benefit of their purchase and, on the other hand, to confer on defaulters too the full rights of a purchaser, provided only they held separate accounts. It is not easy to see what merit there might be in separate accounts which could make the legislature enact that encumbrancers and under-tenure-holders would have full protection against a co-sharer purchaser who held no separate account, even if he was not a defaulter, whereas there would be no protection against a co-sharer purchaser holding a separate account, even if he himself was the defaulter whose default had caused the sale. The law, however, is there and must be accepted and applied. 39. My conclusion on this part of the case is that under sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act, read with sec. 37 as it must be, a co-sharer of an estate holding a separate account opened under sec. 10 or 11, if he purchases the entire estate at a sale on account of its own arrears, whether a sale directed under sec. 14 or a sale otherwise held, would acquire the estate free from all encumbrances and with power to annul under-tenures as provided for by sec. 37, although the sale may have been caused by his own default. 40. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, the answer to the question raised is obvious. The purchasers were co-sharers of the estate, holding separate accounts opened under sec. 10 or sec. 11 of the Revenue Sales Act. They purchased the entire estate at a sale directed under sec. 14. It is true that the reason why the estate was sold was that the purchasers had themselves defaulted in paying their share of the revenue. Nevertheless, by virtue of the provisions of sec. 53, read with sec. 37, they acquired the estate with power to annul all under-tenures, not coming within any of the excepted classes. 14. It is true that the reason why the estate was sold was that the purchasers had themselves defaulted in paying their share of the revenue. Nevertheless, by virtue of the provisions of sec. 53, read with sec. 37, they acquired the estate with power to annul all under-tenures, not coming within any of the excepted classes. The under-tenure set up by the Defendant did not come under any excepted class and therefore the purchasers were entitled to annul it. 41. The under-tenure was in fact annulled by the Plaintiff who was a benamdar for the real purchasers. As the recorded purchaser, the Plaintiff had power to annul it in the right of the real beneficial owners. See Kumar Narendra Nath Roy v. Messrs. Midnapore Zemindary Co. 44 C. W. N. 38 (1939). The annulment was therefore validly made. 42. I was not impressed by the argument of Mr. Mookerjee that the purchasers in the present case could not be allowed to annul the under-tenure, because it being held by themselves, they were under a duty to maintain it and also to protect the sub-tenant against paramount claims. As Mr. Das pointed out, the under-tenure had not been created by the purchasers but by another co-sharer and they had fully discharged their obligation as holders of the tenure by paying the revenue due from their lessor. The estate had not been sold for any default in respect of the revenue payable by the purchasers on behalf of the co-sharer who had created the under-tenure. That revenue had been duly paid. As regards the sub-tenant, in the first place, the purchasers had not inducted him and therefore owed no obligations towards him, whether legal or equitable; and in the second place, they were not seeking to eject him or disturb his tenancy but on the other hand had acknowledged him as a tenant by suing him for rent. But apart from these considerations, it seems to me that it is not possible to overlay sec. 53 of the Revenue Sales Act with supposed principles of equity and thereby to add to the statute. If fraud had been alleged and found, it might have been held to have vitiated the proceeding and to reduce the sale to a mere private sale; but in the absence of fraud, there can be no warrant for travelling beyond what the statute provides. If fraud had been alleged and found, it might have been held to have vitiated the proceeding and to reduce the sale to a mere private sale; but in the absence of fraud, there can be no warrant for travelling beyond what the statute provides. Clearly, the Act contemplates purchase by a defaulting co-proprietor and sec. 53 gives certain rights to encumbrancers, under-tenure-holders and sub-tenants against a co-sharer purchaser. As the Judicial Committee pointed out in the case of Tarini Charan Sarkar v. Bishnu Chand 22 C. W. N. 505 (1917), there is no reason why those rights should be increased against the purchaser because of the motive which led him to cause the sale or make the purchase; and therefore even in a case where a sale is caused and the property re-purchased for the purpose of avoiding encumbrances, the penalties would be only those provided for in the section. 43. In the result, the position, in my view, is that the Plaintiff had a right to annul the under-tenure; that it was annulled when the certificate proceedings were instituted; and that since then there has been a relationship of landlord and tenant between the Plaintiff as the benamdar for the Kumud and Jugal groups and the Defendant. 44. The appeals must therefore be allowed in part. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are accordingly set aside and the Plaintiff's claim for rent, with respect to all the jamas, decreed for the period subsequent to the 15th April, 1936, i.e., for the years 1343 to 1345 B. S. with appropriate cess and damages. There will thus be a decree for Rs. 45-9-3 pies in S. A. No. 42; for Rs. 413-14 as in S. A. No. 43; for Rs. 234-10-9 pies in S. A. No. 44; for Rs. 557-3 as in S. A. No. 45; for Rs. 318-8-10 pies in S. A. No. 46; and for Rs. 13-14-9 pies in S. A. No. 47 with interest at 6 per cent, per annum till realization in each case. 45. In view of the circumstances of the case, I direct that each party will bear his own costs throughout. Leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. In my opinion this is a matter fit to be further considered. The leave asked for is accordingly granted.