JUDGMENT B. K. Mukherjea, J. - This appeal is on behalf of some of the contesting defendants in a suit commenced by the plaintiff for recovery of khas possession of the lands described in the schedule to the plaint, on establishment of his title as purchaser in a certificate sale. The facts material for our present purposes lie within a brief compass and may be stated as follows: The lands in suit appertain to Khatian No. 103 of Balipara Mouza in the district of Bakargunj and were originally held by one Abdul and his cosharers as occupancy raiyats. The landlords filed a certificate for rent due in respect of the holding, and in execution of the certificate the lands were sold and purchased by the plaintiff on 9th August 1937. After his purchase the plaintiff, it is alleged, went to take possession of the lands but was resisted by defendants 1 to 5 who set up their rights as under-raiyats under the occupancy jote. The plaintiff thereupon served notices upon the defendants under S. 167, Ben. Ten. Act, and as they still refused to vacate, the present suit was brought. The suit was contested by defendants 2 to 5 and their contentions were: (1) that the plaintiff was a mere benamidar of the certificate-debtor and hence was not entitled to sue; (2) that the sale had not the effect of a rent sale; (3) that no notice was served on the defendants under S. 167, Ben. Ten. Act; and (4) that the interest of the defendants as under-raiyats with right of occupancy was a protected interest within the meaning of S. 160 (d), Ben. Ten. Act, and it was not liable to be annulled. 2. The Munsif who heard the suit overruled the first three contentions of the defendants but gave effect to the last one. He held that as the provision of S. 48G (3), Bengal Tenancy Act, was not retrospective in its operation, it was not attracted to the present case where the under-raiyats had acquired occupancy rights long before 1928. The rights of the parties, it was said, would be governed by the law as it stood prior to 1928, and under the old law, an occupancy right even acquired by an under-raiyat under a custom, came within the definition of "protected interest" as laid down in S. 160 (d), Bengal Tenancy Act. The rights of the parties, it was said, would be governed by the law as it stood prior to 1928, and under the old law, an occupancy right even acquired by an under-raiyat under a custom, came within the definition of "protected interest" as laid down in S. 160 (d), Bengal Tenancy Act. The result was that the suit was dismissed. Against this decision the plaintiff took an appeal to the Court of the District Judge of Bakargunj and the defendants also filed cross-objections. The Subordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, affirmed the decision of the Munsif on the first three points, but reversing it on the fourth or the last point, allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit The defendants have now come up on appeal to this Court. The case before us was presented with great ability and thoroughness by the learned Advocates on both sides and we are indebted to them for the valuable assistance we received. Mr. Roy appearing for the appellants made no attempt to support the appeal on the ground upon which the learned Munsif based his decision. It is conceded that the view taken by the Munsif is not correct and that if the sale were one under the Bengal Tenancy Act, the provisions of S. 48G (3) of the Act would certainly be attracted and the under-raiyats, even though they had occupancy rights, could not claim protection against the rent sale purchaser. Mr. Roy's contention is that as the sale in the present case was in execution of a certificate for rent under the Public Demands Recovery Act, the rights of the purchaser would have to be determined under the provisions of S. 20, Public Demands Recovery Act. The rights of a purchaser in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect of a tenure or holding are thus set out in sub-s. (3) of Section 20: Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-S. (1) in areas in which Chap. The rights of a purchaser in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect of a tenure or holding are thus set out in sub-s. (3) of Section 20: Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-S. (1) in areas in which Chap. 14, Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is in force, where a tenure or holding is sold in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the tenure or holding shall, subject to the provisions of S. 22 of that Act, pass to the purchaser, subject to the interest defined in that Chapter as 'protected interest' but with power to annul the interest defined in that Chapter as 'incumbrances'. Sub-section (3) of S. 20, Public Demands Recovery Act, says Mr. Roy, came into force in 1913, when the present S. 48G (3) was not in the Bengal Tenancy Act at all. Under the law, as it then stood, any right of occupancy even acquired by an under-raiyat under custom came within the definition of " protected interest" as defined in S. 160, Bengal Tenancy Act. It is argued that the subsequent change in the Bengal Tenancy Act, which was introduced by the amending Act of 1928, could not be read into and incorporated in the Public Demands Recovery Act. Mr. Roy attempts to support this argument on a two-fold ground. In the first place, he says that the Public Demands Recovery Act is a self-contained statute which incorporates by reference some of the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as they stood in the year 1913, when this Act came into force. The provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, thus incorporated, must be read in the sense which they bore at that time. Any addition to or alteration of these provisions made subsequent to the year 1913, could not be incorporated in the Public Demands Recovery Act unless they were made expressly applicable to the latter Act. The second ground, put forward by Mr. Roy, is that S. 48G (3) occurs in Chap. 7 and not in Chap. 14, Bengal Tenancy Act, which alone is referred to in S. 20 (3), Public Demands Recovery Act, and even if it be proper to look at other provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act except those contained in Chap. The second ground, put forward by Mr. Roy, is that S. 48G (3) occurs in Chap. 7 and not in Chap. 14, Bengal Tenancy Act, which alone is referred to in S. 20 (3), Public Demands Recovery Act, and even if it be proper to look at other provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act except those contained in Chap. 14 to ascertain the meaning of the expression "protected interest," it is not permissible to refer to S. 48G (3) which was introduced by way of exception or proviso to S. 160 of Chap. 14. It has not been and cannot be disputed that the Public Demands Recovery Act is a self-contained statute which is complete in itself and although some of the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which, it adopts, are not set out at length, but have been merely incorporated by reference, it is perfectly clear that the effect is the same as if these specific provisions were repeated in the Act itself. It is also not disputed that under the law, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1928, the expression 'occupancy right' occurring in S. 160 (d) embraced all kinds of occupancy rights including the right of occupancy which an under-raiyat could acquire under custom: vide 36 C. W. N. 400 Sonatan v. Daulat Gazi ('32) 19 A. I. R. 1932 Cal. 571 : 141 I. C. 702: 36 C. W. N. 400. The question now is whether the change introduced in 1928 by section 48G (3) which definitely lays down that the right of occupancy acquired by an under-raiyat shall not be a protected interest would be regarded as incorporated in S. 20 (3), Public Demands Recovery Act. Now it is a well-settled rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second: vide Craies on Statute Law, Edn. 4, p. 355. In 58 I. A. 259 Secy. of State v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society, Ltd. ('31) 18 A. I. R. 1931 P. C. 149 : 59 Cal. 4, p. 355. In 58 I. A. 259 Secy. of State v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society, Ltd. ('31) 18 A. I. R. 1931 P. C. 149 : 59 Cal. 55 : 58 I. A. 259 : 132 I. C. 748 (P.C.) it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that it was not less logical to hold that where certain provisions of an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not made expressly applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectively without the addition. 3. In that case the question arose whether an appeal would lie to the Privy Council from a decision of the High Court of Calcutta upon an appeal from an award of the Tribunal appointed under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, assessing compensation in respect of land acquired under the provisions of the Act. Under the Calcutta Improvement Act (Bengal Act 5 [V] of 1911) as modified by Act 18 [XVIII] of the same year, an award of the Tribunal is final and there is only a restricted right of appeal to the High Court within the limits laid down in the modifying Act. No appeal to the Privy Council, therefore, is permissible under the Calcutta Improvement Act itself. 4. In support of the competency of the appeal taken to the Privy Council in the above case it was pointed out by the appellant that the Calcutta Improvement Act incorporated by reference, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which is a general Act, applicable to the whole of British India. By an amendment made in 1921 a new sub-section, namely, sub-s. (2) was added to S. 26, Land Acquisition Act, under which every award of the Court was to be deemed a "decree" and the statement of the grounds of the award a "judgment" within the definitions of "decree" and "judgment" respectively contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The amending Act also substituted for S. 54, Land Acquisition Act, a new section which gave in terms a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from any decree passed by the High Court on appeal from an award of the Court. The amending Act also substituted for S. 54, Land Acquisition Act, a new section which gave in terms a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from any decree passed by the High Court on appeal from an award of the Court. It was argued that by reason of these amendments, which must be deemed to be incorporated in the Calcutta Improvement Act, an appeal would lie from the judgment of the High Court passed on appeal from an award of the Improvement Tribunal. This contention was negatived by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. Their Lordships held that the new section 54, Land Acquisition Act, was of no avail to the appellant, inasmuch as the operation of that section in its original form was excluded by S. 71, Calcutta Improvement Act, As regards sub-s. (2) added to S. 26, Land Acquisition Act, it was held that as it was not a part of the Land Acquisition Act, at the time when the Calcutta Improvement Act was passed, it could not be deemed to be incorporated in the latter, unless expressly made applicable to it, provided, of course, it was not impossible for the Local Act to function effectively without the addition. In our opinion these principles apply with full force to the facts of the present case. It is to be noted that in the earlier Public Demands Recovery Act of 1895, which was repealed by the Act of 1913, there was no provision corresponding to that embodied in S. 20 (3) of the present Act. A certificate sale, even if it was in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent, had the effect of merely transferring the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtor. When the present Act was introduced in 1913, obviously the Legislature intended that the purchaser at a sale in execution of a certificate for arrears of rent in those districts, where Chap. 14, Ben. Ten. Act, was in force, should have the same rights as a rent sale purchaser had under Chap. 14, Ben. Ten. Act. In other words, he would get the tenure or holding subject to all protected interests as defined in S. 160, Ben. Ten. Act, and with power to annul all incumbrances as were specified in S. 161. At that time, as said above, the occupancy right of an under-raiyat was a protected interest. 14, Ben. Ten. Act. In other words, he would get the tenure or holding subject to all protected interests as defined in S. 160, Ben. Ten. Act, and with power to annul all incumbrances as were specified in S. 161. At that time, as said above, the occupancy right of an under-raiyat was a protected interest. In 1928 the Bengal Tenancy Act was amended and section 48G (3), which is a new provision introduced by the amending Act, not in Chap. 14 but in Chap. 7 of the Act, lays down that the occupancy right acquired by an under-raiyat shall not be deemed to be a protected interest. There is nothing to suggest that when the Public Demands Recovery Act was passed in 1913 with certain provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act incorporated in it, the Legislature intended to bind themselves to any future addition that might be made in the Bengal Tenancy Act. It cannot also be contended that S. 20 (8), Public Demands Recovery Act, cannot function effectively without the addition of the provisions contained in S. 48 (G) (3) of the present Bengal Tenancy Act. It may be that the purchaser at a certificate sale would not have the right of ejecting an under-raiyat having occupancy rights. But the procedure for sale in the two Acts is not identical and there is nothing inherently improper if a certificate purchaser is not allowed to have the extended rights of a purchaser at a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act. If it was the intention of the Legislature that S. 48 (G) (3), Ben. Ten. Act, should be read into S. 20 (3), Public Demands Recovery Act, nothing prevented it from expressing its intention in clear words. We think, therefore, that the first contention raised by Mr. Roy is sound and must prevail. 5. Having regard to our decision on this point, the second ground, raised by Mr. Roy, does not arise for consideration at all. It remains for us to consider two other points which have been raised by Mr. Guha in support of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, though the points were decided by the Subordinate Judge against his clients. The first point is that as the under-raiyati in favour of the defendants' predecessor was created in contravention of the provision of S. 85, Ben. Ten. Guha in support of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, though the points were decided by the Subordinate Judge against his clients. The first point is that as the under-raiyati in favour of the defendants' predecessor was created in contravention of the provision of S. 85, Ben. Ten. Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1928, the under-raiyati lease was not binding on the landlord of the raiyat and no occupancy right acquired by such under-raiyat would amount to a protected interest against the latter. This proposition of law, which is accepted by a series of decisions of this Court cannot certainly be disputed: vide 28 Cal. 205 Peary Mohan v. Badul Chandra ('01) 28 Cal. 205, 19 C.W.N. 412 Ashutosh Singha v. Banomali Sain ('15) 2 AIR 1915 Cal. 574 : 21 I. C. 104 : 10 C. W. N. 412, 31 C. W. N. 580 Jnanendra Chandra v. Royman ('27)14 Jnanendra Chandra Ghose Vs. Royman Sheikh, AIR 1927 Cal 513 . But we do not think that this principle is of any assistance to the present plaintiff. In the case before us, the sublease was not by a registered document and consequently it could be held that it was not binding on the landlord of the raiyat. As the landlord can ignore the under-raiyati interest, any occupancy right gained by the under-raiyat would also be not binding on the landlord and could not be availed of against him as a protected interest, if the purchaser at a rent sale was the landlord himself. But here the purchaser was a stranger and against all the world excepting the landlord of the raiyat, the under-raiyati interest should be deemed to be a valid one. In none of the cases mentioned above was the rent Bale purchaser a stranger and there is no authority in support of the view that a stranger purchaser at a rent sale is not called upon to annul an under-raiyati as an incumbrance under S. 161, Ben. Ten. Act. This contention of Mr. Guha, therefore, cannot be accepted. 6. The other ground taken by Mr. Guha is that the finding of the Courts below that the defendants as under-raiyats had acquired occupancy rights has been arrived at by misplacing the burden of proof and without due consideration of the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff. Ten. Act. This contention of Mr. Guha, therefore, cannot be accepted. 6. The other ground taken by Mr. Guha is that the finding of the Courts below that the defendants as under-raiyats had acquired occupancy rights has been arrived at by misplacing the burden of proof and without due consideration of the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff. The under-raiyati was created here by a kabuliat, dated 13th April 1904. The kabuliat was for a period of nine years and was executed by one Rahimulla. The District Settlement Records, finally published between 1904 to 1910, do not show that Rahimulla acquired any occupancy right by custom. Rahimulla died some years after that and subsequent to his death there was a Deara Survey of the lands of the disputed locality, in connection with which the record-of-rights was prepared; and in the Deara Survey Records, the name of Rahimulla's heirs appeared as under-raiyats with rights of occupancy. It may be, as Mr. Guha says, that the Deara Survey Records do not raise the same presumption that attaches to the C. S. Records under S. 103 (B), Ben. Ten. Act, but at the same time it cannot be disputed that the entries in the record-of-rights prepared for Deara purposes are a valuable piece of evidence under S. 35, Evidence Act. The Court of appeal below was apparently not satisfied that the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to outweigh the entries in the Deara Records, and in our opinion there is no error of law that vitiates the finding of the Subordinate Judge. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. The defendants would get their costs in the Courts below. There would be no order for costs in this Court. Sharpe, J. 7. I agree.