JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal by the Defendants in an action for possession and remoal of certain constructions. The property in dispute is an area of land split into several parcels. The facts are briefly these: 2. One Thakur Prasad Dube was the owner of this property. On his death, in 1907, his widoW Mst. Rajwanti, acquired the usual rights of a Hindu widow. Soon after, in the same year Mst. Rajwanti and one Bansidhar Dube, the brother of Thakur Prasad Dube, executed an agreement whereby the lady acknowledged the rights of Bansidhar as the owner of the property as the surviving of the two brothers of a joint Hindu family. Bansidhar came into possession and his name was mutated in the revenue papers. In the course of his administration of the estate he granted a lease of the different portions of the land in favour of a number of people including the present Defendant-Appellants fur building purposes. The lessees have made substantial constructions. Mst. Rajwanti died on 20th of May, 1935, leaving two daughters, Mst. Naurangi and Mst. Yashoda Devi. Naurangi was, as an indigent daughter, entitled to the whole estate under the Hindu law in preference to her sister, Yashodha. She brought a suit, suit No. 11 of 1935, in the Court of the Civil Judge of Mirzapur against Bansidhar for possession of the property on the ground that her father and Bansidhar were separate and her mother had no right to enter into the agreement. She was at all events a limited owner and the agreement exhausted itself with her death. To this suit the present Defendants were not parties. It was decreed on the 29th of January, 1936, and she obtained possession on 26th February, 1936. On the 26th of April, i e. within two months, the two sisters entered into an agreement whereby Naurangi recognised the right of Yashoda to the extent of a half. The latter claimed to be in charge of the entire estate under a subsequent arrangement of the 3rd of May 1940, although the plaint continues, the relations between the two sisters became sometime later strained. The present suit was instituted in the year 1941 by Yashoda for the reliefs mentioned obove. To this suit, besides the lessees, she cited her sister, Naurangi, as a Defendant. 3. The present suit was instituted in the year 1941 by Yashoda for the reliefs mentioned obove. To this suit, besides the lessees, she cited her sister, Naurangi, as a Defendant. 3. The defence, in the main, was that it was Thakur Prasad himself who had granted the lease to the Defendants and that, even if that case failed, Bansidhar was joint with his brother and he was entitled to take the step which be did. It was also pleaded that, even if the two brothers were separate, Mst. Rajwanti was within her rights in coming to an arrangement, for the management of the estate, with Bansidhar and that the latter was, in his turn, within his rights to grant the lease, as it was for the benefit of the estate. The bar of estoppel was also pleaded. The bar of limitation as also of Order 11, R. 2, of the Code of CPC was again pleaded. And, lastly it was pleaded that the Defendants were, in any case entitled to compensation. 4. The learned Munsif found that the Defendants had failed to establish that they had been let into possession by Thakur Prasad himself. He found that the two brothers were separate. But he came to a distinct finding that it was open to the lady to enter into such an arrangement with Bansidhar and the latter was within his right to enter into the transaction with the Defendants, inasmuch as it was for the benefit of the estate. He found that the Defendants were entitled to compensation. The house of Bhagwan was, according to him worth Rs. 700, that of Harihar Dube worth Rs. 600, of Mahadeo worth Rs. 1,500, of Defendants 2 and 3 worth Rs. 500, of Basudeo worth Rs. 300 and of Hanuman worth Rs. 4,000. On finding that the arrangement was for the benefit of the estate he dismissed the suit with costs. 5. The Plaintiff went in appeal. The learned Civil Judge, while agreeing with the finding of the learned Munsif that the Defendants had not been let into possession by Thakur Prasad, disagreed with him in his view that the transaction was within the competence of Mst. Rajwanti or of Bansidhar or that the Defendants were entitled to any compensation. He held that there could be no question of estoppel in the circumstances of the case. Rajwanti or of Bansidhar or that the Defendants were entitled to any compensation. He held that there could be no question of estoppel in the circumstances of the case. He granted an unconditional decree in favour of the Plaintiff. It might be mantioned that the Plaintiff had claimed mesne profits, but this relief was refused by the learned Civil Judge. 6. The Defendants have come here in second appeal and the Plaintiff has filed a cross-objection with regard to the meane profits. 7. On the findings we must take it that Bansidhar and Thakur Prasad were separate. We must also take it that the Defendants were not let into possession by Thakur Prasad We, however, find that the real question as regards the right of Mst Rajwanti to enter it to an arrangement with Bansidhar and the latter's right to grant the lease in favour of the Defendants has been obscured by the way the Courts below have approached this question. We might, however, say that, as it is, the learned Munsif was as it seems to us, correct and the learned Civil Judge was wrong. 8. It was not a case, strictly speaking, of benefit to the estate or legal necessity. Assuming that the lady could not come to an arrangement with Bansidhar which could enure beyond her life time or permanently imperil the interests of the reversioners, she could, in the course of the management of her husband's estate, do something which the prudent conduct of the management required. This may not, strictly speaking, be either benefit to the estate or legal necessity. It is something which is implicit in the right of everyone in charge of an estate, be he or she a full or a limited owner. The case in Pahalwan Singh v. Jiwan Das (1920) 18 A L J 41 though it does not go the whole length with the present case, is certainly an authority for the proposition before us. 9. The learned Munsif has distinctly found that the annual ground-rents payable by the lessees are far in excess of the rents which used to be paid by the tenant or tenants, who were in occupation of this land. The learned Civil Judge has held that the land has been permanently lost to the reversioners and an arrangement of this character could not be for the benefit of the estate. The learned Civil Judge has held that the land has been permanently lost to the reversioners and an arrangement of this character could not be for the benefit of the estate. This, in our opinion, is not the correct approach to this question. In the first place, the land has not been permanently lost to the estate. There is sti1 a right of re-entry. There is the ground rent payable annually. We, therefore, think that the transaction in dispute was one within the competence of Bansidhar as a transferee from the lady. 10. On the question of estoppel, we again feel that the learned Munsif was right and the learned Civil Judge went astray. It is true that there is normally speaking, no estoppel in a transaction by a Hindu widow, but this was not a mormal case. Thakur Prasad and Bansidhar were brothers. There was: a strong presumption of Hindu law that they were joint. The admission by the lady might have led the lessees into an honest belief that the recital in the agreement represented the truth and the brothers were really joint. It was not the lady herself who had granted the lease; it was Bansidhar. The view of law that there is no estoppel in a transaction by a Hindu widow proceeds, to our mind, upon the principle that every body knows that a Hindu widow has limited rights. That important element is lacking in the present case. The lessees were not dealing with a Hindu widow; they were dealing with the brother of the last male owner in whose favour there was a resumption that he was joint with his brother and that presumption was further reinforced by the recitals in the agreement. The case was, therefore, a clear case of estoppel and the Defendants are entitled to its benefits. 11. On the question of compensation we think, here again, the learned munsif is right and the learned Civil Judge is wrong. After the decision of the lower appellate court, there has been a pronouncement of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raja Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan 1943 A W R (P C) 52. It is true that, in one very important particular, the present case differs from the case before their Lordships. After the decision of the lower appellate court, there has been a pronouncement of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raja Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad Khan 1943 A W R (P C) 52. It is true that, in one very important particular, the present case differs from the case before their Lordships. There the person entering into the transaction had a right to the estate, although he suffered from a disability; here the person dealing with the estate had, in the events which have happened, no title to it. But the ratio of their Lordships decision appears to be ratio in Butler v. Rice (910) 2 Ch 277. If the finding of the learned Munsif is correct--as we have held that it is that the estate has benefited by this transaction, there can be no doubt that the principle laid down in that case has full application to the facts of the present case. 12. There is yet another aspect of the case which has escaped the attention of the Courts below by reason perhaps of the wrong pleadings. The plea of Order 2, Rule 2, was raised on the basis of the earlier litigation, when Mst. Naurarngi had brought a suit for possession against Bansidhar. This may or may not be so, but we do feel that Order II, Rule 3, if not Order II, Rule 2, Code of CPC has application to the facts of the case. It says. (1) Save as otherwise provided, a Plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same Defendant, or the same Defendants jointly ; and any plantiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same Defendant or the same Defendants jointly may unite(sic) such causes of action in the same suit. (2) Where causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of the aggregate subject-matters at the date of instituting the suit. 13. The cause of action in both cases was just the same. It was the transfer by the lady to Bansidhar and the resultant transfere by Bansidhar to the lessees. The lessees derived their title from him. In that action the present Defendants could have been cited as party and the case in Parbati Kunwari v. Mahmood Fatima (1907) 29 All. The cause of action in both cases was just the same. It was the transfer by the lady to Bansidhar and the resultant transfere by Bansidhar to the lessees. The lessees derived their title from him. In that action the present Defendants could have been cited as party and the case in Parbati Kunwari v. Mahmood Fatima (1907) 29 All. 267, is authority for this proposition. No other point was argued. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance with costs in all Courts. The cross-objection is dismissed with costs.