JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - This rule was obtained against an order of the learned District Judge of Burdwan passed under S. 40A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, whereby he reversed a decision of the appellate officer of Asansol and held that an application made by two of the petitioners under S. 37A of the said Act was not maintainable in law. It may be added that petitioner 3 also subsequently made an application under the same section which was at first directed to be kept on record but afterwards when the Board came to the stage of determining the debt and making an award, they included the case of petitioner 3 as well. As the facts as stated in the petition are quite sufficient to dispose of this rule, we may take the facts from that source, without referring to the counter-affidavit. It appears that there was a tenancy held by one Delu Maji under one Sm. Saibalini Debi. After the death of the said Delu Maji the tenancy devolved on his widow, Sm. Keshu Dasi, but it is stated in the petition that even during the life time of the said Keshu Dasi these properties came to be in the possession of the reversioners by an amicable arrangement. Those reversioners were petitioner 1 and the husband of petitioner 2. 2. It appears further that the said Saibalini Debi brought a rent suit against Sm. Keshu Dasi and obtained a decree for Rs. 363-7-0. In due course she put the-said decree into execution and purchased the properties herself on 10th December 1935, and obtained possession on 3rd April 1936. As stated already, petitioner 1 is the reversioner to the estate of Delu Maji and petitioner 2 is the widow of the other reversioner. Petitioner 3 claims to be a transferee from Delu Maji of a portion of the lands covered by the tenancy. 3. On 4th October, 1942 the first two petitioners made an application under S. 37A, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, before the Churulia. Debt Settlement Board. They asked for the usual reliefs. The opposite party to this application was the opposite party to this rule which is a limited company, and claims to be a transferee of the landlord's interest from Saibalini Debi by a transfer made before December 1939. Debt Settlement Board. They asked for the usual reliefs. The opposite party to this application was the opposite party to this rule which is a limited company, and claims to be a transferee of the landlord's interest from Saibalini Debi by a transfer made before December 1939. The case set up by the opposite party before the Debt Settlement Board was that after having taken delivery of possession Saibalini Debi settled the lands with two persons, namely, Shyama Sundari Sinha and Nirmala Bala Sinha, who are opposite parties 2 and 8 to the present rule, and also with petitioner 1. The alleged transfer of the zamindari interest in favour of opposite party 1 was also set up. The object of setting up this defence was obviously to make out that the properties, of which recovery was sought, were not in the possession of the decree-holder on or after 20th December 1939. 4. It appears that before the Board Shyama Sundari Sinha and Nirmala Bala Sinha were unable to produce any document, which would establish the alleged settlements made in their favour. Nothing appears from the record as to what evidence was or was not led as regards the rights of opposite party 1, namely, the transferee of the landlord's interest. On 14th November 1943, the Board passed an order whereby it held that the application made by the first two, petitioners under S. 37A was maintainable in law. The two findings upon which this order was based are: (1) that at the date of the sale the applicants were agricultural debtors as defined in the special Act; and (2) that the debtor alleged that the auction, purchased lands were and had always been in the possession of the decree-holder. On the above findings, as already stated, the Board held the application to be maintainable. Subsequently a further order was passed on 6th February 1944, whereby the Board determined the debts. 5. An appeal was thereafter taken by Shyama Sundari Sinha before the appellate officer of Asansol. That officer held that the alleged settlements in favour of Shyama Sundari Sinha and Nirmala Bala Sinha had not been proved and also that the appeal before him was barred by limitation. On the above two findings, the appellate officer dismissed the appeal. 6. 5. An appeal was thereafter taken by Shyama Sundari Sinha before the appellate officer of Asansol. That officer held that the alleged settlements in favour of Shyama Sundari Sinha and Nirmala Bala Sinha had not been proved and also that the appeal before him was barred by limitation. On the above two findings, the appellate officer dismissed the appeal. 6. Thereafter, the said Shyama Sundari moved the District Judge under the provisions of S. 40A and the District Judge, as stated already, held that the application before the Board was not maintainable and should stand dismissed. It is against this order that the present rule was obtained by the three petitioners. In support of the rule, it has been urged by Mr. Ghose that the District Judge did not apply his mind to the records at all inasmuch as he had relied only upon the report of the Board for his finding that the applicants had not proved themselves to be debtors within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. Mr. Ghose further contended that on merits the application made by his clients before the Board was maintainable. We have gone through the relevant orders of the Board and have also examined the other two orders passed by the appellate and the revisional authorities respectively. It appears to us that the learned Judge in so far as he relied upon the mere report of the Board was not justified in doing so. That, however, does not enable us to hold that the present case is a proper one where we ought to interfere in revision. The application upon which the proceedings were started by the petitioners, or rather the first two of them, was an application under S. 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. That section lays down, to quote only the material portion, that When any immovable property of any person has been sold after the twelfth day of August 1935...........................such person or his heir, executor or administrator may...............apply for relief under this section, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely :- (a) if, on the date of the sale, such person was a debtor. It is quite clear from the provisions of Section 37A above quoted that although not merely the persons whose immovable property was sold in execution but also his heir, executor or administrator may maintain an application under the section, still such heir, executor or administrator, if he makes an application, must prove that on the date of the sale the person whose immovable property was sold was a debtor as defined in the Act. Mr. Ghose contended that the phrase "such person" in clause (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 37A refers to the applicant, whoever the applicant may be, and does not refer to the person whose immovable property was sold in execution. We are entirely unable to accept this contention. The words "such person," it is reasonably plain, refer back to the person who has been referred to in the opening paragraph of the section; and that person, it is again plain, is the person whose immovable property was sold in execution. The effect of the opening paragraph of sub-s. (1), read with sub-cl. (a), in our opinion, is the words "such person" in cl. (a) do not refer to the applicant, as such, but refer to the person whose immovable property was sold at the execution sale, whether such person be the applicant himself or his predecessor-in-interest. Applying that view of the section to the facts of the present case, it will be found that the person whose immovable property was sold was Keshu Dasi; and although the first two petitioners might be her representatives and might perhaps bo entitled to apply u/s 37A, still, in order to sustain that application they had to prove that Keshu Dassi herself was an agricultural debtor at the date of the sale. It is quite clear from the record, and it is admitted before us, that the petitioners made no attempt to prove that fact. On the other hand, their application was made on the basis that they themselves were agricultural debtors. The Board in its turn found that it was the petitioners before the Board who were agricultural debtors at the date of the sale, and made or recorded no finding that the person whose immovable property had been sold, namely, Keshu Dasi, was such a debtor. The Board in its turn found that it was the petitioners before the Board who were agricultural debtors at the date of the sale, and made or recorded no finding that the person whose immovable property had been sold, namely, Keshu Dasi, was such a debtor. There may be some question as to whether the first two petitioners were at all entitled even to make the application under the provisions of Section 37A which uses the words 'such person or his heir, executor or administrator.' The first two petitioners were reversioners to the estate of the husband of Keshu Dasi, and it is a question whether they could be regarded as either Keshu Dasi's heirs or her executors or administrators within the meaning of the section. This question, however, need not detain us further, for even assuming, as I have assumed, that the first two petitioners might be entitled to make an application, their application must fail, since it was made on the basis of their own status and not of the status of Keshu Dasi. 7. This finding is quite sufficient to support the order of the learned Judge that the application before the Board was not maintainable. Certain other questions were raised in course of the argument, namely, whether the decree-holder, i. e., Saibalini Devi, as distinguished from the transferee from her, was in possession of the properties on or after the relevant date, and also whether petitioner 3, Tara Prosanna Ghose, was at all competent to maintain his application. It is not necessary for us to go into these matters in detail inasmuch as our view on the first point is sufficient for the disposal of the rule. I may point out, however, that the Board has not recorded any finding that the properties were in possession of the decree-holder on the relevant date. All that the Board has found is that the petitioners so alleged. 8. Mr. Ghose contended in the last resort that the first two petitioners were entitled to make the application in their own right as persons whose immovable property had been sold and that if they were, their own status of agricultural debtors would be sufficient for the needs of the section. It is quite impossible to accept this contention in the face of the facts stated in the petition to this Court. It is quite impossible to accept this contention in the face of the facts stated in the petition to this Court. It appears from that petition that on the death of Dalu Maji the tenancy devolved upon his widow Keshu Dasi and the first two petitioners who were only presumptive reversioners came to be in possession of the lands by way of a family arrangement. There was no surrender of the widow's interest in their favour and they could not possibly be the owners of the lands during the life-time of Keshu Dasi. The decree in execution of which the lands were sold was a decree against the widow and the lands were sold in her hands. In the above circumstances, the first two petitioners could not possibly claim to be persons whose immovable property-had been sold and if their application was really made on that basis and not as representatives of Keshu Dasi, it was liable to be dismissed at sight. 9. For the reasons stated above, we are bound to hold that application before the Debt Settlement Board under S. 37A, as made, was dearly not sustainable in law; and in deciding that it was not sustainable, the learned Judge decided rightly. The rule is accordingly discharged, but in view of the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Akram, J. 10. I agree.