JUDGMENT Madeley and Walford, JJ. - The facts giving rise to this second appeal are that one Jwala Prasad together with his five sons formed a joint family. of these sons Ganga Prasad was from his first wife and the remaining four, namely, Ram Narain, Lachmi Narain, Bhola Nath and Jagat Narain were born of his second wife. These four together with their mother Mst. Mahadei are the Appellants before us. 2. Jwala Prasad died in the year 1916 and some time after his death a dispute arose between Ganga Prasad on the one side and his step-brothers on the other. A suit was ultimately fled by Ganga Prasad for partition of the joint family property. It appears that while the partition proceedings were still pending Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan, the Respondent in this appeal, instituted a suit for recovery of a sum of money against Ganga Prasad and the other members of the joint family. In this suit Ganga Prasad admitted the claim of Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan, while his co-parceners resisted the suit on the ground that it was fictitious and collusive and that in any view of the matter, the joint family property was not liable for the payment of the money claimed as it was not obtained for legal necessity. The suit was decreed against Ganga Prasad on the basis of his admission of liability but was dismissed against the other Ca-parceners on 6th July 1929. 3. The partition suit which was then pending ultimately terminated in an award in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, on 8th December, 1935, whereby inter alia items 1 and 18 comprising houses were allotted to Ganga Prasad and item No. 2 to the other parties. The learned Civil Judge further found that a sum of Rs. 4,503-1-8 was payable by Ganga Prasad to his step-brothers. Ganga Prasad filed objections to the award unsuccessfully. 4. On 18th March 1935, Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan applied for execution of the decree he had obtained and got two houses which at the time he thought were items Nos. 1 and 18 of the award and which had fallen to the share of the judgment-debtor. Ganga Prasad filed objections to the award unsuccessfully. 4. On 18th March 1935, Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan applied for execution of the decree he had obtained and got two houses which at the time he thought were items Nos. 1 and 18 of the award and which had fallen to the share of the judgment-debtor. The order of attachment was issued on the 20th March, 1935, and the actual attachment of the property marked ABCD in the amnni's map purporting to represent items 1 and 18 of the award was effected on the 27th April 1935. The property attached was put to sale and was purchased by a third person on 16th September 1935. The sale, however, has not been confirmed yet. 5. On the 22nd March 1935 (it will be noted, the very day on which the attachment order was issued) Ganga Prasad filed an appeal in this Court against the decision in the arbitration suit. This appeal was valued at Rs. 500 (a small fraction of the value of the property involved in the partition suit). Neither the right of the parties nor the share of the parties in the immoveable property was disputed. The appeal was directed against a few minor and insignificant items. 6. This appeal was compromised on 30th August, 1935, and by the terms of the compromise Ganga Prasad transferred all the houses and land: items 1, 5 and 18 of the award, whim had been given to him in consideration of the sum of Rs. 4, 503 1-8 which was held by the Civil Judge to be payable by Ganga Prasad to the other members of the joint family. 7. The Appellants in this case filed objections u/s 47 of the CPC against the attachment and sale of the property which had been effected on the application for execution of the decree-holder. The main points raised in the objections were: 1. that the houses attached were item 2 of the award which had been allotted to the objectors and therefore they were not liable to attachment and sale for the debt of Ganga Prasad; 2. that the decree obtained by the decree-holder was collusive and fictitious, and it could not in any way affect the interests of the objectors; and 3. that the houses attached were item 2 of the award which had been allotted to the objectors and therefore they were not liable to attachment and sale for the debt of Ganga Prasad; 2. that the decree obtained by the decree-holder was collusive and fictitious, and it could not in any way affect the interests of the objectors; and 3. that assuming even that the houses attached formed part of the property allotted to Ganga Prasad, the objectors held a charge of Rs. 7000 over the houses in question, and the sale of the property should be subject to this charge. 8. The learned Civil Judge allowed the objections holding that the property attached, which is admittedly marked ABCD on the amin's map, was item 2 of the award because he found that item 18 was not situated in the parcel marked ABCD but in another block which is marked EFGHL He also held that the decree obtained by Nawab Sajjad Ali Khan was collusive and fictitious. This finding was based upon some remarks of the learned Civil Judge in the partition proceedings. He further held that Rs. 5,200 were payable by Ganga Prasad to the objectors and that the order in respect of this money in the partition suit created a charge upon the property allotted to the judgment-debtor. 9. In appeal the learned District Judge, Lucknow, reversed the finding of the Civil Judge held that the parcel of property marked ABCD was in fact item 1 of the award and had been allotted to the judgment-debtor. He further held that the order of the partition Court which was to the following effect. Under these circumstances I consider it proper to order and direct the Plaintiff that he shall not transfer the property allotted to him by sale, mortgage or gift so long as the money due to the Defendants has not been paid. 10. did not create a charge upon the property. He also held that the appeal filed by Ganga Prasad and the compromise decree obtained thereunder was a collusive proceedings and therefore the doctrine of his pendens did not apply to the execution of the decree-holder's decree and attachment proceedings. 11. In appeal before us the Learned Counsel for the Appellant has agitated the same points. He also held that the appeal filed by Ganga Prasad and the compromise decree obtained thereunder was a collusive proceedings and therefore the doctrine of his pendens did not apply to the execution of the decree-holder's decree and attachment proceedings. 11. In appeal before us the Learned Counsel for the Appellant has agitated the same points. He contends that the property attached was in fact item 2 of the award and having been allotted to the objector Appellants, it could not be attached in respect of a decree against Ganga Prasad. This point has now become a question of fact, and we are of the opinion that it cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Nevertheless, we have examined the reasoning of the Court below and have also examined the evidence, and we find that the lower appellate Court was perfectly right in arriving at the conclusion that the parcel ABCD was in fact item 1 of the award and had been allotted to Ganga Prasad. It appears that the learned Judge in the Court of first instance was influenced by the fact that the decree-holder had attached a block of buildings marked ABCD describing them to be items 1 and 18 of the award, but as item 18 was found to be situated elsewhere the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the parcel marked ABCD was not items 1 and 8 and inferentially he came to the conclusion that it must be item 2 of the award. It seems that the confusion arose from a mistake of the decree-holder. The decree-holder, came to know that items 1 and 18 had been awarded to his judgment-debtor and as the block ABCD consisted of two houses, he thought that this comprised both items 1 and 18. In point of fact ABCD, though consisted of two houses, is item 1 of the award. Item 18 was situated in another block marked FGHI. We are satisfied that the finding of the learned Judge in lower Court was perfectly correct. 12. The next point agitated by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is that, though the application for execution of the attachment of property was made some three days before the appeal in the partitition suit was filed, the actual attachment was not effected till the 27th April 1935, which was during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. 12. The next point agitated by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is that, though the application for execution of the attachment of property was made some three days before the appeal in the partitition suit was filed, the actual attachment was not effected till the 27th April 1935, which was during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. He, therefore, contended that u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act the doctrine of lis pendens was applicable. The Judge in the lower Court in effect held that from the circumstances in the case and the conduct of Ganga Prasad the appeal was a collusive appeal and it had been filed not so much to obtain an adjudication upon any important question involved in the partition suit affecting the immoveable property but in order to defeat the right of the judgment-debtor. We have examined the record and are in complete agreement with the lower appellate Court The data on which the appeal was filed and the compromise effected shortly after are extremely significant and the learned appellate Court was justified in holding the proceedings to be collusive. It is not contested before us that if the appeal was collusive the doctrine of his pendens would be applicable. Moreover, in the appeal filed by Ganga Prasad there was no contest as to the share of the parties in which their rights to the immoveable property were directly and specifically in question. The immoveable property had been allotted to the coparceners and neither party had questioned that allotment. The appeal was directed againts an order whereby Ganga Prasad, who had realized certain sums of money or was alleged to have taken possession of some timber from an old house; was required to make payment to his coparceners. In Bhupati Banerjee Vs. Bon Behary Roy and Another, AIR 1941 Cal 436 it was held that: An ordinary partition suit where there is no contest as to the fractional share of the parties is not a suit in which their rights to the immoveable property are directly and specifically in question. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to such case. 13. In Hiranya Bhusan Mukherjee and Others Vs. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to such case. 13. In Hiranya Bhusan Mukherjee and Others Vs. Gouri Dutt Maharaj and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 227 a Bench of the Calcutta High Court laid down the principle as follows: The doctrine with which Section 52 is concerned rests upon the foundation that it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The correct mode of stating the doctrine is that 'pendente lite neither party to the litigation can alienate the property in dispute so as to affect his opponent'. During a litigation nothing new should be introduced. The requirements of Section 52 are: (1) the pendency of a suit, (2) non-collusive character of the suit, (3) any right to immoveable property being in question in that suit, being in question directly and specifically, (4) the other party (other than the party making the transfer pendente lite) having some right under the decree in that suit. 14. From the above authorities it will be observed that the proceedings should not be collusive and that the right to immoveable property must directly and specifically in question in that suit. As the finding against the Appellants is that the appeal was collusive, the doctrine of lis pendens cannot apply. 15. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has cited Mt. Ramdulari Kuer and Others Vs. Upendra Nath Basu, AIR 1925 Patna 462 . We find this ruling inapplicable to the present case. 16. The third and final point urged by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the property attached is subject to a charge. This contention is based upon an order passed by the learned Judge trying the partition suit in his judgment Ex. 7. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: At any rate I am not prepared to accept the Defendants' prayer to make the money allotted to them to be a charge on the immoveable property allotted to the Plaintiff. At the same time I am anxious to safe-guard the Defendants' rights and remedies to realise the money due to them. At the same time I am anxious to safe-guard the Defendants' rights and remedies to realise the money due to them. Under these circumstances I consider it proper to order and direct the Plaintiff that he shall not transfer the property allotted to him by sale, mortgage or gift so long as the money due to the Defendants has not been paid. 17. It is manifest that the learned Judge refused to make the money due from Ganga Prasad a charge upon the immoveable property allotted to him and it will be seen that this order was more in the nature of an injunction against Ganga Prasad restraining him from disposing of the property voluntarily until he had paid the money due to his opposite-party. Having specifically refused to make the amount due from Ganga Prasad a charge upon the property, we can not accept the contention of the Learned Counsel that the restraint placed upon dealing with the property amounted to a charge. The Learned Counsel has cited Narain Das v. Babu Murli Dhar (1929) 6 O.W.N. 903 and AIR 1937 420 (Oudh) . In view of the specific refusal of the Judge to make the property in question subject to a charge, the authorities cited are of no avail to the Appellants. We are of the opinion that the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the judgment of the Court of first instance and dismissing the objections. 18. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.