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1945 DIGILAW 246 (ALL)

Faqira v. Jiwan Singh

1945-10-02

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JUDGMENT Malik, J. - Mt. Nathia was the owner of khatas 5 and 6 in village Salarpur in the district of Bulandshahr. Plots Nos. 759, 763 and 996 appertained to the said khatas and they were the sir plots of Mt. Nathia. On 13-10-1921, Mt. Nathia executed a simple mortgage of her rights and interest in khatas 5 and 6 for a sum of Rs. 220 in favour of the plaintiffs. On 10-8-1929, Mt. Nathia executed a permanent lease of the sir plots in favour of Ram Chandra and Faqira, who are the defendants-appellants in this Court. The rent reserved under the lease was Rs. 6 per annum. She gave the lessees the right to make constructions, plant groves and dig wells on the land and agreed that she would compensate the lessees in case they were ejected from the land. The mortgagees filed a suit, No. 315 of 1930, on 15-8-1930, in the Court of the learned Munsif of Bulandshahr on the basis of the mortgage. The lessees, Ram Chandra and Faqira, were also impleaded as subsequent mortgagees and on the allegations that the lease in their favour was collusive and fraudulent and the mortgagor had no right to execute the lease so as to affect the rights of the mortgagees and the mortgagees were not bound by the said lease The relief claimed was that the defendants might be asked to pay the mortgage money with interest failing which the mortgaged property might be sold. Neither the mortgagor nor the lessees put in any appearance. The judgment is not on the record, but the preliminary decree has been filed by the plaintiffs-respondents On 25-10-1930, the learned Munsif passed a decree that the plaintiffs suit for the recovery of the mortgage money together with interest and costs be decreed ex parte and a decree under O. 34, R. 4, Civil P.C., giving six months time for payment be prepared which was accordingly done. The decretal amount not having been paid, a final decree for sale was passed and the property was sold in the year 1932 and was purchased by the mortgagee-decree holders. The sale was for Rs. 300 while the decretal amount was Rs. 885-4-0. The sale was confirmed on 12-10-1932. After the sale Mt. Nathia claimed that she had become the ex-proprietary tenant of the sir plots Nos. The sale was for Rs. 300 while the decretal amount was Rs. 885-4-0. The sale was confirmed on 12-10-1932. After the sale Mt. Nathia claimed that she had become the ex-proprietary tenant of the sir plots Nos. 759, 763 and 996 and was entitled to retain possession on payment of rent. The rent was fixed by the revenue Court at Rs. 6-14-0. Mt. Nathia was recorded as the exproprietary tenant till her death. After her death her son, Mamraj, became the exproprietary tenant having inherited her rights, and he relinquished his rights in favour of the plaintiffs on 6-5-1941, for a consideration of Rs. 25. 2. The plaintiffs filed this suit for possession of the plots on the ground that the lease in favour of the defendants was fictitious and collusive and had been executed on a low rent and the plaintiffs were not bound by the same. It was alleged that the defendants were in pos-session of the plots without the plaintiffs' consent and they had no right to do so. The plaintiffs, therefore, claimed ejectment of the defendants and claimed damages at the rate of Rs. 20 per mensem. The defence was that Mt. Nathia was the owner of the plots and was entitled to execute the lease. The lease in favour of the defendants was therefore perfectly valid. That the defendants were occupancy tenants of the plots and the plaintiffs had no right to eject them and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 3. The learned Munsif framed six issues, only two of which it is now necessary to consider. Issues 3 and 4 were: 3. Whether the patta in favour of the defendants is void and inoperative against the plaintiffs for reasons alleged in Para. 3 of the plaint ? 4. Whether the plaintiffs obtained a decree and also possession as against the defendants ? If so, its effect? The learned Munsif remitted these two issues to the revenue Court for decision. The revenue Court held that after the lease Mt. Nathia's name was entered in the papers as a sir holder and the names of the defendants were recorded as sub-tenants on a rent of Rs. 6 per annum on the basis of the lease. When the plaintiffs purchased the zamindari and the proprietary rights of Mt. Nathia their names were recorded in the column of proprietors and Mt. Nathia's name was entered in the papers as a sir holder and the names of the defendants were recorded as sub-tenants on a rent of Rs. 6 per annum on the basis of the lease. When the plaintiffs purchased the zamindari and the proprietary rights of Mt. Nathia their names were recorded in the column of proprietors and Mt. Nathia was recorded as an exproprietary tenant while the defendants were recorded as her sub-tenants. The revenue Court held that Mt. Nathia, even after the mortgage, was the owner of the sir plots and she could, in the ordinary course of management of the property, execute the lease. That the plaintiffs at the time of the purchase merely acquired Mt. Nathia's rights and they could not, therefore, challenge the lease. That the defendants were the tenants of Mt. Nathia, but the plaintiffs having succeeded to the rights of Mt. Nathia by relinquishment the defendants were now the tenants of the plaintiffs who had no right to claim their ejectment. On issue 4 the revenue Court held that the plaintiffs had impleaded the defendants as subsequent mortgagees and had made certain allegations about the lease but had not claimed any relief on the basis thereof and the decree in that case or the sale under the decree did not entitle them to claim the relief prayed for in this suit. The learned Munsif accepted these findings, as he was bound to do, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. 4. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against that decision and the lower appellate Court held that Mt. Nathia had no right to confer occupancy rights without the written consent of the mortgagees or without the sanction of the District Judge and relied on s. 17, Agra Tenancy Act of 1926. The lease was, therefore, voidable at the option of the mortgagees. The lower appellate Court further went on to hold that the rent reserved under the lease was not a fair rent and it was clear that the lease was detrimental to the interest of the mortgagees and was in contravention of the provisions of s. 66, T.P. Act before its amendment in the year 1929. The lower appellate Court held that the land could fetch Rs. 14-7-0 per year as rent instead of Rs. 6. The lessees were parties to the mortgage suit and the decree in that case was binding on them. The lower appellate Court held that the land could fetch Rs. 14-7-0 per year as rent instead of Rs. 6. The lessees were parties to the mortgage suit and the decree in that case was binding on them. They were merely sub-tenants of the expropreitary tenant and the exproprietary tenant having relinquished his rights in the plots the defendants had no right to remain in possession. In the result the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was decreed and the-lessees were directed to pay Rs. 14-7-10 per year as damages for the period in suit. 5. In appeal learned counsel for the appellants has argued several points before me. His first contention is that the mortgagor had a right to execute the lease in due course of management of the property and it could not be held under S. 66, T.P. Act that the security had become insufficient. I do not think that this contention is sound. Apart from the fact that the findings of the lower appellate Court are against the appellants, and so far as they are findings of fact they are binding on me, there is the further fact that the suit was filed for a sum much in excess of the amount for which the property was sold and the final decree was for a sum of over Rs. 800. As a result of this lease, if it was a valid and binding lease, the income of the property could never exceed Rs. 6 per annum and then there were onerous terms in the lease that the defendants were to make constructions, plant groves and dig wells and the lessor was bound to compensate the lessees if the lessees had to give up possession of the land. As a result of this lease, the property could not fetch more than Rs. 300 for which sum it was sold at auction in the year 1932 while the sum due under the mortgage was far in excess of that amount. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the Court below that the lease was detrimental to the interests of the mortgagees and thus rendered the security insufficient within the meaning of S. 66, T.P. Act and it was not binding on them. 6. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the Court below that the lease was detrimental to the interests of the mortgagees and thus rendered the security insufficient within the meaning of S. 66, T.P. Act and it was not binding on them. 6. The second point was that the relinquishment of the exproprietary rights by Mamraj must be deemed to be in favour of all the cosharers and therefore the plaintiffs alone had no right to file a suit. This point was not taken in the Court below. It may be that by reason of a private arrangement or by partition Mamraj, was the ex-proprietary tenant of only the plaintiffs. For a proper decision of the point findings on questions of fact would be necessary. I cannot, therefore, allow learned counsel to raise this point for the first time in second appeal. 7. Learned counsel has also argued that the lower appellate Court erred in holding that the lease created occupancy rights and has urged that the execution of a permanent lease is not the same as the creation of occupancy rights and that therefore the lower appellate Court was wrong in holding that the lease was bad under S. 17, Agra Tenancy Act. It appears that there is conflict in the decisions of the Board of Revenue on the question whether a permanent lessee is or is not an occupancy tenant. It is not necessary for me to discuss the authorities of the Board on the point. I have already held that the lease was not binding on the mortgagees as it was executed without their consent and had made the security insufficient within the meaning of s. 66, T.P. Act before its amendment. The lower appellate Court has cited several authorities for the proposition that a lease executed without the consent of the mortgagee and which is prejudicial to his rights, inasmuch as it makes his security insufficient would not be binding on him. Therefore even if S. 17, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, was not applicable, it must be held that the lease was not binding on the mortgagees by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. Therefore even if S. 17, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, was not applicable, it must be held that the lease was not binding on the mortgagees by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. The last point urged on behalf of the appellants is that even if the lease was not binding on the mortgagees it was binding on the mortgagor and the mortgagees after their purchase were only entitled to rent from the mortgagor who had become the ex-proprietary tenant. The contention on behalf of the appellants is that the plaintiffs were not entitled to anything more than the rent payable by an ex-proprietary tenant and the relinquishment of the ex-proprietary rights could not place them in a better position and the lessees in a worse position and the lessees were, therefore, entitled to remain in possession of the land in accordance with the terms of the lease. The position appears to me to have become a little complicated by reason of the fact that in the suit filed on behalf of the mortgagees, though it was mentioned that the lease was bad, no declaration to that effect was asked for. The fact, however, remains, that a decree for sale was passed against all the defendants and in execution of the decree the property was sold. After considerable hesitation I have come to the conclusion that the result of the lower Court's finding, which I have upheld, that the lease was not binding on the mortgagees and the fact that the lessees did not put in any defence when they were impleaded on the allegation that the lease was bad and a decree for sale against the mortgagor as well as the lessees was passed, must be that the auction purchasers must be deemed to have purchased the property free from any liability under the lease. Mt. Nathia became the ex-proprietary tenant of the sir plots after the auction sale. She was, there, fore, entitled to remain in possession of the plots on payment of rent, at the rate payable by an ex-proprietary tenant, which was assessed to be Rs. 6-14-0. So long as Mt. Nathia remained in possession, the defendants-appellants could claim against her to continue in possession on payment to her of Rs. 6 the rent fixed in the lease. As soon as Mt. 6-14-0. So long as Mt. Nathia remained in possession, the defendants-appellants could claim against her to continue in possession on payment to her of Rs. 6 the rent fixed in the lease. As soon as Mt. Nathia gave up her possession, the right of the defendants appellants to continue in possession must also cease. Their possession was merely as sub-tenants and their rights must come to an end on the extinction of the tenancy. This consequence must necessarily follow from the finding that the mortgagees and necessarily the auction purchasers who purchased the property in execution of the mortgage decree for sale were not bound by the lease, On the death of Mt. Nathia the ex-proprietary rights came to her son, Mamraj, who having relinquished the same, the defendants, who were merely his subtenants, had no right to continue in possession. Learned counsel has urged that if they were ejected they must be given compensation for any improvements that might have been made by them. The difficulty again is that his clients do not seem to have claimed compensation in the Courts below. There is no finding that they have made any improvements and I do not think that I can at this stage let them raise a plea which would mean fresh enquiry on questions of fact. 9. I dismiss this appeal with costs. Leave to file an appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.