JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is the Plaintiffs appeal arising out of the dismissal of his suit by the lower appellate Court in reversal of the decree of the trial Court. 2. The Defendant-Respondent executed a promissory note in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellant on the 27th March, 1932, for Rs. 900 at two per cent per mensem interest. A suit was filed on the 25th March, 1925, before the Munsif of Safipur, district Unao, for recovery of the amount due upon the promissory note. The defence was that there was no consideration for the promissory note and the Defendant's thumb-impression had been obtained by coercion. The suit was originally decreed experted but the order was set aside. On the 30th April, 1936, a plea having been raised that the Defendant was an agriculturist residing in Hardoi district and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit u/s 7(a) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, the Munsif ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. This order was set aside by the District Judge of Unao, but it was restored in revision by the Plaintiff by a Bench of this Court on the 12th August, 1938. There is a note of the Deputy Registrar dated the 22nd August, 1938, that in view of the Court's order, dated 12-8-1935, the plaint is returned to the Plaintiff through his Counsel Mr. D.K. Seth for presentation to the proper Court, but it is not signed by the Deputy Registrar. The file was returned and received by the Munsif on the 21st September, 1938. On the same date he again noted that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court. Nobody appeared before the Munsif to take back the plaint and on the 24th September he issued a notice to the Plaintiff's Counsel. The 25th September being a Sunday, the planet was actually returned on the 26th September and was re-filed before the Hardoi Court on the. 27th. September. 3. An objection was raised by the Defendant that the suit was time-barred. The Plaintiff sought extention of time by invoking the aid of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 4. The 25th September being a Sunday, the planet was actually returned on the 26th September and was re-filed before the Hardoi Court on the. 27th. September. 3. An objection was raised by the Defendant that the suit was time-barred. The Plaintiff sought extention of time by invoking the aid of Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. 4. The Munsif held that the Plaintiff was not in a position to take back the plaint till the 22nd August, 1938, and accepting the evidence of the Plaintiff's mukhtar and his Counsel's clerk he held that from the 22nd August to the 27th September the Plaintiff was entitled to exclusion of time u/s 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, The mukhtar's evidence was that Mr. Seth told him on the 10th August, 1938, when the case was argued in this Court that the plaint would be returned by the trial Court if the order of the trial Court was upheld. In other words, his finding was that the Plaintiff had acted with due diligence. 5. The lower appellate Court reversed this view holding that the evidence produced by the Plaintiff was not reliable and he had not succeeded in showing that he acted with due diligence. 6. Prima facie the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court is a finding of fact which is binding in second appeal. It is, however, argued on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant that he could not take back the plaint from this Court after the decision was given on the 12th August, 1938, nor was he in a position to know whether the file had been returned to the trial Court until his Counsel received a notice on the 24th September that the plaint was ready to be returned. I cannot accept this contention. I agree with the lower appellate Court that according to the note made by the Deputy Registrar on the 22nd August the plaint was ready to be returned to the Plaintiff but neither he nor his counsel took any steps to take it back. I further agree that this Court was perfectly competent after the decision of the case to order the return of the plaint to the Plaintiff or his Counsel without his having to wait for the return of the file to the trial Court. I further agree that this Court was perfectly competent after the decision of the case to order the return of the plaint to the Plaintiff or his Counsel without his having to wait for the return of the file to the trial Court. Order VII, Rule 10 of the CPC does not restrict the powers of the appellate Court to pass the orders which the trial Court is competent to pass, namely, the actual return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court after the decision of the appeal. 7. The conduct of the Plaintiff or his Counsel does not show that ha acted with due diligence. The case was argued on the 10th August, 1938. The mukhtar admits that Mr. Seth told him that he would inform him of the result of the case and if the decision was against him, he should get back the plaint from the trial Court. He admits that he did receive such a letter but he again went to Luck-now to consult Mr. Seth as to the next step. Mr. Seth naturally repeated the same advice. It is difficult to understand why the mukhtar did not act on the advice previously given and make enquiries at Unao and ask for the return of the plaint. Evan after this advice the Plaintiff or his mukhtar does not appeal to have taken any steps to enquire and get back the plaint. He waited until his Counsel received a notice on the 24th September and a message was sent to him to cons and take the plaint. The Court was not bound to give any notice to the Plaintiff's Counsel and it was the clear duty of the Plaintiff, his pairokar and his Counsel to have kept them selves in constant to with the Court and to ascertain whether the file had come back from the Chief Court. If this had been done, the Plaintiff could easily have got the plaint back on the 21st September. Section 14 allows exclusion of that period only during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding. This proceeding ended on the 12th August, 1938, or at the latest on the 22nd September, when the Munsif noted the result of the case and ordered the plaint to be returned. Section 14 allows exclusion of that period only during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding. This proceeding ended on the 12th August, 1938, or at the latest on the 22nd September, when the Munsif noted the result of the case and ordered the plaint to be returned. Any period that elapsed after that date is not such a period which the Plaintiff is entitled to exclude in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. The suit was originally filed on the last date of limitation and although the Agriculturists' Relief Act did not come into force till the 30th April, 1935, i.e., about a month after the institution of the suit, Section 7(a) clearly forbade the Unao Court to try the suit. Despite the obvious defect in jurisdiction the Plaintiff and his advisers did not realise that the period of suit had run out. The question was agitated right up to this Court and yet the Plaintiff did not take any steps to receive the plaint back immediately and refile it in the Court at Hardoi. These facts, in my opinion far from establishing due diligence on the part of the Plaintiff show gross negligence for which he must thank himself. 8. Accordingly I see no reason to interfere with the view taken by the lower appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with costs.