JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This is a second appeal against the decision of the learned Civil Judge, Gonda, in a preemption suit. 2. On 17th May, 1938, Ram Duhrey executed a composite sale deed in respect of two properties in village Gulharia, pargana and district Ganda. One was 2 pies 10 krants proprietary share in patti Bimrat Ram and the other 1 pie 5 krants under-proprietary share in mahal Hinga Jot. The sale was for Rs. 200, and the vendees were Girdhari, Bhagirath, Raja Ram and Ram Milan. Khuda Yar Khan was a co-sharer both in patti Bharat Ram and Mahal Hinga Jot, and he raised an action a day before the expiry of limitation against the Venlor Ram Dalarey, and the vendees Girdhari and Others for pre-emption of one of the two properties only, namely 2 pies 10 krants share in patti Bharat Ram on payment of the entire sale consideration. A day after Ram Nath and Ram Jas who were also co-sharers both in patti Bharat and in mahal Hinga Jot filed another suit for pre-emption of both items of property. This apneal arises out of the later suit. Neither Khuda Yar Khan was impleaded as plaintiff in Ram Nath and Ram Jas's suit nor were the latter persons impleaded in the suit of Khuda Yar Khan. Both suits were tried by the same Court, but Khuda Yar Khan's claim was decreed on a compromise on 2+th July, 1939. In view of this decree Ram Nath and Ram Jas applied on 26th July, 1939 that Khuda Yar Khan be made a defendant in their suit. The application was allowed on the 6th october, 1939, and the plaint was accordingly amended. Khuda Yar Khan contested the right of Ram Nath and Kam Jas on a denial of their preferential right to pre-empt. As this is the only matter which survives at this stage, it is unnecessary to mention the other paints which were in dispute between the parties. The learned trial Court decreed the suit against the defendants including Khuda Yar Khan, and the decision was upheld by the Court of first appeal. Khuda Yar Khan has now come up by way of second appeal. 3. The learned trial Court decreed the suit against the defendants including Khuda Yar Khan, and the decision was upheld by the Court of first appeal. Khuda Yar Khan has now come up by way of second appeal. 3. The contention raised on behalf of the' appellant is that the trend of decision in Oudh is to the effect that partial pre-emption of a composite sale deed is permissible on payment of full consideration. His suit was, therefore, rightly decreed in respect of 2 pies 10 krants share in patti Bharat Ram So far as his rights against Ram Nath and Ram Jas are concerned, he still retains the qualification as a co-sharer in both patti Bharat Ram and Mahal Hinga Jot to enable him to preempt. This qualification rests on the same footing as the qualification possessed by Ram Nath and Ram Jas. Khuda Yar Khan, therefore, claimed that in order to resolve the competition lots should be ordered to be drawn as prescribed by the last paragraph of Section 9 of the Oudh Laws Act. 4. It cannot be denied that the initial rights possessed by the plaintiffs and Khuda Yar Khan were equal. The only question which requires determination is whether the filing of a suit to pre-empt only one of the properties covered by the sale operated to reduce those rights so as to render them inferior to those possessed by Ram Nath and Ram Jas. Order 2, rule, 2, C.P.C. provides that- Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. It further lays down that Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 5. In the suit instituted by Khudayar Khan he clearly omitted to press his claim for pre-emption of 1 pie 5 krants under- proprietary share of mabal Hinga Jot. It follows that his right u/s 9 of Oudh Laws Act in respect of that property lapsed. 5. In the suit instituted by Khudayar Khan he clearly omitted to press his claim for pre-emption of 1 pie 5 krants under- proprietary share of mabal Hinga Jot. It follows that his right u/s 9 of Oudh Laws Act in respect of that property lapsed. At the date therefore of Ram Nath's suit Khuda Yar Khan could claim pre-emption only in respect of one of the two properties comprised in the deed of 17th May, 1938, whereas the plaintiffs still retained the right of pre-emption in respect of both properties. There could, therefore, be no competition between the two sets of pre-emptor. It: is, however, chimed for the appellant that he must be considered qua the share in patti Bharath Singh at any rate to possess equal rights with the pre- emptor. In respect of this property, there- fore, it U urged there must be a drawing of lots as contemplated by Section 9. In my opinion the loss of the right to pre-empt the Hinga Jot property operates to give preferential claim to the plaintiffs in respect of both properties, and there is therefore, no competition between the plaintiffs and Khuda' Yar Khan. Inspire of the fact that in a number of decisions of this Court for example in Maha Prasad v. Dukh Haraft Nath 1940 OA 792 : AWR (CC) 385 : OWN 828; Syed Ali Naqi v. Zaheer Husain 1941 OA 813 : AWR (Rev) 862 : OW N 1097 and Abhairaj Singh v. Udairaj Dube 1943 OA 120 : OWN 192, the right of partial pre-emption payment of the whole consideration of the sale is recognised, the preference between the competition pre-emptor must be regulated in accordance with the order set down in " Section 9, Oudh Laws Act. Trie application of that order to cases where the sale deed comprises only one property is simple enough, but difficulty arises in cases where there are a number of properties included in the sale deed all of which are pre-emptily. In my opinion it must be held in such cases that a person, who has a right to pre-empt all properties, has a superior claim to the person who is entitled' to pre-empt, only some of them. Judged in this light the plaintiffs' rights must prevail over those of Khuda Yar Khan. 6. In my opinion it must be held in such cases that a person, who has a right to pre-empt all properties, has a superior claim to the person who is entitled' to pre-empt, only some of them. Judged in this light the plaintiffs' rights must prevail over those of Khuda Yar Khan. 6. It was next urged on behalf of the appellant that the lower Courts were not justified in permitting Ram Nath and Ram Jas to override the compromise decree obtained by Khuda Yar Khan on 21st July, 1939. It is to be remembered that Ram Nath and Ram Jas were no parties to that decree, and they could not therefore be bound by it. In their own suit they impleaded Khuda Yar Khan, and his rights were found to be inferior to theirs. There can be no valid objection, to a decree being passed in favour of the plaintiffs in these circumstances, even though it may have the effect of superseding the decree of Khuda Yar Khan. 7. I am satisfied that the decision of the lower Court is correct, This appeal must, therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.