Judgement Appeal (No. 61 of 1942) from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court (December 1, 1939) which affirmed an order of the District Judge of Unao (August 6, 1936) who had decided that the appellant bank was not entitled to share rateably under s. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a distribution of the assets held by the court of a judgment-debtor, one Shanti Lal. The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee The points involved in this appeal turned on the true construction of s. 73, sub-s. I, of the Code of Civil Procedure (V. of 1908) which is in the following terms— "Where assets are held by a, court and more persons than one " have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to " the court for the execution of decrees for the payment of " money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have " not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting " the costs of realisation, shall be rateably distributed among " all such persons." It was common ground that at all material times there was held by the District Court, Unao, assets of one Shanti Lal amounting to a sum of Rs. 49,166 or thereabouts, and that before the receipt of those assets various decree-holders had made application to the court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the said Shanti Lal and had not obtained satisfaction thereof. They accordingly claimed to be entitled to a rateable distribution of the said sum under the above section. Their claims were allowed by the District Judge, Unao, who by an order, dated August 6, 1936, ordered that the balance of the amount in deposit (after satisfying in full a claim of the Secretary of State for India) should be rateably distributed among the holders of seventeen decrees. The present appellant had made an application for the execution of the order hereinafter mentioned, and had not obtained satisfaction thereof. It according claimed a share in the rateable distribution, its claim being based on an order which had been made in its favour under s. 186, sub-s. 1, of the Indian Companies Act (VII. The present appellant had made an application for the execution of the order hereinafter mentioned, and had not obtained satisfaction thereof. It according claimed a share in the rateable distribution, its claim being based on an order which had been made in its favour under s. 186, sub-s. 1, of the Indian Companies Act (VII. of 1913) which runs thus "The court may, at any time after making a winding up order, make an order on any contributory for the time being settled on the list of contributories to pay, in manner directed by the order, any money due from him or from the estate of the person whom he represents to the company exclusive of any money payable by him or the estate by virtue of any call in pursuance of this Act." The order in favour of the appellant, dated March 27, 1935, was made by the District Judge, Lahore, in the following terms — "Upon the application of the official liquidators of the above-named company and upon reading orders passed thereon to-day, it is ordered under s. 186 read with s. 160 of the Act that Shanti Lal son of Lala Jairam Das, c/o Lala Kundan Lal, Eastern Electric Works, Cawnpore, do pay to the official liquidators of the said company the sum of Rs. 1,37,557/10/3 (one lac, thirty-seven thousand, five hundred and fifty-seven, annas ten and pies three) only with costs due from his late father Lala Jairam Das, the original contributory in respect of a pronote dated July 1, 1928, for Rs. 1,11,500/8/-, in favour of the above said Bank, which still remains unpaid. "This order of payment may be enforced as a decree under the provisions of ss. 1,11,500/8/-, in favour of the above said Bank, which still remains unpaid. "This order of payment may be enforced as a decree under the provisions of ss. 199, 200 and 201 of the Act against the estate, if any, of the deceased contributory in the hands of " the above said Shanti Lal." That order was sent for execution to the Chief Court of Oudh, and was by that court forwarded to the District Judge, Unao, in a letter addressed by the deputy registrar of the court to the said District Judge in the following terms— "I am directed to forward to your court for execution and necessary action, the order of the District Judge in charge liquidation work at Lahore, which has been certified by this honourable court on January 27, 1936, in the case noted on the margin.” The case was described in the margin as “No. 91 of 1936., Civil Miscellaneous Application Register. In the matter of the Indian Companies Act, 7 of 1913, and of The Lyallpur Bank, Ld.(in Liquidation), Decree-holder v Lala Shanti Lal, Judgment-debtor.” Among the documents which accompanied the letter was a certificate of non-satisfaction of decree." The appellants claim to share in the rateable distribution was disallowed by the District Judge on the ground that its application for the execution of the said order was not an application for the execution of a decree for the payment of money, and that therefore the appellant could not share in the rateable distribution. An appeal to the Chief Court of Oudh (Ziaul Hasan and Yorke JJ.) was dismissed on the same ground. It was from that dismissal that the present appeal was brought. 1944. Nov. 16, 20., Khambatta for the appellant. The question is whether the provisions of s. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provide for rateable distribution of assets held in court among holders of decrees in that court, apply also to holders of orders made under s. 186, sub-s.1, of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. 1944. Nov. 16, 20., Khambatta for the appellant. The question is whether the provisions of s. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provide for rateable distribution of assets held in court among holders of decrees in that court, apply also to holders of orders made under s. 186, sub-s.1, of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. It is submitted that s. 186 of the Companies Act, and s. 199 of that Act, which provides that "All orders made by a court under this Act may be enforced in the same manner in which decrees of such court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced,” read together, make it clear that an order for the payment of money made by the court under s. 186 in liquidation proceedings, though not a decree as defined by the Civil Procedure Code, shall be enforced in the same manner as decrees made in suits are enforced. It was said below that a decree must be made in a suit, and that an application made under the Companies Act cannot be regarded as a plaint in a suit. The words "the execution of decrees for the payment of money,” in s. 73 of the Code includes an order for the payment of money made under s. 186 of the Companies Act. The decision of the Chief Court in this case followed the judgment in Mohanlal v. Bhivraj Devichand (A. I. R. ( 1934) Nag. 243.). There is a subsequent decision of the Lahore High Court, in 1941, which dissented, in this appellants favour, from the judgment in the present case and from Mohanlals case (A. I. R. ( 1934) Nag. 243.) Radhesham Beopar Co. v. Karam Chand (A. I. R. ( 1941) Lah. 273.). The payment order ought to have been held to have been placed on the same footing as any decree of a civil court, and should have been allowed to partake of the benefit under s. 73 of the Code. Quass and Hammerton for the respondent the Punjab National Bank, Ld. Looking at s. 73 of the Code alone, the appellant bank was not a, decree-holder, and accordingly it does not come within the section, which provides relief only to decree-holders. It was argued, however, that because of other sections it should be treated as though it did hold a decree. Looking at s. 73 of the Code alone, the appellant bank was not a, decree-holder, and accordingly it does not come within the section, which provides relief only to decree-holders. It was argued, however, that because of other sections it should be treated as though it did hold a decree. Of the cases, Tarya Ram v. Popat Ram (A. I. R. ( 1918) Lah. 211.) is not in the respondents favour, while Mohanlal v. Bhivraj Devichand (A. I. R. ( 1934) Nag. 243.), so far as it goes, is, and the judgment of the Chief Court in the present case follows it. Modern Chemical Works, Ld. v. Manmohan Nath Dar (A. I. R. ( 1935) Lah. 975) follows a number of English cases which lay down clearly that an order under a similar provision of the English Companies Act is not a judgment. Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidators, Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. (( 1932) L. R. 60 I. A. 13.) not being a suit, no order made in it could be a decree. No Indian court, until Radhesham Beopar Co., Okara (in Liquidation) v. Karam Chand (( 1941) I. L. R. 23 Lah. 267.) has dealt with the matter on the basis that the order can be executed as a decree and so enable the holder to come within s. 73 of the Code. The Beopar Co.s case (I. L. R. 23 Lah. 267.) is a plain dissent from the present one. Some importance should be attached to the difference between a person holding something equivalent to a judgment and something which can be enforced as a judgment. [Reference was made to the Civil Court Manual, 6th ed., vol.1, p. 438.] The view taken by Sir Basil Scott (see Mullas Code of Civil Procedure, 11th ed., p. 290) is much too narrow; the correct view appears on p. 292 of Mulla. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment under appeal is right and should be affirmed. No reply was required. 1945. Jan. 18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment under appeal is right and should be affirmed. No reply was required. 1945. Jan. 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, who stated the facts set out above and continued The ground on which the judgments of the courts in India were based was the same in each court, namely, that an order made under s. 186 of the Companies Act did not come within the definition of the word "decree" contained in s. 2, cl.2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, that a holder of such an order could not fulfil the requirement of s. 73 of being within the class of persons who had " made application to the court for the execution of "decrees." The courts in coming to their conclusions were following the decision which had been reached in Mohanlal v. Bhivraj Devichand (A. I. R. ( 1934) Nag. 243.). From any point of view this result, if right in law, would appear strange. It would mean that a company resorting to the short and simple procedure against a contributory which s. 186 invites it to adopt, would be depriving itself of an effective method of enforcing its claim which would have been available had it resorted to the longer and more elaborate procedure of a suit. In their Lordships opinion, however, the courts in India have, in the present case, taken too narrow a view. The strange result indicated above is avoided if and when s. 36 of the Code and s. 199 of the Companies Act, or either of them, are, or is, taken into consideration. In their Lordships opinion, however, the courts in India have, in the present case, taken too narrow a view. The strange result indicated above is avoided if and when s. 36 of the Code and s. 199 of the Companies Act, or either of them, are, or is, taken into consideration. Section 199 of the Companies Act provides "All orders made by a court under this Act may be enforced in the same manner in which decrees of such court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced." The effect of this section is, in their Lordships opinion that a company which holds an order made under s. 186, sub-s. 1, may resort to any procedure for its enforcement which would be open to it if the order had been a decree made in a suit, with the result that the method of enforcement provided by s. 73 of the Code is open to the company, and an application by the company for its execution must rank as an application for the execution of a decree for the purposes of that section. Section 36 of the Code operates in the same way. By that section it is enacted— "The provisions of this Code relating to the execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders." This section appears to their Lordships to enact that s. 73 is to be deemed to apply to the execution of an order made under s. 186 of the Companies Act; and if this be so, an application made to a court for its execution must, their Lordships think, be treated as, or deemed to be, an application for the execution of a decree, notwithstanding the somewhat curious fact that, although the company is a "decree-holder" as defined by the Code, it would appear not to hold a decree as so defined. While there appears to have been a divergence of view in India on this question, their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the views expressed by Young C.J. and Blacker J. in Radhesham Beopar Co. v. Karam Chand (A. I. R. ( 1941) Lah. 273). While there appears to have been a divergence of view in India on this question, their Lordships find themselves in agreement with the views expressed by Young C.J. and Blacker J. in Radhesham Beopar Co. v. Karam Chand (A. I. R. ( 1941) Lah. 273). In the course of the argument before the Board it was suggested that even if an application for the execution of the order under the Companies Act must be treated as, or deemed to be, an application for the execution of a decree under s. 73, sub-s. 1, of the Code, nevertheless Shanti Lal could not be said to be "the same judgment-debtor" as the judgment-debtors against whom the said seventeen decrees had been passed. But an examination of the record before their Lordships showed that the seventeen decrees must have been, and were in fact, treated by the District Judge as decrees passed against Shanti Lal, who was the person against whom the order under the Companies Act was made. In these circumstances no question relating to the "sameness" of the appellants judgment-debtor can arise on this appeal. Their Lordships accordingly refrain from expressing any opinion on a question as to which, apparently, different views have prevailed in India. In the result, their Lordships are of opinion that the claim of the appellant to share in the rateable distribution of the fund ought to have been admitted. The appeal must therefore be allowed, the orders of the Chief Court and the District Judge discharged, and the matter remitted to the District Judge to adjust the rights of the parties in accordance with this judgment. The costs ordered by the Chief Court to be paid by the present appellant must (if already paid) be repaid to the appellant by the opposite parties in that court, Nos.1 (i. to v.) 11 and 12 and No. 13, and those opposite parties must pay the costs of the appellant of its application to the Chief Court. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellants costs of this appeal must be paid by the respondent The Punjab National Bank, Ld.