JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Kaul, J. - This revision application is preferred against an appellate order of the District Judge, Luck- now, passed in exercise of insolvency jurisdiction. 2. Badloo insolvent was employed with the East Indian Railway. On his retirement from service he received from the railway authorities Rs. 6,788-9-0 representing his provident fund and gratuity money. The learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Luck- now, who had adjudicated Badloo insolvent, directed him to deposit this money in Court. It was contended on behalf of Badloo that the money in question did not vest in the official receiver u/s 28 sub Section (5) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Reliance in support of this contention was placed on Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Judge, Small Cause Court, repelled the contention. Badloo appealed to the District Judge who accepted the appeal so far as it related to the sum of Rs. 2,100, representing Badloo's gratuity, but confirmed the decision of the lower Court as regards the provident fund money, Rs. 4,688-9-0. Badloo comes in revision. 3. The matter relating to the gratuity money is not before us. The revision relates only to the provident fund money. There is an authority of this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar v. R. J. DeCruze (1927) 1 Luck 313 in support of the view taken by the District Judge that the provident fund money due to an insolvent from a Railway Company ceases to retain its character of a compulsory deposit as defined by Section 2 (4) of the Provident Funds Act IX of 18*7 after it is paid over to the insolvent. The appellant's learned Counsel tried to persuade us to hold that Gauri Shankar's case was not rightly decided and asked us to refer the matter to a larger Bench for consideration. We have given very careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel but are unable to accept his con- tention. It will appear that the view taken by the Bench of this Court in I. L. R. 1 Luc, 313 is now accepted to be the correct interpretation of the law in almost all the High Courts. The learned Judges constituting the Bench dissented from the view taken in Nagindas Bhukhandas v. Ghelanbhai Golabdas (1920) 44 Bom 673 which was based on the English decision in Cohen v. Mitchell (1890) Q B D 262. The learned Judges constituting the Bench dissented from the view taken in Nagindas Bhukhandas v. Ghelanbhai Golabdas (1920) 44 Bom 673 which was based on the English decision in Cohen v. Mitchell (1890) Q B D 262. These cases were strongly relied on by the petitioner's counsel. In the Bombay High Court also Rangnekar and Divatia JJ. have lately interpreted the law in the same way as was done by this Court in Gauri Shan- kar's case and held in Walchand Molaji Marwari v. Charlee A Williams A I R 1935 Bom 393 that as long as a compulsory deposit is in the hands of the Government or the institution which keeps and manages the fund, it is exempt from attachment under any decree, and neither does it vest in the Official Assignee nor ia a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure. But after the amount standing to the credit of a subscriber is paid to him and comes into his hands, it ceases to retain its character of a compulsory deposit and it becomes his property, with which he can deal in any manner he likes, and is liable therefore to be attached in execution of a decree against him, or against which his creditors can proceed; and, for the same reasons, it must vest in the receiver, if he is adjudicated an insolvent, either before or after such acquisition of it by him. This was a case decided under the Provident Funds Act of 1925. They relied on Gauri Shankar's case in support of their view. Justice Rangnekar was unable to agree with the decision in the earlier Bombay Case ILR 44 Bom. 673. This was a case decided under the Provident Funds Act of 1925. They relied on Gauri Shankar's case in support of their view. Justice Rangnekar was unable to agree with the decision in the earlier Bombay Case ILR 44 Bom. 673. The decision in this Bombay case was given after the Provident Fund Act No. 19 of 1925 had some into force, In the present Act a compulsory deposit is defined as follows: Compulsory deposit' means a subscription to, or deposit in, a Provident Fund which under the rules of the Fund, is not, until the happening of some specified contingency, repayable on demand otherwise than for the purpose of the payment of premia in respect of a policy of life insurance (or the payment of subscription or premia in respect of a family pension fund), and includes any contribution and any interest or increment which has accrued under the rules of the Fund on any such subscription, deposit or contribution, and also any such subscription, deposit, contribution, interest or increment, remaining to the credit of the subscriber or depositor alter the happening of any such contingency. 4. There is no material difference between this and the definition of this expression in the Act of 1897 which would affect the point under consideration. In N. Ranganayaki Ammal v. Official Assignee of Madras AIR 1931 Mad 797 Ramesam and Cornish JJ. dissented from the decision in I. L. R. 44 Bom. 673 and held that a compulsory deposit e.g., a Provident Fund deposit is only a deposit so long as it remains in the fund and not after it has been paid over to the person to whose credit it has hitherto stood. Where an insolvent has handed over his Provident Fund deposit to his wife, they said such payment being a voluntary transfer cannot previl against the Official Assignee and the Official Assignee is entitled to an order against the wife that she should pay down that amount to him. Gauri Shankar's case decided by this Court was relied on by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in this case. The same view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Baramdeo Pandey v. Mrs. Fay Smith (1910) CWN 637 and Nazar Mohammad Khan v. J. O. Browne AIR 1942 Cal 294. Pollok and Digby JJ. Gauri Shankar's case decided by this Court was relied on by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in this case. The same view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Baramdeo Pandey v. Mrs. Fay Smith (1910) CWN 637 and Nazar Mohammad Khan v. J. O. Browne AIR 1942 Cal 294. Pollok and Digby JJ. of the Nagpur High Court also took the same view and relied on Gauri Shankar's case decided by this Court. (See Mrs. A. T. Marten v. R. K. Dutt Manager Bengali Store AIR 1938 Nag 498. In Devi Prasad v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (1918) 45 All 554. Deniels J. refused to go to the length of holding, as was done in Nagindas Bhu- khandas v. Ghelabhai Gulabdas2, where it was held that the deposit was protected even after payment to the subscriber. The matter has been considered and commented upon by Sir Dinshah Mulla in his Law of Insolvency (Tagore Law Lectures, 1929) at pages 345-46 where l.L. R. ILuc, 313 was relied on as having laid down the correct law. The learned author opined that the view taken in ILR 44 Bom. 673 and in jagdish Narain Singh v. Msr. Ramsakal Kuar (1929) 8 Pat 478 where Cohen v. Mitchell was followed was erroneous. 5. Apart from authority it would appear that the occurrence of the words "repay- able on demand" and "until the happening of some precise contingency" make it clear that the money is a compulsory deposit onl y so long as it remains with the institution. u/s 28 (5) of the insolvency Act all after acquired property of the insolvent vests forthwith in the Official Receiver of the Court. It cannot be disputed that oace the provident fund money is paid over to the insolvent it falls within the category of property acquired by him after his adjudication. Accordingly as soon as it is paid to him it vests in the receiver. The protection contemplated by Section 3 of the Provident Fuads Act extends only to a compulsory doposit. Oace the money ceases to retain that character the protection comes to an aid. Both on authority and on principle wa are satisfied that the view taken in Gauri Sharker's case by this Court correctly interprets the law. The protection contemplated by Section 3 of the Provident Fuads Act extends only to a compulsory doposit. Oace the money ceases to retain that character the protection comes to an aid. Both on authority and on principle wa are satisfied that the view taken in Gauri Sharker's case by this Court correctly interprets the law. In view of the conclusion arrived at by us the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.