JUDGMENT Malik, J. - This appeal is on behalf of the Cantonment Board, Meerut. The plaintiff is the owner of a shop within the Cantonment area numbered as 226-A. There is another floor on the top of this shop and there is a staircase on plot No. 231 which leads up to the first floor. In between the staircase and the shop is a small plot of land which, according to the plaintiff, had a door towards the east belonging to the plaintiff and it had two pillars as its western end to support the construction above. The plaintiff filed this suit in the year 1942 on the allegation that the door flaps facing the opening towards the Sadar Bazar Road had got worn out and they were replaced by the plaintiff about three years before the suit and the Cantonment Board without any justification gave the plaintiff a notice under s. 187, Cantonments Act, for the removal of the pillars and the door. The plaintiff alleged that the covered land belonged, to the plaintiff and had been in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff from a very long time. On behalf of the Cantonment Board a written statement was filed in which it was alleged that the land in between the staircase and the shop was a public street and the plaintiff had no right to build the pillars and the door which had been recently constructed and they must be removed. 2. The lower appellate Court has found that the land in between the staircase and the shop belonged to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case was that he had purchased this land under a sale deed dated 17th July 1893. Learned counsel for the Board submitted that the learned Civil Judge had misinterpreted the sale deed and his finding on the point should not, therefore, be accepted. No such ground was taken in the memorandum of appeal, but I have had the sale deed read out to me and have compared the boundaries given in the sale deed with the plan attached to the plaint. It appears from the boundaries that the whole of the property was treated as one block and not that there were two separate blocks separated by a public lane. Further from the body of the sale deed it is clear that the land which had been built on was also being sold. It appears from the boundaries that the whole of the property was treated as one block and not that there were two separate blocks separated by a public lane. Further from the body of the sale deed it is clear that the land which had been built on was also being sold. The learned Judge not only relied on the sale deed but on the other evidence in the case and re-corded a finding which I consider is a finding of factthat the land belongs to the plaintiff and is not a public street. 3. Three other points have been urged on behalf of the Cantonment Board, firstly that the suit was not maintainable by reason of s. 272, Cantonment Act, secondly that the suit should have been brought against the Central Government and not against the Cantonment Board, and lastly that there was no notice given to the Board as required by S. 273, Cantonments Act. 4. I have already said above that the notice for demolition was gives by the Board under s. 187, Cantonments Act. Section 187 (l) reads as follows: No owner or occupier of any building in a cantonment shall, without the permission in writing of the Board, add to or place against or in front of the building any projection or structure overhanging, projecting into, or encroaching on, any street or any drain, sewer or aqueduct therein. It would appear from the above that only projections or structures overhanging, projecting into, or encroaching on, any street or any drain, sewer or aqueduct therein can be demolished under that section. The case of the Board was, as I have already said, that it was a public street and therefore the Board had a right to have the constructions demolished as they were encroaching on the street. The lower appellate Court has held, and I have accepted the finding of that, Court, that the constructions do not encroach on any street but are on land which belongs to the plaintiff. Learned counsel has, however, argued that even on that finding a suit for an injunction would not be maintainable by reason of s. 272, Cantonments Act. The only relief prayed for by the plaintiff was in these terms: A permanent injunction may be issued against the Board restraining the same from demolishing the plaintiff's door and pillar. Learned counsel has, however, argued that even on that finding a suit for an injunction would not be maintainable by reason of s. 272, Cantonments Act. The only relief prayed for by the plaintiff was in these terms: A permanent injunction may be issued against the Board restraining the same from demolishing the plaintiff's door and pillar. Learned counsel has argued that there is nothing to show that the notice was not given in good faith and s. 272 provides that no suit is maintainable against the Board for anything done in good faith, or intended to be done in good faith. I asked learned counsel whether on the findings recorded above the plaintiff was entitled to any relief at all, if his argument is accepted, as s. 274 of the Act which provides for appeals against certain orders of the Board does not provide for any appeal to any higher authority against an order issuing a notice under s. 187 of the Act. His suggestion was that the plaintiff could file a suit for declaration of title and then ask for an ancillary relief of injunction. If civil Courts are absolutely barred from issuing an injunction. I do not see what difference it would make if the plaintiff claims a declaration and then an injunction. To my mind, s. 272 of the Act would apply only to such cases where from the facts proved it appears Chat the notice was given by the Board according to the terms of the Act, that is, if it had been held that the encroachment was on a public street then the Board would be justified in issuing a notice under s. 187 and no suit could he Maintained against such an order. But where it is found that the notice itself was bad because the encroachments were not on a public street but were on the land belonging to the plaintiff and therefore a notice under s. 187 was not justified. I think s. 272 would have no application. 5. As regards the second point. I agree with the decision of the lower appellate Court that the suit was maintainable against the Board. I think s. 272 would have no application. 5. As regards the second point. I agree with the decision of the lower appellate Court that the suit was maintainable against the Board. Under S. 108, Cantonments Act, subject to any special reservation made by the Central Government all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified which has been acquired or provided or is maintained by a Board shall vest in and belong to that Board and shall be under its direction, management and control. and then a list of properties is given and all streets and pavements etc., are included in that list. Learned counsel, however, relied on R. 43 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937, and urged that only the management was rested in the Board and not the ownership. A reference, however, to R. 4 of the Rules would show that land is classified as land which vests in the Crown and land which vests in the Board, and in the latter class we have land which is vested in the Board under a. 108 of the Act and it is called Class "c" land. By R. 9 the management of this land is also vested in the Board so that the Board has both the ownership as well as the management and, to my mind, therefore the suit could only be filed against the Board and not against the Central Government. 6. As regards the last plea of notice, no such point was raised in either of the Courts below, nor was it raised in the written statement. For ought we know notice may have been given to the Board as required by S. 273, Cantonments Act. It is, however, a question of fact and the point not having been raised in the lower Courts I will not be justified in allowing learned counsel to raise a new point in second appeal. I find that even in the grounds of appeal in this Court no such point was raised. The appeal is, therefore dismissed with costs. Leave to file an appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.