JUDGMENT Verma, J. - This is an appeal against a decision of the learned District Judge of Aligarh, dated 24th September 1942, upholding the decision of a Special Judge dated 2nd October 1941, of the second grade in proceedings under the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act. The appellants were the landlords applicants under S. 4 of the Act and Chaube Jagannath, the deceased father of the respondents, had preferred a claim under S. 11 of the Act to certain property. The Courts below have agreed in deciding that claim in favour of Chaube Jagannath. 2. The essential facts are these. As has already been stated, an application under S. 4 Encumbered Estates Act was filed by the present appellants in the year 1936, and in the written statement filed by them under S. 8 of the Act the property in dispute was shown as property belonging to the landlords. The proceedings prescribed by the Act were taken in due course and Chaube Jagannath, as already stated, made an application to the Special Judge claiming this particular item of property and stating that it belonged to him and not to the landlords applicants. The main ground on which the claim of Chaube Jagannath was based was that he had, by adverse possession for more than twelve years as against the landlords-applicants, become the owner of the property. Various defences were raised, among them being the pleas that Chaube Jagannath's claim was barred by estoppel, by S. 11, Civil P.C. and by S. 233 (k), United Provinces Land Revenue Act, and issues were framed by the Special Judge with regard to these pleas. The Special Judge, by a judgment dated July 1939, held that Chaube Jagannath had not acquired title to the property in dispute by adverse possession. Having arrived at that decision on the merits, he did not record findings on the issues framed on the question of estoppel, res judicata and the bar of S. 233 (k), Land, Revenue Act Chaube Jagannath took an appeal to the Court of the District Judge and the learned Judge, by a judgment dated 21st March 1940, allowed his appeal and, reversing the decision of the Special Judge, held that it was established that Chaube Jagannath bad acquired title to the property in question by adverse possession for more than twelve years as claimed by him. The learned Judge remanded the case to the Court of the Special Judge with the direction that the remaining issues should be tried and decided. The Special Judge thereupon took up the issues which had remained undecided and held in favour of Chaube Jagannath on all the questions raised by those issues. He accordingly held that the claim of Chaube Jagannath was established and that he, and not the landlords-applicants, was the owner of the property in question. The landlords-applicants thereupon went up in appeal to the Court of the District Judge and that Court, as has been stated above, dismissed their appeal. The landlords-applicants have consequently filed this second appeal in this Court. 3. The only question which was argued in the lower appellate Court, and which has been argued before us, is that the claim put forward by Chaube Jagannath was barred by the provisions of S. 233 (k), Land Revenue Act. The facts bearing upon this matter are as follows: The parties to this appeal and one Balwant Singh were co-sharers in a Mahal called "Mahal Ghair Khwastgaran". In the year 1934 Balwant Singh applied under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act for the partition of his share in that Mahal, and arrayed the parties to this appeal and, possibly, other co-sharersas opposite parties. The parties to this appeal raised no objection to the partition being made as desired by Balwant Singh, and Balwant Singh's application was granted and the partition was made. The appellants were impleaded by Balwant Singh as opposite parties in those partition proceedings as their names appeared in the Khewat. The contention of the appellants is and has been in the Courts below that, as Chaube Jagannath did not in those partition proceedings state that he had become owner by adverse possession of the share against which the names of the appellants were entered, his present claim was barred by S. 233 (k), Land Revenue Act. It may be mentioned here that the pleas of estoppel and res judicata, as distinct from the plea based on S. 233 (k) Land Revenue Act, have not been pressed before us. The sole question that arises for our consideration therefore, is whether, upon the facts stated above, the plea that Chaube Jagannath's claim is barred by S. 233 (k), Land Revenue Act is well-founded. 4. The sole question that arises for our consideration therefore, is whether, upon the facts stated above, the plea that Chaube Jagannath's claim is barred by S. 233 (k), Land Revenue Act is well-founded. 4. On behalf of the appellants strong reliance has been placed on certain stray sentences in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1938 210 (Privy Council) The only authorities on which the appellants have placed reliance here as well as in the Courts below is that judgment of their Lordships. The argument is that their Lordships of the Privy Council have in that case made observations which support the contention that Chaube Jagannath's claim is barred by S. 233(k). We are unable to accept the contention of the appellants' learned counsel that the sentences on which he places reliance are any authority for the proposition contended for. We are relieved, however, of the necessity of dealing with the passages relied upon in detail because of what their Lordships themselves make clear in the penultimate paragraph of their judgment. The question which their Lordships had to consider, and which they decided, was whether, on the facts of that particular case, the ground on which Raza and Srivastava JJ., had based their decisionviz. barred by S. 233 (k) - or the ground on which Wazir Hasan C.J., had held that the suit was not maintainableviz. that the suit was barred by res judicata, but not by S. 233 (k) was correct. In this connection they had to consider the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of Richards C.J., in Bijai Misir and Another Vs. Kali Prasad Misir and Others, AIR 1917 All 258 and of the views expressed in Ram Raikha Misir Vs. Lallu Misir and Others and they held that the interpretation placed by Richards C.J., and by the learned Judges who decided the case in Ram Raikha Misir Vs. Lallu Misir and Others on S. 233 (k) was too narrow. Their Lordships, after carefully analysing the various provisions in Chap. VII, Land Revenue Act, headed "Partition and Union of Mahals", referred to the words "except as provided in Ss. Lallu Misir and Others on S. 233 (k) was too narrow. Their Lordships, after carefully analysing the various provisions in Chap. VII, Land Revenue Act, headed "Partition and Union of Mahals", referred to the words "except as provided in Ss. 111 and 112" in clause (k) of S. 233, Land Revenue Act and observed as follows: AIR 1938 210 (Privy Council) The exception makes it exceedingly difficult to maintain that the only thing excluded from the cognizance of the Civil Court by clause (k) is the schemata arrangement of the land into units of area and that no question of proprietary right conies within the prohibition of access to the Civil Court. 5. As has been pointed out by a Full Bench of the Chief Court at Lucknow in AIR 1940 354 (Oudh) their Lordships in AIR 1938 210 (Privy Council) only decided what the meaning of the word "partition" in chapter VII and S. 233 (k) was, and further that no civil suit would lie in respect of matters arising for decision between contending co-sharers. It has further been pointed out by the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench in AIR 1940 354 (Oudh) that their Lordships did not decide that 110 civil suit would lie between persons whose interests were not opposed for the purposes of the particular partition carried out by the Collector. We entirely agree with this interpretation of the judgment of the Privy Council. The matter is put beyond doubt by what the Privy Council themselves have said in the penultimate paragraph of their judgment. The material portion of that paragraphas follows: The facts of the present case raise no question .... .......as to any case between persons whose interests were not opposed for the purpose of the partition. 6. The matter is put beyond doubt by what the Privy Council themselves have said in the penultimate paragraph of their judgment. The material portion of that paragraphas follows: The facts of the present case raise no question .... .......as to any case between persons whose interests were not opposed for the purpose of the partition. 6. Their Lordships went on to observe that a considerable number of decisions had been given upon a case of that descriptionbesides cases of other types mentioned in the paragraphbut that their Lordships had not had occasion to hear argument upon them and did not deal with them - "more especially as their Lordships consider that their decision upon the point arising in the present case is in conformation of the main current of authority in India." It is thus clear that, in view of the facts of the present case, the decision of their Lordships in AIR 1938 210 (Privy Council) is not only not in favour of the appellants, but is really against them. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has invited our attention to several decisions of this Court in which it has been held that S. 233 (k) does not bar a suit brought in respect of a dispute between persons who were arrayed on the same side as non-applicants in the partition proceedings and between whom no controversy arose in those proceedings. It will be sufficient to mention only one of them, namely, Lal Behari and Others Vs. Musammat Parkalli Koer and Others, AIR 1920 All 21 We have come to the conclusion, therefore, that the appeal is without force. 8. It may be stated here that it is open to considerable doubt whether a person, who files an application before a Special Judge under S. 11, Encumbered Estates Act putting forward a claim to an item of property shown by the landlords-applicants in their written statement as belonging to them, can be said to "institute any suit or other proceeding in the Civil Court" within the meaning of S. 233 (k). We do not, however, consider it necessary to express any definite opinion on this question as the view that we have taken on the other point is sufficient for the disposal of this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.