JUDGMENT Walford, J. - The only question in- volved in this appeal isfwhether the right of pri- vacy of thej plaintiffs is invaded by the erection of a room on the roof of the defendants house with certain doorways in that room. The trial 'Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the right of privacy of plaintiff No.Jll was not at all affected and that, though certain portions of the house of plaintiff No. 8 were visible from the doorways of the newly constructed room, no right of the plaintiff had been in anyway affected inasmuch' as that those portions of the house)"of plaintiff No. 3, which were visible from the doorways, had always been visible from the roof where the'new construction has now been put up. 2. In appeal the learned Civil judge reversed the judgment of the learned Munsif, who tried the case, and decreed a permanent injunction to compel the defendants to close the doorways, as in his opinion by the new construction in which these doorways existed the plaintiffs' right of privacy had been invaded. 3. The facts briefly in the case are /that the houses of the [plaintiffs and the defendants are situated in a very thickly populated Jarea of the city of Lucjuiow known as the Restogi Tola. The houses of the plaintiffs and the defendants face each other and are divided by a narrow lane. The defendants, it is admitted, always used the roof of the third storey of their house in hot weather for sleeping purposes, and a person could always overlook the housejof plaintiff No. 3 and get a view of certain portions of the house. The defendants shortly before the institution of the suit had put up a construction made of wood, covered by a tinshed, having 6 doorways therein. The plaintiffs now complain that by this new construction and the doorways their right of privacy has been (violated. The defendants shortly before the institution of the suit had put up a construction made of wood, covered by a tinshed, having 6 doorways therein. The plaintiffs now complain that by this new construction and the doorways their right of privacy has been (violated. The learned Munsif, after having considered the/entire evidence, has said in his judgment: Thus in view of the entire oral evidence adduced both by the plaintiffs and the defendants it is borne oit that prior to the construction of the room in questio i there was interference with the privacy of the house of the plaintiffs from the roof in the defendants' house Qn a portion .of which the room in question stands, .that plaintiff No. l's house which consists of only two storeys is practically unviewed by the defendants' room, that a portion of the third storey of the house of plaintiff No. 3 along with a portion of the stair- case at the top is visible from the room and that the mohalla in which the houses of the parties stand is thickly populated and the houses on account of their loose situation overlook each other and that the privacy of the plaintiffs house is interfered by the other houses of the mohalla. 4. He further held that, as the houses of the plaintiffs could be seen from the surrounding houses to the same extent more or less as from the newly con- structed room, the plaintiffs cannot claim any right of privacy which in fact they never enjoyed prior to the construction of the room i n question. The learned Civil Judge in appeal reversed this finding. He says in his judgment under appeal : I hold that it has not been proved by any cogent and (satisfactory evidence that the well recognised and universally prevalent custom of the right of privacy of houses has in any manner been abrogated or slackened in Rastogi Tola 'and that consequently all the houses including these of the appellants in that quarter are in full possession of the enjoyment of that right. 5. From the above passage it is obvious that the learned Civil Judge failed to appreciate the implication of the findings of the trial Court. 5. From the above passage it is obvious that the learned Civil Judge failed to appreciate the implication of the findings of the trial Court. I do not think that the learned Munsif ever intended to hold that by virtue of the fact of the Rastogi Tola being a congested and a thickly populated area the inhabitants of the locality could never claim the right of privacy, but what he did in fact hold was that such housesjin that area which had been exposed to the view of their neighbours can not claim a greater right of privacy than they had in fact enjoyed, merely(because some new construction has been put on at a place from where the identical portion of the house of the complaining party had been visible, to my mind, this was a sound view of the matter. The learned Civil Judge appears to have been greatly influenced by a single Judge decisionjreported in Abdul Rahman v, Bhagwan Das (1907) 29 All 582 although he has not specifica lly cited this ruling. I may at once say that not only was the ruling referred to above was overruled by a Division Bench in a Letters Patent .Appeal in the Allahabad High Court but .it had been con- sidered ini/several cases and dissented from. Knox, J. in the case under consideration had in fact held that though a portion of the house n"y ordinarily,be open to view from a neighbouring house, yet if the doors or apertures are created at a place where nothing existing before, the right of privacy would be more substantially or materi- ally invaded because these apertures would permit a person to look on without himself being observed than by the existence of an open space where the presence of a looker-on would at once be cons- picuous and could easily be guarded against. The Court below has virtually adopted these reasonings for it says, The trial Court has held further that as the roof of the third storey of the respondent's house over which the new room has been built, already overlooked the appellants'house, the construction of the new room could not possibly have added to the view already commended by that roof and as such could give no cause of action to the appellants. But the appellants' complaint did not relate to the construction of the room. But the appellants' complaint did not relate to the construction of the room. It related only to the doors on the side of their houses and, as was; argued by the appellants, learned Counsel, those doors would certainly be worsening the position of the appellants inasmuch as the presence of any one on an open roof may at once be noticed and put the inmates of the neighbouring house on their guard, whereas the presence of anyone peeping from behind the doors might remain unnoticed by t hem and thus put them in a disadvantageous position. 6. The learned Counsel "for the respondents before me has reiterated the arguments of the learned Civil Judge indicated above and has strongly relied upon the ruling in Abdul Rahman v. Bhagwan Das* He contends that though the ruling might have been overruled in a Letters Patent Appeal, never- theless the principles laid down therein are correct principles. He further points out that this ruling was considered in; Sangam Madho v. Ram Narain2. It seems, however that the learned Counsel is under some misapprehension because Pullan, J. after quoting a passage from I. W R, XXIX Allahabad, 582, goes on to say : This ruling is perhaps not intended for gene- ral application and the remarks should certainly be read with the previous remark in the same judgment that every case of this kind must be governed by Us particular facts and that the question in every such case is whether the construction amounts to a substantial interference with the right of privacy. A right of privacy is assumed to exist in all Indian towns, and this has been laid down both by the late Mr. Justice Misra in the case of list. Subhaga v. Mst. Janki (29 O. C. 136) and Mr. Justice Raza in the case of Sardar Husain v. Ahmad Husain (5 O. W, N. 538). 7. The question which the learned Judge con- sidered in 6 Sangam Madho v. Ram Narain (1929) 6 O W N 864, was not whether in that particular case the right of privacy had been affected but whether the right 'of privacy is assumedjto exist in all Indian towns. ' In the present case it was never the question whe. 7. The question which the learned Judge con- sidered in 6 Sangam Madho v. Ram Narain (1929) 6 O W N 864, was not whether in that particular case the right of privacy had been affected but whether the right 'of privacy is assumedjto exist in all Indian towns. ' In the present case it was never the question whe. ther any right of privacy existed in the city of Lucknow, but whether under the circumstances o' the particular case a plaintiff could bring an action claiming a right of privacy which in fact never existed. In the case of Shib Lal v. Ram Narain (1909) 3 IC 88 8. which is a decision of the Allahabad High Court, Alston J., considered /. L. iR.& 29 All, 582, and declined to follow it. The learned Judge held that : Where from before the institution of the suit the plaintiff's house and courtyard could be over looked from the roof of the defendant's house as well as from those of the other adjacent houses it could not be legally found that the plaintiff had a right of privacy at the date of the institution of the suit, and consequently the suit to have the win- dows, in the second storey built upon the roof from which the plaintiff's court-yard, could be seen closed, could not be maintained. 9. In that case the facts were that a certain portion of the house of the plaintiff was always visible -from the roof of the defendant. Later a room was constructed upon this roof with windows facing the house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a suit for an injunction to compel the defendant to closej the.room on the ground that these windows invaded the right of privacy, and the arguments used were (he same as laid down in /. L. R 29 All 582. 10. In an unreported case of this Court, Shams- uddin v. Ashraf Ali (Second Civil Appeal No. 421 of 1937) of Yorke J. reviewed the law and specifically considered LfL.iR. 29 All, 582, and in considering ,the principle laid down therein the learned Judge said : The view taken by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in I L R 29 All. 29 All, 582, and in considering ,the principle laid down therein the learned Judge said : The view taken by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in I L R 29 All. 582 was that even in these circumstances there might be an" interference with privacy 'because the right of privacy is more substantially invaded by apertures which would permit a person to look on without being observed than by the existence of an open surface where the presence of a 1 ooker-on would at once be conspicuous and could easily be guarded against.' To my mind the argument could easily be met and the deduction is not entirely logical The true deduction is that the effect of complete exposure is that the persons who are exposed are always on their guard, whereas in the case of a reduced exposure they would be less upon their guard, but that does not mean that the reduction of exposure constitutes either an interference with privacy or an increased interference with privacy. 11. I am in respectful agreement with these observations of the learned Judge of this Court. In suits of this nature the question is not whether some improvement in the house, or some alteration needed by its occupants, has aroused a suspicion in the mind of the occupier of the neighbouring house that by the restricted view brought about by the improvement or construction the occupants might be looking into some portion of the houses unobserved, but whether the complaining party did in fact enjoy certain privacy which has now been destroyed by construction. 12. It is not disputed before"me that the statement of facts as found upon evidence by the trial Court are erroneous, nor is it disputed that persons standing in the door-way of the newly constructed room on the roof of the disputed house can get a more extended view of the interior of the plaintiff s'house than they could from-the open roof. In fact plaintiff No. 2 admitted in his evidence that "had there been no room in question on the roof of the defendants' house there would have been the same interference (in the privacy of the plaintiffs as has been caused by the present room on the third storey of the defendants' house." The contention relates purely to the application of law to the facts found. 13. 13. As I conceive the law to be, a plaintiff cannot I be granted any 'relief in a case where there has been no fresh invasion of his right of privacy but merely a more restricted view has been brought about by an alteration in the house of the defendant, and by this restricted view a suspicion has been created in the mind of the plaintiffs that someone might unobserved look into that part of their house which was always open to the same view. The learned Judge in the appel- late Court has to my-mind completelyjmisconceived the law. 14. I allow the appeal land'dismiss the suit with costs in all the. Courts.