JUDGMENT Thomas, C.J. and Ghulam Hasan, J. - A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the respondents to the competency of the appeal. 2. A preliminary decree for partition was passed in 1935 in favour of the appellant decreeing a one-fifth share in c 3 tain property, This (decree was upheld in appeal by this Court in 1938 and leave to appeal to Privy Council was dismissed on the 18th March, 1940. On the 25th March, 1940, the appellant filed an application before the Civil Judge of Sitapur praying that accounting should be done from the year 1923, since the defendant No. 1 held the position of the karta till the date of accounting in respect of money and whatever sum of money may be found due as a result of the accounting, the share of the appellant to the extent of one-fifth be delivered to him. The appellant further prayed that a decree absolute be prepared. Certain objections were filed by the respondents. The defendant, the accounting party, admitted that he was liable to accounting from 1923 till 1935, the date of the decree, but denied his liability since the latter date as the appellant himself began to mike collections according to his one-fifth share. The learned Civil Judge after framing issues found upon the evidence that the plaintiff had been miking collections from 1935 onwards. Accordingly he ordered that /accounting of the shares be made through a Commissioner from 1923 to 1935 only. The prayer as regards the accounting from 1935 onwards was refused, This order was passed on the 29th October, 1912. Against this order the appellant filed what he described as an execution cf Jecree appeal and valued it at Rs. 26,000 paying a court-fee of Rs. 5 only. 3. It in conceded that the order under appeal was not passed in course of execution proceedings "because the final decree for partition had yet to be made. 4. It may be mentioned that since the passing of that order the final decree has been passed on the 14th December, 1943, awarding Rs. 9,361-12-7 to 'the appellant. That decree shows that the plaintiff's prayer for accounting from 1936 onwards has been refused. No appeal has been filed against the final decree. 5. 4. It may be mentioned that since the passing of that order the final decree has been passed on the 14th December, 1943, awarding Rs. 9,361-12-7 to 'the appellant. That decree shows that the plaintiff's prayer for accounting from 1936 onwards has been refused. No appeal has been filed against the final decree. 5. It is argued before us with reference to certain decisions that the order dated the 29th October, 1942, has the force of a decree as defined in Section 2(2);of the CPC and as such an appeal lies. There are two obvious objections to this argument. In the first place in a suit for partition there cm be only two decrees. The first is a preliminary decree and the second a fi.ial decree. In between these two stages, there can be no other decree passed by a Court which miy be designated as a.[decree liable to appeal. The final decree that has now been passed is no doubt appealable u/s 96 of the CPC but no appeal has been filed and the decree has become final. The appellant's Counsel at first suggested that his appeal was a miscellaneous appeal against;the order of the lower Court but he had to admit that that order is not appealable, as such an order is not provided for anywhere in the Code. If, however, the order were treated as a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2), then it would have to be appealable u/s 96 and ad valorem court-fee would be payable in respect thereof. This position learned Counsel was forced to accept with great reluctance. We do nott however, accept the contention that the order of the lower Court has the force of a decree. There can be only one decree after the passing of the preliminary decree for partition and not several decrees. Any orders which the Court may pass antecedent to the passing of the final decree for partition in course of proceedings for the preparation thereof cannot be designated a decree liable to appeal u/s 96. The order which the appellant 'complains of could very well be challenged by him in the appeal from the final decree. Any orders which the Court may pass antecedent to the passing of the final decree for partition in course of proceedings for the preparation thereof cannot be designated a decree liable to appeal u/s 96. The order which the appellant 'complains of could very well be challenged by him in the appeal from the final decree. It was an order merely of an interlocutory character and could not be regarded as the formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.; 6. The case in Bharat Indu v. Yakub Hasan (1913) 35 All. 159 was the case of preliminary decree for partition which had been confirmed on appeal. When the case ,came back for the passing of the final decree, the Court passed an order directing that the actual partition should be made in accordance with (certain directions then given by it. The defendant filed an appeal against the order to the lower appellate Court. That appellate Court held that that order was no decree inasmuch as no final decree had yet been made. A learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court however on further appeal set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court holding that the order appealed against wasjreally a second preliminary decree. On a Letters Patent appeal the learned Judges held that the CPC contemplates one preliminary decree and no more and that the order passed should be regarded as an interlocutory order preparatory to the making of the final decree. They further observed that the propriety of the order could be challenged after a final decree had been made. 7. In Babu Lal v. Hari Bakhsh A I R 19 Lah. 699 a preliminary decree for dissolution of partnership and taking of accounts was passed. Subsequently when the question as to which partner was in possession of the account-books came up, it made an order that the account-books were in possession of the defendant. It further ordered that the accounts be taken up to the date of the final decree. The defendant carried this matter'in appeal. It was held that the order was not an'appealable order under Order XLIII, that it did not fall u/s 47 of the CPC and that it was not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. The defendant carried this matter'in appeal. It was held that the order was not an'appealable order under Order XLIII, that it did not fall u/s 47 of the CPC and that it was not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. The finding that the account-books were in possession af a certain member was not a decree or order which could be enforced and the direction of the Court that the account-books shall be taken up to a certain date did not constitute the adjudication of the rights of the parties. 8. The cases relied mpon for the appellant in Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh (1901) 23 All. 162, (Raja) Peary Mohan Mookerjee Vs. Manohar Mookerjee, AIR 1924 Cal 160 and Khatemannessa Bibi Vs. Upendra Chandra Mandal and Others, AIR 1928 Cal 804 were referred to in this case. Peary Mohan Mookerjee's case was distinguished on the'ground that it.was a suit for administration of a debuttar estate, for the (removal of a trustee and for the appointment of a new trustee and the order determining the period and the mode of accounting was a preliminary decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case was also dissented from in Udhavdas v. Devi Pas A I R 1928 Sind 100. 9. Bhup Indar Bahadur's case was a case of a mesne profits and the question apparently arose in the course of execution. The Court had ordered that the mesne profits should be recovered for three years frcm the date of the decree and under these circumstances it was held that the order was essentially final in its nature and within the meaning of Sectiona2j(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case of Khatemannessa Bibi was also a case of mesne profits and followin" the decision in Bhup Indar Bahadur's case; it was held that the order was appealable. 10. The case of Shankar Appaji Patil v. Gangarafn. Bapuji Nagude (1928) 52 Bom. 360 also a case of mesne profits. In (that case the Court declined ito ascertain the mesne profits on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, ;and it was held that the decision of the Court was a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. Bapuji Nagude (1928) 52 Bom. 360 also a case of mesne profits. In (that case the Court declined ito ascertain the mesne profits on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, ;and it was held that the decision of the Court was a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code. We may say at once that |the cases of mesne profits stand on a different footing. Order XX rule 12 of the CPC lays down that in a suit for recovery of the immoveable property and for rent or mesne profits-, the Court may pass a decree, (a) for the possession of the property, (b) for the rent or mesne profits............ (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until............. Sub-Section (2) lays that where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such /inquiry. 11. It is obvious, therefore, that a decree directing that mesne profits be ascertained under Order XX rule 12 (.1) (c) is a proceeding in a suit and the Court must pass a final decree in accordance with the result of the inquiry as laid down by sub- Section (2). 12. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in JogdishuryiDebea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry (1897) 24 Cal. 725 held that an order passed |in a suit for partition, subsequently to the preliminary decree, appointing a commission to make the partition, is not an order in execution, and, therefore, is not appealable u/s 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is an interlocutoryrorder pending the suit which has not been finally decided; and the appellant may take objection to it in an appeal against the final decree. 13. It is significant to note that not only no decree was prepared in pursuance of the order but no formal order was even prepared in the case. The formal order that was filed in Court subsequent t" the /filing of the appeal was prepared by the lower Court under orders from this Court. 14. We hold, therefore, that the order, passed by the Court below is neither an appealable order nor a decree against which any appeal lies. The pre- liminary objection;succeeds and this appeal is dis- missed with costs.