JUDGMENT Bennett, J. - This appeal raises some questions of interest in connection with the U. P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act (XVIII of 1939) and of the U. P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act (IV of 1937). The earlier Act provides for the stay of proceedings in certain cases under the Agra Tenancy Act and the Oudh Rent Act. Those proceedings are proceedings in suits and in execution. Section 3 of the later Act provides that all suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent which have been stayed under the earlier Act shall be dismissed. 2. The appellant is a judgment debtor. The respondent decree holder is stated to have purchased at an auction sale rent due from the appellant, who was a sub-tenant of the judgment debtor in an earlier case. The respondent after this purchase sued the sub-tenant for the rent and obtained a decree. What followed is not very clear. The lower appellate Court refers to certain Government orders relating to stay of suits in Revenue Courts. It is clear that the respondent applied in execution of his decree and that execution proceedings were stayed under Act IV of 1937. The question of consideration is whether in view of this stay the execution proceedings should have been dismissed u/s 3 of Act XVIII of 1939. 3. The Revenue Court held that the execution proceedings were not maintainable and allowing the judgment debtor's objection dismissed the execution application. In first appeal the Additional Civil Judge observed that Section 2 of Act X-VIII clearly exempts rent in the circumstances stated, namely, where rent has been assigned. He regarded the purchase of the rent by the respondent as equivalent to assignment for the purpose of Section 2. The Additional Civil Judge accordingly set aside the Revenue Court's order and directed it to continue the execution proceedings. 4. This view is contested in second appeal, it being contended that Section 2 does not bear the construction which is claimed for it. The Additional Civil Judge accordingly set aside the Revenue Court's order and directed it to continue the execution proceedings. 4. This view is contested in second appeal, it being contended that Section 2 does not bear the construction which is claimed for it. The first part of the section reads as follows: Unless there its something repugnant in the subject or context, all words used in this Act which are defined in the Agra Tenancy.(Act, 1926, or the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 shall have the meanings assigned to them herein, except that rent does not include the rent of a thekadar of person to whom the collection of rents in a village or portion of a village has been leased or assigned. 5. It is argued for the appellant. that "rent of a thekadar or person etc." does not mean rent payable to a thekadar or person etc. but rent payble by a thekadar or person etc. For the respondent it is conceded that the words "rent of a thekadar" mean rent payable by a thekadar., but at the same time it is argued that "rent of a person etc." means rent payable to person. It seems to me very difficult to adopt such a construction. It is extremely unlikely that if such different meanings had been intended, the matter would have been left in such an ambiguous way. If "rent of a thekadar" means rent payable by a thekadar, it must be held in my opinion, that "rent of a person etc." means rent payable by that person. Moreover, the context to my mind suggests that this meaning was intended to apply both to the thekadar or other person. It is clear that the person referred to was a person who occupied the position of a thekadar or some similar position. I am unable therefore to adopt the view taken by the Additional Judge on this point. 6. But I do not think that the question of the construction of Section 2 is very material. Another argument has been addressed with reference to the provisions of Section 3 of Act XVIII. These provisions provide that all suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent which have been stayed under "the earlier Act IV of 1937 should be dismissed. Another argument has been addressed with reference to the provisions of Section 3 of Act XVIII. These provisions provide that all suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent which have been stayed under "the earlier Act IV of 1937 should be dismissed. Admittedly the execution proceedings were stayed under the provisions of the earlier Act, but Learned Counsel for the respondent argues that Section 8 does not relate to execution proceedings and it merely requires the dismissal of all suits or applications, not being applications in execution, for the recovery of arrears of rent which have been stayed. This question was considered at some lenght by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Inderman Jain v. Tara Singh 1943 A. L. W. 358. The case is not reported in a recognised law report but, I see no reason to take a different view from that taken by Mulla J. in that case. It is the view at which I had myself arrived before my attention was drawn to the case. It is that Section 3 applies as much to an application for execution of a decree for arrears of rent as to any other application for recovery of arrears of rent provided for by the U."P. Tenancy Act. 7. For these reasons I consider that the view taken by the Additional Civil Judge cannot be upheld I accordingly set aside his order and restore the order passed by the Revenue Court dismissing the execution proceedings. The appellant will get his costs both in this Court and in the lower appellate Court. 8. Leave to appeals under the Letters Patent ii granted.