JUDGMENT Mathur, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the Collector of Cawnpore as Manager of the estate of Raj Bahadur and Shiam Lal under the Court of Wards for recovery of sum of Rs. 800 by enforcement of a simple mortgage bond dated 7th February 1899, executed by Puttan the father of the defendants appellants. The mortgage money was payable by annual instalments of Rs. 25 each during a period of 32 years. It was further provided in the bond that the mortgagee was entitled to recover any instalment as it fell due and in default of its payment was further entitled to sue for the entire mortgage money. Among other pleas it was contended that the claim was barred by 12 years limitation as having been brought 12 years after the first default, when the money became due. The learned Munsif who originally tried the suit decreed the claim for recovery of Rs. 100 only being the last four instalments, while he dismissed the suit with regard to the rest of the claim as being barred by time. The plaintiff went in appeal and the learned Additional Civil Judge of Cawnpore modified the decree of the learned Munsif and passed a decree for the entire mortgage money in favour of the plaintiff respondent. It is now urged in this second appeal on behalf of the defendants that the decision of the learned Additional Civil Judge was not correct, and that the claim with regard to all the instalments except the last four was barred by limitation. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and in my judgment in view of the Privy Council decision in AIR 1932 207 (Privy Council) , the finding of the learned Additional Civil Judge cannot be assailed. It seems to me that the decision of the point in question would depend on the interpretation of the wordings of Art. 132, Limitation Act. In the said Article it is provided that the period of limitation would start from the time the money sued for becomes due. The word "money" refers to the entire mortgage money and the limitation would not start when only one instalment becomes due. In the said Article it is provided that the period of limitation would start from the time the money sued for becomes due. The word "money" refers to the entire mortgage money and the limitation would not start when only one instalment becomes due. There is no doubt that an option is given to the mortgagee to sue for the entire mortgage money on the happening of a default, but if he does not exercise that option the limitation does not start running. The analogy of Art. 75 would not be applicable because according to that Article the period of limitation of an instalment bond runs from the time when the default is made. It was further pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council that a proviso entitling the mortgagee to sue for the entire mortgage money was inserted exclusively for his benefit and that on the default of the mortgagor to pay an instalment "the mortgage money" would not become immediately due because that would be giving an option to the mortgagor. It has also been pointed out that upon such default the mortgagor would have no right to redeem and the mortgage money does not "become due within the meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act until both the mortgagor's right to redeem and the mortgagee's right to enforce his security have accrued." I am therefore fully satisfied that the claim was not barred by time and the decision of the learned Additional Civil Judge was correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.