JUDGMENT Lodge, J. - This Rule was issued upon the Deputy Commissioner of Sylhet to show cause why the convictions and sentences passed on the petitioners should not be set aside. Petitioner 1, Md. Abdul Khalique is a big cloth merchant of Bandar Bazar, Sylhet. Petitioner 2 is employed in his shop and is described throughout as his karmachari. On 29th May 1945, petitioner 1 Abdul Khalique and his karmachari Kuti Mea, sold certain mill cloths to one Dhon Singh Khasia of Jaintiapur Bazar at a price higher than the controlled price and without granting him any cash memo as required under the law. It was further alleged that they sold these cloths to Dhon Singh Khasia inspite of instructions to the contrary from the Licensing Authority. Three charges were framed against the two petitioners and they were found guilty and convicted on all three charges. The charge with which we are more particularly concerned is the second charge. That charge reads: That yon sold one than of voil Addi, four thans of prints and one than of coating (Exs. 1 to 6) to Dhon Singh Khasia on 29-5-45 before the approval of the list of rural paikers against the instructions of the Licensing Authority, Sylhet, contained in his letter No. 10674 War dated 18-4-45 asking you not to sell thereafter cloths to paikers of the rural areas till the approval of the list of such paikers by the licensing Authority and thus violated condition 5 of the Licence issued to him and contravened the provision of Cl. 3, Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order, 1943. 2. The petitioners were tried by Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali, Additional District Magistrate of Sylhet. The instructions contained in letter No. 10674 War dated 18th April 1945 referred to in the charge were instructions issued by Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali, Additional District Magistrate, as Licensing Authority. Two arguments have been addressed to us. It has been argued in the first place that Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali was not the Licensing Authority, under the Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order of 1943 and that, therefore, these instructions contained in this letter were not instructions contemplated by condition 5 of the licence. Therefore failure to comply with these instructions was not an offence under Cl. 3, Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order. Therefore failure to comply with these instructions was not an offence under Cl. 3, Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order. The second argument was that inasmuch as the petitioners were accused of disobeying the instructions issued by Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali as Licensing Authority, Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the provisions of S. 556, Criminal P. C. With regard to the first of these arguments Licensing Authority is defined in the Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order of 1943 as follows : Clause 2 (d)-'Licensing authority' means, in a district which has no subdivision and in the sadar sub-division of a district, the District Magistrate and, in any other sub-division, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. 3. Assam Gazette Notification No. AAA31/43/4 (A) dated 27th May 1943 appointed Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali as Additional District Magistrate of Sylhet and empowered him to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate whether under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under any other law for the time being in force. Mr. N. K. Basu for the petitioners has argued that the power to give instructions is not a power conferred upon the District Magistrate and therefore the Gazette Notification did not empower the Additional District Magistrate to exercise the authority of a Licensing Authority. Mr. Basu's argument was that the Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order of 1943 confers certain powers on an Authority described as the Licensing Authority and then appoints the District Magistrate of the district to be the Licensing Authority. He argued that the result of this was that only the District Magistrate in a district in which there is no subdivision and in the sadar sub-division could exercise the powers of a Licensing Authority. I am unable to accept this argument. He argued that the result of this was that only the District Magistrate in a district in which there is no subdivision and in the sadar sub-division could exercise the powers of a Licensing Authority. I am unable to accept this argument. It seems to me that according to the definition in the Assam Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Licensing Order of 1943 and according to the other provisions of that Order, the powers are definitely conferred upon the District Magistrate as such in a district which has no sub-division and in the sadar sub-division of a district, and in other sub-divisions the powers are conferred upon the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as such and that, therefore, the Gazette Notification which empowered Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate authorised him to exercise the powers of a Licensing Authority under this particular Order. 4. With regard to the second argument Mr. Basu contended that inasmuch as Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali himself gave the instructions which were disregarded he was personally interested in the case within the meaning of S. 556, Criminal P. C. The instructions given by Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali were general instructions contained in a letter addressed to the Secretary, Cloth and Yarn Dealers' Co-operative Wholesale Society Sylhet, governing the distribution of cloths throughout the district. I am unable to hold that Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali was in any way personally interested in this particular case. It seems to me that the question whether he is personally interested or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case, and, in the present case, I cannot hold that Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali was in any way personally interested in the case. In the result, I am of opinion that S. 556, Criminal P. C., has no application and that Moulvi Syed Nabib Ali was competent to try this case. For the rest, the conviction is based on evidence and on findings of facts with which we are not entitled to interfere. In my opinion, therefore, this Rule should be discharged. Derbyshire, C. J. 5. I agree.