JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal from a decree of the Civil and Sessions Judge, Agra passed nearly five years ago in a matter which is relatively simple. 2. The suit was one by the Benares Bank Ltd. and its Liquidator against the two promisors under a promissory note dated 23rd or 24th April 1937. The promissory note was executed by the two defendants, Manohar Lal, described in the plaint as a Vakil of Meerut, and Krishna Lal who was his brother. The promissory note itself is in these words: On demand I/we jointly and severally promise to pay at Agra, to the order of the Benares Bank Ltd., the sum of rupees five thousand three hundred and eighty seven and annas thirteen only with interest at one per cent, over Imperial Bank of India published rate of interest for Demand Loans with a minimum of ten per cent, per annum with monthly rests on every 30th June and 31st December, for value received.... 3. Historically, it is common ground that this promissory note was the last of a series of promissory notes at three years' intervals each one in renewal of the last, the original promissory note being dated 31st May 1928 to secure repayment of a principal sum of five thousand rupees. It is also a fact that in the beginning the Bank also took what is described as a "security bond" which amounted to a charge on certain property of the two brothers at Agra, but when it came to suing on the promissory note after its liquidation, the bank dropped the security and brought a suit in the simplest possible form against the two promisors claiming payment of the principal and interest then due from them jointly and severally. We do not think it necessary to set out the plaint in detail except to observe that on the face of it, it is unmistakably a claim against the two defendant brothers as principal co-debtors jointly and severally. The amount claimed comes in the aggregate to Rs. 6750 which, of course, includes accrued interest from the date of the promissory note. 4. The written statementsor rather the one written statementare of more interest. The only one of the defendants who actually and formally filed a written statement was the defendant Krishna Lal, defendant 2. The amount claimed comes in the aggregate to Rs. 6750 which, of course, includes accrued interest from the date of the promissory note. 4. The written statementsor rather the one written statementare of more interest. The only one of the defendants who actually and formally filed a written statement was the defendant Krishna Lal, defendant 2. He filed a written statement on 19th September 1940 on his own behalf saying, in effect, that at the time of taking the loan and at the time of the suit, he was an agriculturist and, as such, was entitled to all the benefits of the Agriculturists' Relief Act, including the benefit of ss. 3 and 30 of that Act. He went on to say that, if accounts were taken under s. 30, it would be found that he had paid back the whole of the principal due under the loan and he, therefore, claimed to have an account on that footing, which, if the facts were as he alleged, would in effect have meant that he owed nothing or practically nothing to the plaintiff bank. Now, the interesting thing is that his co-defendant, Manohar Lal, who, at any rate, on the face of the promissory note, was jointly and severally liable on it, did not trouble to put in a written statement at all and, at one stage of the suit, the proceedings were treated on this account by the Court as against him as being ex parte. But on 19th September, incidentally the same date as his brother filed the written statement, the Vakil made a written application to the Civil Judge in which he explained that for various reasons "being a practising lawyer" he could not manage to appear in the Court and asking that the proceedings might go on against him inter parties and not ex parte and he ended up this peculiar document by saying that he "submitted that this defendant adopts the defence filed by defendant 2." The learned Civil Judge somewhat unfortunately, we thinkseems to have allowed this very slipshod Course to have been followed and the result was that the proceedings went on with a written statement by defendant 2, no written statement whatever by defendant 1 and the vary peculiar submission made by the latter that he had adopted the defence of defendant 2. We desire to point out for the benefit of the learned Civil Judge that it is always much better if matters of this kind are conducted regularly, and that if he was disposed to allow defendant 1 to appear, he should certainly have insisted on a written statement being filed in the proper way. We are not prepared to say that it would have made very much difference in this case, but there are many cases in which it might well make a great deal of difference. However, that may be, we feel that we must, at this stage in appeal, treat defendant 1 as having been before the Court, raising - or perhaps supporting - those pleas which are contained in his brother's written statement. 5. The learned Judge in a commendably-short judgment discussed the issue whether the defendants were agriculturists. The whole matter turned on that. In the first place we can perhaps dispose quickly of one suggestion that has been made to us in appeal which is the assertion that defendant 1, the Vakil Manohar Lal, never was a principal debtor on this promissory note at all but throughout figured as a mere surety and, therefore, as we understand it, his status as an agriculturist or not is neither here nor there. In our view, this suggestion cannot be supported for a moment. The promissory note on the face of it is as clear as anything can possibly be. Manohar Lal is there described to be jointly and severally liable with Krishna Lal and, in any case, it would be a most peculiar thing to find the surety figuring in the promissory note in front of the principal debtor. The only shred on which the appellant bangs this suggestion is that it seems to have been the fact that the proceeds of the promissory note in the first place went into the Bank account of Krishna Lal alone. That may well be true; but it proves nothing. Debtors may very well be joint and several debtors, notwithstanding that one of them takes, or keeps in his Bank account, the money that has been borrowed. That may well be true; but it proves nothing. Debtors may very well be joint and several debtors, notwithstanding that one of them takes, or keeps in his Bank account, the money that has been borrowed. We propose to deal with that issue very quickly by saying that there is nothing on the facts before us which could justify us in saying that the only capacity in which Manohar Lal joined in this promissory note was that of a surety or as it is described in s. 2, U.P. Agriculturists 'Relief Act,' "for the purpose of adding his name as security." If there were any doubt about this, we think it would be completely resolved by a letter Ex. 5 written by Manohar Lal himself on 2nd June to the Bank in which he said that the promissory note was signed by his brother Krishna Lal and himself and asked that the five thousand rupees in question might be credited to his brother's Bank account. Nothing on earth could be plainer than that for the purpose of explaining that both of them were jointly and severally liable. 6. The more difficult point, however is the one which we will now deal with. The learned Judge in his judgment first dealt, as we have already said, with the issue of whether the defendants were agriculturists. It has to be remembered that there was no written statement of defendant 1, before the Court and in that sense, it is extremely doubtful whether there was any issue in this respect affecting defendant 1. All he had done was to adopt his brother's written statement and even in that written statement the only allegation is that Krishna Lal was an agriculturist and not that Manohar Lal was an agriculturist. But the learned Judge appears to have given defendant 1 the benefit of doubt and he proceeded to discuss whether he was an agriculturist. He first of all examined a certain khewat of certain village for the year as far back as 1926 and he came to the conclusion from what he found in that khewat that both the defendants were persons paying land revenue not exceeding a thousand rupees per annum. In other words, he found that sub-s. (2) (a) of S. 2, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, was satisfied and that up to that point, the defendants were agriculturists. In other words, he found that sub-s. (2) (a) of S. 2, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, was satisfied and that up to that point, the defendants were agriculturists. He then went on to say that: The plaintiff has proved that defendant 1 was assessed to income tax for the last financial year for which assessments were made by the income tax Department when.......semble before.......the suit was filed.... 7. Now, what this means is that he found that notwithstanding that defendant 1 had succeeded in bringing himself within sub-cl. (a), nevertheless the plaintiff had succeeded in taking him out of it again under the second of the provisos to s. 2 (2) by saying that in the year of the last assessment before the bringing of the suit, he bad paid income tax. 8. Now, had the test been whether defendant I had paid income tax in the year of the last assessment before the suit was brought, we should have thought that the learned Judge was perfectly right in coming to that conclusion. It had been proved that the defendant had paid income tax in that year and if it was to be contended on his behalf that the amount paid was not such as to bring it within the proviso, then it was for him to establish it. But, unfortunately, the matter is not quite as simple as that. At the time when the learned Judge heard this case, the law in respect of this matter seems to have been governed by a Bench decision of two learned Judges of this Court including the late Chief Justice in Raj Narain and Another Vs. B. Bindaban, AIR 1936 All 449 The learned Judges in that case, in particular in making reference to a case under S. 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Belief Act, had unmistakably decided that the relevant year of assessment for the purpose of the proviso was the last occasion on which the debtor was assessed before the suit was brought. This has to be read in reference to S. 8, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, which applies only to that Chapter of the Act which contains s. 3 but does not apply to that Chapter of the Act which contains S. 30. This has to be read in reference to S. 8, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, which applies only to that Chapter of the Act which contains s. 3 but does not apply to that Chapter of the Act which contains S. 30. It follows, therefore, that at the date the learned Judge decided this case in 1940, the relevant year for the purpose of s. 30 of the Act in which the debtor would have had to show that he was not assessed to income tax beyond the specified rate was the year of the last assessment before the suit was brought and not the year in which the loan was taken. Since 1940, however, there has been an alteration in the law in consequence of the Full Bench case in Ganeshi Lal Vs. Shiam Lal, AIR 1943 All 190 In that case again in reference to a case under s. 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act the Full Bench has established that a debtor who claims the benefit of s. 30 must show that he was an agriculturist at the date of the advance. Though the earlier case in 1936 was distinguished and explained, it appears to us that this latter decision of the Full Bench must really be taken to have overruled it. However that may be, it is the decision of this Full Bench that constitutes the law in this Court to-day. 9. In these circumstances, so far as related to any question in this suit under s. 30 U.P. Agriculturists' Belief Act, the result is that the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, through no fault of his own, proceeded on an entirely wrong basis and instead of the relevant year being the year before the suit was filed, the relevant year really was the year in which the loan was taken. For that reason, so far as the question is one relating to the defendant's right to the benefit of S. 30 of the Act, we shall have to consider it again, but so far as, s. 3 of the Act is concerned, we may say at once that we think that the learned Judge is perfectly right and that there is no occasion for us to differ in any way from his opinion. The remainder of this judgment therefore, concerns the question merely as regards s. 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 10. The remainder of this judgment therefore, concerns the question merely as regards s. 30, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 10. The course, therefore, which matters have taken is that the only evidence at the trial is that defendant 2, Krishna Lal, who has been into the witness-box in support of his own, written statement, produced the khewats to show that he and his brother were technically agriculturists within the meaning of sub-3. (a) of S. 2 (2) of the Act and he has sworn that he himself was an agriculturist. He has put it quite simply in that language "I am an agriculturist"; and nothing more. Defendant 1, Manohar Lal, has not been near the witness-box and we have no evidence on the record whatever, beyond the khewat, as to whether he was an agriculturist or not. It is with reference to defendant 1 that the question principally arises because, as the learned Judge points out, if defendant 1 was a non agriculturist, then the case will be one of a non Agriculturistjoining with an agriculturist and accordingly, under proviso 3 to sub-s. (2) of s. 2, neither of them would become entitled to the benefit of the Act. 11. We have teen pressed to say that once evidence has been given to the effect that a debtor is what we may describe as a technical agriculturist under sub-s. (a), then the onus lies with the plaintiffthe creditorof showing or at least of asserting, that he is really not the agriculturist he seems to be, because, by virtue of the second proviso he is a person paying income tax beyond a certain amount. We do not entirely agree with that view. It has to be remembered that this is an Act which gives to a certain class of person, to wit an agriculturist, certain privileges; and we should have thought that it was a safe starting point to assume that, before a person can take advantage of the privileges of this Act, it is for him to show that he comes strictly within that class which is entitled to those privileges. In other words, the debtor must prove that he is an "agriculturist". And to do that, in our view, it is necessary for him to do something more than to say that he is a person who does not pay land revenue exceeding a thousand rupees per annum. In other words, the debtor must prove that he is an "agriculturist". And to do that, in our view, it is necessary for him to do something more than to say that he is a person who does not pay land revenue exceeding a thousand rupees per annum. In our view, it is necessary for him not only to say that, but to say also that he is a person who is not assessed to income tax beyond that rate which would exclude him from the class of agriculturists. A moment's reflection, we think, will show that this is so. It has to be remembered. that the plaintiff, that is to say the creditor, is a person who himself has not access-indeed he is statutorily debarred from access by S. 54, income tax Act, 1922to the only material from which it can be shown whether the debtor has paid income tax on a particular sum in a particular year. Section 54, income tax Act, in effect, makes it impossible in all cases for a private individual to make inquiries from the income tax authorities and only in a very limited class of case even for the authorities, such as a Court of Law, themselves to require facts and documents to be produced. And when one looks at sub-s. 3(m) of s. 54, income tax Act, one finds that even then the only thing that the Court itself could compel the income tax authorities to disclose is the very limited fact of whether a particular person has paid income tax in a particular year. There is no way in which even the Court itself could find out whether a particular person had paid income tax on a particular sum in any particular year. 12. It is apparent, therefore, that it would be impossible for the plaintiff himself to prove the facts required by the second proviso to s. 2, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act and it would be equally impossible even for the Court itself to compel production of proof except to the limited extent whether the debtors paid income tax in a particular year. From this, what appears to us to follow, is that this is a case in which those facts which are covered by the second proviso to s. 2 are such as are, not merely "especially" but "solely" within the knowledge of the debtor himself. From this, what appears to us to follow, is that this is a case in which those facts which are covered by the second proviso to s. 2 are such as are, not merely "especially" but "solely" within the knowledge of the debtor himself. If ever there was a case which, if it is not covered precisely by the language of s. 106, Evidence Act, is covered by the principle of that section, this case, in our view, is it. Here is a case in which a man comes to the Court, claiming against his creditor the great concessions which are provided by the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act. In order to obtain those concessions he has to prove a certain character which is defined both positively and negativelypositively by sub-cl. (a) and negatively by the second proviso. It would, to our minds, be an unreasonable proposition if he were allowed to give evidence to show that he qualified under sub-s. (a) and to leave it at that without disclosing that which ex-hypothesi must necessarily be within his own "especial", if not exclusive, knowledge, namely, what income tax he has paid in the relevant year. To take any other view of the obligation of a debtor claiming under sub-s. (2) would, as we see it, be tantamount, in any case in which that debtor was minded to be dishonest, to giving him a licnce to prove a falsehood on the off chance that his creditor might not be able to disprove it. For these reasons, we are satisfied that when a defendant comes to the Court claiming the concessions of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act, the obligationlies on him to prove himself within s. 2, sub-s. (2), as an agriculturist, both positively under sub-s. (a) and negatively under the proviso. And that reasoning applies with no less force to a case in which the defendant in question has not troubled to put in a written statement but has said in the most casual possible way that he relies on the written statement of someone else. Nor is the matter made any better when the gentleman himself is a Vakil. 13. We arrive, therefore, at the same conclusion as the learned Judge of Agra, though by a somewhat different road. Nor is the matter made any better when the gentleman himself is a Vakil. 13. We arrive, therefore, at the same conclusion as the learned Judge of Agra, though by a somewhat different road. We think that defendant 2 has not been proved to be an agriculturist and, therefore, that this is a case under proviso 3 of an association between a non-agriculturist and an agriculturist which deprives them both of the benefits of s. 30 of the Act. We, therefore, think that the appeal must be dismissed. 14. We would note that the decree has been drawn up in the most careless manner. As it stands, it is unintelligible. It is stated on the form that the plaintiff claimed Rs. 6,750 with pendente lite and future interest and costs of the suit and it is further stated: It is, therefore, ordered that the plaintiff's claim be decreed with costs against both the defendants. And that the sum of Rs. 6,750 be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff from December 5, 1940 up to the date of realization. After the words "the plaintiff" there has evidently been an omission of a direction in regard to interest pendente lite and future. It appears to us in the light of the earlier wording of the decree that this was an accidental error in the preparation of the decree which should be remedied. One other slight alteration is also required and the decree should finally read as follows: And that the sum of Rs. 6,750 be paid jointly and severally by the defendants to the plaintiff with interest pendente lite and future interest from December 5, 1940 up to the date of realization of the said sum and with Rs. 668 8-0 on account of costs of the suit. The respondents are entitled to their costs of this appeal.