JUDGMENT Mulla, J. - This is an application in revision by one Mohan Lal who has been convicted u/s 6 of Ordinance XXXV of 1943 as amended by Ordinance XII of 1944. He has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and in default to undergo one month's rigorous imprisonment. 2. The applicant is one of the proprietors of a firm styled Messrs. Puran Chand and Sons. This firm deals in cloth and has a retail shop in Mussoorie On the 29th of March, 1944, a lady customer went to the applicant's shop and wanted to purchase Viyella Flannel. The attendant at the shop showed her the stuff and upon being asked what was the price he demanded Rs. 12 per yard. The lady customer thought that the control price of the article was only Rs. 5 per yard and she accordingly made a report on the 1st of April, 1944, to the District Supply Officer. Mussoorie, in which she mentioned the facts stated above. Upon this report Mr. J.B. Saxena, an Anti-Profiteering Inspector, proceeded to the applicant's shop and found several bales of Viyella Flannel there to which labals were attached showing that the price per yard was Rs. 12-8-0. He demanded the invoice for the cloth which was sup plied and which showed that the cloth had been purchased by the firm from another firm in Delhi in the year 1942 at Rs. 8-8-0 per yard. Upon these facts the applicant was prosecuted for an offence u/s 6 of the Hoarding and Profiteeiing Prevention Ordinance No. XXXV ot 1943. The said section runs as follows: (1) Where no maximum has been fixed by notification under Clause (c) of tub Section (1) of Section 3, no dealer or producer shall sell or offer for sale or otherwise dispose of an article for a consideration which is unreasonable. The said section runs as follows: (1) Where no maximum has been fixed by notification under Clause (c) of tub Section (1) of Section 3, no dealer or producer shall sell or offer for sale or otherwise dispose of an article for a consideration which is unreasonable. (2) For the purposes of this section a consideration is unreasonable if, whether it is exclusively in money or not,-- (a) the purchaser is as a condition of sale, required to purchase at the same time any other article; (b) where the sale is by a dealer, the consideration exceeds the amount represented by the addition allowed by the normal trade practice in force on the 31st day of August, 1939, to- (i) the landed coat of the article in the case of an article imported into British India, or, where the article is delivered to the consignee else where than at a port, that cost increased by any charges incurred for freight and octroi or other duties before delivery, or (ii) the price at which the producer sold the article, in the case of an article which is not imported; (c) Where the sale is by a producer, the consideration exceeds the amount represented by the addition allowed by the normal trade practice in force on the 31st day of August, 1939, to the cost of production: Provided that, where the addition allowed by such normal trade practice exceeds or is alleged to exceed 20 per cent., the dealer or producer, as the case may be, shall report the fact to the Controller General who may either sanction such addition or, for reasons to be recorded in writing, order its variation; and, unless such report has been made and the price charged is within the limits approved by the Controller General under this proviso, the dealer or producer, as the case may be shall be deemed to sell for a consideration which is unreasonable. (3) The Controller General may make or cause to be made a certificate stating the landed cost of any imported article dealt in by a dealer, and shall, on request made by any dealer, grant or cause to be granted to that dealer a certificate stating the landed cost of any such imported article.... 3. The prosecution examined three witnesses in support of the charge against the applicant. 3. The prosecution examined three witnesses in support of the charge against the applicant. The first witness was the lady customer referred to above who only stated the fact that she had gone to the shop on the 29th of March, 1944, and wanted to purchase Viyella Flannel and was told by the attendant at the shop that the price of the article was Rs. 12 pep yard; whereas she thought that the control price was only about Rs. 5 per yard. This fact is not now in contest and hence no further reference is necessary to the evidence of the lady customer. The next witness for the prosecution was Mr. J B. Saxena, the Anti-Profiteering inspector. He proved the fact that upon a complaint made by the lady customer he proceeded to the applicant's shop and found a number of bales of Viyella Flannel there which had labels attached to them showing that the price per yard was Rs 2/8. He further proved that upon his demand an invoice was produced by the attendant at the shop from which it appeared that the cloth had been purchased by the firm from another firm at Delhi in the year 1942 at Rs. 8/8 per yard. Lastly he stated that he had obtained the sanction of the District Magistrate for the prosecution of the applicant for an offencs u/s 6 of the Ordinance. The third witness only gave formal evidence to the effect that his presence certain bales of cloth to which labels were attached show ing the price to be Rs. 12/8 par yard were seized by Mr. J. B. Saxena in the circumstances stated above. 4. The defence taken by the applicant was that he had instructed his servants not to sell the cloth in question until a price had been fixed by the Controller General and secondly, that he was not in any case responsible because he was then not present in Mussoorie at all. 5. The applicant was tried summarily by a Magistrate of the first class at Mussoorie and was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. The defences taken by him were rejected and I may say at once that there was no force in those pleas. 6. Two points have been raised on behalf of the applicant in the course of the argument before me. The defences taken by him were rejected and I may say at once that there was no force in those pleas. 6. Two points have been raised on behalf of the applicant in the course of the argument before me. The first point is that the prosecution in this case entirely failed to prove the landed cost of Viyella Flannel and hence it cannot be said that in charging Rs. 12/8 per yard for that stuff the applicant's firm demanded a price which can be said to be a consideration which is unreasonable within the meaning of Section 6 of the Ordinance, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that the price demanded by the applicant's firm included more than 20 per cent, of the profit over and above the landed cost as permitted by. Section 6 of the Ordinance. It has been emphasized by learned Counsel for the applicant that the landed cost which the prosecution must prove in very case in which a person is charged with an offence u/s 6 of the Ordinance must be the landed cost at or about the time when the offence is alleged to have been committed. The second point raised by learned Counsel for the applicant is that there was no valid section for the applicant's prosecution in the present case. This point has been raised in view of. Section 14 of the Ordinance which, runs as follows: No prosecution for any offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central or the Provincial Government, or of an officer not below the rank of a District Magistrate empowered by the Central or the Provincial Government to grant such sanction. 7. Upon a careful consideration of these points raised by learned Counsel for the applicant and after having heard, learned Counsel for the Crown, I have arrived at the conclusion that both these contentions are sound and must prevail. With regard to the first point it is enough to state that the normal rule which applies to every criminal case must be applied also to a prosecution for an offence u/s 6 of the Ordinance, namely, that the onus of establishing all the ingredients of the offence lies entirely upon the prosecution. With regard to the first point it is enough to state that the normal rule which applies to every criminal case must be applied also to a prosecution for an offence u/s 6 of the Ordinance, namely, that the onus of establishing all the ingredients of the offence lies entirely upon the prosecution. The charge against the applicant is that he offered certain cloth for sale at a price which constituted unreasonable consideration within the meaning of Section 6, inasmuch as it included more than 20 per cent, of profit over and above the landed cost of the article as permitted by Section 6. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain what the landed cost of the article was before it can be held that in offering to sell the article at Rs. 12 per yard the applicant's firm demanded a price which included more than 20 per cent, of profit over and above the landed costs. It is clearly in my opinion the duty of the prosecution in every case u/s 6 of the Ordinance to prove the landed cost of the article sold or offered to be sold, because unless that point is established it cannot be found against the accused person that the price obtained or demanded by him was in contravention of the provisions of Section 6 of the Ordinance. I am further clear in my mind that the landed cost of the article as contemplated by Section 6 of the Ordinance must be deemed to be the landed cost at or about the time when the transaction which is the subject of the charge against the accused person took place. Now, in order to discharge the onus which lay upon the prosecution in the present case Mr. J. B. Saxena, the Anti-Profiteering Inspector, appears to have stated categorically in the course of his evidence that the landed cost of Viyella Flannel in the year 1944 was Rs. 6/12/ a yard. The trial, as already stated, Was summary and no notes of the evidence were kept by the learned trying Magistrate. It appears, however, from the judgment of the learned Magistrate that a statement to that effect was made by Mr. J. B. Saxena in the course of his cross-examination. It may be noted that even from what the learned Magistrate had stated in his judgment it is clear that no attempt was made by Mr. It appears, however, from the judgment of the learned Magistrate that a statement to that effect was made by Mr. J. B. Saxena in the course of his cross-examination. It may be noted that even from what the learned Magistrate had stated in his judgment it is clear that no attempt was made by Mr. J. B. Saxena in the course of his examination-in-chief to prove the landed cost of the article. I find further that there is nothing in the judgment of the learned trying Magistrate to show that Mr. J. B. Saxena referred to any document upon which his know ledge relating to the landed cost of the Viyella Flannel was based It was open to the prosecution to obtain a certificate from the Controller General as to the landed cost of the article, but no such step appears to have been taken. The prosecution relies only upon the solitary statement of Mr, J. B Saxena made by him in the course of his cross examination which has been referred to by the learned trying Magistrate in his. judgment. It is not clear at all whether any further questions were put by the cross-examining counsel to Mr. Saxena in order to ascertain his source of knowledge relating to the statement made by him. Ordinarily one would think that an Anti-Profiteering Inspector need not necessarily be aware of the landed cost of every article in the absence of any certificate given by the (Controller General. He is not an exporter or importer of any article and his knowledge must be based upon some document or some order or notification of the Government or the Controller General. That material las not been placed before the Court in the present case. I am not, therefore, prepared to attach any weight to the evidence of Mr. J.B. Saxena as proof of the landed cost of the article. Indeed, Mr. Saxena's casual statement in the course of his cross-examination relating to landed cost appears to me to be based not upon any evidence in the case but upon some knowledge derived from some private source of information which he had but which was not disclosed. J.B. Saxena as proof of the landed cost of the article. Indeed, Mr. Saxena's casual statement in the course of his cross-examination relating to landed cost appears to me to be based not upon any evidence in the case but upon some knowledge derived from some private source of information which he had but which was not disclosed. The only other attempt made by the prosecution to discharge the onus of proof which lay upon it was to refer to the invoice produced by the applicant's firm from which it appeared that this firm purchased the article in question from another firm at Delhi in the year 1942 at Rs. 8/8/- per yard. It was contended on that basis that the landed cost of the article must have been less than Rs. 8/8/-, the price paid by the applicant's firm, but the point remains that what the prosecution has to prove in these cases is the landed cost at of(sic) about the time when the transaction which is the subject of charge against the accused persons takes place. There is absolutely no evidence in my opinion which can enable the Court in the present case to arrive at any finding as to the landed cost of the article offered for sale by the applicant's firm, upon this ground alone the prosecution should in my opinion fail. I find, however, that the second point raised by the learned Counsel for the applicant has also great force and derives me, to the conclusion that the prosecution in this case was not validly initiated. 8. The facts in this connection may briefly be stated. There is on the record of the case a slip of paper which is marked Exhibit E. It contains a communication addressed by Mr. J.B. Saxena to the Town Rationing Officer in the following terms: The letter received from Mohan Lal amending his previous statement does not affect the merits of the case at all Sale or no sale is the same when prices are marked and the cloth bears the selling price. 9. Underneath this communication I find another addressed presumably to the District Magistrate by one Mr. Khanna, the Price Control Officer, Mussoorie, which runs as follows:- Please see my note of 5 4-44 and Mr. Johnston's order of 17-1 44 giving time to Mr. Mohan Lal for interview. 9. Underneath this communication I find another addressed presumably to the District Magistrate by one Mr. Khanna, the Price Control Officer, Mussoorie, which runs as follows:- Please see my note of 5 4-44 and Mr. Johnston's order of 17-1 44 giving time to Mr. Mohan Lal for interview. Orders are now solicited whether you would like to see Mr. Mohan Lal on your next visit to Mussoorie or whether orders would be passed by you finally now without seeing him. 10. Now, on this slip of paper Exhibiting E I further find an order recorded in the following terms: Prosecution sanctioned. Mussoorie trial in S. D. M's Court. 11. This order is signed by Mr. D. G. P. Anthony. I am informed that Mr. Anthony was at that time officiating for Mr. Johnston as Superintendent of Dehradun. From what I have stated above it is perfectly clear that there is absolutely no reference at all in Exhibit E to the facts of the case and the offence, if any, which the applicant was alleged to have committed. The two notes of the 15th and the 17th of April, 1944, referred to in the communication addressed by Mr. Khanna to the District Magistrate are not to be found on the record. From the context of the communication it would appear that those notes did not refer to the facts of the cass or the alleged charge against the applicant. Then we find the brief order recorded by Mr. D. G. P. Anthony which does not show at all whether he applied his mind to any set of facts put before him and whether upon doing so he came to the couclusion that the applicant had committed an offence u/s 6 of the Ordinance. The cryptic order recorded by Mr. Anthony makes no reference at all to any offence. In fact it is not even clear in this case whether Mr. 12. Anthony was empowered by the Provincial Government to grant sanction for prosecution for any offence committed under the Ordinance. The cryptic order recorded by Mr. Anthony makes no reference at all to any offence. In fact it is not even clear in this case whether Mr. 12. Anthony was empowered by the Provincial Government to grant sanction for prosecution for any offence committed under the Ordinance. My attention was drawn by learned Counsel for the Crown to a Government notification to the effect that all District Magistrate in the Province were authorised by the Provincial Government to sanction prosecutions u/s 14 of the Ordinance and it was contended that tit Anthony being at the time in the position of an Officiating Superintendent of Dehra Dun must be presumed to have the power contemplated by Section 14. I am not quite clear on this point, but one thing is quite clear to my mind and that is that the sanction for prosecution given in the present case was not a valid sanction as required by the law. As I have already stated, the material on the record before me does not show at all whether Mr. Anthony ever applied his mind to any set of facts and having done so arrived at the result that any offence u/s 5 of the Ordinance had been committed by the applicant. His cryptic order does not even mention any offence. Such a sanction in my opinion is not a valid sanction and I must, there fore, hold that the prosecution in this ease failed to remove the bar placed in its way by Section 14 of the Ordinance and upon that ground also it must fail. 13. The result, therefore, is that I allow this application in revision and set aside the conviction and sentence of the applicant Mohan Lal. The fine, if paid by him, shall be refunded. The order of confiscation passed by the learned trying Magistrate is also set aside.