Judgement Appeal (No. 41 of 1944) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 28, 1942) which reversed on second appeal a judgment and decree of the court of the District Judge of Coimbatore (August 4, 1933), which on first appeal had affirmed a judgment and decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore (November 30, 1931). In 1825 the British authorities in Madras granted to one Govinda Rao, the great-grandfather of the respondent, the jaghir of Maileripalayam, which consisted of seven shotriem villages. From the correspondence that passed between the departments concerned before the grant it appeared that Govinda Rao was the Head Sarishtadar in the district of Coimbatore, and that it was proposed to reward him for services rendered by him to the Government. He was asked to select seven villages, and the Collector of the District reported to the Board of Revenue the villages so selected, whereupon the latter recommended to the Governor that the grant be made to Govinda Rao as a shotriem. On December 16, 1825, the Governor in Council approved the recommendation and asked the Board of Revenue to prepare and submit the requisite deed for execution. It would appear that no deed was in fact executed, though Govinda Rao was put in possession of the villages. In 1832 Govinda Rao died, and his adopted son, Krishna Rao, was put in possession of the jaghir. The Board of Revenue recommended to the Government to approve of the succession, and observed that they had reason to believe that no deed was issued to Govinda Rao, and that they gathered from the correspondence that the grant was for three lives. In 1864 the Inam Commission, which had been set up to investigate into the titles of inam-holders, confirmed the grant of 1825 and made a settlement with the respondents father on a permanent basis., on his agreeing to pay a higher quit-rent. The inam title deed granted by the Inam Commission provided, inter alia, that the land will be your own absolute property, to hold or dispose " of as you think proper, subject only to the payment of the "above-mentioned quit-rent." For some years before 1926 the Government had been levying watercess on the respondents ryots in respect of lands in the seven villages under the provisions of the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865, as amended by later Acts. On July 9, 1927, the respondent instituted the suit out of which this appeal arose against the Government, the present appellant, claiming, inter alia, that by virtue of the shotriem grant the grantee acquired full proprietary rights, and that he was accordingly entitled to free irrigation from the water sources situated in the shotriem villages, and that neither he nor his tenants were liable to the Government for any water cess, and he prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the Government from levying water cess from him or his ryots and from otherwise interfering with his rights in that behalf. Both the trial court and the first appellate court proceeded on the basis that if the original grant carried the full proprietary interest in the lands then the lands would be exempt from the levy of water cess by the Government, but that if the grant was only of the revenue of the lands (the melvaram) the lands would not be so exempt. Both the trial court and the first appellate court found on the evidence that the grant was only of the melvaram. The hearing of the second appeal before the High Court was adjourned pending the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22.), in which it was held that the principles of the Urlam case (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) were applicable to the cases of inams where the inam grant in fact conferred on the holder the full proprietary interest in the land. Accordingly, when the second appeal came to be heard by the High Court (Abdur Rahman and Somayya JJ.) the only question debated was whether the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court were correct, and the High Court reversed those findings, holding that under the grant all the rights which the Government had had passed to the grantee, and they gave the respondent the injunction prayed for. 1945. May 10, 11, 14 Tucker K.C. and Khambatta for the appellant. The decision in this appeal will govern many other cases. 1945. May 10, 11, 14 Tucker K.C. and Khambatta for the appellant. The decision in this appeal will govern many other cases. The questions that arise are (a) whether the respondent has established that the grant to him and his predecessors in title was of the full proprietary interest in the lands, or whether, as the appellant contends, the grant was only of the revenue of the lands, i.e., the melvaram; and (b) if the grant was only of the melvaram, whether the levying of water cess by the Government was forbidden by the first proviso to s. 1 of the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865 ("Provided that where a zamindar or inamdar or any other description of landholder not holding under ryotwari settlement is by virtue of engagements with the Government entitled to irrigation free of separate charge, no cess under this Act shall be imposed for water supplied to the extent of this right and no more."), as that proviso has been construed in the Urlam case (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) as regards zemindars and the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22;) as regards inamdars. In the present case cess was levied on the respondents ryots, not on the respondent himself. It is conceded that if it is found on the facts that full proprietary interest in the lands passed by the original grant, then the case for the appellant is at an end. The appellants case is that if originally this was a grant of the revenue only, then as a result of the provisions of Madras Act VIII of 1869 the inam title deed of 1864 amounted to nothing more than a confirmation by the Government of the rights already vested in the shotriemdar by his original grant, and did not operate to vest in him any subject-matter not already belonging to him. The respondent must show an engagement with the Government which gives him such a right in the land as will carry the right to water, and the inam title deed is not conclusive if there is other evidence which shows that the original grant was of the melvaram only Evidence supporting the contention that the grant was of the melvaram only is (a) there were ryots on the land holding under what must have been ryotwari tenure, namely, with permanent occupancy rights, at the time of the original shotriem grant; (b) the grant was to a Brahmin officer of the Government, and that would make it more probable that the grant was of the revenue only (see observations of the Privy Council in Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu (( 1929) L. R. 56 I. A. 146, 154); (c) the respondent had taken proceedings for the collection of rent under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and that Act cannot apply if the kudivaram as well as the melvaram of the village had been granted (see Suryanarayana v. Patanna (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 209.)); (d) the word " village " does not help; it is not used in the English sense; it is a description given to a tract of land for revenue purposes, and for those purposes the whole of the land is divided into divisions called " villages." [Reference was also made to Baden Powells Land Systems of British India, vol. 3.] On the evidence as a whole the original grant was of the melvaram only, and not of full proprietary rights, and that being so, there was no " engagement with the Government " by virtue of which the respondent was entitled to any irrigation free of separate charge, and therefore the exempting provisions of the first proviso to s. 1 of the Madras Irrigation Cess Act, 1865, have no application to these lands. In the present case it would not matter whether the words "besides poramboke" were or were not in the inam title deed. They are not conclusive. The High Court said that those words would include all rights which the grantor had, but this being a shotriem grant it is submitted that that indicates that the word "poramboke" means the unassessed waste. Cases on the question of poramboke are Narayanasawmy Naidu v. Secretary of State for India (( 1912) 24 Mad. They are not conclusive. The High Court said that those words would include all rights which the grantor had, but this being a shotriem grant it is submitted that that indicates that the word "poramboke" means the unassessed waste. Cases on the question of poramboke are Narayanasawmy Naidu v. Secretary of State for India (( 1912) 24 Mad. L. J. 36.), Secretary of State v. Raghunatha Tathachariar (( 1915) I. L. R. 38 M. 108.), Venkataratnammah v. Secretary of State (( 1914) I.L.R. 37 M. 364.) and Venkatarama Sivan v. Secretary of State for India (( 1919) 36 Mad. L. J. 203.). There was therefore evidence on which the courts below could find, as they did, that this was a grant of melvaram only. There was also evidence on which the trial and the first appellate courts could find, as they did, that the water used for the irrigation of the lands, and in respect of which the charge of water cess was levied, came from a " river, stream, channel, " tank or work belonging to, or constructed by, Government " within the meaning of s. 1 of the Act of 1865. [Reference was made to the land tenure system in Coimbatore, and, on the nature of a shotriem grant, to Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu (L, R. 56 I. A. 146, 153.).] The Urlam decision (L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) is the basis and foundation of this matter, and to succeed, the respondent must bring himself within the principles laid down in that case, and establish in the first place that he has here full proprietary interest in the land. In the Swamigal case (L. R. 69 I. A. 22.) a very close examination was made as to whether there was any evidence of what the true nature of the original grant was in 1753, and there being none whatever, except the inam title deed and the entries in the inam register, those were held to be evidence as to what was originally granted. In Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasa Chariar (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 56, 65.) also the question was whether there was full ownership of the land or some lesser interest— the question in the present case—and that case shows the method of approaching this sort of question; if evidence can be found of what the original grant was, then the inam commission grant need not be looked at all. Chidambara Sivaprakasa v. Veerama Reddi (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 286, 300.) shows that the mere fact that there is an inam grant raises no presumption either way, and that each case must be determined on its own facts. [Reference was also made to Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu v. Divi Seetharamudu (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 123, 127.), Arunachellam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 204.), and Secretary of State v. T. R. M. T. S. T. Thinnappa Chettiar (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 112.).] Summarizing, the question to be determined is whether the grant was of the full proprietary interest or merely of the land revenue; melvaram and kudivaram are both defined in Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu v. Divi Seetharamudu (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 123, 127.). The question what was granted in this respect is one of fact to be determined on such documents as are available, but having regard also to all the facts and circumstances, and among the relevant facts are, what is being given, to what sort of person it is given, how long the grant is to be for, and what kind of a grant it is Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasa Chariar (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 56, 65.). This was a grant of shotriem, and while it is conceded that a shotriem may involve full proprietorship (Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu (L.R. 56 I.A. 146, 153)), yet, looking at all the facts and circumstances here, prima facie it would not. This was a grant of shotriem, and while it is conceded that a shotriem may involve full proprietorship (Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu (L.R. 56 I.A. 146, 153)), yet, looking at all the facts and circumstances here, prima facie it would not. The letter of December 8, 1825, recommended that the villages should be granted as a shotriem on the usual conditions, and " usual " conditions " is a phrase which cannot be ignored; it shows that there are some usual conditions, and if it be right to say, as appears from the judgment of the District Judge, that the draft cowle put in by the Government pleader was a true copy in the form in which cowles used to be granted, it would be the best evidence as to what the usual conditions were—that the grant was of the melvaram only. The grant of anything less than in perpetuity—and here it was originally for three lives— could not carry with it more than the grant of the land revenue. The kudivaram would have to be obtained by some other means. It would not be freehold in the Urlam case (L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) sense. If that be right, then up to para. 2 of the inam title deed—which, following the Swamigal case (L. R. 69 I. A. 22.), only provides evidence as to what the original grant was—there has been no enlargement of that interest. It merely confirms the right to the Government revenue for two lives. That, it is submitted, is con clusive; a grant for two lives could not confirm a freehold right —the two things are inconsistent. It is readily admitted that if the words in para. 3 were being read by themselves they appear to change the term of the interest, not only into a perpetual one, but into a freehold in the English sense, for there could not be words more definite than " your own " absolute property." The inam title deed is not therefore evidence that the original grant was for a freehold, but on the contrary, is conclusive evidence that it was not. Lastly, there being evidence on which the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge could properly find, as they did, that the original, grant to the predecessor in title of the respondent was no more than a grant of the revenue of the lands, such findings were by ss. 100, 101 and 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, binding on the High Court on the second appeal Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Bakhsh (( 1929) L. R. 57 I. A. 86.). There cannot be a second appeal on an erroneous finding of fact however gross the error may seem to be. The inam title deed is not a document of title, but can be evidence of what was granted years before; that is a question of fact, and it is submitted that the appeal to the High Court was incompetent. Rewcastle K.C. and Subba Row for the respondent. The first question is whether on the evidence of fact the original grant was of full proprietary rights or only of the melvaram. It is submitted that the first two courts decided that it was a grant of the melvaram only entirely on the basis of their taking the view that the draft cowle embodied the usual conditions. That inference was entirely unjustified; the draft cowle was not proved and was of no evidential value. There was no evidence to connect that draft cowle with the original in this case, and if that be right there is no evidence at all as to the terms of the original grant as such. The first evidence in point of time is the Inam Commissions report. There is no presumption that the Inam Commission was wrong the Swamigal case (L. R. 69 I. A. 22, 40, 38, 39.), and if there is no evidence but the inam grant there is no presumption that they are right. There are two kinds of poramboke, communal, and not communal, which is waste, and waste can be either land or water or anything which is not assessed. The words " besides poramboke " in the inam title deed mean that everything that the Government had has been handed over to the grantee the Swamigal case (L. R. 69 I. A. 22, 40, 38, 39.). The words " besides poramboke " in the inam title deed mean that everything that the Government had has been handed over to the grantee the Swamigal case (L. R. 69 I. A. 22, 40, 38, 39.). Then there could not be stronger words than " the land will be your " own absolute property, to hold or dispose of as you think " proper." It comes exactly within the observations made in the Swamigal case (1). As soon as the predecessor in title of the respondent accepted the offer to convert, the right of the Government in the land was limited to the receipt of the quit-rent, and so long as that was paid it was not open to them to make any other demand. The next piece of evidence, the Revenue Boards proceedings, 1887, is relied on as a very careful investigation of a claim to the proprietary rights over part of the lands of one of the shotriem villages; that claim was then admitted. Then when another area of the shotriem land was exchanged the claim that both the melvaram and the kudivaram was held was examined and sanctioned by the Government, and the melvaram and kudivaram in the exchanged land were given, and it is clear that what was given in exchange was given on the title admitted in the land which was given up. All that evidence points to a full original grant, and there is no trace of evidence that the original grant was confined to the melvaram. The case raised questions of law, and the appeal to the High Court was competent. [On the point of a second appeal from a finding of fact reference was made to Anangamanjari Chowdhrani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani (( 1887) L. R. 14 I. A. 101, 109.), Damusa v. Abdul Samad (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A.. 140.) and Raghojirao Saheb v. Lakshmanrao Saheb (( 1912) L. 39 I. A. 202, 217.).] Tucker K.C. replied. June 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD GODDARD. The action out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for an injunction restraining the Government of the Province of Madras from levying water cess from the respondent or his ryos in respect of a jaghir consisting of seven shotriem villages in the Coimbatore taluk. The action out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for an injunction restraining the Government of the Province of Madras from levying water cess from the respondent or his ryos in respect of a jaghir consisting of seven shotriem villages in the Coimbatore taluk. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the action, and his judgment was affirmed by the learned District Judge of Coimbatore. His judgment was reversed by the High Court of Madras, which granted the injunction on July 28, 1942, and against that judgment this appeal is brought. In this judgment, which was delivered by Somayya J., with whom Abdur Rahman J. concurred, the High Court said that the only question they had to decide was whether under the grant in question all the rights which the Government possessed (that is, all the rights in the lands in question) had passed to the grantee, and with this their Lordships agree. The appellant contends that all that was granted to the respondents ancestor was themelvaram, or right to the revenue, from the lands, while the respondents contention is that the grant carried not only the melvaram but also the proprietary interest in the land itself, and in the latter case there is no question but that water cess cannot be claimed by the Government. It is not in dispute that the villages were originally granted as a shotriem inam to the respondents great-grandfather, Govinda Rao, as a reward for his services as head Sarishtadar of the district. The grant itself could not be found, and, indeed, it seems that no formal cowle was ever issued. It appears that it had been the original intention of Government to grant the shotriem for three lives, but as Govinda Rao died before any cowle was issued it was confirmed for two lives in favour of Govindas son, Krishna Rao, the respondents grandfather. The evidence begins with a letter (Ex. 1) from the Secretary of the Revenue Department to the Chief Secretary of Govern- ment, dated December 8,1825, transmitting a list of the villages selected by Govinda as a shotriem. The evidence begins with a letter (Ex. 1) from the Secretary of the Revenue Department to the Chief Secretary of Govern- ment, dated December 8,1825, transmitting a list of the villages selected by Govinda as a shotriem. The letter stated the aggregate survey value of the villages, not, it will be observed, the revenue derived therefrom, and concluded " the extent " and value of these villages being moderate, the Board beg " leave to recommend that they be granted as a shotriem on " the usual conditions." The Secretary to the Government replied saying that the grant of the villages on shotriem tenure was approved, and asking for the preparation and submission of the requisite deed so that it might be executed. On December 22, 1825, the Secretary to the Board of Revenue wrote to the Principal Collector, Coimbatore, forwarding a copy of a draft of a cowle for jaghirs, and asking him to prepare a cowle accordingly for the grant to Govinda Rao. Then, on April 26, 1832, the Secretary of the Board of Revenue informed the Chief Secretary that shortly before the death of Govinda Rao, and at his request, he had put his adopted son and next heir, Krishna Rao, in possession of the villages, and stating that the Board believed that no cowle was issued to Govinda Rao but that it was to be gathered from the correspondence that the shotriem was granted for three lives, or to the grantee and his next two heirs. The next document in order of date consists of entries in the register of Inam in one of the shotriem villages dated February 6, 1864. The general class to which the inam belongs is stated to be “shotriem village"; it is set out that the shotriem being granted by the British Government is to be confirmed, and that the present holder is willing to commute his present tenure into freehold by paying quit-rent. Then it is stated that the assessment of all the villages comprised in the grant, including the value of the waste land, is Rs.7,000, and states how the value is calculated. On May 6, 1864, a title deed was granted to Krishna Rao by the Inam Commissioner. The deed is in these terms— Coimbatore... (Seal—Inam commission—Madras) No.559. Title deed granted to Krishna Rao. 1. On May 6, 1864, a title deed was granted to Krishna Rao by the Inam Commissioner. The deed is in these terms— Coimbatore... (Seal—Inam commission—Madras) No.559. Title deed granted to Krishna Rao. 1. On behalf of the Governor-in-Council of Madras, I acknowledge your title to the shotriem village of Maileripalayam and six other villages as per 4th side—taluk of Coimbatore, district of Coimbatore claimed to be of acres 8,680.98 (eight thousand six hundred and eighty) of dry land, and acres 12.89 of wet land and (one hundred and thirty) 13099 acres of garden land besides poramboke. 2. This inam is subject to a jodi or quit-rent of Rs. 10 per annum, and is confirmed for two lives only, but it is not otherwise transferable; and on the expiration of the limited term above mentioned it will lapse to the State. 1. 3. On your agreeing to pay an annual quit-rent of Rs. 1,182 (one thousand one hundred and eighty-two rupees), inclusive of the jodi already charged on the land as above stated, your inam tenure will be converted into freehold; in which case the land will be your own absolute property, to hold or dispose of as you think proper, subject only to the payment of the above mentioned quit-rent. 2. 4. If you should desire to commute the quit-rent for the payment of a sum of money, once for all, equal to (20) twenty years purchase of the quit-rent, you will be at liberty to do so. Coimbatore, (Signed), ---------6th May, 1864. Inam Commissioner Rs. 4,700-0-0 ¼ (Seal—Inam Commission—Madras) (Seal—Governor-in-Council of Madras) Whereas you have agreed to convert your tenure into a freehold, on the terms offered by you in clause (3) three of this deed, your inam is hereby confirmed to you as freehold in perpetuity, subject only to the payment of the annual quit-rent therein mentioned, viz., Rs. 1,182 (one thousand one hundred and eighty-two rupees). Coimbatore, (Signed) -----------, 6th May, 1864. Inam Commissioner (Seal—Inam Commission, Madras) Dry. Garden. Wet. Assessment. Maileripalaiyam 2,099.98 93.24 12.89 Rs. A. P. Nachipalaiyam 1,1410.91 3.10 ….. Karisamikaundanpalai yam 960.17 5.20 ….. Palattarai 665.57 9.55 ….. 4,700 0 0 60Iambakaundanpalaiya 587.85 19.88 ….. m Vellimalapatnam 2, 461.04 ….. ….. Naikarnpalaiyam 7,644.6(sic) ….. ….. Total 8,680.98 130.99(sic) 12.89 4,700 0 0 Coimbatore, (Signed) --------------------, 6th May, 1864. Acting Inam Commissioner. The next document in order of date is Ex. A. P. Nachipalaiyam 1,1410.91 3.10 ….. Karisamikaundanpalai yam 960.17 5.20 ….. Palattarai 665.57 9.55 ….. 4,700 0 0 60Iambakaundanpalaiya 587.85 19.88 ….. m Vellimalapatnam 2, 461.04 ….. ….. Naikarnpalaiyam 7,644.6(sic) ….. ….. Total 8,680.98 130.99(sic) 12.89 4,700 0 0 Coimbatore, (Signed) --------------------, 6th May, 1864. Acting Inam Commissioner. The next document in order of date is Ex. D., which is headed "Revenue Boards Proceedings, dated October 13, 1887.” How this document came into existence is somewhat obscure, but taken together with Ex. C, which is dated May 29, 1913, the position seems to have been this. In 1883 the Government were desirous of acquiring some of the shotriem lands. There was an award by the District Judge of a sum by way of purchase price for some of the lands, which was paid on March 29, 1884. With regard to 233 acres the amount offered by the Government was refused, and that land was accordingly not bought but was ordered to be kept as an enclosure within the reserve of the forest. But in 1912 the Jaghirdars themselves proposed an exchange of these 233 acres for other land in the neighbourhood, and to this the Government agreed. The document Ex. D. is a copy of the Inam claims register and the importance of it is that it shows that the Jaghirdars claim to proprietary rights over the village was admitted to the extent of 1,273 acres and to 233 acres portion of 210 bullahs, though to the remainder of the 210 bullahs title was not admitted. Then, when the suggestion for an exchange of these 233 acres was made, the Jaghirdars expressly claimed melvaram and proprietary rights over them, and Ex. C. shows that on May 29, 1913, this claim was admitted and the exchange was effected, 240 acres being awarded to the claimants, as they were called, on the same tenure as the block surrendered. These are all the documents put in evidence relating to the land in question, and no oral evidence was given which threw any light on the nature of the original grant. Before the Subordinate Judge, however, the Government Pleader produced, apparently without objection, a document stated by him to be a copy or draft of a cowle in use about the time of the original grant, and which, he asserted, showed, the conditions on which such grants were made. Before the Subordinate Judge, however, the Government Pleader produced, apparently without objection, a document stated by him to be a copy or draft of a cowle in use about the time of the original grant, and which, he asserted, showed, the conditions on which such grants were made. If there had been evidence that this grant had been made on the conditions appearing in this document there would be no doubt that the original grant was of the right to melvaram only and no proprietary interest in the land itself was given. But no evidence was given as to this draft. Had objection been made to its being looked at all, in their Lordships opinion the objection ought to have prevailed. In any case it could only have been looked at for what it was worth, and it appears from the judgment of the District Judge that the respondent did object that no such deed was ever granted to his predecessor. In fact, it is clear that no deed at all was ever executed at the time of the original grant. Both the learned Subordinate and the District Judges paid great attention to this draft, and, indeed, really founded their judgments on it, holding that it showed what were " the " usual conditions " referred to in the letter of December 8, 1825, but, in their Lordships opinion, the document has no evidential value whatever. Assuming, as they do, that it was a genuine document obtained from a government office, there is nothing to show that the conditions set out in it were, if usual, the only conditions which were usual or used, and certainly nothing to show that they applied generally or that no other forms were used. Indeed, as will appear later in this judgment, it is now established that shotriem grants sometimes carried only rights of melvaram and sometimes proprietary rights, so that there must have been other forms, and their Lordships agree with the High Court that this draft affords no evidence as to the terms on which the original grant was made and no conclusion or inference can be founded on or drawn from it. Before turning to the main question in the case it will be convenient to dispose of one matter raised by the appellant, namely, whether the appeal to the High Court was competent. Before turning to the main question in the case it will be convenient to dispose of one matter raised by the appellant, namely, whether the appeal to the High Court was competent. It was argued that the whole question was one of fact and that as there had been concurrent findings by both the lower courts a second appeal was incompetent by reason of the provisions of ss. 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No submission to this effect was made in the High Court, and in their Lordships opinion there is no substance in the objection. What has to be decided is the nature of the respondents title, which in their opinion involves a question of law. There is also the question whether the draft cowle on which, as already observed, both the lower courts largely based their judgments, constituted any evidence of the conditions on which the original grant was made, and that, again, is a matter of law. Their Lordships have no doubt that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Turning now to the main questions, which are what was the nature of the original grant and what did it include, there are two matters which have been established by decision of this Board which must be borne in mind. The first is that a grant of a shotriem inam may be either of the revenue from the land only, which is termed melvaram, or it may be of the proprietary rights, that is, of the rights which the Government had in the land. The second is that if the original grant gave only the melvaram the subsequent proceedings of the inam commission and the title deed granted by them will not change its character or vest in the inamdar a subject-matter not belonging to him (Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasa Chariar (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 56, 67.), and Secretary of State for India v. Srimath Vidhya Sri Varada Thirta Swamigal, hereinafter referred to as the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22.). In the present case, as no sanad or cowle has been produced or even shown to have been executed, the title deed granted by the inam commission and the extracts from the inam register referred to above are evidence, and, indeed, the best evidence of the true character of the grant. In the judgment of this Board, delivered by Sir George Rankin, in the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22.) it was said that the Madras Act VIII. of 1869 created no presumption that the view of the inam commission was unfounded, and unquestionably in many cases the inam right does comprise the proprietary rights in the soil. In that case the Board held that the title deed granted by the commission and the entries in the register were evidence of the true intent and effect of the original grant and of the right which in 1864 was being recognized and continued. It was contended by the appellant in the present case that, as in this case the grant was expressly confirmed for two lives only, the two cases are essentially different, there being no limitation for lives in the former. In their Lordships opinion this makes no difference, as they can see no reason why a grant of the full proprietary rights should not be made either for a period of lives or without any limitation in point of time. As the inam deed shows, if granted for lives the grantee is given the option of acquiring an unlimited interest in the subject of the grant, and that was done in this case. The proceedings in 1883 and 1884 and as recently as 1913 also show that at those dates the Government recognized that the full proprietary rights were vested in the grantee, and this case is stronger in favour of the grantee than was the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22.) not only on this ground but also because here the inam deed included poramboke in the grant. Since the decision of this Board in what is usually called the Urlam case (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 166.) there can no longer be any question but that a grant of the proprietary interest includes the grantors rights in tank, river, and channel poramboke, and it is unnecessary to consider what effect, if any, such a grant has on what is called communal poramboke, such as burning grounds, threshing floors and the like. In their Lordships opinion the judgment of the Madras High Court in Narayanasawmy Naidu v. Secretary of State for India (( 1912) 24 Mad. L. J. 36.), where a contrary opinion was expressed, must be regarded as overruled to that extent by the Urlam case (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 166.). In the present case the High Court said "There is not the " slightest indication that any rights were reserved by the "Government except the right to collect Rs. 1,182 every year. " Further, the expression besides poramboke was put in to" indicate that not merely the lands that were then cultivated " as dry, wet or garden were granted but also all the other " rights which the grantor had, as is pointed out by the Judicial " Committee in the Swamigal case (( 1941) L. R. 69 I. A. 22.)." With this their Lordships agree, as they do with the rest of the High Courts judgment. There remain two further matters which should be mentioned. An argument was addressed to the Board, which was not raised before the High Court, based on the provisos to s. 1 of Madras Act No. VII. of 1865. By the first proviso a zamindar, inamdar or any other description of landholder not holding under ryotwari settlement is by virtue of engagements with the Government entitled to irrigation free of separate charge, and no cess shall be imposed for water supplied to the extent of this right and no more. It was submitted that this proviso did not apply because the lands were held under ryotwari settlement. If they were it would have been open to the Government to prove it, but no evidence was given on this point and no more need be said upon it. It was submitted that this proviso did not apply because the lands were held under ryotwari settlement. If they were it would have been open to the Government to prove it, but no evidence was given on this point and no more need be said upon it. The other matter is that their Lordships desire to emphasize, as did the High Court in their judgment, that this case is not concerned with the rights of persons other than the grantor and grantee, and the respective rights and liabilities between the inamdar and the ryots are in no way affected by this judgment. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed, with costs.