Judgement Appeal (No. 14 of 1944) from a decree of the Federal Court of India exercising original jurisdiction (March 17, 1943) which dismissed an action brought by the appellant, the Governor-General in Council, as plaintiff, against the respondent, the Province of Madras, as defendant, claiming a declaration that the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, were ultra vires the legislature of the Province of Madras in so far as that Act imposed a tax on the manufacturer or producer of goods on the first sale thereof. The main question raised by this appeal was whether a tax imposed on the manufacturer or producer of goods on the first sale thereof was, as the appellant contended and the respondent denied, a duty of excise within the meaning of entry 45 of the Federal Legislative List contained in the seventh schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and therefore within the exclusive legislative competence of the appellant. By s. 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 "(1.) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding subsections, the Federal Legislature has, and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I. in the Seventh Schedule to this Act (hereinafter called the ‘Federal Legislative List’). "(2.) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding subsection, the Federal Legislature, and, subject to the preceding sub-section, a Provincial Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the Concurrent Legislative List). "(3.) Subject to the two preceding subsections, the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the Provincial Legislative List). "(4.) The Federal Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List except or a Province or any part thereof.” Entry No. 45 of the Federal Legislative List is as follows "45. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except.... [there follow certain exceptions]." Entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List is as follows "48. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except.... [there follow certain exceptions]." Entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List is as follows "48. Taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements.” The relevant provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Federal Court of India (Gwyer C.J., S. Varadachariar and T. Ameer Ali JJ.) held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the declaration prayed for, saying "We agree that substantially the same issue is raised in the present suit as in the appeal last year [Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons ([ 1942] F. C. R. 90.)] and we see no reason to modify the decision which we then gave." 1944. Nov. 6, 7, 8; Dec. 18, 19. Sir Walter Monckton K.C. and B. MacKenna for the appellant. This appeal will in fact determine the Boddu Paidanna & Sons case (1) in which an appeal to, the Board is pending. The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (hereinafter called "the Madras Act ") imposes a tax on all sales, including the first sale, and a tax on the first sale is an excise duty and is not open to the respondent. In short, (a) any tax on commodities produced within a country levied on the producer is a duty of excise; and (b) any tax levied on commodities before they become part of the general stock is a duty of excise. The first point is who is to pay? The second, at what stage? In 1935, when the Constitution Act was passed, the great bulk of excise duties in India were levied on producers, and levied before the goods had become part of the common stock, i.e., before they reached the stage of retail sales. There is no doubt that in its ordinary meaning "excise duty" has a wider connotation than the appellant here now seeks to give it, but the wider meaning is not contended for. Taking the more limited view, there cannot have been an intention to exclude from the duty of excise on home produced commodities taxes which were levied on the producer before the goods reached the general stock, and for that reason a tax on first sales levied on the producer must be treated as within the express duties of excise. Taking the more limited view, there cannot have been an intention to exclude from the duty of excise on home produced commodities taxes which were levied on the producer before the goods reached the general stock, and for that reason a tax on first sales levied on the producer must be treated as within the express duties of excise. [The judgments were read in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Ad No. XIV. of 1938 ([ 1939] F. C. R. 18.), Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons ([ 1942] F. C. R. 90,), and the Federal Court decision in the present case ([ 1943] F. C. R.).] In Peterswald v. Bartley (( 1904) 1 C. L. R. 497, 509) the word "excise" as there used was intended to mean a duty analogous to a customs duty imposed on goods either in relation to quantity or value when produced or manufactured. In The Commonwealth and Commonwealth Oil Refineries, Ld. v. South Australia (( 1926) 38 C. L. R. 408.) a line was drawn on one side of which the goods were still in the hands of the producer, and on the other side in the dealers hands. Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board (Victoria) (( 1937) 60 C. L. R. 263.) followed the decision in the Commonwealth Oil Refineries case (5). The mere fact of production does not in the ordinary legislative practice give rise to a liability to tax, it is production plus something else—when it issues out of the factory, or when it issues for sale. If in Brown v. State of Maryland (( 1827) 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 419.) one reads for " importation " the words " manufacture or production " the reasoning there can be applied by parity to a case of excise, and the goods remain subject to excise duty in the hands of the producer at all stages until they get out of his hands into the common stock. [Reference was also made to Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Kingcome Navigation Co. ([ 1934] A. C. 45.) and Atlantic Smoke Shops, Ld. v. Conlon ([ 1943] A. C. 550.).] There are a number of instances showing the legislative practice both in England and India in this connexion in the Spirits Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Viet., c. 24), ss. [Reference was also made to Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Kingcome Navigation Co. ([ 1934] A. C. 45.) and Atlantic Smoke Shops, Ld. v. Conlon ([ 1943] A. C. 550.).] There are a number of instances showing the legislative practice both in England and India in this connexion in the Spirits Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Viet., c. 24), ss. 75 and 76, duty is to be paid on the quantity; in the Finance Act, 1924, s. 3, duties are imposed on articles " sold or kept for sale "; there is a similar provision in the same Act in relation to table waters, s. 10; in the Finance Act, 1927, s. 6, there is an excise duty on sweets sent out to be sold. [Reference was also made to the following Acts on the Indian legislative practice Act XIV. of 1934, s. 3; Act XXIII. of 1934, s. 3, s. 5, s. 15, sub-s. 2 (c); and Act XXXI. of 1934, s. 4.] Summarizing, a duty of excise is a tax on goods, as also is a tax on sales, and it cannot be that the same tax is within the meaning of the Act both a duty of excise and a tax on sales. Where is the line to be drawn? It can be drwn in two ways (a) On whom it is imposed—where it is a tax on the producer it must be a duty of excise; and (b) the line should be drawn in relation to the point at which the tax is imposed, and should be drawn before the goods get into the hands of the dealer as part of the common stock. Applying either or both of those tests, the tax now in question is an excise duty, and under the provisions of the Constitution Act the appellant has, and the respondent has not, power to impose a duty of excise. MacKenna followed. The fundamental economic nature of the tax on the first sale imposed on the producer is exactly the same as that of any other tax imposed on production, and falls within the duty of excise. MacKenna followed. The fundamental economic nature of the tax on the first sale imposed on the producer is exactly the same as that of any other tax imposed on production, and falls within the duty of excise. In the Commonwealth Oil Refineries case (38 C. L. R. 408, 430.) Isaacs J. said that "a tax on that sale [the first sale]" is essentially a burden and a tax on the production of the "goods." If the Province is free to tax every sale of goods produced in the Province, although intended for consumption outside the Province, the inevitable effect will be to increase the cost to persons outside the Province, which Parliament could never have intended In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV. of 1938 ([ 1939] F. C. R. 18, 79, 82, 106.). It is impossible to limit duties of excise to duties which are imposed on production irrespective of sale. Tucker K.C. and H. G. Robertson for the respondent. Although reliance is placed on the reasons of the majority in the Central Provinces case (11), an alternative construction of s. 100 of the Constitution Act will be submitted which does not require the words "other than the first sale of goods manufactured or produced in India" to be written into entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List. The true construction of s. 100 is that effect must be given to the opening words of sub-s.1, "notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections.” Therefore, if it is found that an exercise in practice of what appears to be a Provincial right under List II. is in pith and substance an exercise of a right contained in List I., then the Provincial statute is barred. The pith and substance have to be looked at. If there is a Provincial Act imposing a tax on first sales of goods manufactured in the Province, it is a tax on the sale of goods, and prima facie comes within Provincial legislative competence, though a tax on the first sales of goods produced in the Province may be a duty of excise. If there is a Provincial Act imposing a tax on first sales of goods manufactured in the Province, it is a tax on the sale of goods, and prima facie comes within Provincial legislative competence, though a tax on the first sales of goods produced in the Province may be a duty of excise. If there is a Provincial statute which is in form a tax on the sale of goods, but is in substance an attempt to impose an excise tax, then the non obstante provision of s. 100, sub-s. 1, of the Constitution Act operates to make the Provincial Act invalid. If, however, as in this case, the pith and substance of the Act is a tax on the sale of goods, and not an excise duty, it is good Rex v. Caledonian Collieries, Ld. ([ 1928] A. C. 358.); Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada ([ 1928] A. C. 475.). Pith and substance means what is its real nature. This is not in pith and substance an excise tax, though in some instances an excise tax may include a tax on first sales, as, for example, where goods are sold several times over while in bond, and the duty is not to be exacted until the last sale preceding the removal of the goods from bond. [The detailed provisions of the Madras Act were examined, and also the judgments in the Central Provinces case ([ 1939] F. C. R. 18.) and in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons ([ 1942] F. C. R. 90.) and in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan ([ 1940] F. C. R. 188.), and on "pith and substance" reference was made to Attorney-General for Ontario w. Reciprocal Insurers ([ 1924] A. C. 328.).] if incidentally in the carrying out of the general object an Act intrudes into the other sphere, that does not affect its validity Gallagher v. Lynn ([ 1937] A. C. 860, 870.); City of Halifax v. Fairbanks Estate ([ 1928] A. C. 117. 126.). Therefore, looking at this Act as a whole, its true nature and general object is that it imposes a tax in respect of the sale of goods in the Province, whether they are home produced or not. It is not an excise duty, and it does not matter that there are incidental questions—that the persons who sell the goods are also the manufacturers. It is not an excise duty, and it does not matter that there are incidental questions—that the persons who sell the goods are also the manufacturers. Some of the main features of an excise duty are—(a) It is always placed on goods of a specified class or description. It is never imposed as a tax on unnamed or unspecified goods indiscriminately, or on the act of sale or the proceeds of sale of such unspecified goods, (b) The amount of an excise duty is usually calculated according to quantity or value of the specified goods; the duty is never calculated on the varying actual proceeds of sale which different particular individuals may obtain when the goods are actually sold. (c) Where payment of an excise duty is exacted on the occasion of a sale of goods, it is always uniform in its incidence. In this Act the goods can bear the sales tax more than once, whereas an excise tax is only levied once. Further, an excise duty is not intended to be a tax on profit, and, in substance, this is. A sales tax on the proceeds of sale is not truly a tax on the commodity. Looked at as a whole, in pith and substance no part of this tax bears a remote resemblance to an excise duty. The essence of a duty of excise on goods properly so called is that it is a duty levied in respect of the manufacture or production of such goods, and no liability for the Madras sales tax arises merely by reason of the manufacture or production of any goods. Further, no liability for the Madras sales tax arises merely by reason of the first sale of goods manufactured or produced within the Province, but only on such a sale if made by or to a person who carries on the business of buying or selling goods. H. G. Robertson followed. Sir Walter Monckton K.C. in reply. To exclude a tax on first sales would be to do violence to the ordinary meaning of excise duty. H. G. Robertson followed. Sir Walter Monckton K.C. in reply. To exclude a tax on first sales would be to do violence to the ordinary meaning of excise duty. The inquiry whether an Act is in pith and substance imposing a duty of excise does not mean that an Act can be valid as a whole if in part it is an exercise of Provincial powers and in part an exercise of Central powers, and it is found that on a comparison the part within the Provincial powers is the more important. There is no authority for such a proposition. It is quite another thing where it is shown that an apparent encroachment is necessarily incidental to the exercise of the Provincial powers, for then the Act may be good notwithstanding that it affects something in the central power City of Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway ([ 1912] A. C. 333.); Gallagher v. Lynn ([ 1937] A. C. 863.). To ascertain the pith and substance of an Act its true or real object must be examined Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v. Bryden ([ 1899] A. C. 580.); Hodge v. The Queen (( 1883) 9 App. Cas. 117, 126.); John Deere Plow Co., Ld. v. Wharton ([ 1915] A. C. 330.). The pith and substance of this Act is that (a) it imposes an excise duty on the producers in respect of home-produced goods at the time of first sale, and (b) a tax on sales. As to the indicia said by the respondent to be found in an excise duty, none of them refers to the mode in which the duty is to be levied or paid, and none of them goes to the essence. [Reference was made to the Commonwealth Oil Refineries case (38 C. L. R. 408.)]. The object of giving to the Central authority power to legislate in relation to excise is because its effect will be felt throughout India. 1945. Jan. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Simonds. This appeal is brought by the Governor-General in Council from a decree made by the Federal Court of India in its original jurisdiction on March 17, 1942. In proceedings commenced in that court against the respondent, the Province of Madras, the appellant claimed that the Madras Act, IX. Jan. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Simonds. This appeal is brought by the Governor-General in Council from a decree made by the Federal Court of India in its original jurisdiction on March 17, 1942. In proceedings commenced in that court against the respondent, the Province of Madras, the appellant claimed that the Madras Act, IX. of 1939, known as the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1939, and hereafter referred to as a the " Madras Act," in so far as it purports to levy a tax on first sales in Madras of goods manufactured or produced in India is, except in respect of certain excepted goods, ultra vires and beyond the competence of the legislature of the respondent. The Federal Court dismissed the appellants suit, following its previous decision in an appeal from the High Court of Madras in a suit in which the present respondent was appellant and a firm called Boddu Paidanna and Sons were respondents, and the validity of the same provisions of the same Act was in issue. This case will be referred to as the Boddu Paidanna case. The legislative powers of the Federal and Provincial legislatures respectively are defined in the Government of India Act, 1935, sometimes called "The Constitution Act," and it will be convenient to refer to them before examining the provisions of the impugned Madras Act [His Lordship read the provisions of s. 100, sub-ss. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and entry No. 45 of the Federal Legislative List, and No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List, and continued] It is on these two entries respectively that the parties rely, the respondent contending that entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List authorizes and justifies the impugned provisions of the Madras Act, the appellant con- tending that so far as those provisions purport to impose a tax on first sales they in effect impose a duty of excise and are therefore an encroachment on the power given exclusively to the Federal Legislature by entry No. 45 of the Federal Legislative List. Before further considering the provisions of the Constitution Act it will be convenient to examine somewhat closely the Madras Act. Before further considering the provisions of the Constitution Act it will be convenient to examine somewhat closely the Madras Act. For in a Federal constitution, in which there is a division of legislative powers between Central and Provincial legislatures, it appears to be inevitable that controversy should arise whether one or other legislature is not exceeding its own, and encroaching on the others, constitutional legislative power, and in such a controversy it is a principle, which their Lordships do not hesitate to apply in the present case, that it is not the name of the tax but its real nature, its " pith and substance " as it has sometimes been said, which must determine into what category it falls. The Madras Act, which received the assent of the Governor of Madras on June 4, 1939, is entitled "An Act to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madras." Its preamble recites that it is expedient to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madras. By s.1, it is provided that this Act may be called "The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939," and that it is to extend to the whole of the Province of Madras. The rest of the Act does not belie its title or its declared purpose. Section 2 contains a number of definitions, of which it is necessary to refer only to the following "(b) ‘dealer’ means any person who carries on the business of buying or selling goods. (h) ‘sale’ with all its grammatical variations and cgnate expressions means every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. (i) ‘Turnover’ means the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought by or sold by a dealer, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration provided that the proceeds of the sale by a person of agricultural or horticultural produce grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise, shall be excluded from his turnover. "Explanation.—Subject to such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed in this behalf—(i) the amount for which goods are sold shall include any sums charged for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods sold at the time of or before the delivery thereof; (ii) any cash or other discount on the price allowed in respect of any sale and any amount refunded in respect of articles returned by customers shall not be included in the turnover, and (iii) where for accommodating a particular customer, a dealer obtains goods from another dealer and immediately disposes of the same to the said customer, the sale in respect of such goods shall be included in the turnover of the latter dealer but not in that of the former." Section 3, the taxing section, provides as follows — "(3) (1.) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every dealer shall pay in each year a tax in accordance with the scale specified below—(a) If his turnover does not exceed 20,000 rupees, 5 rupees per month, (b) If his turnover " exceeds 20,000 rupees, one half of one per cent, of such turnover. Provided that any dealer whose turnover in any year is less than 10,000 rupees shall not be liable to pay the tax under this sub-section for that year Provided further (1) that in respect of the same transaction of sale, the buyer and the sellers shall not both be taxed, but only one of them, as shall be determined by the rules made in this behalf under sub-s. 2, shall be taxed thereon, and (2.) that, when the amount for which any goods were bought by a dealer has been included in his turnover, the amount for which the same goods were sold by him shall not be included in his turnover, for the purposes of this Act. "(2.) The turnover for all the purposes of this Act shall be determined in accordance with, and the tax shall be assessed, levied and collected in such manner and in such instalments as may be prescribed by, the rules made by the Provincial Government in this behalf. "(2.) The turnover for all the purposes of this Act shall be determined in accordance with, and the tax shall be assessed, levied and collected in such manner and in such instalments as may be prescribed by, the rules made by the Provincial Government in this behalf. "(3) Subject to any rules made under sub-s.2, the assessing authority may fix the turnover of any dealer in any year at the amount of his turnover in the previous year." Sections 4 and 5 provide for exemption from the tax imposed by s. 3 of certain classes of goods, and s. 6 for taxation of the sale of hides and skins whether tanned or untanned only at such single point in the series of sales by successive dealers as might be prescribed. Section 7 provides for a rebate of one-half of the tax levied on sales of certain goods for delivery outside the Province; s. 8 for the licensing and exemption of agents. Other sections provide the necessary administrative machinery for the assessment and collection of a tax on sales. Section 19 provides that the Provincial Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. Under s. 3, sub-s.2, of the Madras Act the Provincial Government made rules which are called "The Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939" and under s. 19 further rules which are called " The Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1939." To these rules, which are of an elaborate and comprehensive character, it is unnecessary to refer, except to note that under r. 4, sub-r. 1, of the first-mentioned rules the gross turnover of a dealer for the purpose of the rules is to be the amount for which the goods are sold by him, except that under r. 4, sub-r. 2, in the case of certain goods therein enumerated the gross turnover is to be the amount for which the goods are bought. Their Lordships have thought it desirable to refer to the provisions of the Madras Act in this detail to emphasize its essential character. Its real nature, its pith and substance,” is that it imposes a tax on the sale of goods. Their Lordships have thought it desirable to refer to the provisions of the Madras Act in this detail to emphasize its essential character. Its real nature, its pith and substance,” is that it imposes a tax on the sale of goods. No other succinct description could be given of it except that it is a "tax on the sale of goods.” It is, in fact, a tax which according to the ordinary canons of interpretation appears to fall precisely within entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List. It is necessary, then, to consider the contention, which in the Boddu Paidanna case ([ 1941] Fed. L. J. 352.) found favour with the High Court of Madras, that the Madras Act, so far as it imposes a tax on first sales of goods manufactured or produced in India is ultra vires the Provincial legislature. This contention is thus clearly stated in the appellants formal reasons on the present appeal (1.) a tax on the manufacturer or producer of goods on the first sale thereof is a duty of excise, (2.) under the provisions of the Constitution Act the appellant has, and the respondent has not, power to impose a duty of excise, (3.) the provisions of entry No. 48 in the Provincial Legislative List must be construed subject to the provisions of entry No. 45 in the Federal Legislative List. The third reason thus stated rests on the opening words of s. 100, sub-s.1, of the Constitution Act "Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections, and the opening words of s. 100, sub-s.3, subject to the two preceding sub-sections.” Their Lordships do not doubt that the effect of these words is that, if the legislative powers of the Federal and Provincial legislatures, which are enumerated in List I. and List II of the seventh schedule, cannot fairly be reconciled, the latter must give way to the former. But it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear. In this connexion it must in the first place be observed that the contention of the appellant involves doing violence to the language of entry No. 48 of the Provincial Legislative List. For if his contention is upheld, the plain words "Taxes on the sale of goods" must be read as if the words "other than the first sale of goods" manufactured or produced in India "were added by way of qualification. Bearing in mind, first, that the problem of the division of taxing power in a federal constitution was in general no new one, and that the framers of the constitution must in particular have been well aware of the controversies that had arisen in regard to "excise" and taxes on first or other sales, and, secondly, that the contention of the appellant would remove from the range of Provincial taxation goods which had not been in the past, nor were likely in the future to be, the subject of an excise duty, their Lordships would be reluctant to adopt such a construction if any other was fairly open to them, The validity of the appellants first reason must, therefore, be examined to see whether the Lists can be reconciled not by doing violence to the language of the Provincial List but by giving some other than the meaning and effect, for which the appellant contends, to the relevant words of the Federal List. Their Lordships would first observe (concurring herein in the cogent reasoning of the Federal Court in the Boddu Paidanna case) ([ 1942] F. C. R. 90.) that little assistance is to be derived from the consideration of other federal constitutions and of their judicial interpretation. Here there is no question of direct and indirect taxation, nor of the definition of specific and residuary powers. The Indian constitution is unlike any that have been called to their Lordships notice in that it contains what purports to be an exhaustive enumeration and division of legislative powers between the Federal and Provincial legislatures. Where there is such an enumeration, the language of the one list may be coloured or qualified by that of the other. The problem is different when on the one hand there are specific, and on the other, residuary, powers. Where there is such an enumeration, the language of the one list may be coloured or qualified by that of the other. The problem is different when on the one hand there are specific, and on the other, residuary, powers. The appellants fundamental contention is that the power to impose a duty of excise, which is given to the Federal legislature alone by entry No. 45 of the Federal List, entitles that legislature and no other to impose a tax on first sales of goods manufactured or produced in India. No other meaning, it is contended, can fairly be given to the words "duty of excise" than one which includes a tax on the first sales of such goods. If such a construction involves that violence must be done to the plain meaning of entry No. 48 of the Provincial List, that, it is said, is contemplated and safeguarded by the opening words of s. 100, sub-s.1. To their Lordships this contention does not appear well-founded. The term "duty of excise" is a somewhat flexible one it may, no doubt, cover a tax on first and, perhaps, on other sales it may in a proper context have an even wider meaning. An exhaustive discussion of this subject, from which their Lordships have obtained valuable assistance, is to be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in In re the Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1935 ([ 1939] F. C. R. 18). Consistently with this decision their Lordships are of opinion that a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods. Here, again, their Lordships find themselves in complete accord with the reasoning and conclusions of the Federal Court in the Boddu Paidanna case ([ 1942] F. C. R. 90.). The two taxes, the one levied on a manufacturer in respect of his goods, the other on a vendor in respect of his sales, may, as is there pointed out, in one sense overlap. But in law there is no overlapping. The taxes are separate and distinct imposts. The two taxes, the one levied on a manufacturer in respect of his goods, the other on a vendor in respect of his sales, may, as is there pointed out, in one sense overlap. But in law there is no overlapping. The taxes are separate and distinct imposts. If in fact they overlap, that may be because the taxing authority, imposing a duty of excise, finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment when the exciseable article leaves the factory or workshop for the first time on the occasion of its sale. But that method of collecting the tax is an accident of administration; it is not of the essence of the duty of excise, which is attracted by the manufacture itself. That this is so is clearly exemplified in those excepted cases in which the Provincial, not the Federal, legislature has power to impose a duty of excise. In such cases there appears to be no reason why the Provincial legislature should not impose a duty of excise in respect of the commodity manufactured and then a tax on first or other sales of the same commodity. Whether or not such a course is followed appears to be merely a matter of administrative convenience. So, by parity of reasoning, may the Federal legislature impose a duty of excise on the manufacture of exciseable goods and the Provincial legislature imposes a tax on the sale of the same goods when manufactured. It appears, then, to their Lordships that the competing entries No. 45 of the Federal List and No. 48 of the Provincial List may fairly be reconciled without adopting the contention of the appellant, and that the validity of the Madras Act cannot successfully be challenged. Their Lordships would again emphasize that in coming to this conclusion they have regarded substance not form. The tax imposed by the Madras Act is not a duty of excise in the cloak of a tax on sales. Lacking the characteristic features of a duty of excise, such as uniformity of incidence and discrimination in subject-matter, it is in its general scope and in its detailed provisions a "tax on sales." Their Lordships must not-be taken as expressing any view on the validity of any measure on the substance of which a different opinion might be formed. Lacking the characteristic features of a duty of excise, such as uniformity of incidence and discrimination in subject-matter, it is in its general scope and in its detailed provisions a "tax on sales." Their Lordships must not-be taken as expressing any view on the validity of any measure on the substance of which a different opinion might be formed. For the reasons already stated their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.