JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - This is a second appeal by one Ram Chander Sahai (who died during the hearing of the arguments and is now represented by other persons) who had on 19-3-1939 instituted a suit against the Cantonment Board of Meerut for the recovery of Rs. 2500 as salary, to which he claimed to be entitled but which had been withheld by the Board. The case has arisen in the following circumstances : The plaintiff is a man who had been for many years in the service of the Cantonment Board and in January 1933 was holding the post of Tax Superintendent of the Board on Rs. 160, p.m. In January 1933 one Mr. Palman, who had been in the service of the Board as permanent Office Superintendent on a salary of Rs. 300 per month, went Cm leave preparatory to retirement and the plaintiff was appointed as officiating Superintendent on Rs. 210, made up of Rs. 150 plus one-fifth of the salary of the post of Office Superintendent. In the year 1926 a new scale of pay of the office staff of the Cantonment Board had been sanctioned by the Board and the new scale of pay fixed for the Office Superintendent was Rs. 150 rising to RS. 300. It is not clear from the record as to what the exact scheme of increments was but it would appear that it provided for three annual increments of Rs. 25 each to be followed by annual increments of Rs. 15 upto the maximum of Rs. 300. Be that as it may, it is free from doubt that this scale had never been submitted by the Board to the Eastern Command for sanction and in consequence at the date of the appointment of the plaintiff to the post of Office Superintendent the new scale of pay was not legally in force. The Board apparently had a peculiar habit of asking for sanction to the new rates of pay of each particular post at the time when a fresh appointment was being made to that post instead of seeking sanction to the scale as a whole. 2. It was, in these circumstances, that on 24th July 1933, the plaintiff was made permanent on the post on a pay of RS. 225 and that subsequently on 23rd February 1934 the Board confirmed the appointment of the plaintiff as Office Superintendent on Rs. 2. It was, in these circumstances, that on 24th July 1933, the plaintiff was made permanent on the post on a pay of RS. 225 and that subsequently on 23rd February 1934 the Board confirmed the appointment of the plaintiff as Office Superintendent on Rs. 225. It was a contention on behalf of the Board that the plaintiff was himself responsible and somehow guilty of dishonesty in not bringing to the notice of the Board that the new scale had not been sanctioned, having an idea in his mind that he would later make a claim to be paid at the same rate as his predecessor, Mr. Palman. That contention was repelled by the learned Munsif, and although the learned additional District Judge thought that there was a deliberate omission to ask for sanction of the Eastern Command to the revised scale of pay applicable to plaintiff's case in August 1933, he took the view that the plaintiff could not be estopped from claiming that under the rules applicable to his case he was entitled to receive a salary of Rs. 300 from the date of his appointment. 3. We are of opinion, after considering the circumstances of the case, that undoubtedly the appointment of the plaintiff on Rs. 225 in the new scale of pay was the result of a general misunderstanding. The Board and every one responsible failed to realise that the new scale had not been passed by the Eastern Command and hence the appointment was made as if the scale had been sanctioned. The Courts below have gone into the history of the appointment and have shown how the question as to what was the correct pay of the plaintiff-appellant, came to Joe raised and those Courts have held as a fact that the correct pay of the post was Rs. 300, and that the plaintiff could not be estopped from claiming pay at that rate by any conduct on his part. On 25th November 1936 as a result of the prior correspondence it was pointed out by the Accountant-General, in a letter, Ex. 28, also described as Ex. U, that as B. Ram Chander Sahai was confirmed as Office Superintendent on 24th July 1933 and as the pay of the post on that date was Rs. On 25th November 1936 as a result of the prior correspondence it was pointed out by the Accountant-General, in a letter, Ex. 28, also described as Ex. U, that as B. Ram Chander Sahai was confirmed as Office Superintendent on 24th July 1933 and as the pay of the post on that date was Rs. 300 he should have, in view of fundamental R. 19, been allowed from 24th July 1933 the presumptive pay of the post, namely, Rs. 300 and on 1st April 1934, when the revised scale of pay actually did come into force, his pay in the revised scale should, under the fundamental R. 23, have been fixed at the maximum scale, namely, Rs. 300 and that his pay might now be regularized accordingly. On this letter the then Executive Officer, Major Kelan, made a note as follows : B. Ram Chander Sahai is entitled to Rs. 300 per month from the date of his appointment as office Superintendent and the matter may be brought up at the time of his retirement. 4. At that date B. Ram Chander Sahai was already on extension having passed the age of 55 and no doubt the Executive Officer thought that he would be retiring in another six months (i.e. from 20th May 1937) so that consideration of the matter would not be long delayed. Actually B. Ram Chander Sahai got another extension up to 20th May 1938 and it was not until 21st February 1938 that he applied for leave pending retirement and also asked to be paid his arrears of pay in accordance with the terms of the Accountant-General's letter, Ex. 28. In due course the plaintiff retired with effect from 21st May 1938, but his application for arrears of pay remained undisposed of until on 21st December 1938 by its resolution of that date the Board declined to grant to him the arrears due. The plaintiff evidently had immediate information of this resolution and on the following day, 22nd December, he gave a notice to the Board, such as would be required if the provisions of S. 273, Cantonments Act were applicable to the case. The plaintiff evidently had immediate information of this resolution and on the following day, 22nd December, he gave a notice to the Board, such as would be required if the provisions of S. 273, Cantonments Act were applicable to the case. The formal intimation of the Board's decision was conveyed to the plaintiff on 19th January 1939, but it was not until 19th September 1939 that the plaintiff instituted his suit claiming arrears of pay from 24th July 1933 upto 20th May 1938, a total sum of Rupees 2,520-5-10 out of which he relinquished Rs. 20-5-10 possibly because it was not worth while to pay additional court-fee for that amount. 5. The main defences that were taken were that the plaintiff was employed by the Board as Office Supdt. on a salary of Rs. 225 and not on Rs. 300, that the pay of the post at the time of his appointment was not Rs. 300, that the plaintiff himself was estopped because it was due to his conduct that the new scale of 1926 was not referred to the Eastern Command before he was made permanent, and that the suit was barred by limitation under the provisions of S. 273 (3), Cantonments Act. The trial Court held against the Board on all points and holding that for purposes of limitation the suit was governed by Art. 120, Limitation Act, it gave the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 2306 1-6 holding that the arrears for the period from 24-7-1933 to 24-8-1933 only were time-barred. On appeal the learned Additional District Judge held that the sanctioned pay of the Office Superintendent at the time of the plaintiff's appointment was Rs. 300 per month, that the scale fixed by the Board in 1926 was inoperative for want of sanction of the Eastern Command and the plaintiff was entitled to receive Rs. 300 per month as Office Superintendent from the date of his appointment. On the question of estoppel, he held that there could be no estoppel to defeat a plain provision of law, and that although in this case the position of the Board was altered for the worse by plaintiff's conduct, the plaintiff was not estopped from claiming salary at the rate of Rs. 300 per month from the date of his appointment as Office Superintendent, No serious attempt has been made to contest any of these findings in this Court. 300 per month from the date of his appointment as Office Superintendent, No serious attempt has been made to contest any of these findings in this Court. 6. On the question of limitation the learned Additional District Judge held that the case came within the mischief of S. 273, Cantonments Act. Section 273 (1) prescribes that "no suit shall be instituted against any Board ... in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act or of any rule or bye-law made thereunder until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been left at the office of the Board" while S. 273 (3) prescribes that "no suit, such as is described in sub-s. (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises." The effect of these two provisions and similar provisions in other Acts, has been held to he that a plaintiff is entitled to institute his suit within 8 months of the date of the accruing of the cause of action after having delivered notice to the Board not less than 2 months perior to the, institution of the suit. In the present case it is clear that the plaintiff gave his notice to the Board on 22-12-1938, whereas the suit was not filed until 19-9-1939 more than 8 months after the cause of action had accrued. 7. As we have remarked earlier, the finding that the pay of the post prior to the appointment of the appellant was Rs. 300 is in the nature of a finding of fact and has not been sought to be questioned in this appeal, nor has the question of estoppel been argued. Owing to the death of the appellant, the appeal has come up before us on two occasions and it was not disputed that the only question for argument was the question of limitation on the finding in regard to which the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The questions which arise, put shortly, are whether S. 273, Cantonments Act, applies to this suit. If not, what Article of the Limitation Act does apply and what part of the claim is within time? The questions which arise, put shortly, are whether S. 273, Cantonments Act, applies to this suit. If not, what Article of the Limitation Act does apply and what part of the claim is within time? The learned Munsif was of opinion that S. 273, Cantonments Act, was not applicable and that the suit was governed by Art. 120, Limitation Act. It has been conceded in this Court that it would be difficult to contend that the suit is governed by Art. 120, and the suit might be construed as governed by Art. 102 or Art. 115, Limitation Act. In either case the limitation is 3 years and in consequence the bulk of the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation. Article 102 prescribes for a suit for wages not otherwise expressly provided for by this schedule, a period of 3 years which begins to run from the date when the wages accrue due. Article 115 prescribes for a suit for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for, a period of 3 years' limitation which begins to run from the date when the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted has occurred (or where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. The present would not be a case of continuing breach but of successive breaches of contract occurring on the date of each monthly payment of salary. 8. The question in this appeal really is as to the correct interpretation of S. 273 (1), Cantonments Act. That section provides as follows: No suit shall be instituted against any Board .... in respect of any act done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act, or of any rule or bye-law made thereunder, until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been left at the office of the Board.....and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and unless the plaint contains a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. 9. 9. The learned Additional District Judge took the view that the plaintiff was appointed by the Board under the rules framed under the Cantonments Act and in fixing the salary of the plaintiff the Board certainly purported to act under such rules. He went on to say : It is true that the rules were not fully complied with by the Board in fixing the plaintiff's salary inasmuch as it was fixed without the requisite sanction of the Eastern Command. The Board's act may not be legally valid and effective, but it did purport to act under the rules framed under S. 280, Cantonments Act. The word 'purport' means profess or be intended to seem. It is not necessary that the Board when it purports to act in a manner under the rules should be fully authorised by the rules to act in that manner. In this case in my opinion as the Board purported to act under the rules framed under the Cantonments Act the suit is of the nature contemplated in sub-s. (1), S. 273 and the period of limitation prescribed for such suits is 6 months from the cause of action. 10. He went on to hold that even considering that information of the Board's decision was not conveyed until 19th January, the suit was not within time, and indeed if the cause of action be deemed to have arisen on 19-1-1939, then it must be said that the suit was instituted without notice at all. 11. On behalf of the appellant the contention put forward is that this case does not fall within the mischief of S. 273 (1) on the view that the suit is not in respect of an act done, or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act. This contention has been put upon the footing that in order to bring the suit within the scope of S. 273 (1) such an act or illegal omission must be with reference to the wrong performance or the non-performance of some duty cast upon the Board by the Act itself or by a rule made under the Act. Stress is to be laid upon the words "duty cast upon the Board". The suit must, it is said, have some reference to an act enjoined by the Act and not some act which the Act empowers the Board to do. Stress is to be laid upon the words "duty cast upon the Board". The suit must, it is said, have some reference to an act enjoined by the Act and not some act which the Act empowers the Board to do. The plaintiff's claim rests upon the footing that by emisting him in its service the Board entered into an implied contract to pay him the scales of pay validly fixed by it for the posts on its establishment, subject of course to the proviso that the Board necessarily has the power to alter the scale of pay of a post so as to affect future incumbents of the post, but not so as to affect the existing incumbent of it. His case was that by a resolution of the Board duly sanctioned by the Eastern Command the pay of the post of Office Superintendent had in the time of Mr. Palman been fixed at Rs. 300 and was still so fixed at the time of his appointment to and confirmation on that post. His case further was that in view of the sanctioned scale his appointment and confirmation on Rs. 225 was a mere mistake which the Board was bound to rectify and that as the Board had fixed rates of pay for its establishment his acceptance from the Board of Rs. 225 and of other rates of pay less than Rs. 300 did not and could not amount to a simple contract by which he was bound. 12. Section 273, Cantonments Act, like S. 326, Municipalities Act, S. 192, District Boards Act, S. 80, Civil P.C. and the English Public Authorities Protection Act, makes provision for this protection of public authorities by cutting down the period of limitation within which suits of particular kinds must be instituted against the board and by providing that no such suit shall be instituted without a notice delivered not less than two months prior to the institution of the suit. The object of these two provisions is to give these public authorities an opportunity to settle such claims without suit and to afford them protection against suits filed after considerable delay with the result that the burden falls upon a different set of tax-payers and not upon the body of tax-payers as it existed at the date of the cause of action. The wordings of these different Acts are not identical, but the wording of the Cantonments Act closely follows the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. Section 1 of that Act provides as follows: Where after the commencement of this Act any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act duty, or authority, the following provisions shall have effect (a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or, in a case of continuance of injury or damage, within six months next after the ceasing thereof. 13. The preamble to the Act indicated that these provisions had reference not to the public generally but to public authorities and public officers. One possible view of the wording of the Public Authorities Protection Act and S. 273, Cantonments Act is that it extends generally to all acts of a Cantonment Board which it does in pursuance of the Act, that is, within the scope not merely of its duty but also of its powers under the Act, and it has often been urged that this wider view should be taken. But there is a strong consensus of opinion expressed in decisions of the Courts in England, and indeed also in India, that this is not the correct view. The view which has been adopted by the Courts is that it is to acts which the Board has not merely the authority, but also the duty to perform, that is, acts which are enjoined upon the Board that the protection afforded by S. 273 or the Public Authorities Protection Act extends. 14. There was at one time a view held that the limitation imposed by this Act was applicable only to acts giving rise to a claim in tort and not a claim resting on contract or implied contract, but that view has now been rejected and need not be considered in the present case. 14. There was at one time a view held that the limitation imposed by this Act was applicable only to acts giving rise to a claim in tort and not a claim resting on contract or implied contract, but that view has now been rejected and need not be considered in the present case. We have, therefore, only to consider whether a breach of contract or of implied contract, such as that which is pleaded by the plaintiff, does or does not come within the protection of S. 273. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edn. vol. XXVI, P. 294, para. 612, in the section which is concerned with the execution of a statute, duty or a authority, dealing with the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, we find the following statement: The performance, or breach, of a contract which a public authority has the power, but not the duty, to make is not within the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act. 15. This has been accepted as a correct statement of the law, for example, in [Compton v. West Ham County Borough Council] (1939) 1939 Ch. 771 : 108 L.J. Ch. 300 (304) : 160 L.T. 633 : 1939 3 All. E.R. 193. In his judgment in that case Crossman J. remarked : I think that it is only a breach of contract which a public authority has the power, but not the duty, to make which is not within the Act. 16. To apply the principle of this decision to the Cantonments Act we note that the Act requires that a Board should have an Executive Officer. It follows that the Board must appoint an Executive Officer and if in regard to the contract between such an Executive Officer and the Board there should arise a dispute, the Board will be entitled to the benefit of S. 273 of the Act. On the other hand, although S. 280, Cantonments Act provides for the making by the Central Government of rules relating to the appointment, control, supervision, suspension, removal, dismissal and punishment of servants of Boards, and although obviously the appointment of servants is necessary to enable the Board to perform its duties, there is nothing in the Act which enjoins upon the Board, that is, which makes it the duty of the Board to appoint a servant. It has the authority or power to make such appointment but it has not a corresponding duty. 17. In support of this view of the correct interpretation of the words "in pursuance of the Act" in S. 273, Cantonments Act, we have been referred to a number of cases. In [Sharpington v. Fulham Guardians] (1904) 2 Ch. 449 (456) : 73 L.J. Ch. 777 : 91 L.T. 739 : 52 W.R. 617, a case against a Board of Guardians arising out of a building contract, it was held that the plaintiff's claim was in respect of a private duty arising out of a contract, not for any negligence in performing a statutory or public duty, and therefore the Public Authorities Protection Act did not apply. Farewell J. remarked that the Guardians in order to carry out their duty had a power to build a house or alter a house, and they accordingly entered into a private contract. He remarked that it was a breach of this private contract that was complained of in this action and not a complaint by a member of the public in respect of the public duty of the Guardians. It was a complaint by a private individual in respect of a private injury done to him. The only way in which the public duty came in at all was that if it were not for the public duty any such contract (entered into by the Guardians) would be ultra vires. But that would apply to every contract. He concluded by saying I cannot find any ground for saying that this particular contract comes within the Act. I think it is clear that what is complained of is a breach of a private duty of the guardians to a private individual. The result is that, so far as this section is concerned, the action will lie that is to say, the suit was not barred by limitation. This decision clearly negatives the view that anything done by a Board which is not ultra vires of the Act from which it derives its authority, must be "in pursuance of the Act." 18. [McManus v. Bowes] (1937) 3 All. E.R. 227 (233) : 157 L.T. 385 was a case relating to the removal of a person required by a particular Act to be employed, the removal being made also under a power conferred by the Act. [McManus v. Bowes] (1937) 3 All. E.R. 227 (233) : 157 L.T. 385 was a case relating to the removal of a person required by a particular Act to be employed, the removal being made also under a power conferred by the Act. It was held that the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act were applicable and limitation for filing a suit reduced to 6 months, because the appointment and removal of the plaintiff were directly traceable to the statute. Again in (1939) 3 ALL E.R. 193 corresponding to (1939) 1939 Ch. 771 : 108 L.J. Ch. 300 (304) : 160 L.T. 633 : 1939-3 All. E.R. 193, it was held that if a local authority commits any breach of a contract which under an Act of Parliament, it is its duty to make, then the local authority can claim the protection of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, if any action or proceeding against it for the breach of such a contract is not brought within the limit of time prescribed by the Act. Crossman J, summed up his conclusions as follows : Thus, the appointment of the plaintiff was an appointment which the defendant council were bound to make under the Act. The action here has arisen in Consequenceof that appointment, and it seems to me that the best conclusion at which I can arrive as to the meaning of S. 1 of the Act (the Public Authorities Protection Act) is that the section does apply to an action which is to remedy a breach of a contract which the defendant council were bound to make in pursuance of the Poor Law Act, 1930, and the regulations thereunder. 19. The most interesting of the cases under the Public Authorities Protection Act which has been put before us is the decision of the House of Lords in [Bradford Corporation v. Myers] (1916) 1 A.C. 242 (260) : 85 L.J.K.B. 146 : 114 L.T. 83. That, like the case in (1904) 2 Ch. 449 (456) : 73 L.J. Ch. 777 : 91 L.T. 739 : 52 W.R. 617, arose, out of a contract which the defendant Corporation had authority to make but were not directed by the statute to enter into. That, like the case in (1904) 2 Ch. 449 (456) : 73 L.J. Ch. 777 : 91 L.T. 739 : 52 W.R. 617, arose, out of a contract which the defendant Corporation had authority to make but were not directed by the statute to enter into. The headnote runs as follows : The defendants, a municipal corporation, were authorised by Act of Parliament to carry on the undertaking of a gas company and were bound to supply gas to the inhabitants of the district, and they were also empowered to sell the coke produced in the manufacture of the gas. The defendants contracted to sell and deliver a ton of coke to the plaintiff, and by the negligence of their agent, the coke was shot through the plaintiff's shop window. More than six months afterwards the plaintiffs commenced an action of negligence against the defendants. The defendants pleaded S. 1, Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, as a bar to the action. 20. It was held that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a public duty or the exercise of a public authority and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. 21. In the speech of Lord Buckmaster at p. 247 we find the following remarks : While the preamble is necessary thus to constrict the meaning of the persons whom the statute is intended to protect the words of the section themselves limit the class of action, and show that it was not intended to cover every act which a local authority bad power to perform. In other words, it is not because the act out of which an action arises is within their power that a public authority enjoy the benefit of the statute, It is because the act is one which is either an act in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a public duty, or the exercise of a public authority. I regard these latter words as meaning a duty owed to all the public alike or an authority exercised impartially with regard to all the public. It assumes that there are duties and authorities which are not public, and that in the exercise or discharge of such duties or authorities this protection does not apply. 22. I regard these latter words as meaning a duty owed to all the public alike or an authority exercised impartially with regard to all the public. It assumes that there are duties and authorities which are not public, and that in the exercise or discharge of such duties or authorities this protection does not apply. 22. In his speech Viscount Haldane referring to the Judgment of Farewell J. in (1904) 2 ch. 4492 remarked : I think that Farewell J. was right, For it seems to me that the language of S. 1 does not extend to an act which is done merely incidentally and in the sense that it is the direct result, not of the public duty or authority as such, but of some contract which it may be that such duty or authority put it into the power of a public body to make, but which it need not have made at all. 23. Again Lord Atkinson in bis speech remarked : And, moreover, though a statute may create a corporation for a certain purpose statutes somewhat similar to the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, have been held not to apply to the breach by such bodies of duties imposed upon them by the common law, not by the statute, while if the duties which the common law would of itself impose are also imposed by statute then statutes such as the Public Authorities Protection Act would apply. 24. He went on to quote the remarks made by Vaugham Williams L. J., in Lyles v. South-end-on-Sea Corporation, (1905) 2 K.B. 1 (13) : 74 L.J.K.B. 484 : 92 L.T. 586 where he said: Now, I do not think that it can have been the intention of the Legislature that every act done by the corporation which was intra vires conferred by this Order (the Light Railways Order, 1899) should be subject to the protection afforded by this Act (the Public Authorities Protection Act). In my judgment an act which is done, not only in pursuance or execution, or intended (execution, of this Light Railways Order, but also in pursuance or execution, or intended execution, of some obligation incurred by public authority voluntarily beyond the obligation cast upon them by the Order, is not an act done in pursuance or execution, or intended execution, of the Order. [24] Lord Atkinson went on to say further: I think that the negligent act complained of here was not done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, since there was no statutory obligation on the appellants to do it. 25. The last speech in this case delivered by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline who incidentally dealt with the distinction between cases arising out of breach of contract and cases arising out of tort and in this connection remarked: The same principle applies whether the act complained of arose through breach of contract or through tort. I take no stock of such distinction for the Act does not; it speaks of an act done : 26. Elsewhere in his speech Lord Shaw distinguished between the right given and the duty imposed upon the corporation of supplying gas to the inhabitants of Bradford and the right to sell and dispose of the coke and he went on to say: It is not enough that the neglect occurs in the doing of a thing which is authorised by statute, but the thing done is not every or any thing done but must be something in the execution of a public duty or authority, and it is only neglect in the execution of any each duty or authority that is covered by the statute. [27] Again remarked: This restriction appears to me to be vital. The Act seems to say that there are many things which a public authority, clothed, say, with statutory power, may do, which the limitation will not cover, but when the act or neglect had reference to the execution of their public duty or authority-something founded truly on their statutory powers or their public position to that, and that only, will the limitation apply. 28. Later on (at page 263) he remarked: I will venture to add, my Lords, that it will be found that the position, not of the one party, but of both parties must rest on the same foundation. If there be a duty arising from statute or the exercise of a public function there is ft correlative right similarly arising. A municipal tramway car depends for its existence and conduct on, say, a private and many public acts, and the corporation in running it is performing a public duty. If there be a duty arising from statute or the exercise of a public function there is ft correlative right similarly arising. A municipal tramway car depends for its existence and conduct on, say, a private and many public acts, and the corporation in running it is performing a public duty. When a citizen boards such a car, in one sense he makes, by paying his fare, a contract, but the boarding of the car, the payment of the fare, and the charging of the corporation with the responsibility for safe carriage are all matter of right on the part of the passenger, a public right of a carriage which he shares with all his fellow citizens, correlative to the public duty which the corporation owes to all. Similarly, when a municipality, by virtue of private and public statutes, carries on a gas undertaking, the public duty of manufacture and supply finds its correlative in the right of the consumer, a public right which he has in common with all his fellow house-holders, to supply and to service. In both of these cases, accordingly, the Public Authorities Protection Act applies. But where the right of the individual cannot be correlated with a statutory or public duty to the individual, the foundation of the relations of parties does not lie in anything but a private bargain which it was open for either the municipality or the individual citizen, consumer, or customer to enter into or to decline. And an action on either side founded on the performance or non-performance of that contract is one to which the Protection Act does not apply, because the appeal, which is made to Court of Law, does not rest on statutory or public duty, but merely on a private and individual bargain. 29. In the light of these decisions, it appears to us that in the present case it would be difficult to hold S. 273 (1), Cantonments Act, to be applicable. Had the case been one of a suit of an exactly similar nature filed by the Executive Officer, whose appointment it is the duty of the Board to make whereas the employing of the plaintiff was as it were an incidental act or an act of internal administration, we should have been inclined to hold the Act to be applicable. Had the case been one of a suit of an exactly similar nature filed by the Executive Officer, whose appointment it is the duty of the Board to make whereas the employing of the plaintiff was as it were an incidental act or an act of internal administration, we should have been inclined to hold the Act to be applicable. We have not been able to derive much assistance from the earlier cases of this Court. For the most part of these cases were not decided under the Cantonments Act, but under the Municipalities Act or the District Boards Act, the provisions of which are worded differently. For example, in Municipal Board Vs. Ram Kishan it was held that the period of limitation of 6 months under S. 326, Municipalities Act, was not intended to apply to a suit on contract. Bennet J. at p. 1416 remarked: The reason why we consider that this suit does Hot come under S.326 is that it is not a suit in tort but it is a suit in contract and we consider that a suit in contract is not one contemplated by S. 326. 30. On the other hand, he went on to quote from the decision of the House of Lords in (1916) 1 A.C. 242 (260) : 85 L.J.K.B. 146 : 114 L.T. 83 referred to above and the speech of Lord Haldane and thereafter he remarked : In other words, this view of law treats a municipal body and its officers and servants on the same footing as private individuals when they enter into a contract. 31. For the reasons we have given earlier, we should consider this statement to be much too wide. A ease of more directly applicable is Cantonment Board Vs. (Firm) Hazari Lal Ganga Prasad, AIR 1934 All 436 in which it was held that a suit for recovery of the value of goods supplied to a Cantonment Board does not fall within the description of suits mentioned under S. 273 (1), Cantonments Act, and Art. 52, Limitation Act applies to such a suit. At page 807, Sulaiman J. remarked : No doubt under S. 12, Cantonments Act a Cantonment Board is empowered to acquire and hold property both moveable and immovable and to contract. At page 807, Sulaiman J. remarked : No doubt under S. 12, Cantonments Act a Cantonment Board is empowered to acquire and hold property both moveable and immovable and to contract. It is also clear that the purchase made by the Board was by virtue of the power vested in it under the Cantonments Act. But I am unable to regard the suit of the plaintiff against the Board as a suit in respect of an act done by the Board in pursuance of the Act itself as distinct from an act done in the exercise of the power granted to the Board under the Act. 32. Weinter that Sulaiman, C.J. interpreted "act done by the Board in pursuance of the Act" as meaning an act enjoined upon the Board by the Act. The Full Bench case in District Board Vs. Lala Behari Lal, AIR 1936 All 18 was a case under S. 182 (1), District Boards Act. In the last paragraph of the leading judgment in this case, Sulaiman C.J. remarked: I do not consider it necessary to refer to the English cases under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 though it may be observed that it appears to have been generally held in England that private contracts entered into by public authorities would not be 'acts done in pursuance or execution of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority, etc. 33. On behalf of the respondent Mr. Gurtu has contended first that this was a private bargain between the Board and the plaintiff-appellant by which the appellant accepted a pay of Rs. 225 per mensem in the scale sanctioned by the Board in 1926. We are not impressed by this contention. He goes on, however, to contend that if the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action is an implied contract by the Board to give to a person appointed to a certain post of a certain pay unless and until the Board makes an alteration of its own rules, in a legal manner then the plaintiff is in effect contending that the Board was bound by law to give him a pay of Rs. 300 if it appointed him to a post of which the pay was Rs. 300 if it appointed him to a post of which the pay was Rs. 300, that is, that there was a statutory rule not merely giving the Board authority to pay him so much, but also making it the duty of the Board to give him that pay. He seeks to put this contractual duty on the same footing as the duty of the Board to appoint an Executive Officer and pay him according to the rates fixed by itself or by the Central Government. We do not think that this argument is sound. The relation between the Board and the Executive Officer rests upon the statutory duty to make an Appointment of an Executive Officer but the relation between the Board and its ministerial servants arises out of its power to appoint such servants to facilitate the carrying out of its duties. The obligation to pay a certain rate of pay fixed in accordance with the rules arises not out of the statute but out of the implied contract between the parties; whereas in the case of an Executive Officer the Board cannot change its mind about making an appointment of an Executive Officer and decide not to appoint one. The Board could in the year 1933 have decided not to appoint any one Jo the post of Office Superintendent, or it could have decided to postpone the appointment until such time as the new scales had been sanctioned by the Eastern Command. In our judgment, the fact that the Board if it appointed someone to the post of Office Superintendent then vacant, was bound by its own rules to give him the pay of the post, does not bring the case within the scope of S. 273 (1) because there was no statutory obligation on or duty of the Board to make the appointment at all. 34. On a full consideration of the decisions, we hold that the provisions of S. 273 (1), Cantonments Act, were not applicable to the present case and the decree of the learned Additional District Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit must, therefore, be set aside. We have felt some doubt in this case on the question what is the appropriate order to make as to costs. We have felt some doubt in this case on the question what is the appropriate order to make as to costs. On the whole we see no reason why the Board, which merely represents the tax-payer, should not be treated in exactly the same way as any other litigant. The plaintiff began by claiming in this suit a far larger sum than that for which in law he could maintain his claim. Had he given notice of claim or filed his suit for the now agreed sum of Rs. 427 only the Board might well have decided to pay him and not to contest the claim. In allowing this appeal therefore we direct that the plaintiff's claim be decreed for Rs. 427 only. Parties will receive and pay costs throughout in proportion to their success and failure.