Judgement Appeal (No. 52 of 1943) from a judgment and decree of the Additional Judge of the Court of the British Resident in Mysore, Bangalore (August 14, 1940), which varied a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Bangalore (November 20, 1939). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The claim of the plaintiff (respondent) out of which this appeal arose was for damages for injuries sustained by him in an accident to a motor car in which he was a passenger. He sued J. G. Anniah Reddy, the first defendant and second appellant, who was the driver of the car, and his father, J. Subbiah Reddy, the second defendant and original first appellant, who was the owner of the car. Subbiah died on December 20, 1940, and appellants (i.) to (xvi.) were his legal representatives. The material facts were that in September, 1937, the respondent, who was a motor engineer and salesman, was negotiating for a Law. Rep. 72 Ind. App. 206 ( 1944- 1945) Subbiah Reddy V. Jordon 76 position in International Motors, Bangalore, a concern owned by appellant No. 1, in which appellant No. 2 was employed. In the morning of September 27, whilst the draft of a proposed agreement between the respondent and the firm was being typed, appellant No. 2 took the respondent out in a Skoda car to demonstrate the performance of the car. In the course of the drive there was an accident due to the failure of appellant No. 2, who was driving, to notice an obstruction across the road in time to avoid it. The car overturned, and the respondents left arm was severely injured, and eventually had to be amputated below the elbow. Both the lower courts held that the accident was caused by the negligence of appellant No. 2. The trial judge passed a decree against appellant No. 2 for Rs.12,500 damages, but dismissed the suit against appellant No. 1. In appeal the Additional Judge increased the damages to Rs.25,000, and reversed the decree dismissing the suit against appellant No. 1. In the result, he passed a decree against both appellants for Rs.25,000, and costs. 1945 May 15 Quass and W. A. Hammerton for the appellants. The only real question is as to damages. In appeal the Additional Judge increased the damages to Rs.25,000, and reversed the decree dismissing the suit against appellant No. 1. In the result, he passed a decree against both appellants for Rs.25,000, and costs. 1945 May 15 Quass and W. A. Hammerton for the appellants. The only real question is as to damages. The appeal judge doubled the damages without indicating any reason to suggest that the trial judge had not adopted the right principles or considered all the items of account. An appellate tribunal should not interfere with the assessment of damages by a trial judge unless (a) the trial judge has proceeded on some erroneous principle of law—and that does not apply here—or (b) the damages are so large or so small that it appears plainly that the judge has left out some relevant consideration. The damages were correctly assessed by the District Judge, and in any event, the mere fact that if an appellate tribunal had had a case before it in the first instance it might have awarded a different sum by way of damages is no ground for interfering with the estimate made by the trial judge or for substituting its own estimate for his. The words in Flint v. Lovell ([ 1935] 1 K. B. 354, 360.) are "to justify reversing the trial judge on the "question of the amount of damages it will generally be " necessary that this Court should be convinced....that " the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small " as to make it, in the judgment of this Court, an entirely " erroneous estimate . . . ." [Reference was also made to Owen v. Sykes ([ 1936] 1 K. B. 192.) and Hewitt v. Bonvin ([ 1940] 1 K. B. 188.).] If the Board thinks that the principle as expressed in Flint v. Lovell ([ 1935] 1 K. B. 354, 360.) applies in India, it is an important rule of practice, and the principle should be upheld that the trial judge should not be disturbed on the question of damages merely because the appeal court might themselves take a different view. The respondent did not appear. June 18. The respondent did not appear. June 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above and continued In their Lordships view the finding by both the lower courts that the accident was caused by the negligence of appellant No. 2, which is one primarily of fact, is clearly right, and must be accepted. Their Lordships also feel no doubt that the Additional Judge was right in holding appellant No. 1 liable. The car in which the accident occurred belonged to him, and was used in connexion with his business; it was being driven by his son, who was employed in the business; and the car was being demon strated to one about to join the business, that is, for the purposes of the business. It is clear, therefore, that appellant No. 2 was acting within the scope, or apparent scope, of his authority, as a servant of appellant No.1, and the latter is answerable for his tort. The only question which requires consideration on this appeal is that of damages, and this raises a question of some importance. The respondent has not appeared, but Mr. Quass, for the appellants, has argued that the Additional Judge had no right to interfere with the amount of damages found by the lower court. He relies on the rule acted on by the Court of Appeal in England which was stated by Greer L.J. in Flint v. Lovell ([ 1935] 1 K. B. 354, 360.) in these terms—"This Court will be " Law. Rep. 72 Ind. App. 206 ( 1944- 1945) Subbiah Reddy V. Jordon 77 disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because they think that if they had tried the case in the first instance they would have given a lesser sum. Rep. 72 Ind. App. 206 ( 1944- 1945) Subbiah Reddy V. Jordon 77 disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because they think that if they had tried the case in the first instance they would have given a lesser sum. In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the question of the amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this Court should be convinced either that the judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of this Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled." This rule originated at a time when the assessment of damages was the province of the jury, and illustrates the reluctance which an appellate court always feels in interfering with the decision of a trial court on a question of fact, especially when the decision is that of a jury. In British India civil suits are not tried with a jury, and trial judges generally have less experience in assessing damages for tort than have judges in England, where such claims are very common. Art appeal court should never interfere arbitrarily and without good reason with the decision of the lower court, and on questions of fact the advantage which the trial judge enjoys in having seen the witnesses, and sometimes in knowledge of local conditions, must always be recognized; but where such considerations do not operate, an appeal court is entitled, and indeed bound, to give effect to its own view on matters within its competence. To hold otherwise would be to deprive parties of the benefit of a right of appeal which they possess. Their Lordships see no sufficient reason for holding that in British India the full rigour of the rule stated in Flint v. Lovell ([ 1935] 1 K. B. 534, 360.) applies. They think, therefore, that the Additional Judge was entitled to act on his own view as to the amount of damages, and they proceed to consider how far his award was justified by the evidence. The plaintiff claimed Rs.6o,ooo as damages. The trial judge (as already mentioned) assessed the damages at Rs. 12,500. They think, therefore, that the Additional Judge was entitled to act on his own view as to the amount of damages, and they proceed to consider how far his award was justified by the evidence. The plaintiff claimed Rs.6o,ooo as damages. The trial judge (as already mentioned) assessed the damages at Rs. 12,500. He based this figure on the general claim for disfiguration, loss of health, pain and suffering, and expenses of treatment, and on the handicap which the plaintiff would suffer in his earning capacity by the loss of an arm. The learned judge, however, stated that the reduction of the plaintiffs income had not been shown, nor could it be said, to be due wholly, or even largely, to the injury he had received. Therein the learned judge was not correct. The evidence of the plaintiff was that down to the month of the accident he had been employed by Mysore Motors at a salary of Rs.200 a month and a commission, which brought his total earnings up to Rs.350 to Rs.400 a month. The manager of Mysore Motors put the commission at Rs.125 to Rs.150 a month. The plaintiff further gave evidence that owing to the loss of his arm he was unable to obtain a license to drive a car, and that his earnings at the time of the trial were Rs.8o salary and commission, bringing his total earnings up to Rs.130 a month. His employer put the latter figure at Rs.140. There is, therefore, satisfactory evidence that the earnings of the plaintiff had been reduced-by about Rs.200 a month since the accident, and it is a legitimate inference that the reduction was the result of the accident, since it is obvious that loss of an arm and consequent inability to drive a car must be a serious handicap to a motor salesman. In appeal the Additional Judge doubled the damages, but gave no detailed reasons for so doing. Damages for tort are based on the loss suffered by the plaintiff, and the consideration that the decree of the Appeal Court was against an additional defendant who might be in a better position to pay than the defendant originally held solely liable is irrelevant. Damages for tort are based on the loss suffered by the plaintiff, and the consideration that the decree of the Appeal Court was against an additional defendant who might be in a better position to pay than the defendant originally held solely liable is irrelevant. Their Lordships think that the Additional Judge was not justified on the materials before him in awarding so large a sum as Rs.25,000, but, on the other hand, that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the evidence of actual loss of earning capacity by the plaintiff. In their Lordships view Rs.15,000 is a fair sum at which to assess the damages. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Additional Judge be varied by reducing the sum decreed from Rs.25,000 to Rs.15,000. In other respects the decree will stand, and there will be no order as to the costs of this appeal.