JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Walford, JJ. - This revision application u/s 115 of the CPC is brought from an order dated the 27th April, 1942, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Akbarpur, amending the decree under the Debt Redemption Act. The revision was filed on the 12th August, 1942. 2. The facts are these : On the 16th July, 1898, Ram Adhin Pandey, mortgaged with possession five Bighas and 18 Biswas of cultivated land and one bigha eight biswas and ten biswansis of uncultivated land in village Nakrapur, tahsil Akbarpur, distract Fyzabad, for lis. 300 in favour of Kam Lakhan Pandey, The interest stipulated in the deed was Rs. 12/8 per cent per annum. Two deeds of further charge were also executed ; the first one on the 14th January, 1898, for Rs. 195 at Annas -/3/6 per rupee per annum com- poundable yearly, and the second on the 22nd November, 1899 for Rs. 90 at the same rate of interest. The application u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act was brought by the representatives of the mortgagor against the representative of the mortgagee. On the 30th September, 191-3, the redemption was decreed by the Sub-Division Officer of Akbarpur on payment of Rs. 2,071 to be paid within six months or in default the application shall stand dismissed. This period expired on the 30th March, 1941, but no money was paid. An appeal was taken by the mortgagors but this was dismissed on the 10th May, 1941, by the District Judge. They, however, filed an application on the 31st July, 1941, praying for amendment of the decree and asking time for payment of the money which may be found on ac- counting. A written statement was filed objecting to the amendment on the ground that the judgment-debtors did not carry out the order of the Court dated the 30th September, 1940, that the decree had spent itself by the flux of time and there was no legal decree in existence which could be amended. The Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed, the objection, went into the accounts and came to the conclusion that the money had been paid out of the usufruct of the property and nothing was due. He accordingly ordered redemption without payment. The Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed, the objection, went into the accounts and came to the conclusion that the money had been paid out of the usufruct of the property and nothing was due. He accordingly ordered redemption without payment. He does not appear to have dealt with the legal argument as to the maintainability of the application for amendment presumably because, the case was not presented to him in arguments in that light. 3. We have heard Counsel for parties at considerable length and after having given our best consideration to the case have come to the conclusion that the order of the trial Court must be maintained. 4. A preliminary point which falls for consideration is whether this Court is competent to entertain the revision without the applicant having preferred an appeal before the District Judge. While the opposite-parties contend that an appeal lay to the District Judge and a revision could not be filed direct in this Court, the applicant contends that no appeal lay to the District Judge from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer as that order was neither passed in a regular suit nor in the course of the execution proceedings but even if an appeal lay to the District Judge, no second appeal lay to this Court and a revision was in any case entertainable by this Court. It regards the first branch of the contention, we are of opinion that the matter is concluded by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Salik Ram v. Ram Sarup 1945 OA 133 : AWR(CC) 133 : OWN 230. The answer to the first question, which covers this point, is as follows:- 1 (a) The order passed by the Court amending or refusing to amend the decree will be appealable in the same way as the original decree was appealable. If the original decree was passed by the Civil Court, it will be open to first appeal and second appeal under Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively. If the decree was passed u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act., the right of appeal will be restricted by Section 23 of the Act and there will be no right of second appeal. The decree will be revisable if the case can be brought within the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. If the decree was passed u/s 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act., the right of appeal will be restricted by Section 23 of the Act and there will be no right of second appeal. The decree will be revisable if the case can be brought within the purview of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The original decree was passed u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. There was one right of appeal which was, in fact, exhausted and there could have been a revision to this Court u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. It is true that the decree which is now sought to be revised was not passed u/s 12, but as was held in the Full Bench case no independent proceedings are initiated by way of a suit under the Debt Redemption Act independently of a suit either regularly filed in the Civil Court or instituted in any .other Court under the provisions of any law for the time being in force, e. g., under the Agriculturists Relief Act. The object of an application under the Debt Kedemption Act is merely to obtain the reduction of the decretal amount by the elimination, wholly or partially, of the interest. The order passed under the Debt Redemption Act in such a case must relate back to the proceedings under the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The position, therefore, is that an appeal against the order of the lower Court lay to the District Judge but no appeal was filed i there against that order. It is not suggested on behalf, of the opposite-party that a ' second appeal lay to this Court. 7. The position, therefore, resolves itself into this whether the aggrieved party could file a revision application direct in this Court without exhausting his right of appeal to the lower appellate Court. 8. Reliance is placed on the words "in which no appeal lies thereto" used in Section 115, it being argued that these words mean that no appeal lies to the High Court or the Chief Court, as the case may be. This interpretation found favour with a Bench of this Court in Harcharan Singh v. Mohammad Husain Khan 1943 OA 41 : A W R (CC) 17 : OWN 71, where it was held following Maharaja Sashi Kanta Acharjya Bahadur Vs. Nasirabad Loan Office Co. This interpretation found favour with a Bench of this Court in Harcharan Singh v. Mohammad Husain Khan 1943 OA 41 : A W R (CC) 17 : OWN 71, where it was held following Maharaja Sashi Kanta Acharjya Bahadur Vs. Nasirabad Loan Office Co. Ltd. and Others, AIR 1936 Cal 786 , and Daw Min Baw v. A.V.P.L.N. Chettyar Firm (1931) 11 Rang. 134, that the fact that an appeal lies to the lower Court will not take away the powers of this Court to revise the order passed by the trial Court. 9. One of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Naphar Chandra Sardar v. Kali Pada Das ILR 1940 Cal. 393, held that the words "appeal lies thereto" in Section 115 of the CPC indicate that when a relief can be given by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Sections 96, 100, 104 or Order XLIII of the Code or any other statute, its revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 cannot be invoked. These words mean "appeal is allowed under the Code or any other law". The other learned Judge in the same case held that the revision u/s 115 is barred where an appeal, first or second, lies immediately to the High Court. The case of Bern Madho Ram v. Mahadeo Pandey ILR 1930 All. 604, was followed. Sulaiman and Niamatullah, JJ. observed in that case :- In our opinion there is no ground for restricting the scope of the words ''in which no appeal lies thereto" to cases where no appeal lies from the order sought to be revised. So long as the party has a right to come up to the High Court by way of an appeal and has failed to avail himself of that opportunity by first going up to the District Judge and then coming up to the High Court, he cannot ask the High Court to interfere in revision. 10. That was a case in which the first appeal lay to the district Judge and the second appeal to the High Court. 11. In Tipan Prasad Singh v. Secretary of State IR 1935 Patna 86 Section 115 was construed to mean that the High Court can interfere in revision where an appeal lies to an inferior Court and not to the High Court. 11. In Tipan Prasad Singh v. Secretary of State IR 1935 Patna 86 Section 115 was construed to mean that the High Court can interfere in revision where an appeal lies to an inferior Court and not to the High Court. In a later case of that Court in Hridaynath Singh v. Lohar Singh (1940) 187 IC 838 it was held that according to the practice of the Patna High Court there could be no interference in revision where a definite remedy is provided to the parties in the form of an appeal to the lower Court where the matter is pending investigation. 12. In the following cases 'it has been held without discussing the meaning of the words "in which no appeal lies thereto" that where another remedy is open to an applicant e.g., a suit or an appeal, the High Court should not interfere in revision : 1. Raja Birendra Bikram Singh v. Basdeo (1937) 12 Luck 52, 2. Ashiq Ali v. Abdus Sayeed Khan 1938 OA 384 : (CC) 43 : OWN 494, 3. Khurshed Ali v. Ghulam Mustafa 1935 A W R 967 : ALJ 995 4. Sher Ali v. Jagmohan Ram (1931) 53 All. 466. On the other hand, it has been held by a Bench of this Court in District Board, Bahraich v. Ramendra Prasad Singh 1944 O A 122 : AWR(CC) 122 : OWN 174 that the rule of non interference in revision upon the ground that another remedy is open to the applicant is not an inflexible one and is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. 13. Where non-interference is likely to result in multiplicity of suits, in delay and in unnecessary expense to the parties, a revision may be entertained. The question is purely academicals, as on the merits we are satisfied that the order of the lower Court cannot be disturbed. 14. The contention raised on behalf of the applicant is that the terms of the condition- al decree for redemption not being com- plied with by the mortgagors, the decree ceased to be operative and there being no decree in existence the lower Court had no jurisdiction to amend it. The argument is founded upon the words of Section 16 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The argument is founded upon the words of Section 16 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. This section seems to contemplate the making of a deposit by the mortgagor of the sum due from him under the mortgage simultaneously with the making of the application, but it is well settled now that the application for redemption is not defective by reason of the non deposit where the applicant claims that nothing is due from him as the entire redemption money has been paid out of the usufruct of the property. Section 17 refers to the sufficiency or otherwise of the deposit, the power of the Court to order the mortgagor to pay up the balance and the consequence of the failure on his part to carry out the order of the Court. The section further says that if the Court finds that the applicant is not entitled to redeem it shall reject the application. If it finds that the applicant is entitled redeem and he fails to deposit the balance of the money ordered by the Court to make up the deficiency in the original deposit the Court shall reject his application. If the money is deposited as ordered by the Court, the mort- gage is redeemed. u/s 18 the Court ordering redemption is bound to put the applicant in possession of the mortgaged property. The failure of the mortgagors to pay the redemption money within six months resulting in the automatic dismissal of the application, it is urged, amounts to a rejection of the application for redemption by the Court, and there is no further jurisdiction in the Court to enlarge the time for payment of money. The remedy, if any, of the mortgagors lies in a separate suit for redemption. This argument overlooks the fact that u/s 27 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act the provisions of the CPC in regard to suits must be followed so far as they can be made applicable to all proceedings under Chapter III, which includes an application for redemption. It has been held that by virtue of the provisions of this section Order XXXIV of the CPC applies to proceedings u/s 12 of the Act. The Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the mortgagor /for overpayments under Order XXXIV rule 9 of the CPC in proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. It has been held that by virtue of the provisions of this section Order XXXIV of the CPC applies to proceedings u/s 12 of the Act. The Court has jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the mortgagor /for overpayments under Order XXXIV rule 9 of the CPC in proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. (Vide Raja Ram v. Mushtaq Husain (1943) 18 Luck. 183 : 1942 O A 237 : AWR (CC) 216. The Court has also power to extend the time fixed for payment of the money found due to the mortgagees under Order XXXIV rule 7 of the CPC (See Misri Lal v. Gajodhar 1943 OA 210 : AWR (CC) 83 : OWN 373. 15. Rule 7 of Order XXXIV refers to a preliminary decree for redemption. Sub- rule (2) empowers the Court to extend the time fixed for the payment of the amount before the passing of a final decree for foreclosure or sale. Rule 8 says where payment has not been made and the mortgage happens to be one of conditional sale or an anomalous mortgage, the Court shall pass a final decree' declaring that the plaintiff and all persons claiming under him are debarred from all right to redeem the property and if it is any other mortgage not being a usufructuary mortgage the Court shall pass a final decree that the mortgaged property shall be sold and the proceeds applied in payment of the mortgage debt. We are not prepared to construe the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer as debarring the mortgagors from all rights to redeem the property by merely adding in his order that in default of payment within six months the suit shall stand dismissed. He could not even j if he so intended, deprive the mortgagors of the statutory right of redemption which must be deemed to subsist and continue until the Court has passed a final order as contemplated by Order XXXIV be barring the mortgagors from all rights to redeem the property. We are fortified in this conclusion by a decision or their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Singh v. Hansraj Kunwar (1934) 611 A 362. That was a case in which a decree for redemption in respect of a mortgage by conditional sale provided that if the mortgagor failed to pay in accordance with the decree his case will stand dismissed. That was a case in which a decree for redemption in respect of a mortgage by conditional sale provided that if the mortgagor failed to pay in accordance with the decree his case will stand dismissed. The decree did not provide as it should have done, that upon default the mortgagor should be absolutely debarred of all right to redeem. The mortgagor did not pay the mortgage money and the frontage remained in possession but did not apply for an order under rule 93 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 corresponding to rule 8 of Order XXXIV of the CPC debarring the right to redeem. A fresh suit was brought for redemption. It was held that the previous decree did not extinguish the right to redeem and consequently by Section 60 of the Act that right still existed. Their lord- ships of the Privy Council after referring to the proviso to Section 60 "Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by order of a Court" observed that there was no question of extinguishment by an act of the parties and the right must still exist unless it has been extinguished by an order of the Court. 16. There being no order u/s 93 the right subsists. Their Lordships went on to observe : The right to redeem is a right conferred upon the mortgagor by enactment, of which he can only be deprived by means and in manner enacted for that purpose, and strictly complied with. In the present case the only basis for the claim that the right to redeem his been extinguished is Section 60 ; but in (heir Lordships' view the old decree cannot properly be construed as doing what which it does not purport to do namely, as extinguishing the right to redeem. 17. Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act provides a cheap and summary remedy for redemption of mortgages by the agriculturists and it would be repugnant to the policy and principle of the Act to construe Section 16 as curtailing the right of the mortgagor or depriving him of the benefits conferred by the procedure laid down in Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the right of the mortgagors to obtain redemption has not been extinguished, as we do not hold it to be, it follows that they are entitled to redeem the property without recourse to the remedy of an ex- pensive regular suit. To drive them to a separate suit would be to defeat the object of Section 25 of the Act which says that no suit shall be brought in any relief which can be obtained by an I application under this Chapter. It is I not denied that if the right was not extinguished, the decree must be deemed to exist and it was open to the mortgagors to have claimed the benefit of the beneficial provision of the Debt Redemption Act. It is significant that in the application the mortgagors asked for time to pay the amount which may be found due to the mortgagee upon accounting. 18. It Ram Prasad Singh v. Bachcha Singh 1945 O A 184 : AWR (CC) 184 (1945 OA 184) it was held that a liability under the Debt Redemption Act continues until the sale of the decree in execution is confirmed and before the confirmation of the sale the debtor can apply u/s 8 of the Debt Redemption Act for amendment of the decree. This decision was given by applying the provisions of Order XXXIV of the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. The cases referred to by the applicant have no bearing. They are not cases to which the provisions pf Order XXXIV apply. In Srefpathi Balaiaji v. Darsi Ramayya AIR 1941 Mad. 716 the question arose whether the Court Had: any power-to extend the time for paying money due under a conditional decree allowing or dismissing the appeal. The learned Judge, however, held that the time could be extended u/s 151 of the CPC in the ends of justice to rectify an error. In a Calcutta case the order passed by the Court that the sale would be cancelled upon the applicants depositing the decree of amount within a certain period failing which it was to stand dismissed, was held, to be final and therefore the Court had no power to grant extension of. time under' Section 148 (See Girish Chandra Das Vs. Sm. Annadamoni and Another, AIR 1939 Cal 309 . 20. The case of Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad AIR 1936 All. time under' Section 148 (See Girish Chandra Das Vs. Sm. Annadamoni and Another, AIR 1939 Cal 309 . 20. The case of Gaya Din v. Lalta Prasad AIR 1936 All. 47 : 1936 AWR 414 was a case of a conditional order restoring the suit dismissed on default, on condition of paying costs. The order being automatic it was held that Section 148 did not empower the Court to grant time The case, of Raj Bahadur v. Bishuntha (1928) 50 WN 880 was a case in which a final decree for pre-emption had been passed and no money having been paid within the time fixed Section 148 was held inapplicable. 21. For the foregoing reasons it is clear that the decree in question was not extinguished and the lower Court had Jurisdiction to amend the decree under the Debt Redemption Act. The decision of the lower Court that the mortgage money was satisfied out of the usufruct of the property is a decision on a question of fact and is not challenged before us. 22. We, therefore, dismiss this application for revision with costs.