JUDGMENT Sharpe, J. - The facts which have given rise to this reference are briefly as follows. On 15th April 1944 a rent suit No. 4226 of 1944 was instituted in the Court of the Munsif, Nilphamari, and the usual processes were issued. Defendant 1 in the suit died on 4th September 1944 and on 1st December 1944 an application was made for substitution of his heirs. One of the heirs of the deceased defendant was a minor, and in order that a guardian-ad-litem might be appointed, the application had to be supported by an affidavit under the provisions of O. 32, R. 3 (3), Civil P. C. The plaintiff's lawyer, however, declined to stamp the affidavit with the usual court-fee of Re. 1, contending that there was no legal authority for its payment or realisation, and the Commissioner of Affidavits refused therefore to accept it. The matter was referred to the learned Munsif, who, after hearing the pleader for the plaintiff and the local Government pleader entertained some doubt whether the rule which prescribes the levying of a fee of rupee one to be paid in court-fee stamps on affidavits is legal. The question which has been submitted for decision therefore is : Is the levy of Rupee one on affidavits filed in the lower Courts legal ? 2. We Have carefully considered the reference submitted by the learned Munsif and have also had the benefit of hearing the learned senior Government pleader of the High Court to whom notice of the question was given. The learned Munsif is certainly correct in his view that there is no authority for the levy of the fee on affidavits under the Stamp Act or the Court-fees Act. The authority is derived from R. 704 of the current High Court Civil Rules and Orders which have been issued under the powers conferred by S. 107, Government of India Act, 1915, corresponding to S. 224, Government of India Act, 1935. The powers conferred by those two sections are similar, but the Act of 1935 omitted the condition of the earlier Act requiring previous approval in the case of the High Court, Calcutta, of the Governor-General in Council and substituted approval of the Governor. The powers conferred by those two sections are similar, but the Act of 1935 omitted the condition of the earlier Act requiring previous approval in the case of the High Court, Calcutta, of the Governor-General in Council and substituted approval of the Governor. Rule 704 of the present Civil Rules and Orders, in so far as it authorises the levy of a fee of rupee one on affidavits and its payment by means of a court-fee stamp, is merely a reproduction of R. 7 of chap. VI of the previous G. R. & C. O's (Civil) and this, in turn, was based on a Circular Order of 1878 issued, with the prior sanction of the Governor-General in Council under the powers conferred by S. 15 of the High Courts Act of 1861. The provisions of that section in so far as concerns the conferment of powers relevant to the matter now under consideration are substantially the same as those conferred by S. 224, Government of India Act, 1935. The powers conferred by S. 224 relevant to the decision of the present question are to : (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts;.... (d) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys, and all clerks and officers of Courts. 3. We have not been able to discover any ruling directly applicable to the question now under consideration, but the decision in 45 Mad. 849 Mahomed Ishack v. Mahomed Moideen ('22) 9 A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 421 : 45 Mad. 849 : 70 I. C. 813, to which reference has been made by the learned Munsif, affords some support for the view that a fee of the nature levied on affidavits can be authorised under the powers conferred by (b) and not by (d) above mentioned. 421 : 45 Mad. 849 : 70 I. C. 813, to which reference has been made by the learned Munsif, affords some support for the view that a fee of the nature levied on affidavits can be authorised under the powers conferred by (b) and not by (d) above mentioned. In that case, the question for decision was the proper court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal against a final order passed by a single Judge sitting on the original side of the Madras High Court, and it was contended that as the fees to be paid on such a memorandum of appeal were prescribed, not by the Court-fees Act, but by rules framed by the High Court, the Judge to whom the dispute as to the proper fees had been referred was not competent to decide the matter under S. 5, Court-fees Act. It was held in that decision that the High Court can make rules for the imposition and collection of court-fees in proceedings on the original side of the Court by virtue of the power to issue general rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Courts conferred by S. 15, High Courts Charter Act; 1861, and the argument was accepted that the power to make regulations for procedure necessarily includes imposition of fees and the collection of them, and that the Court can collect the fees only through its proper officers. 4. We think on the whole that the view of the learned Munsif is correct that fees of the nature now under consideration which are credited to Government do not strictly come within "fees allowed to.... clerks and officers of Courts" which may be imposed by (d) of S. 224, Government of India Act, 1935, and this appears also to have been the view taken by the Madras High Court in the decision to which we have just referred. clerks and officers of Courts" which may be imposed by (d) of S. 224, Government of India Act, 1935, and this appears also to have been the view taken by the Madras High Court in the decision to which we have just referred. At the same time, it was held in that decision that "the fee leviable on an appeal is the fee payable for the time being to the officers of the High Court by virtue of the High Court Charter Act directly" so as to bring such fees within S. 3, Court-fees Act, and we notice that the fees authorised by (d) of S. 224 are those to be "allowed" to officers of Courts which does not necessarily mean that such fees have actually got to be made over to those officers for the particular items of work for the performance of which they are prescribed. We consider it probable that the original idea underlying the powers conferred by what is now (d) of S. 224 was that such fees would be retained by the officers who did the work, and it is only when in the course of time those officers became salaried officers, the imposition of the fee on affidavits was continued to form as it were a fund, or contribution to the revenue out of which such salaries could be paid. If that view be correct, it might, we think, be contended that such imposition was not entirely outside the spirit and letter of the powers conferred by S. 224 (d), Government of India Act, 1935. 5. However that may be, we see no adequate reason for differing from the view of the Madras High Court that authority for the levy and collection of fees payable, not to the clerks and officers of Courts as per requisites, but to its salaried officers for credit to Government may be given by the powers conferred by (b) of S. 224, Government of India Act, 1935. The levy of the fee of rupee one for affidavits has the sanction of long standing practice which has never, so far as we are aware, been previously challenged in any case, and we do not think it will be straining the language of cl. (b) of that section too far to hold that the power to "issue general rules.... The levy of the fee of rupee one for affidavits has the sanction of long standing practice which has never, so far as we are aware, been previously challenged in any case, and we do not think it will be straining the language of cl. (b) of that section too far to hold that the power to "issue general rules.... for regulating the practice and procedure of such Courts" enables the High Court to prescribe such a fee to be paid in court-fee stamps for the performance, by such of its officers as may be so empowered, of such specific duties in connection with the swearing of affidavits as have been enjoined by the present Civil Rules and Orders. For these reasons, we think the question which has been referred for our opinion should be answered in the affirmative and we answer it accordingly. B.K. Mukherjea J. 6. I agree.