JUDGMENT Misra and Kaul, JJ. - These are first civil appeals u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act, and they relate only to costs awarded by the Special Judge, First Grade, Barabanki. 2. In First Civil Appeals Nos. 54 and 56 of 1942 each of the two appellants, namely Bhagwati Prasad and Vidyarathi Chintamani preferred an application in the lower Court claiming arrears of maintenance which had been granted to them under the will of the late Raja Pirthipal Singh of Surajpur whose estate after his death was represented in proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act by the Court of Wards. In the same application these appellants purported to set up objections u/s 11 and sought a declaration that their maintenance was a charge on the entire Taluqa Surajpur and that it was liable to attachment and sale subject only to the aforesaid charge. The appellant in First Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1942, namely Mathura Prasad did not lay any claim to arrears of maintenance. He merely filed his application seeking a declaration in respect of his maintenance charge u/s 11. In reply to the claims three written statements were filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki in charge of Surajpur estate contesting the allegations on various grounds. 12th October, 1940 was fixed for disposal in all the three claims. On that date the Government Pleader who represented the Court of Wards was absent. The arguments were heard ex parte. Mathura Prasad's objections u/s 11 were dismissed on a finding that they were not maintainable. The judgments in the claims of Bhagwati Prasad and Vidyarathi Chintamani were reserved, and 14th of October, was fixed for their delivery. On that date the Government Pleader presented an application for setting aside the ex parte order not only in cases of Bhagwati Prasad and Vidyarathi Chintamani but also in the case of Mathura Prasad under Order 9, rule 9, C. P. C. So far as Mathura Prasad's case was concerned. Order 9, rule 9 C. P. C. could scarcely have been availed of in view of the fact that it had already been dismissed on merits, and the order was in favour of the landlord. The Special Judge, however, granted the prayer of the Government Pleader and cancelled all the ex parte orders apparently because the applications were not opposed by the claimants4 counsel. 3. The Special Judge, however, granted the prayer of the Government Pleader and cancelled all the ex parte orders apparently because the applications were not opposed by the claimants4 counsel. 3. After many adjournments a preliminary issue in each of the three cases out of which the present appeals arise was framed about the maintainability of the claims at the request of 'the Government Pleader. Ultimately the claimants withdrew their applications on !6th February, 194a, with liberty to file fresh claims. The withdrawal was not opposed, but the Government Pleader prayed that full costs be allowed to him. The Court permitted the withdrawal and awarded costs on the ground that the cases have been pending for long and that there had been numerous hearings. Thereafter the Government Pleader chose to move another application, wherein he prayed that his fees should be calculated not on the valuation given by the applicants of their claims but on an enchanced valuation. He urged in Bhagwati Prasad's case that instead of Rs. 745-4-3 at which the latter had valued his claim the true valuation should be Rs. 745-4-3 plus the value of the declaratory relief which should be . computed at ten times the annual maintenance ' allowance. The total valuation, it was said, should therefore be Rs. 5065-4-3 on which a pleader's fee of Rs. 377 should be taxed. Similarly in respect of the claims of Mathura Prasad and Vidyarathi Chintamani, it was said, that the respective fees should be Rs. 682 on Rs. 15,234-4-11 and Rs. 585 on Rs. 12,000 for the purposes of taxation. On these applications. the learned Special Judge passed the following ex parte order on 16th February, 1942 Office to compute the valuation according to the Suits Valuation Act according to the guzara given in the objection. 4. The result was that in the formal orders in each of these cases the valuation of the claims was enhanced as prayed, and the pleader's fees were taxed as desired. Aggrieved thereby the claimants have preferred these appeals against the Court of ' Wards. 5. A preliminary objection to the hearing of these appeals is taken by the learned Government Advocate on the basis of numerous decisions of this Court, wherein it has been held that an appeal by a claimant u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act is incompetent, unless all the other creditors or claimants are impleaded. 5. A preliminary objection to the hearing of these appeals is taken by the learned Government Advocate on the basis of numerous decisions of this Court, wherein it has been held that an appeal by a claimant u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act is incompetent, unless all the other creditors or claimants are impleaded. The foundation upon which these decisions rest is that the interest of the other creditors cannot be allowed to be adversely affected by the determination of the appeal in their absence. In cases where the creditors do not stand to be prejudicially affected the ground upon which the bar rests completely disappears. 6. In the appeals before us the enhanced taxation of the pleader's fees does not ensure to the benefit of the other creditors, as by Section 24 of the Act the Collector is to realize, only the value of the- debtor's property as reported by the Special Judge under the provisions of Sub-Section (2). of Section 19. The latter section refers back to the property mentioned in the notice u/s 11 and found to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicant. The decree in favour of the Court of Wards- cannot be regarded as such property, and we can- not therefore hold that these appeals are incompetent. The preliminary objection must, therefore, fail. 7. As regards the merits also we are of opinion that the appeal of Mathura Prasad, namely First Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1942 should be allowed in its entirety, and the appeals of Bhagwati Prasad and Vidyarathi Chintamani should succeed partly. 8. We have already mentioned that as the judgment in Mathura Prasad's case had been given on merits, there could be no room for the application of the provisions of Order 9, rule 9, C. P.C. The action of the lower Court in setting aside the ex parte order was, in our opinion, apparently unwarranted and without jurisdiction. Order 9, rule 8, C. P. C. refers to a case where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, and it is provided that in such event the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, in which case the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission. It is clear, that in passing the order in Mathura Prasad's case on 14th October, 1910, the learned Special Judge did not purport to act under the aforesaid rule. As the pro- visions of Order 9, rule 9, rule 9, C. P. C. can be invoked only in cases where a dismissal has taken place under rule 8j C. P. C. it is clear that the benefit of it was not available to the Government Pleader. We do not think it is necessary for the purposes of these appeals to enter into the vexed question as to whether it is the landlord or it is the claimant who should be regarded as plaintiff in proceedings under the .Encumbered Estates Act: We think, however, that if Order 9,.rule 8, C. P. C. has to be applied to claims in such proceedings, it must relate to the absence of the person who comes to Court to seek a decree and against whom the order of dismissal is made in consequence of his default in appearance. Obviously the party who failed to appear and against whom the order of dismissal is made as result of his failure to appear is the person who is. given an opportunity to invoke the aid of Order 9, rule 9, C. P. C. The dismissal of Mathura Prasad's claim was not in consequence of his default. The default was of the landlord in whose favour despite his absence the order was passed. He could not .therefore be given the indulgence which might presumably have been available to him if the claim was allowed ex parte. We must therefore hold that the proceedings subsequent to the 14th October, 1940, ultra vires. 9. The proceedings of the 14th October, 1940, in the other two cases do not suffer from the same defect. The only question which falls to be considered in the appeals which arise out of the decrees in these two cases is whether the lower Court could on the application of the Government Pleader, amend valuation and the costs and whether in cases where the claims are withdrawn, the pleader's fees can be taxed on a contested scale. The CPC does not afford any warrant for the Court itself to amend the valuation put upon the claim by the party who comes to seek the relief and thus to enlarge the taxation. Order 7, rule 11. The CPC does not afford any warrant for the Court itself to amend the valuation put upon the claim by the party who comes to seek the relief and thus to enlarge the taxation. Order 7, rule 11. C. P. C. indicates that if a wrong or an arbitrary valuation is made by the plaintiff, the Court can compel him to correct it on pains of dismissal of his suit. We apprehend that if this procedure was followed, by the Court below, the appellants would have preferred, the dismissal of their claims as a lesser evil. It is to be observed that the order directing the office to compute the valuation according to Suits Valuation Act and to calculate: the pleader's fee on that footing was ex parte. We have no doubt that the order was wrong, and we are supported in cur view by the decision in Ashiq Ali and Others Vs. Imtiaz Begam and Others, AIR 1917 All 78 and In the matter of the Court Fees Act and In Re: Court-fee Act and Kalipada Mukharjee, AIR 1930 Cal 686 . We also think that the pleader's fees ought to have been calculated on the value of the claims as given by the appellants, and. having regard to clause 6 of Rule 289 of the Oudh Civil Rules they ought to have been one-quarter of the fees payable in a contested case. The question whether withdrawal should be allowed at the initial stage of the proceedings amounted to a preliminary point within the meaning of the rule. 10. We therefore set aside the order of the learned Special Judge in First Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1942 and restore his order dated !4th October, 1940. So far as First Civil Appeals Nos. 54 and 56 are concerned we allow then to this extent that the pleader's fees of the lower Court shall he taxed as indicated above on the valuation given by the claimants. We observe that in the claim of Vidyarathi Chintamani no valuation of the claim is mentioned. The office will call upon his Counsel to state the value of the claim forthwith and calculate the costs upon that footing. In view of the fact that the appellants have failed to print all the necessary documents in the paper book, we order that the" .parties shall bear their OA'II costs of First Civil Appeals Nos. The office will call upon his Counsel to state the value of the claim forthwith and calculate the costs upon that footing. In view of the fact that the appellants have failed to print all the necessary documents in the paper book, we order that the" .parties shall bear their OA'II costs of First Civil Appeals Nos. 54, 55 and 56 of 1942.