JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal in a suit brought for possession of three plots of land (Nos. 66, 76 and 24) in Purah Kurmian, a hamlet of Islambari, The trial Court dismissed the suit with regard to plot Nos. 66 and 24, but gave a decree for possession over plot No. 76. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge against the decree in so far as it related to his claim with regard to plot Nos. 66 and 24, The defendants filed cross-objections against that part of the decree which related to plot No. 76. The plaintiffs appeal was dismissed and the cross-objections were allowed, with the result that the plaintiffs claim was dismissed in its entirety. Dissatisfied with this decision he comes up in second appeal. 2. According to the plaint allegations no building stood upon plots Nos. 66 and 76. The debris of an old house which stood on plot No. 66, and fell down in 1936, was still lying there The appellant's contention was that he war the proprietor of village Islambari and as the defendants had no right to retain possession of the land they should be ejected. With regard to plot No. 24 whereon a house stood at | the time of the institution of the suit, it was alleged that the plaintiff's riaya who owned the house left it and abandoned the village four or five years ago, and that the defendants had no right to the house in question, and even if they were found to be the owners of the material, the original riaya having abandoned the village, they had no right to keep the materials on the plaintiffs land. 3. With regard to plot No. 66, the defendants pleaded that it belonged to one Parbhu and that they were living in the house with him and with. his permission. 4. His regards plot No. 24 it was urged that the house which stood on this land be longed to one Mata Din at the time of the first regulars, settlement. Mata Din had two other brothers, Udai and Sukkha. Sukkha's son, Bhairon, was the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants Nos. 2 to 5. The house thus being their ancestral house, which had existed on this land for 75 years, they could not be ejected from it. 5. Mata Din had two other brothers, Udai and Sukkha. Sukkha's son, Bhairon, was the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants Nos. 2 to 5. The house thus being their ancestral house, which had existed on this land for 75 years, they could not be ejected from it. 5. Concerning plot No. 76 the defence was that it was originally sold by one Mst. Lachmin to Lau who in his turn sold it to Bhairon on the 4th of March, 1929, before the plaintiff purchased the village, and that the defendants and Bhairon had been in possession of the house under their deed ever since and could not be ejected therefrom. 6. The appeal so far as it relates to plots Nos. c6 and 24 is easily disposed of. As regards the house on plot No. 66 it has been found by both the Courts below that it belongs to Parbhu and the present defendants are living in it with him and with his permission. Parbhu is not a party to this suit. An issue was framed by 'the trial Court whether he was or was-at a necessary party. It appears that the plaintiff appellant opposed his being impleaded as a party to this suit. Accordingly he was examined as a witness on behal of the defendants and has supported their case. In view of the findings of both the Courts below that the houses belong to Parbhu, who has been in possession of it for the last 30 years long before the plaintiff purchased the village, the suit as regards this land was rightly dismissed, 7. As to plot No. 24, the lower appellate Court has accepted the pedigree set up on behalf of the defendants. It further held that the house which stood on this land belonged to Mata Din (and not Manna as alleged by the plaintiff appellant) who was the brother of Sukha, grandfather of defendants 2 to 5. The only point urged against this finding of the lower appellate Court was that it had wrongly refused to make a presumption as regards the genuineness of Exs. 80 and 81 which showed that the house on plot No. 24 belonged to Manna or Manni Ram and not to Mata Din. Exs. 80 and 81 are certified copies of two sale deeds of 1875 and 1902 respectively. 80 and 81 which showed that the house on plot No. 24 belonged to Manna or Manni Ram and not to Mata Din. Exs. 80 and 81 are certified copies of two sale deeds of 1875 and 1902 respectively. The * original of the first purports to have been executed by Manni Ram and Durga, sons of Budhai, while the original of 81 appears to have been executed by Parmeshwar, son of Durga, and one Mendi Lai. The appellant asked the Court below to presume the due execution of the originals whereof these were certified copies. This the Court refused to do. It has given good reasons for not asking the presumption. As pointed out in its judgment by the lower appellate Court obviously the first deed was not given effect to because we find that in 1902, about 27 years after it was executed, Parmeshwar, son of Durga, who was one of the executants of the previous deed, again sold the house along with Mendi Lal to one Ram Dayal. There is nothing to show who Mendi Lal was. Under the circumstances the Court below was perfectly justified in refusing to presume the due and proper execution of the originals by the production of certified copies. It was frankly conceded by the appellant's Counsel that if this presumption was not made he could not challenge the finding of the Court below. In view of the opinion formed by me as regards the exercise of its discretion by the Court below is not making the presumption, the decision as regards the claim to plot No. 24 must also be upheld. 8. The position with regard to plot No 76 is this": According to the plaint allegations it was vacant land whereon there was no building. (See paragraphs 3 of the plaint). This allegation has been distinctly found by both the Courts below to be false. On the other hand the finding is that a double storied house belonging to one Lau still stands on this plot. It appears that this house was sold by one Mst. Lachhman to Lau Lau mortgaged it with Bhairoa in 1925 and subsequently on the 7th of March, 1929, sold it to. him. As already stated the defendant respondent No. 1 is Bhairon's widow, and defendants 2 to 5 are Bhairon's sons. It appears that this house was sold by one Mst. Lachhman to Lau Lau mortgaged it with Bhairoa in 1925 and subsequently on the 7th of March, 1929, sold it to. him. As already stated the defendant respondent No. 1 is Bhairon's widow, and defendants 2 to 5 are Bhairon's sons. It was contended by the appellant's learned Counsel that van if there existed a house on this Ian J" which balonged to Mst. Lachhmin or Lau, they having ceased to live in the village, the respondents were, under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz of Islambari, not entitled to retain possession of the land. They could remove the materials of the house which stood thereof and must give possession of the vacant plot to his client. Having given this contention my best consideration I am satisfied that it is without substance. The relevant paragraph of the wajib-ul-arz of Islambari runs thus : If any riaya wants to construct a house in the abadi of this hamlet or gang, he can do so with the permission of the karinda appointed for the time being. But if any riaya was help d by the zamindar with timber, etc. for the construction of his house, such riaya would have no right to sell the amla of the house; he would have only the right of residence' for himself and his heirs. Nor would he have a right to give it away to any person for residence. And if any riaya constructs a roofed house either in present or future, with his own money, he has a right, while he lives in the village, to effect a mortgage or sale of the amla of the house, with the exception of the land, in case of necessity In cases a riaya runs away from the village. the proprietor of the village would be the owner of the amla of such a house. And if any person who is the owner in possession of a house dies, the nearest heir would .be the owner and possessor of the house under above stated conditions. In case of non-existence of any heir the proprietor of the village,, would take possession of the house. And if any person who is the owner in possession of a house dies, the nearest heir would .be the owner and possessor of the house under above stated conditions. In case of non-existence of any heir the proprietor of the village,, would take possession of the house. And such houses of riayas as are thatched; In them they have no right (except a right of residence for themselves and their heirs) to give them away to any other person for the purpose of residence on their own account. Nor have they the right to take away the timber etc. of the house to another village. Such a house, if left, (by a riaya) will belong to the proprietor of the village. 9. It was contended on the bisis of the decision of this Court in Ganga Prasad v. Alt Bux 1948 OA 12 : A W R (CC) 4 : OWN 29 that on a correct interpretation of this wajib-ul-arz a -riaya had no right to transfer the house and confer upon the transferee a right of residence therein. All that this original licensee of the house could do was to sell or mortgage the materials of the house as distinct from the right of residence therein, That this power of transfer of materials also could be exercised only during the residence of the licensee in the village. In case the licensee, while still in the village, transferred the materials to another person by mortgage or sale, and then left the village, the zamindar would be entitled to ask the transferee to vacate the land. On a correct interpretation of the waib-ul-aiz that wakf before their Lordships in Ganga Prasad's case, such a view was taken. But the construction put by the Court upon terms of one wajib-ul-aiz is seldom helpful in interpreting another wajib-ul-arz. In the wajib-ul-arz produced in that case one of the terms was as follows: In the same way those riayas who have built roofed houses, pacca or kachcha. on other land in this bazar excepting the shops, with their own money have the right to mortgage or sell the materials of those houses an can allow others whom they like, to live in them But when they abandon the village or die heirless the Nawab will become the owner of such houses. 10. on other land in this bazar excepting the shops, with their own money have the right to mortgage or sell the materials of those houses an can allow others whom they like, to live in them But when they abandon the village or die heirless the Nawab will become the owner of such houses. 10. Reading this with other terms of the wajib-ul-arz it was held that "amla-i- makan" meant materials as distinct from the whole super-structure of the building. It Was observed that there was no authority for ;he contention that "amla" meant the super-structure as distinct from materials. The learned Judges say at page 31 of the report; This argument, so far as we have been able to ascertain, has not been put forward before and it rests on a construction of the word Amla" for which it is conceded there is no authority, The word is not so defined in any dictionary, and in previous cases where this or similar questions have arisen it has been translated as "material. 11. With the greatest respect I may point out that "amla" is a word of Persian Origin. Its original dictionary meaning is "virtue" or "goodness" [see Ghayas-ul- lugat, printed at Kayum Press, Cawnpore, page 351). But it 'is now freely used in Hindustani where its meaning depends upon the context in which it occurs. How it came in Hindustani to indicate material or super-structure of a building is not clear. It appears to me however, that the word has no very definite meaning in Hindustani. What it means in a particular document would depend upon the context in which it is used. In the wajib-ul-arz in the present case the words used are "amlai makan ko bai istisnai takhta arazi ka bai wa rahan kar lawen" The use of the words "bai istisnai takhta arazi ka" indicates that by amlai makan was meant the super-structure and not the building material consisting of bricks, mortar, timber etc. Obviously, if by this expression were meant only the bricks, mortar and timber, it would be I wholly unnecessary to specify that the "land (that is the site of the house) could not be made the subject of mortgage or sale. These words can have any significance only if by the expression "amlai makan"* was meant the super-structure. Obviously, if by this expression were meant only the bricks, mortar and timber, it would be I wholly unnecessary to specify that the "land (that is the site of the house) could not be made the subject of mortgage or sale. These words can have any significance only if by the expression "amlai makan"* was meant the super-structure. It would be necessary only to expressly exclude the site if the right to mortgage or sell conferred by the wajib-ul-aiz related to the super- structure. On the other hand if the only right conferred was a right to sell or mortgage the building material, as distinct from the super-structure, there would be no point in expressly excluding the site of the house. Had the wajib-ul-arz in Ganga Prasad's case been couched in the same language as that in the present case it would have been my duty to follow the Bench decision. But as the language used in the two documents is not the same, and I am clear that the terms of the wajib-ul-arz in the present case, a riaya had the power to transfer by. sale or mortgage the super-structure, as distinct from merely the building material of his house, it must be held that Ganga Prasad's case cannot be of any help to the present appellant. 12. It will further be noticed that a distinction is drawn between what are called roofed houses and" those designated as thatched houses. It is specified with regard to the latter class that the 'riaya owning such houses cannot give them to others for residential purposes. The same _is applicable to houses which are "footed" and built with the help of the zamindar. The case of (roofed) houses built by a riaya with his own money without any assistance from the zamindar stands on a different footing. He is given the right to transfer the Amla-i-Makan ba Istisnai Takhtai Arazi by sale or mortgage in case of necessity. This right, however, can be exercised only, so long as he lived in the village. In case he left the village without effecting any transfer the house would escheat to the zamindar. He is given the right to transfer the Amla-i-Makan ba Istisnai Takhtai Arazi by sale or mortgage in case of necessity. This right, however, can be exercised only, so long as he lived in the village. In case he left the village without effecting any transfer the house would escheat to the zamindar. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents the right to alienate would be a practically valueless right if immediately after the transfer the zamindar compelled the transferee to remove the materials and give up possession of the vacant land to him. I am satisfied of a careful consideration of the terms of this particular wajib-ul-arz that riayas were given a right to transfer the' super-structure of -their houses with a right of residence therein provided the houses were roofed houses and built without any assistance from the zamindar in the! shape of materials etc. That the house in question is a roofed house and was built without any help from the 'zamindar was not disputed, Accordingly Lau's transferee had a right to retain possession even after Lau or his heirs had left the village. Apart from the reasons to which reference has been made above, it appears to me that the transfer having apparently been recognised by the previous zamindar, Bhairon's possession with regard to this house was the tame as that of a riaya who constructed a house constituting a work of a permanent character, under a license granted by the zamindar. The present appellant who purchased' the village only in 1930 could not eject him or his heirs from the land which formed the site of the house. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on Section 59 of the Easements Act, This section, as pointed as pointed out by Katiar in his Law of Easements and Licenses in British India, page 355 has been enclosed Fully in order into avoid .an inference that the right of revocation is confined to the granto' personally.... But if the license is for some reasons arrive able by the grantor himself this section does not authorise the transferee to revoke it and the provisions of this section are in this respect subject to the provisions of Section 60." 13. But if the license is for some reasons arrive able by the grantor himself this section does not authorise the transferee to revoke it and the provisions of this section are in this respect subject to the provisions of Section 60." 13. I am clear that the lower appellate Court came to a correct conclusion when it allowed the cross-objections and Bisajisse the claim with regard to plot No. 76 also. 14. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.