JUDGMENT Das, J. - This is a vendor's suit for specific-performance of an agreement for sale of certain immovable properties situate within the jurisdiction of this Court. The relevant facts are as follows: One Nilmoney Dey was the owner of four several properties, namely, premises Nos. 6, 7 and 7/1, Gopal Chandra Lane and a garden at Beliaghata. By his Will Nilmoney dedicated the said properties to the deity Sree Sree Gopi Nath Jew located at No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane. Nilmoney died in 1839. By a decree of His Majesty's Privy Council in a litigation amongst persons interested in the aforesaid endowment, it was declared that one Nagendra Nath Dey and one Kartic Chandra Dey, both since deceased, the two great grandsons of Nilmoney Dey, were entitled to be the sebaits of the said deity. By a deed dated June 8th, 1904, made between Nagendra as the first party and Kartic and his brother's widow Sushila as the second party it was declared that the first and second parties were entitled to and in possession of the said several properties in equal shares and for the purpose of mutual convenience of possession and enjoyment the premises No. 7/1, Gopal Chandra Lane valued at Rs. 17,538 was allotted to Nagendra and the premises No. 6, Gopal Chandra Lane valued at Rs. 7,374 and the Beliaghata garden valued at Rs. 7,000 were allotted to Kartic and Sushila. It was provided by that deed that the parties would hold their respective allotments down to sons, sons' sons and so on in succession, with the right of gift and sale thereof, that one party would have no claim or demand on the properties allotted to the other, that as between the separate allotments there would be no other easements besides the then existing widows and that Nagendra would pay Rs. 1,582 as owelty money to Kartic and Sushila. The premises No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane where the deity was located was left joint and it was agreed that the deity would reside there and two parties would perform the seba thereof by turns of six months and that both parties would remain responsible for the payment of rates and taxes of that premises in equal shares. The premises No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane where the deity was located was left joint and it was agreed that the deity would reside there and two parties would perform the seba thereof by turns of six months and that both parties would remain responsible for the payment of rates and taxes of that premises in equal shares. Pursuant to the aforesaid deed the premises No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane, the Thakurbari, remained in the joint possession of the two parties and they took separate possession of the properties allotted to them respectively and began performing the seba of the deity by turns of six months. It appears that Nagendra mane extensive improvements on the premises No. 7/1, Gopal Chandra Lane allotted to him at a considerable expenditure of money and got the same divided and numbered as four separate premises, namely, Nos. 7/1A, 7/1B. 7/1C and 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane. 2. By a deed dated May 25th, 1928, Nagendra after reciting the debutter character of the properties, the setting apart of No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane as Thakurbari and the separate allotments of the other properties under the deed of 1904 and the division of the turns of worship, declared that his sons Kshitindra, Rabindra, Fanindra and Satyendra would be sebaits in his place and directed them to perform the during his turn of worship from Baisak to Aswin of each Bengali year. 3. Nagendra died leaving four sons, Kshitindra, Rabindra, Fanindra and Satyendra. Kan died leaving three sons, Ajit, Jiban and Nirmal. The members of the two branches continued in separate possession of their respective allotments and in joint possession of the Thakurbati and performed the seba during the respective turn, of the two branches. 4. In December, 1937, Fanindra, the third son Nagendra, alleging that he had been excluded from the management of the debutter estate and that his three brothers and mother were mismanaging and wasting the debutter estate filed a suit (being Suit No. 2001 of 1937), in this Court in the names of the deity Sree Sree Gopinath Jew and of himself as Plaintiffs against his three brothers, Kshitindra, Rabindra and Satyendra and his mother Sm. Chamatkar Mohini Dassi, for removal of his three brothers from the office of sebait, for a declaration of his rights to be the sole sebait, for a scheme for the proper performance of the worship of the Plaintiff deity, if necessary for the division and allotment in severalty of the turn of worship amongst the sebaits and other reliefs. The sons of Kartic who are also sebaits of the Plaintiff deity were not made parties to that suit and consequently no notice of any proceeding therein was given to any of them. 5. On February 7th, 1939, a decree was passed in the said Suit No. 2001 of 1937 by consent of all parties thereto in accordance with certain terms of settlement which were certified by the. Court to be for the benefit of the Plaintiff deity. By cl. 1 of the said terms of settlement it was agreed and declared that the premises Nos. 7, 7/A, 7/1B, 7/1C and 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane absolutely belonged to the Plaintiff deity Sree Sree Gopinath Jew and that the said deity would continue to be located at No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane and that Fanindra. Kshitindra, Rabindra and Satyendra as representing the branch of Nagendra were the present sebaits and were entitled to perform the daily and periodical seba of the deity during the first half of each Bengali year i.e., from the month of Baisakh to Aswin every year. By cl. 2 of the terms of settlement the six-monthly turn of worship of Nagendra was sub-divided amongst his four sons as therein mentioned and it was enjoined that each of them should be responsible for the due performance of the seba during his turn. By cl. 3 the Official Receiver was appointed Receiver of the premises Nos. 7/1A, 7/1B, 7/1C and 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane and the rents, issues and profits thereof. He was also appointed Receiver of the Thakurbari No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane only during the turn of worship of the branch of Nagendra but not during that of the branch of Kartic. Cl. 4 enjoined the Official Receiver to disburse the rents, issues and profits for the following purposes and in the following order, namely, (a) in payment of his commission, government revenue, municipal taxes, etc., (b) in setting apart 10 per cent, of the gross collections as a reserve fund for repairs, (c) in payment of Rs. Cl. 4 enjoined the Official Receiver to disburse the rents, issues and profits for the following purposes and in the following order, namely, (a) in payment of his commission, government revenue, municipal taxes, etc., (b) in setting apart 10 per cent, of the gross collections as a reserve fund for repairs, (c) in payment of Rs. 50 per month to Sm. Tarubala (wife of Kshitindra) in liquidation of the sum of Rs. 1,500 to be advanced by her for meeting certain costs and expenses detailed in cl. 8 on the security of the four premises mentioned in cl. 9 and (d) in payment of the balance of the income of the whole year to the sebait whose turn of worship should fall during the said year. The costs and expenses for which Rs. 1.500 was to be raised included Rs. 900 as costs of the Plaintiffs' attorney, Rs. 379 as costs of the Defendants' attorney, Rs. 150 as contribution towards costs of repairs of the Thakurbari, Rs. 25 as costs of the proposed mortgage and Rs. 46 as the Receiver's commission. Pursuant to this consent decree the Official Receiver took possession of the properties. 6. Tarubala, the wife of Kshitindra, declined to advance the sum of Rs. 1,500 or any sum whatsoever. The attorneys were pressing for payment of their costs. Accordingly in August, 1940, the Official Receiver applied to Court for leave to raise a sum of Rs. 2.500 on mortgage of the said four premises. In the petition the Official Receiver set out the rents realised from the different premises, the fact of suspension of rent by the Corporation of Calcutta, which was the tenant of premises Nos. 7/1A and 7/1D at Rs. 113 per month, on account of want of repairs, the estimated cost of repairs, the fact of Tarubala's refusal to advance Rs. 1.500 and the insistent demands of the attorneys for payment. It was stated that Rs. 2,290-6-9 was urgently needed for meeting the following expenses: Rs. 900 for Plaintiff's attorney's costs, Rs. 379 for Defendant's attorney's costs, Rs. 586-6-9 for repairs to No. 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane, Rs. 150 for contribution for repairs of Thakurbari (No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane), Rs. 150 for raising the loan on mortgage including brokerage and Rs. 126 for Receiver's commission. 2,290-6-9 was urgently needed for meeting the following expenses: Rs. 900 for Plaintiff's attorney's costs, Rs. 379 for Defendant's attorney's costs, Rs. 586-6-9 for repairs to No. 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane, Rs. 150 for contribution for repairs of Thakurbari (No. 7, Gopal Chandra Lane), Rs. 150 for raising the loan on mortgage including brokerage and Rs. 126 for Receiver's commission. On August 28th, 1940, Sen, J., made an order granting leave to the Official Receiver to raise a loan of Rs. 2.500 on mortgage of premises Nos. 7/1A, 7/1B, 7/1C and 7/1D, Gopal Chandra Lane and to make the several payments mentioned above. The Official Receiver was authorised to retain his costs of that application as between attorney and client out of the estate and the other parties were directed to bear and pay their own costs of that application. 7. The Official Receiver asked the solicitors for the parties to that suit if any of their clients would advance the amount but none of them offered to do so. The Official Receiver then approached certain other attorneys but met with no better result. 8. A meeting of the parties was held on February 25th, 1941, at the Official Receiver's office to consider the position. A suggestion was made on behalf of the Plaintiffs in that suit that the properties or a sufficient portion thereof be sold and the liabilities be met out of the sale proceeds and that an application be made to Court in that behalf or in the alternative an administrative order he obtained from Court for payment of the liabilities by instalments out of the income of the estate. The Defendants attorney suggested that Rs. 50 provided in the decree for payment to Tarubala in liquidation of the amount to be advanced by her but which she declined to do might be utilised in paying the present liabilities by instalments. The Official Receiver was of opinion that a formal application was necessary and directed the parties to write to him suggesting the course to be adopted by him. He also stated that if the parties did not write or did not agree, he would apply to Court for leave to sell one of the properties, preferably No. 7/1B, Gopal Chandra Lane for payment of the liabilities by instalments out of the funds in his hands. 9. He also stated that if the parties did not write or did not agree, he would apply to Court for leave to sell one of the properties, preferably No. 7/1B, Gopal Chandra Lane for payment of the liabilities by instalments out of the funds in his hands. 9. The parties not having written to the Official Receiver as directed, the Official Receiver convened another meeting on July 7th, 1941. At this meeting the attorneys for both parties suggested that the Receiver should apply to Court for leave to sell the properties or a portion thereof. The Official Receiver also expressed the view that he had no other alternative than to move the Court for sale of one of the properties. 10. Further both the attorneys suggested that their costs of the previous application, which their respective clients had by the order of August 28th, 1940, been directed to bear and pay should be paid out of the sale proceeds. 11. Having decided that there must be a sale, the question arose as to which of the prop should be sold. 7/1A and 7/1D had been out to the Coq>oration of Calcutta and fetching good rent, namely, Rs. 113 per month and consequently the Official Receiver very properly held that those two properties should not be sold. There were then two other properties left, namely 7/1B and 7/1C, Gopal Chandra Lane. The Official Receiver on July 18th 19th, 1941, wrote to the attorneys asking them categorically as to which of the properties should be sold. The attorneys had no specific instructions from their respective clients and by their replies left it to the Official Receiver to act according to his discretion having regard to the extent of the liabilities. The Official Receiver directed his office engineer to survey the premises This engineer, it is said, pointed out the difficulty of demarcating the boundary lines both 7/1B and 7/1C. Further, anticipating that the costs of the parties subsequent to the decree would also have to be paid out of the estate it was decided that an application should be made for leave to sell both 7/1B and 7/1C, Gopal Chandra Lane. A draft petition was prepared by the Official Receiver's attorneys sent to the attorneys for the parties. Further, anticipating that the costs of the parties subsequent to the decree would also have to be paid out of the estate it was decided that an application should be made for leave to sell both 7/1B and 7/1C, Gopal Chandra Lane. A draft petition was prepared by the Official Receiver's attorneys sent to the attorneys for the parties. The latter altered the petition to some extent by inserting direction for payment of subsequent costs the parties including those of the application leave to raise loan on mortgage. This petition was then engrossed on December 18th, 1941, and presented to Court and on January 6th, 1942, Sen. J., made an order giving leave to the Official Receiver to sell both 7/1B and 7/1C, Gopal Chandra Lane by private treaty or public auction after fixing a reserve price and to utilise the sale proceeds in paying the liabilities mentioned in the petition. The Official Receiver then engaged Messrs Ballardie Thomson and Mathews, a well-known firm of surveyors who are on the Registrar's list of approved surveyors, to survey and value the properties, so as to enable the Official Receiver to fix a reserve price. The surveyors also pointed out the difficulties of demarcating the boundary lines and suggested that the two properties should be sold as one lot. After some correspondence a meeting was held on March 24th, 1943, at which a representative of the surveyors was also present. He explained the difficulties of selling either of the properties separately and suggested sale of both in one lot. The attorneys agreed to the suggestions and eventually the surveyors were directed to value the two properties as one lot. The surveyors submitted their final valuation report on July 14th, 1943, valuing the two properties which together comprised an area of 3 k. 15 ch. 29 sq. ft. at Rs. 15,000. Notification of sale, conditions of sale and abstract of title were prepared and advertisements were issued for sale to be held on July 11th, 1944. 12. On the date of the sale the Official Receiver received two letters from two lawyers acting respectively for Ajit and Jiban, two of the sons of Kartic, pointing out the debutter character of the properties, their liability to meet the debseba expenses, the easements which the Thakurbari had over them, the invalidity of the proceedings and their clients' intention to take legal steps. This letter was read at the sale but the attorneys for the parties insisted on the sale being proceeded with. It does not appear whether Sarbatosh Sen who was declared the purchaser was present at the time when these letters were read out. It is, however, not suggested by Mr. Mukherjee that his presence at the time would have in any way precluded him from taking the objections that have been taken to the title. The sale was eventually proceeded with and Sarbatosh Sen was declared the purchaser at and for Rs. 30,200 and he paid 25 per cent, in terms of the conditions of sale. The reason for this unexpectedly high price offered by Sarbatosh Sen was that he was the owner of the adjoining premises which was his dwelling house and the other bidder was a Mahomedan gentleman who intended to have his hide godown in the premises. On July 16th, 1944, a formal agreement for sale in writing was executed by the Official Receiver and Sarbatosh Sen. The conditions; of sale form part of the terms of this agreement. 13. Investigation of title followed and various requisitions on title were put and answered and eventually on August 9th, 1944. Messrs. N. C. Bural and Pyne acting for Sarbatosh Sen rejected the title and demanded back the earnest money. The Official Receiver, on the other hand, insisted on Sarbatosh Sen completing the purchase. 14. On October 22nd, 1944, Sarbatosh Sen died intestate leaving his widow Sm. Jogmaya Dassi and five sons, Prosad, Khetra, Kartick, Shyam and Madan as his heirs. 15. Thereafter on January 9th, 1945, the Official Receiver filed the present suit against the heirs of Sarbatosh Sen deceased for specific performance of the agreement dated July 16th, 1944, and other incidental reliefs. All the Defendants entered appearance and filed a joint written statement. Jogmaya Dassi and five sons, Prosad, Khetra, Kartick, Shyam and Madan as his heirs. 15. Thereafter on January 9th, 1945, the Official Receiver filed the present suit against the heirs of Sarbatosh Sen deceased for specific performance of the agreement dated July 16th, 1944, and other incidental reliefs. All the Defendants entered appearance and filed a joint written statement. Their defence is that the deed of partition dated June 8th, 1904, the proceedings in Suit No. 2001 of 1937 and the decree and orders made therein and the sale held pursuant thereto are not valid or binding on the deity, that the parties to that suit other than the deity are but some only of the sebaits and as such the suit was not maintainable and no title can be passed by a sale held in a suit in which all the sebaits are not parties, that even if the order for sale was valid, there was in fact no legal necessity for selling the debutter property, that the alleged necessity, if any was brought about by the mismanagement of the Official Receiver, and finally, that in any event the alleged necessity did not justify the sale of two of the properties belonging to the deity. 16. The following issues were raised on the pleadings :-- (1) Is the deed of partition dated 8th June, 1904, valid and/or operative? (2) Is the consent decree dated 7th February, 1939, valid and binding on the thakur and/or its Sebaits (3) Had the shebaits in the line of Nagen by themselves any right to alienate the premises in suit? (4) Was there any legal necessity for such alienation ? (5) Was it within the power of the Official Receiver to apply for and obtain the order for sale of the premises in suit? (6) Can the Plaintiff give the Defendants a title free from reasonable doubts? (7) Was the order dated 6th January, 1942, obtained collusively, improperly and/or fraudulently as alleged in paragraph 2 of the written statement ? To what relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled. 17. Mr. Mukherjee has not argued that the Defendants are, by reason of any of the conditions of sale, precluded from setting up any of the aforesaid defences. Indeed the arguments before me on both sides have been confined to the consideration of the correctness or otherwise of the points raised by the defence. 17. Mr. Mukherjee has not argued that the Defendants are, by reason of any of the conditions of sale, precluded from setting up any of the aforesaid defences. Indeed the arguments before me on both sides have been confined to the consideration of the correctness or otherwise of the points raised by the defence. It is, therefore, necessary for me now, to examine the merits of the respective contentions of the parties. 18. There is no dispute that Nilmoney Dey by his Will created an endowment in favour of the, deity Sree Sree Gopinath Jew comprising several properties including those in suit. It is common ground that by virtue of the Privy Council decision Nagendra and Kartic became the sebaits of the deity. Mr. Mukherjee conceded that the properties all along retained the character of debutter properties. In fact by the deed of direction of 1928 Nagendra acknowledged them as debutter properties and the decree in Suit No. 2001 of 1937 expressly declared them as debutter properties. Mr. Mukherjee therefore conceded that the deed of 1904 as a deed of partition was not binding on the deity. Issue No. 1 must therefore be answered in favour of the Defendants. 19. While conceding that the deed of partition between Nagendra and Kartic was not as such binding on the deity and that the properties tinned to be debutter properties, Mr. Mukherjee contended that it was binding on the parties thereto and their heirs as a family arrangement for the convenient management of the debutter properties. The terms of the deed are so explicit that it is difficult to construe it as anything but an ordinary deed of partition. The deed declared the shares of the two parties and divided and allotted properties to them separately a provision that one party should have no share in the properties allotted to the oilier. It provided for payment of owelty money and expressly reserved power of gift and sale to parties in respect of the properties allotted to them respectively. In short the deed had all characteristics of a regular deed of partition of secular properties. It is true that Nagendra by his deed of direction of 1928 acknowledged the debutter character of the properties and directed his sons to treat them as such but that, in my opinion, cannot affect the meaning or construction of the deed of partition. In short the deed had all characteristics of a regular deed of partition of secular properties. It is true that Nagendra by his deed of direction of 1928 acknowledged the debutter character of the properties and directed his sons to treat them as such but that, in my opinion, cannot affect the meaning or construction of the deed of partition. The deed of 1904 was in terms and in effect a deed of partition and as such was not binding on the deity. It cannot in my judgment be construed as a mere deed of arrangement amongst the sebaits for the convenient management of the debutter estate 20. Assuming that the deed of 1904 can be regarded as a mere deed of management, what are its implications in law? Mr. Mukherjee argued that by this deed Nagendra in effect relinquished his sebaiti rights in respect of the properties allotted to Kartic and Kartic relinquished his sebaiti rights in the properties allotted to Nagendra He pointed out that ever since 1904 Kartic and his branch ceased to manage the properties allotted to Nagendra and therefore by such con duct ceased to be sebaits qua those properties. He concluded by urging that there was nothing to prevent a sebait renouncing his sebaiti rights in respect of the debutter properties or son them and relied on several judicial decisions which must now be examined. 21. The first case cited by Mr. Mukherjee was that of Khetter Chunder Ghose v. Hari Das Bundopadhya I. L. R. 17 Cal. 557 (1890). In that case a gift of an idol and of the lands with which it was endowed dicing a private endowment) made with the concurrence of the whole family to another family for the purpose of carrying on the regular worship of the idol and for the benefit of the idol was upheld as valid and binding on the succeeding sebaits. Apart from the question whether a deity which is a juridical entity can he properly treated as a mere chattel and whether even the consensus of the whole family of the founder can put an end to the debutter it will he observed that the Ghoses, the sebaits of the family of the original founder, absolutely relinquished their sebaiti right in the idol as well as in all the properties of the idol. It was not a case of mutual arrangement for separate management of the debutter properties made by sebaits who retained their office as sebaits. In Bhuban Mohon Koley v. Narendra Nath Konwar 35 C. W. N. 478 (1930) the four sebaits arranged amongst themselves to collect rents from tenants separately according to certain shares agreed upon between them. Two of the sebaits having ceased to perform the seba of the deity, the other two who were performing the seba claimed to realise the whole rent from the tenants and not merely their respective shares thereof. The lower Courts found that the two sebaits had by their conduct ceased to be sebaits and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to realise the 16-annas of the rent from the tenants. The High Court on appeal upheld the decision of the lower Courts. It will be noticed that in that case two of the sebaits ceased to perform the duties of sebaits in the matter of the seba of the idol and therefore they altogether ceased to be sebaits and having ceased to be sebaits they forfeited the right to collect the rents. In the next place, it was held in that case that notwithstanding the mutual arrangement for separate collection of rent according to shares, the dutiful sebaits were entitled to realise the whole rent. In other words, in spite of the arrangement the performing sebaits were not precluded from asserting their rights to collect the whole rent. In Nilmoni Poricha v. Appanna Poricha A. I. R. [1936] Mad. 14 next cited by Mr. Mukherjee it was held that arrangements between the parties to carry out the duties of a trust, if they are conducive to the interests of smooth administration of the affairs of the trust were really in the nature of schemes framed for the management of the trust and would be binding upon the parties thereto and their representatives till modified cither by common consent or in some manner known to law. The observations of Varadachariar, J., in his judgment at p. 15 clearly show that such arrangements may be modified, that by such arrangements the trustees do not cease to be interested in the trust properties and that in spite of such arrangements one trustee can enforce the performance of the duties of the trust by the defaulting trustee. The observations of Varadachariar, J., in his judgment at p. 15 clearly show that such arrangements may be modified, that by such arrangements the trustees do not cease to be interested in the trust properties and that in spite of such arrangements one trustee can enforce the performance of the duties of the trust by the defaulting trustee. In Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti L. R. 33 I. A. 139: S.C. I. L. R. 29 Mad. 283 (1906) a family arrangement by which one branch of the family relinquished the claim to hold the office of the manager of a temple in favour of another branch was upheld by the Judicial Committee. It will be observed, however, that the relinquishment extended to the office itself as well as to the management of all the properties. Further the judgment of Lord Macnaughten at p. 144 clearly indicates that in spite of such relinquishment the persons relinquishing can go to Court to have it set aside on proof of maladministration. These cases, in my judgment, do not assist the Plaintiff at all: On the authorities it appears to be well settled that (a) all the sebaits, like trustees, must act together. See Iswar Lakshmi Durga v. Surendra 45 C. W. N. 665 (1941), Radha Charan Saha v. Sree Sree Iswar Joykali Bigraha 46 C. W. N. 94 (1941) and Lala Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad 49 C. W. N. 195 (1944), (b) the right of suit on behalf of the deity or relating to the properties of the deity is vested in all the sebaits jointly. Sree Sree Sire Sreedhar Jew v. Kanta Mohan Mullick 50 C. W. N. 14 (1945) and the cases discussed therein; (c) it is competent to a sebait to renounce or make a gift of his office to a person standing in the line of succession who is otherwise not disqualified by personal unfitness: Mancharan v. Pran Shankar I. L. R. 6 Bom. 298 (1882) and Nirad v. Shibdas I. L. R. 36 Cal. 298 (1882) and Nirad v. Shibdas I. L. R. 36 Cal. 975 (1909); (d) in case of such renunciation or gift, the sebait renouncing or making a gift of his office has still the right, in case of mismanagement or waste by the transferee, to intervene by invoking the aid of the Court to prevent the same: Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti L. R. B. 33 I. A. 130 : S. C. I. L. R. 9 Mad. 283 (1906) ; (e) although sebaits can for the proper administration of the debutter estate make arrangements or schemes for separate management, they cannot, while retaining their office of trust, abdicate altogether their duties and functions and delegate all their authority including that of sale, gift or mortgage or the like to a co-shebait; Bonnerji v. Sitanath Das L. R. 9 I. A. 46: S. C. 26 C. W. N. 236 (1921) and (Sri Sri) Gopal Sridhar Mahadeb and Others Vs. Sashi Bhusan Sarkar and Others, AIR 1933 Cal 109 ; (f) arrangement for separate management by sebaits can authorise the doing of routine administration work but cannot authorise an alienation of the debutter property without the concurrence of all sebaits and without justifying necessity: Krishnaswami Naidu v. S. Varnikalingam Pillai A. I. R. [1926] Mad. 1199 ; (g) mutual arrangement for separate management, being in the nature of a scheme, is binding so far as ordinary routine management is concerned but, does not disentitle a sebait in case of dereliction of duty by another sebait from asserting the right as sebait or from intervening and taking legal steps to modify or cancel the arrangement and prevent mismanagement : Bhuban Mohan Koley v. Narendra Nath Konwar 35 C. W. N. 478 (1930), Nilmoni Poricha v. Appanna Poricha A. I. R. [1936] Mad. 14 and Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti L. R. 33 I. A. 139: S.C. I. L. R. 29 Mad. 283 (1906). 22. In the case now before me both branches of the family still retain their office as sebait. The Thakurbari has been left joint. They are performing the seba of the deity by turns. There is no suggestion, far less proof, that the sons of Kartic by reason of any misconduct have ceased to be sebaits. 283 (1906). 22. In the case now before me both branches of the family still retain their office as sebait. The Thakurbari has been left joint. They are performing the seba of the deity by turns. There is no suggestion, far less proof, that the sons of Kartic by reason of any misconduct have ceased to be sebaits. Assuming that the deed of 1904 can be construed as a family arrangement for separate management of separate portions of the debutter estate and as such binding on Nagendra and Kartic and their heirs, it is clear, on the authorities, that by such an arrangement the heirs of Kartic have not ceased to be sebaits and that it is still open to any of them, on proof of mismanagement or waste on the part of the heirs of Nagendra, to take steps in Court to prevent the same and to protect the debutter estate and that such an arrangement does not authorise the sebaits of the branch of Nagendra alone to alienate or charge the debutter properties entrusted to their management and care. The, heirs of Kartic are still sebaits and as such interested in the framing of a scheme for the debseba and management of the debutter estate, even if they had left the management of a part of the estate to their co-sebaits. In any event they are interested to see that the debutter estate is not frittered away in meeting the costs of a suit which is brought about by the internecine quarrels amongst the sons of Nagendra. They certainly have a say on the question whether any part of the debutter estate should be mortgaged or sold. They were not made parties to the said Suit No. 2001 of 1937 and consequently they are not bound by any decree or order made therein and they may challenge, if they can make out a proper case, the title of a purchaser at a sale held under order of Court made in that suit. In my judgment Issues Nos. 2 and 3 must be answered in the negative. 23. Assuming, however, that Mr. In my judgment Issues Nos. 2 and 3 must be answered in the negative. 23. Assuming, however, that Mr. Mukherjee is right in his contention, namely that the members the branch of Kartic are bound by the arrangement of 1904 and that they are precluded, for all times to come, from questioning the propriety or otherwise of the administration of the debutter properties entrusted to the management and care of the branch of Nagendra and that therefore they were not necessary or proper parties to Suit No. 2001 of 1937, will the purchaser at a sale held under order of Court in that suit be absolutely protected by that order alone? The passage in the judgment of Kania. J., in In re Dattatraya Govind Haldankar I. L. R. 56 Bom. 519 at p. 525 (1932) based on the observations of the Privy Council in Ram Krishna v. Ratan Chand L. R. 58 I. A. 173: S. C. 35 C. W. N. 341 (1931) clearly indicates that if the sale is challenged at a future date the purchaser, in spite of the order for sale will have to prove aliunde, as a fact, that there was legal necessity for the sale or that he made independent enquiries and was reasonably satisfied that there was such necessity. At the highest, as pointed out by Ameer Ali. J., in Pasupatinath Seal v. Pradyumnakumar Mallik I. L. R. 63 Cal. 454 at p. 469 (1035) the order of Court may constitute prima facie evidence of necessity which may, however, be rebutted. The purchaser, if the sale is completed, may therefore be exposed to the risk of having in future to prove necessity or bond fide enquiries. It is therefore only right and just that before an agreement for sale of debutter property is enforced against a purchaser he should be reasonably satisfied in fact that there is legal necessity for the sale. This leads me to examine the evidence and see if there is any proof of legal necessity. The onus of proof on this issue is admittedly on the vendor. 24. [His Lordship then considered the evidence and proceeded.] 25. There is a good deal of force in the argument of learned Counsel for the Defendants that sufficient evidence of legal necessity has not been adduced before the Court. The onus of proof on this issue is admittedly on the vendor. 24. [His Lordship then considered the evidence and proceeded.] 25. There is a good deal of force in the argument of learned Counsel for the Defendants that sufficient evidence of legal necessity has not been adduced before the Court. I am also impressed by the argument that the legal necessity of the deity must be ascertained after taking into account all the resources of the deity. The deity is the owner of these properties. Assume that the income of these properties is not sufficient to meet these liabilities, is that a good and valid ground for sale of these properties even if the deity has other resources out of which these liabilities can be paid ? The deity is equally the owner of the properties put in charge of the branch of Kartic. The Official Receiver naturally has no knowledge and consequently has given no evidence before me as to what the income of those properties are. If there are sufficient sums belonging to the deity in the hands of the sebaits of that branch, surely it cannot be said that there is legal necessity for sale of any of these properties. By the arrangement for separate management the deity has not ceased to be owner of any of its properties and its pressing needs must be judged by taking into account all its resources. There is, as I have said, no evidence as to the income of those other properties. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the Official Receiver has discharged the onus that is undoubtedly on him. The Issues Nos. 4 and 5 must be decided in favour of the Defendants. 26. Another subsidiary point was taken namely, that for meeting the existing liabilities it was not necessary to sell two of the premises. I am satisfied, on the evidence before me, that in this matter the Official Receiver acted perfectly reasonably and honestly. Then was difficulty in demarcating the boundary between the two premises Nos. 7/1R and 7/1C. The parties did not care to help the Official Receiver. The attorneys left it to the discretion of the Official Receiver. The engineers and surveyors advised the sale of the two premises as one lot. It is obvious that sale of one of them would have greatly affected the value of the other. 7/1R and 7/1C. The parties did not care to help the Official Receiver. The attorneys left it to the discretion of the Official Receiver. The engineers and surveyors advised the sale of the two premises as one lot. It is obvious that sale of one of them would have greatly affected the value of the other. If there was to be sale at all for necessity the sale of both was certainly for the benefit of the estate. Even after the order for sale the Official Receiver tried to find out if one of them could be advantageously sold. I am quite satisfied that the Official Receiver acted in perfect good faith in coming to the decision that the two properties should be put up for sale in out lot and if I were satisfied as to the right of the sons of Nagendra, who are only some of the sebaits, to alienate the debutter property and as to the existence of legal necessity, I certainly would not have refused relief to the Official Receiver on the mere ground that the sale of the two premises was improper or imprudent. To summarise, then, I am not pursuaded that the deed of 1904 which in terms purports to be a deed of partition can be construed as a mere arrangement amongst sebaits for separate management or that as such it is binding on the deity. I am not convinced, on the authorities, that even if it constitutes an arrangement of that character, the members of the branch of Kartic, who are undoubtedly still sebaits of the deity, are precluded by reason of such arrangement from intervening, for all times to come, even if the sebaits of the branch of Nagendra mismanage or waste the properties entrusted to their management and care. Those sebaits who belong to the branch of Kartic were not made parties to Suit No. 2001 of 1937, and they are not bound by the decree or orders made therein and it is open to them, if they can make out a good and sufficient ground, to challenge the sale. I am satisfied, on the authorities, that the order of Court for sale will not give absolute protection to the purchaser if his title is challenged at a future date. I am satisfied, on the authorities, that the order of Court for sale will not give absolute protection to the purchaser if his title is challenged at a future date. Finally, the Official Receiver has not, to my mind, sufficiently discharged the onus of proof of legal necessity which, apart from the order of Court, will justify the sale. The title, in my judgment, is, at least, a highly doubtful title and a Court of equity will not force such a doubtful title on an unwilling purchaser. To compel the purchaser to take this property will amount to forcing him to buy a litigation which has in fact been threatened by two of the sons of Kartic. The objections of the purchaser do not appear to me to be fanciful or unreasonable at all. I answer Issue No. 6 in the negative. The result, therefore, is that this suit must be dismissed with costs. The Official Receiver will refund the 25 per cent, deposited by Sarbatosh Sen to the Defendants with interest thereon at 6 per cent, from date of deposit, on production of evidence of presentation to the estate of Sarbatosh Sen. This decree will not be executed for three months.