JUDGMENT Misra and Walford, JJ. - This is an application for leave to appeal to their Lordships of the Privy Council against a decision of this Court given under its re-visional powers. 2. The case arose on an application for redemption of a mortgage u/s 12, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The deed contained a covenant entitling the mortgagee to construct on the land and to recover at the time of redemption the amount spent by him in construction together with interest at 2 per cent per month. The trial Court ordered redemption on payment of Rs. 10,500, but the lower appellate Court on appeal by the mortgagee raised the amount to Rs. 16,471-2-6. This sum comprised Rs. 700 for principal and Rs. 7,885-9-3 for costs of construction and a similar amount for interest upon that costs in view of the fact that calculated at 9 per cent per annum the interest would have exceeded the principal. The mortgagor and the mortgagee both came up to this Court in revision. The mortgagor's case was, whoever, not pressed. The mortgagee's revision application was dismissed and against the order of dismissal passed by a Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member he now proposes to appeal to His Majesty in Council. 3. There are in our opinion two fatal objections which stand in the way of the applicants. (1) The order of this Court having affirmed the decision of the Court immediately below, the appeal must, under the final clause of Section 110 Code of Civil Procedure, involve some substantial question of law. In our opinion on such question of law exists. (2) Section 109 CPC permits an appeal to their Lordships of the Privy Council from a decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction. We think that the order against which leave to appeal is sought was an order not passed by this Court on appeal. 4. We now proceed to give our reasons for the view which we have expressed above. 5. We think that the order against which leave to appeal is sought was an order not passed by this Court on appeal. 4. We now proceed to give our reasons for the view which we have expressed above. 5. The contention which was urged by the Learned Counsel for the applicants as constituting substantial question of law was that the monies spent on constructions did not constitute a part of the mortgage dues inasmuch as the covenant with respect to building constituted a licence within the meaning of Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act. Considered in this light it was urged that whatever was spent upon the constructions would not amount to a loan within the meaning of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and could not, therefore, be determined by the Court of first instance in proceedings u/s 12 of that Act. At the time of hearing of the revision application in this Court the question was argued by the Learned Counsel at some length, but it was held in view of Section 52 Indian Easement Act, that the conception of licence necessitated the grant of a right to do or to continue to do something on the immoveable property of the grantor which would in the absence of such right be unlawful. In cases of possessory mortgages the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act invest the mortgagee with the right to build upon the land, provided it does not amount to waste. The right to construct, therefore, subsisted in the mortgagee independently of the grant, and the mortgagee's action could not be regarded as that of trespass. It was thus clear that the right conferred upon the mortgagee by the covenant in the deed did not' partake of the nature of licence but was in fact an interest in land. It followed that the amount spent in the constructions constituted a loan and was recoverable at the time of redemption as mortgage money. The matter is plain enough on a bare reading of the relevant sections. It was not raised before the Court of first instance apparently because it could not bear examination. We are unable to hold the proposed appeal involves any serious or substantial question of law. It was not urged that the case falls under Clause (c) of Section 109 and was otherwise fit for appeal to his Majesty in Council. It was not raised before the Court of first instance apparently because it could not bear examination. We are unable to hold the proposed appeal involves any serious or substantial question of law. It was not urged that the case falls under Clause (c) of Section 109 and was otherwise fit for appeal to his Majesty in Council. There is no question of public or private importance. 6. We come now to the second objection which we have called fatal Section 115 CPC empowers the High Court to call for the record of a case decided by any Court subordinate to it, but it is a condition precedent that the case must be one in which no appeal lies to the High Court. In exercising the revisional powers, therefore, it would be somewhat difficult to consider the order as one "passed on appeal." It has been decided in a number of cases that an order rejecting an application to review a judgment passed on appeal is not an order made on appeal, and it is, therefore, not appealable to His Mejesty in Council vide Soudamonee Dossee v. Maharaj Dheraj Mahatab Chand Bhadoor (1866) W R(Misc. Rul) 102, Rajah Enaet Hossein v. Ranee Rowshun Jahan (1868) 10 W R (F B R) 1, Ambika Prasad v. Debi Dayal (1932) 54 All 401, and Ram Prasad v. Trilok Nath 1935 A W R 115. In Rajah Enaet Hossein's case above referred to Sir Barnes Peacock dealing with the language used in the Charter which is practically identical with that used in Section 109, Clause (a) Code of CPC emphasised the difference between orders "made or passed on appeal" and those "passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction." There is also direct authority for the view that an appeal to their Lordship's Board u/s 109 against a revisional order of a High Court is incompetent. In Suraj Singh v. Phul Kumari (1926) 48 All 226, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court expressed the view that an order passed in revision was entirely distinct in its nature from an order passed in appeal and did not come within the purview of Section 109, Clause (a) Code of Civil Procedure. In Atma Ram v. Beni Prasad (1934) 4 AWR 1593, another Division Bench of that Court arrived at the same result. In Atma Ram v. Beni Prasad (1934) 4 AWR 1593, another Division Bench of that Court arrived at the same result. In Krishna Chandra Deb v. Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanj Deo (1996) 15 Pat 659, it was pointed out that the provisions of Section 115 Code of CPC necessarily implied that an order passed in pursuance of it was not an order made on appeal and was, therefore, not appealable. The last case on the point, to which reference may be made in this connection, is the decision in R. M. A. R A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. Ramaraja Thevar ILR 1944 Mad 372. The learned Judges in that case after discussion of the decisions of the various High Courts on the point laid down that the word "appeal" in clause, (a) of Section 109 Code of CPC could not embrace a revision. Our attention has however been invited by the Learned Counsel for the applicants to the case of Secretary of State for India in Council v. British India Steam Navigation Company (1871) 9 IC 183, where Mookerjee and Coxe, JJ. held that an order passed by the High Court in the ex-ercise of its revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC or of its power of superintendence u/s 15 of the Charter Act, is "an order made or pissed on appeal" within the meaning of Section 109 CPC and Section 39 of the Letters Patent. 7. The decision was based mainly if not wholly upon the fact that the provisions of the Letters Patent, as they stood then, did not specifically refer to revisional jurisdiction as distinct from appellate jurisdiction. It was, therefore, thought that an order passed u/s 115 CPC must be one made in the exercire of appellate jurisdiction and could be considered as having been passed on appeal. There is a difference in our opinion which must not be lost sight of in the meaning of the expression "passed on appeal," and made in exercice of appellate jurisdiction". All orders passed on appeal are obviously passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but it does not necessarily follow that every order made in exercise of such jurisdiction is an order passed on appeal. The Learned Counsel for the applicants also referred to the decision in Harish Chandra Acharya v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad (1873) 11 I C 65. All orders passed on appeal are obviously passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but it does not necessarily follow that every order made in exercise of such jurisdiction is an order passed on appeal. The Learned Counsel for the applicants also referred to the decision in Harish Chandra Acharya v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad (1873) 11 I C 65. It is, however, not necessary to examine that case separately as it followed the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court to which reference has already been made. We are in entire agreement if we may say so with respect, with the views expressed by the Allahabad, Patna and Madras High Courts in respect of the right to appeal against orders passed on revision. 8. This application must, therefore, be dismissed. We order accordingly. 9. The application for leave to appeal having been dismissed, the stay application (Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 629 of 1945), is also dismissed.