JUDGMENT Madeley, J. - This is a second appeal in a rent suit. 2. The facts of the case are that two plaintiffs brought a suit for profits against the lambardar who was defendant No. 1 in the case. Defendant No. 2, the present appellant, was shown as Performa defendant. Defendant 2 filed a written statement in which he claimed that certain sums are also due from the lambardar to him, but at that stage of the case he made no prayer that he might be transferred to the array of the plaintiffs, nor did he offer to pay court-fee. Two issues only were framed, (1) whether the lambardar is entitled to village expenses and (2) to what profits, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled- No issue was based upon the plea put forward in the written statement of defendant No. 2 that money was due to him. The case was then referred to arbitration. The arbitrator decided the questions to which the issues related, but also remarked that according to the accounts Rs. 227-8-7 were due to defendant No. 2 from the lambardar and that it lay with the Court to pass a decree in his favour, if within its discretion it thought fit to do so. On the 29th May, 1939, the date when the award was to be confirmed and a decree passed on the basis of it, defendant No. 2 made an application stating that he bad not got the money to pay the court-fee and that lime might be given to him for payment thereof, or else that a decree without payment of the court-fee might be passed in his favour and the amount; of court-fee deducted from the money payable to him by the lambardar. The trial Court did not think fit to give time and the second prayer could not, of course, be granted. The trial Court passed a decree in terms of the award in favour of the plaintiffs. No decree was passed in favour of defendant No. 2. 3. Defendant No. 2 thereafter went in appeal to the District Judge. His appeal was dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay against the decree, which was in terms of the award, under para 16, Schedule II, C. P. C. The Court below did not go into the merits of the case. 4. 3. Defendant No. 2 thereafter went in appeal to the District Judge. His appeal was dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay against the decree, which was in terms of the award, under para 16, Schedule II, C. P. C. The Court below did not go into the merits of the case. 4. Against, this decision defendant No. 2 came in appeal to this Court. His learned Counsel cites Lachhmi v. Ratnzan, in which it was held by Mr. Pirn, J. M.: The Oudh Rent Act do s not specifically con- template a reference to arbitration and when such a reference is made, it must be generally under the rules in the CPC but not so as to infringe any direct provisions of the Rent Act. Section 06 of that Act gives a general right to appeal and this is not cancelled by para 16 of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where, therefore, an Assistant Collector wrongly rejects objections to the award as time-barred, an appeal lies to the Commissioner. 5. With great respect I cannot agree with this decision. There seems to me to be no question of para 16 of Schedule II of the CPC canceling a general right to appeal given in Section 116 of the Oudh Rent Act. Section 116 begins, "subject to the provisions of Section 119 and of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as applied by this Act, an appeal shall lie" etc. Section 135 is the section which applies the provisions of the CPC to this Act. They are made applicable, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act, to all suits and other proceedings under the Act. Since the Oudh Rent Act itself makes no provision for a reference to arbitration, the procedure, when such a reference is made under the Civil Procedure Code, Schedule II, is governed by that Schedule and cannot be inconsistent with anything in the Oudh Rent Act for the simple reason that the Oudh Rent Act lays down no law about arbitration. Section 116 gives a right of appeal subject to the provisions of the CPC so far as they are not in- consistent with the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act. Section 116 gives a right of appeal subject to the provisions of the CPC so far as they are not in- consistent with the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act. The provision, that no appeal lies against a decree which is passed in accordance with an arbitration award is in no way inconsistent with any provision of the Oudh Rent Act. Per. the Oudh Rent act not only does not lay down any procedure for arbitration, but also makes no special rules as to appeals from decrees based upon arbitration awards. 6. One further argument has been urged before me which is that the decree of the trial Court was not in conformity with the arbitration award, because it did not incorporate a decree in favour of defendant No. 2, though the award found that a sum of money was due to him. It seems to me, however, that this part of the award was outside the terms of the reference. Defendant No. 2 was not the plaintiff and no issue was framed concerning the claim of defendant No. 2. The reference of the case to arbitration must be deemed to have been a reference of the plaintiff's claim to arbitration, and in the case as framed no decree could have been passed in favour of defendant No, -2. Moreover the award left it to the discretion of the Court to allow defendant No. 2 to become the plaintiff and pay the court-fee or not. It cannot be said, therefore, that the decree passed by the trial Court was not in conformity with the terms of the award. This being so, it appears to me that the appeal is clearly barred by para 16 of Schedule II, C.P.C. 7. For these reasons I dismiss this appeal with costs.