JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - This is a Defendants' second appeal in a suit for contribution. The material facts are as follows: Lala Narain Das, the present Respondent, Sababdin and Baldeo Prasad (father of Sheo Balak Bajpai and Ganga Ratan Bajpai who were Defendants 2 and 3 in the trial Court) entered into a partnership in March 1926 with the object of carrying on a grain business under the firm name Narain Das Baldeo Prasad. Lala Narain Das and Sababdin was each to contribute a fourth share of the capital and Baldeo Prasad one half. They were to divide the profits and loss in the same proportion. The business was carried on in Sultanpur till March 1930 when the partnership was dissolved as the business did not yield any profit. In July 1932 a firm Klshorilal Makundilal obtained a decree in respect of a partnership debt against Lala Narain Das and in execution of that decree the Respondent (Narain Das) bad on the 28th of February, 1933 to pay a sum of Rs. 1,606-2-0. He accordingly brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for contribution against Sababdin and the sons of Baldeo Prasad who died since the partnership was dissolved. It was alleged by Narain Das that at the time of dissolution of the partnership the partnership assets consisting of "goods in the shop" were left in the possession of Sababdin and Baldeo Prasad with the direction that they might sell the same and apply the proceeds towards satisfaction of partnership debts. That Sababdin and Baldeo Prasad, instead of doing so, misappropriated the assets and did not pay off any of the debts. It was further alleged that a rough account of the partnership transactions called a Chittha was also prepared at the time the partnership was dissolved. Sababdin denied being a partner in any business with Narain Das and Baldeo Prasad. On the other hand, he pleaded that he had advanced a loan of Rs. 6,042 to them in connection with the business which they carried on in Sultanpur. It was pleaded by him in the alternative that in case he be held to be a partner no suit for contribution could lie against him for contribution without a suit for settlement of partnership accounts. The sous of Baldeo Prasad also denied that their father was a partner with Narain Das. It was pleaded by him in the alternative that in case he be held to be a partner no suit for contribution could lie against him for contribution without a suit for settlement of partnership accounts. The sous of Baldeo Prasad also denied that their father was a partner with Narain Das. According to them the grain business referred to in the plaint was carried on only by Narain Das and that their father had from time to time advanced a sum of Rs. 5,000 for his business by way of loan which he was liable to pay. That at time the business was wound up Narain Das took away all the account books and had instituted this false claim against them more than 6 years after their father's death which was time-barred. It was further pleaded that the decree in respect of which contribution was claimed was passed after their father, Baldeo Prasad was dead and could not bind them. They further averred that their father had on the Plaintiffs showing paid more than his proportionate share of the partnership capital. The learned Munif who tried the suit held that the three persons, Lala Narain Dass, Sahabdfn and Baldeo Prasad entered into a partnership as alleged by the Plaintiff and that they agreed to contribute the partnership capital and share in the profits and loss in the proportions mentioned in the plaint. He further held that the partnership came to an end in March, 1930. As regards the Chittha produced by the Plaintiff he came to the finding that it was not a reliable document "and did not show that there was an adjustment of the rights and liabilities of the different partners". He stressed the point that it was not signed by any of the partners and doubted its authenticity. As regards the decree obtained by the firm Kisborilal Makundilal he found that it was obtained after the death of Baldeo Prasad and so could not bind him or his heirs; and inasmuch as there was no accounting between the partners, a suit for contribution could not lie. The claim was accordingly dismissed. 2. There was an appeal and the first appellate Court agreed with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court. The claim was accordingly dismissed. 2. There was an appeal and the first appellate Court agreed with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court. It held, however, that the decree obtained by Kishorilal Makundilal was passed in a suit in which Narain Das was sued as partner in the firm Narain Das Bildeo Prasad. Relying on the decision in Sadhu Narayan Aiyangar v. Ramaswami Aiyanagar (1909) 3 I.C. 486 : 32 Mad. 203 it held that (he suit for contribution was maintainable even though no suit was brought for settlement of the partnership accounts and at the date of the suit for contribution such a suit was barred by the law of limitation. The appeal was allowed and a decree for Rs. 401/8/6 was passed against Sahabdin and for Rs. 803/1 against the assets of Baldeo Prasad in the hands of Defendants 1 and 2. Dissatisfied with this decision the present appeal was filed. Sahabdin died since the appeal was filed and is now represented by his legal representative. 3. It was contended on behalf of the Appellants that the lower appellate Court had taken a wrong view of the law and based its decision on a case which was overruled. 4. The following facts are established on the findings of the Courts below: That there was a partnership entered into between Narain Das, Baldeo Prasad and Sahabdin. That a grain business was carried on by the partnership. That the partnership was dissolved in March, 1930. That there was no settlement of accounts between the partners. Though the lower appellate Court did not expressly record a finding on that point it observed that "a suit for accounts was already time-barred on 28-5-1935, when the Plaintiff had to pay the decretal amount in question." It is, therefore, clear that the learned Civil Judge who heard the appeal confirmed the finding of Munsif as to the Chittha which was relied on by the Plaintiff as showing that there had been a settlement of accounts between the partners. That a suit for recovery of a debt alleged to be due from the firm Narain Dass Baldeo Prasad was brought by the firm Kishorilal Makundilal after the partnership was dissolved. That Narain Das Baldeo Prasad were impleaded in the suit as proprietors of the firm. That Baldeo Prasad was dead at the time this suit was brought. That a suit for recovery of a debt alleged to be due from the firm Narain Dass Baldeo Prasad was brought by the firm Kishorilal Makundilal after the partnership was dissolved. That Narain Das Baldeo Prasad were impleaded in the suit as proprietors of the firm. That Baldeo Prasad was dead at the time this suit was brought. That the suit was dismissed against Baldeo Prasad and a decree was passed against Narain Das alone. That Narain Das had on 28-2-1935, to pay a sum of Rs. 1,606/2/- in respect of that decree. 5. Having given the matter my most careful consideration I am of opinion that this appeal should be allowed. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee laid down the law in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar (1922) 45 Mad. 378 at 389-90 as fellows: If a partnership has been dissolved and the accounts have been wound up and each partner has paid what he has to contribute to the debts of the partnership and received his share of the profits, the mutual rights and obligations having been thus all discharged, and then it turns out afterwards that there was spine item to the credit of the partnership which was either forgotten or treated as valueless by reason of the supposed insolvency of the debtor or for any other cause, which item afterwards becomes of value and falls in, it ought to be divided between the partners in proportion to their shares in the original partnership. There is no reason why one should have it more than the other If on the other hand no accounts have been taken and there is no constant that the partners have squared up, then the proper remedy when such an items falls in is to have the accounts of the partnership taken; and if it is too late to have recourse to that remedy, then it is also too late to claim a share in an item as part of the partnership assets, and the Plaintiff does not prove and cannot prove that upon the due taking of the accounts he would be entitled to that share. It might well be the case that One of the reasons why no final balancing of accounts took place was that A owed the partnership so much money that it was anticipated that B would hereafter receive a particular item which would operate substantially to balance the claim. 6. The same principles would apply to a claim for contribution in respect of a debt due from the partnership which is paid by one partner. The claim for contribution is based on the Plaintiff's right as partner to receive contribution, which right as was observed by Pandrang Row J. in Chockalingam Chettiar Vs. Meyappa Chettiar and Others, AIR 1939 Mad 228 also would be subject to the pre-payment of debts due by the partnership and to the reciprocal rights possessed by the other partners which could be determined only in a suit for general accounts, no contribution being allowed by reason of the contract of partnership in respect of individual transactions ignoring the other partnership transactions. The present claim for contribution should be distinguished from a case where contribution is claimed by one judgment-debtor from his co-judgment debtor. The right to contribution as between co-judgment debtors arises not out of any statutory provision but is based on equity while the right to contribution in the present case, if it exists, would arise out of the provisions of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act. (The Indian Partnership Act IX of 1932, came into force after the dissolution of the partnership to which the present case relates). 7. In the present case as we know, a suit was brought against Narain Das and Baldeo Prasad, who were described as proprietors; of the firm Narain Das Baldeo Prasad.. The suit was dismissed against Baldeo Prasad. it is clear, therefore, that the equity on which the right to contribution as between co-judgment-debtors is based cannot be availed of by Narain Das in the present case. If he is to succeed he must make out a case for contribution arising out of a right conferred by the law of partnership. It has been found as a fact that there was no settlement of accounts between the parties. A suit for such a settlement of accounts was allowed by Narain Das to become time barred before he paid Rs. 1606/2/- in satisfaction of the decree obtained by the firm Kishori Lal Makundi Lal. It has been found as a fact that there was no settlement of accounts between the parties. A suit for such a settlement of accounts was allowed by Narain Das to become time barred before he paid Rs. 1606/2/- in satisfaction of the decree obtained by the firm Kishori Lal Makundi Lal. Having regard, therefore, to the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar (1922) 45 Mad. 378 at 389-90 the claim must fail. 8. The learned Civil Judge based his decision on the case of Sadhu Narayana Aiyanagar v. Ramaswami Aiyanagar (1909) 3 I.C. 486 : 32 Mad. 203. It was held by Miller and Sankaran Nair JJ. in that case that a partner who, after the dissolution of the partnership, has been compelled to pay a debt due by the partnership, can maintain a suit for contribution against his co-partners, even though a suit for general account of the partnership and a share therein is barred by limitation. The Defendant, however, will, in such a case they added be entitled to show that in a settlement of accounts he will not be liable, or that his liability would be reduced. The principle it was further held, will apply equally whether the party suing is a partner or his representative. This case was in Arunachalam Servai v. Nottam Beer Vavu Rowiher (1928) 27 M.L.W 597 considered overruled by the Privy Council in 45 Madras 378, as it relied on Sokkanadha Vannimmndar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar (1905) 28 Mad. 344 which was expressly overruled by the Privy Council. It is clear that the decision in ILR 32 Mad. 203 is against the principle laid down by their Lordships in the case reported in ILR 45 Mad. 378, 9. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court restored. The Appellants shall get their costs from the Respondent in all the Courts. 10. The lower appellate Court had not allowed the Plaintiff any interest on the sums decreed against Saheb Din and the sons of Baldeo Prasad. Narain Das filed cross-objections and prayed for interest. In view, however, of the conclusion arrived at by me and the consequent success of the appeal this question does not arise. 10. The lower appellate Court had not allowed the Plaintiff any interest on the sums decreed against Saheb Din and the sons of Baldeo Prasad. Narain Das filed cross-objections and prayed for interest. In view, however, of the conclusion arrived at by me and the consequent success of the appeal this question does not arise. The cross-objections are dismissed with costs.