JUDGMENT Misra and Kaul, JJ. - The Plaintiffs, who were eight out of the nine reversionary heirs to the estate of one Hardeo Singh after the death of his widow Musammat Jaipal Kuar in 1935, instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for possession of village Ratnapur in the district of Sitapur. The ninth reversioner did not join and was impleaded as Defendant No. 3. Thakur Shankar Bux Singh, Defendant No. 1, holds a possessory mortgage over village Ratnapur, Ex. A5, dated 7th August, 1888, executed by Musammat Jaipal Kuar for Rs. 2,500. This mortgage originally stood in favour of Munnu Singh, but he relinquished the mortgagee rights by a deed, dated 30th March, 1897, to Musammat Govind Kuar, a younger sister of Musammat Jaipal Kuar, who was married to Thakur Kalka Singh, Taluqdar of Halwapur, stating that he was merely a benamidar. In 1898 Musammat Govind Kuar, under one of the stipulations contained in the mortgage, obtained possession of the hypothecated property under a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Sitapur. The estate of Musammat Govind Kuar eventually develoved on Musammat Raj Kuar, and she along with her husband, reversioner, Shankar Bux Singh, who subsequently succeeded to the property, sub-mortgaged the mortgagee rights to Seth Bisheshwar Nath, Defendant No. 2. 2. The Plaintiffs brought the suit on 17th November, 1939, alleging that the possessory mortgage deed, dated 7th August, 1888, did not operate to convey their reversionary right and was invalid beyond the lifetime of Musammat Jaipal Kuar, as it was not executed for legal necessity. They embodied in their suit for possession a relief for manse profits for the past three years. 3. With this relief we need no longer concern ourselves, since the lower Court disallowed it, and the matter has not been recanvassed in appeal. The ninth reversioner, Rampal Singh, who was Defendant No. 3 filed a written statement and pleaded that he had been unnecessarily made a party to the suit in view of the fact that the claim of the mortgagee Shankar Bux Singh, was a subject matter of dispute in proceedings instituted by his father under the Encumbered Estates Act. The plea was eventually given up on 27th March, 1940, and it is no longer necessary to determine the effect of the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings on the suit. 4. The plea was eventually given up on 27th March, 1940, and it is no longer necessary to determine the effect of the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings on the suit. 4. The main defence was set up by Shankar Bux Singh, Defendant No. 1, and his sub-mortgagee, Seth Bisheshwar Nath, Defendant No. 2. They filed separate written statements. 5. Shankar Bux Singh alleged that Hardeo Singh, husband of Musammat Jaipal Kuar, was indebted to several persons at the time of his death, and his widow was bound to pay off those liabilities. In paragraph 10 of his written statement he gave the following particulars. "Specification of husband's debt as far as the watering Defendant knows is given below Name of creditor. Amount of debt. 1. Hannu Prasad of Kotra. Rs. 2,225 2. Janga of Dudwapur About Rs. 500. 6. In paragraph 11 of his written statement Shankar Bux Singh stated that Musammat Jaipal Kuar having borrowed Rs. 2,500 from his ancestor under the mortgage of 1888 paid off the creditors and spent some money in Gaya pilgrimage and Barambhoj etc., and that if the Plaintiffs be held to be the reversioners, they ought to file a redemption suit. On 27th March, 1940, however, Defendant No. l's counsel, while stating his case, was somewhat more definite. He said that the mortgage in suit was executed to pay off two decrees against Hardeo Singh, one in favour of Hannu Prasad Ex. Al, and the other in favour of Jagnu, Ex. A2. Trie evidence, which he produced in the case, was also confined to proof of these two items of necessity only. 7. The defence set up by the sub-mortgagee, Seth Bisheshwar Nath, Defendant No. 2, was similar though in more general terms. He alleged that the mortgage deed of 1888 had been executed for legal necessity in order to pay off the husband's debts as well as for expenses of pilgrimage and Barambhoj. 8. The issues which related to the controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were as follows Issue No. 1-Are the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 3 the nearest reversionary heirs of Hardeo Singh and as such owners of the property in suit? Issue No. 2- Whether the mortgage executed by Hardeo Singh's widow was for legal necessity as alleged by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2? 1 and 2 were as follows Issue No. 1-Are the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 3 the nearest reversionary heirs of Hardeo Singh and as such owners of the property in suit? Issue No. 2- Whether the mortgage executed by Hardeo Singh's widow was for legal necessity as alleged by Defendants Nos. 1 and 2? Issue No. 4.- To what mesne profits, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled ? Issue No. 5-To what reliefs are the Plaintiffs entitled ? 9. So far as issue No. 1 was concerned, the counsel for Defendant No. 2 admitted on 27th March, 1940, that for the purposes of the case the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 3 were the reversionary heirs of Hardeo Singh, and the learned Civil Judge, therefore, decided it in the Plaintiffs' favour. On issue No. 2 he came to the conclusion that legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 472-6 only out of the total consideration of Rs. 2,500 had been established by the Defendants. As regards issue No. 4, we have already stated that it was decided against the Plaintiffs. Accordingly under issue No. 5 the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 3 ware granted a decree for possession of village Ratnapur on payment of Rs. 472-5 to Defendant No. 2. Shankar Bux Singh, Defendant No. 1, alone has come up in appeal. His co-Defendant, Seth Bisheshwar Nath, who was impleaded as a Respondent has since died, and the names of his legal representatives have been brought on the record in his place. Two of the Plaintiffs, namely Durga Bux Singh and Jagjiwan Singh, have also died during the pendency of the appeal. The legal representatives of Durga Bux Singh were substituted in due course, but so far as Jagjiwan Singh was concerned, no action was taken under Order 22, Rule 4, within the time allowed by law, and the appeal against Jagjiwan Singh abated. An order in this regard was passed on 16th July, 1945, and the question whether as a consequence the entire appeal abated was left for consideration at the time of hearing. As the interests of reversioners in the estate of Hardeo Singh were separate, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents did not consider it fit to press the matter, and we think rightly. The appeal, therefore, does not abate as a whole. 10. As the interests of reversioners in the estate of Hardeo Singh were separate, the Learned Counsel for the Respondents did not consider it fit to press the matter, and we think rightly. The appeal, therefore, does not abate as a whole. 10. The reversioners have filed cross-objections, and they impugn the decree of the Court below so far as it held that the mortgage was valid to the extent of Rs. 472-6. 11. The mortgage in suit, Ex. A5, was executed in lieu of Rs. 2,500 by hypothecation of village Ratnapur for a period of five years. The interest stipulated was at the rate of 24 per cent per annum compoundable six monthly, and it was agreed that if after the expiry of five years the mortgagor failed to redeem the property, the mortgagee would be entitled either to enter into the mortgagee possession or to realise his entire mortgage money by attachment and sale of the village. During the period of mortgagee's possession neither the mortgagor was to be entitled to profits nor the mortgagee to interest. The recital in this deed is of some importance, and we reproduce it below. Whereas I, having borrowed Rs. 2,500, a moiety of which amounts to Rs. 1,530 for the purpose of paying off the debts due from my husband on account of the execution of decree etc. and for meeting the expenses of pilgrimage to Gayaji and for feeding Brahmans to benefit the soul of my husband, which on account of his being childless, is preferable to all other things among the Hindu community, bearing interest at the rate of Rs. 2 per cent per month from Thakur Munnu singh, son of Thakar Mansa Singh, resident and Zamindar of village Gondwa, pargana and tahsil Sitapur, have appropriated the same, and so in lieu of the aforesaid amount, I, while in enjoyment of sound health and an unimpaired intellect, without reluctance and coercion, out of my own freewill and consent, have, for the satisfaction of the said mortgagee, mortgaged without possession the entire village Ratnapur. 12. The only direct evidence produced in support of the defence of legal necessity consisted of Exs. A1, A12 and A2 and the statement of D.W. 1, Sahai Lal. [After discussing the evidence their Lordship proceeded:] 13. 12. The only direct evidence produced in support of the defence of legal necessity consisted of Exs. A1, A12 and A2 and the statement of D.W. 1, Sahai Lal. [After discussing the evidence their Lordship proceeded:] 13. The cumulative effect of all these factors, to our mind, is that the recitals contained in the mortgage were largely intended for the protection of Mst. Govind Kuar and were not wholly founded on fact. The probabilities were that the decree of Hannu Prasad had already been paid by Hardeo Singh at or about the time when it was passed, and we cannot, therefore, accept the recitals as evidencing a representation that his decree was still subsisting or was under execution. If nevertheless a representation in that behalf be assumed to have been made, even a superficial inquiry would have been enough to expose its falsity. 14. It is suggested by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants that from the fact that Hardeo Singh borrowed heavily and the further fact that paltry sum Rs. 443 still remained outstanding after his death, an irresistible inference must follow that he died heavily indebted. We have already said that there is evidence of heavy borrowing, but there is also evidence of prompt payment of debts. The fact that Jagnu's dues amounting to Rs. 443 were not satisfied would scarcely imply that Hardeo Bux Singh was heavily in debt when he died, for the liability on which that decree was founded may well have arisen from an unsettled account or from any other cause of a cognate nature. We may add that the Appellants have brought no other alienations of Mst. Jaipal Kuar to our notice to show that any other debt of Hardeo was discharged by her. According to the case as presented to us at the bar on Defendant's behalf, the yield from the property was wholly inadequate for Mst. Jaipal Kuar's maintenance, and she had to borrow even for such essential religious needs as the pilgrimage to Gaya and the Baranbhoj. There would, therefore, be all the more reason to expect that if heavy outstanding debts were left by Hardeo Singh, there would have been litigation to obtain their satisfaction, or substantial alienations to discharge them. There is evidence that after Mst. There would, therefore, be all the more reason to expect that if heavy outstanding debts were left by Hardeo Singh, there would have been litigation to obtain their satisfaction, or substantial alienations to discharge them. There is evidence that after Mst. Jaipal Kuar's death at least village Barchata and possibly other properties, which Hardeo Bux Singh had left, came into the hands of the reversions. It is immpossible, therefore, to suppose that the creditors of Hardeo, if there were any, would have remained inactive and would have allowed their debts to lapse. 15. The main argument, which was addressed to us on Appellant's behalf as a question of law, was that the recitals contained in ancient alienations constitute by themselves conclusive evidence of necessity, and that it is unnecessary to go beyoned them. This, to our mind, is wholly unwarranted and is an overstatement of the legal position. The recitals in ancient documents, in order that they may be acceptable, must be in accord with the probabilities and circumstances of the case, for it is to be remembered that false recitals are often got inserted in deeds in order to protect the interests of the alienee. In Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri (1916) 43 I.A. 749 Lord Buckmaster considered it well established that recital alone could not be relied upon for proving the assertions of fact which they contain for if such proof was permitted, the rights of reversions could always be defeated by the insertion of carefully worded statements. Under ordinary circumstances and apart from statute, therefore, recitals in deeds could only be evidence as between the parties to the conveyance and those who c aimed under them. With this note of caution in the judgment the Judicial Committee proceeds As time goes by and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have been given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, a recital consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case assumes greater importance and cannot lightly be set aside for it should be remembered that the actual proof of the necessity, which justified the deed, is not essential to establish its validity. It is only necessary that a representation should have been made to the purchaser that such necessity existed, and that he should have acted honestly and made proper inquiry to satisfy himself of its truth. The recital is clear evidence of the representation, and if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that an inquiry would have confirmed its truth, then when proof of actual inquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances, would be sufficient evidence to support the deed. To hold otherwise would result in deciding that a title becomes weaker, as it grown older so that a transaction - perfectly honest and legitimate when it took place-would ultimately be incapable of justification merely owing to the passage of time. (The italics are ours). 16. The circumstances established in that case were in their Lordship's view sufficient to Justify the assumption that proper inquiries would have disclosed that the real necessity existed, and the alienation was therefore, upheld In Chintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi v. Rani of Wadhwan (1920) 47 I.A. 6 the transfer made by a widow was impugned 82 years afterwards when full and detailed evidence was not possible. A mass of oral and documentary evidence was adduced at the trial. In dismissing the reversioners suit the High Court of Madras dealt at length with the evidence which indicated that the presumptive heirs had full opportunity of ascertaining the facts but kept silent and brought no suit for declaration, that the history of the estate both before and after the sale disclosed that for a long period it was a source of burden and anxiety to whoever held it, that at the time of the sale Rs. 5,000 Government Revenue was in arrears for which the property was likely to be sold, that within ten days of the sale which was impugned a further sum of Rs. 4,647 became due and that the widow had no assets except grain worth Rs. 1,870 to meet the Government Revenue and the liabilities of her husband. These circumstances in view of the learned Judges of the High Court rendered the sale or mortgage of the property inevitable. 4,647 became due and that the widow had no assets except grain worth Rs. 1,870 to meet the Government Revenue and the liabilities of her husband. These circumstances in view of the learned Judges of the High Court rendered the sale or mortgage of the property inevitable. In the course of their judgment they said It is not disputed that the onus lay upon the Defendant to prove the necessity for the sale, but having regard to the great lapse of time since the transaction took place, it will not be reasonable to expect such full and detailed evidence as to the state of things which gave rise to the sale in question as in the case of alienations made at more or less recent dates. In such circumstances, presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which have been obliterated by time. 17. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee adopted the aforesaid remarks and observed that they represented both the sense as well as the law of the situation disclosed by the evidence. 18. It will be observed that none of these cases go the length of saying that recitals alone must in cases of ancient documents be accepted at their face value. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, thinks that two subsequent decisions of their Lordships' Board have the effect of laying down such | a proposition. 19. The first of these cases in Bawa Magniram Sitarcim v. Kasturbhai Manibhai (1922) 49 I.A. 54. The question, that arose for determination in that case, related to the effect of a document of 1824. It was found that it evidenced the record of a transaction by which a permanent right to occupy was conferred upon the Respondent's predecessors in title. The lands which had been leased out were endowed property, and the next question, therefore, was whether the perpetual lease could be justified by legal necessity. In that connection their Lordships observed that At the lapse of 100 years, when every party to the original transaction has pissed away, and it becomes completely impossible to ascertain what were the circumstances which caused the original grant to be made, it is only following the policy which the Courts always adopt, of securing as far as possible quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, to assume that the grant was lawfully and not unlawfully made. 20. Our attention was directed to the above passage in support of the Appellant's argument. It is impossible, however, to read this observation divorced from the circumstances and probabilities surrounding the transaction which their Lordships examined minutely and which they found to be in accord with requirements of Hindu Law. In our opinion the decision is not an authority for the proposition for which it was cited before us. 21. In the second case, namely, AIR 1936 60 (Privy Council) the reversions challenged the alienations made by a Hindu widow after a lapse of about 51 years. The Courts in India had held that the transfers were not for legal necessity, and reversionary interest was, therefore, unaffected by them. The concurrent findings of fact in this behalf were accepted by their Lordships. It was, however, urged before the Board on behalf of the Defendants' transferees that owing to lapse of time as a matter of law, necessity should be presumed. The case of Chintamani bhatla (47 I.A. 6), was cited in support of the proposition Lord Roche in refusing to interfere with the decision of the Courts in this country distinguished their earlier pronouncement and observed The judgment in that case does not, in the opinion of their Lordships, support the contention of the Respondents. Here, as in the case cited, regard must be had to the amount of evidence likely to be available, after the lapse of a long time and presumptions should be allowed to fill in gaps disclosed in the evidence, but in this case there is evidence justifying the conclusions of the Courts below. Presumptions not to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of place. 22. In our opinion Bhojrajs case does not help the Appellants. 23. We have already referred to the circumstances of the case before us. Here the evidence on the record leads to only one conclusion and that is that there was no legal necessity to satisfy the decree of Hannu Prasad, There is no specific recital in the deed, and if there was, a mere recital could not be of much help. Our view is that the decree in question had been satisfied along before the date of the mortgage of 1888 and except for the decree of Jagnu the rest of the consideration was taken, if it was really taken for purposes unauthorised by Hindu Law. Our view is that the decree in question had been satisfied along before the date of the mortgage of 1888 and except for the decree of Jagnu the rest of the consideration was taken, if it was really taken for purposes unauthorised by Hindu Law. We cannot read in the recital any assertion of necessity to pay off the decree of Hannu Prasad. By doing so we will not be filling in the gaps but demolishing the valid effect of the contrary evidence. 24. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has also invited our attention to the decisions in Kumarasami Mudaliar Vs. Narayansami and Others, AIR 1932 Mad 762 , Thimmanna Bhatta and Others Vs. Rama Bhatta and, AIR 1938 Mad 300 and Babulal Nandram v. Maniklal Beharila AIR 1941 Nag. 79. The first of these cases refers to inaction on the part of the reversions for a long period during the lifetime of the widow. This inaction, it was said deprived the alienee of an opportunity to prove legal necessity when cogent evidence was available, and it was made one of the many grounds upon which the learned Judges decided to accept the recitals in the deed. The report shows that there was definite oral evidence of necessity which was regarded as trustworthy. The observations of the learned Judges in connection with inaction merely constituted an amplification of the reasons for accepting that evidence. In Thimmanna Bhatta's case the nearest reversioner had joined in the execution of the document which was being impugned. This factor was considered as affording presumptive proof of necessity. Due regard also was paid to other circumstances and to the setting in which the impugned transfer was placed. We do not think that the decision goes the length of supporting the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. In the Nagpur case the principle of the decision of their Lordship's Board in 47 Indian Appeals, page 6 was followed. The learned Judges, however, went on to say that the onus in cases of ancient documents should be placed upon the Plaintiffs to show absence of legal necessity and that the validity of the transaction must be presumed. They said It is clear that in the case of an ancient transaction, it must be presumed that the alienation was lawful i.e. justified by legal necessity. They said It is clear that in the case of an ancient transaction, it must be presumed that the alienation was lawful i.e. justified by legal necessity. The difficulty no doubt lies in fixing the length of time (intervening between the transaction and its challenge in a suit) that would be necessary to justify the application of that presumption. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule. But it appears to us that on the principle underlying Section 90, Evidence Act, relating to documents 30 years old, the presumption in favour of the existence of necessity may well be applied to transfers more than 30 years old, provided that the original parties and witnesses to it are not available at the trial for bearing testimony to the circumstances in which the transaction was concluded. The presumption will operate with greater force in a case where the reversioner fails to bring a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the alienor. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the failure to sue for declaration was due to the existence of evidence proving necessity. In any case application of the rule as to presumption would depend on the particular facts of each case and we are decidedly of opinion that the facts and circumstances of this case are such as to justify the placing of onus on the reversioner of proving of absence of legal necessity. 25. We are disposed to think that the learned Judges considered that in the circumstances established by evidence the onus had been shifted on the reversioner and the decision was given in favour of the alienee, because it was in consonance with the proved probabilities. If it was intended, however, to lay down the rule that recitals standing by themselves, if they happen to be made in ancient documents, must constitute the proof of the facts recited, we respectfully differ from that view. 26. The rule, as we understand it, is that the recitals of existence of necessity in deeds of transfer are legally admissible, but they do not of themselves constitute evidence of the facts narrated. In order to substantiate those allegations, evidence aliunde is essential. When by lapse of time detailed evidence is obliterated, recitals, if consistent with probability and circumstances, are given greater weight. In order to substantiate those allegations, evidence aliunde is essential. When by lapse of time detailed evidence is obliterated, recitals, if consistent with probability and circumstances, are given greater weight. They are then regarded as good evidence of representation to the alienee and they give rise to a reasonable belief that an inquiry, if made, would have confirmed the truth of the facts stated. This is, because full and detailed evidence cannot be expected to be in existence. Regard in such cases must be had to the evidence still available and to the probabilities arising from the proved circumstances. If their consideration justifies such a course, the missing links may be filled up by resorting to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act. The rule is one of evidence and it cannot be invoked as a general rule of law rendering it imperative that recitals in old deeds should be accepted without question and at their face value. The onus cannot shift to the reversions, unless the initial burden of proof is first discharged by the transferee. In our opinion the Defendants in the present case have failed to discharge that onus satisfactorily. On the other hand the evidence is indicative of the fact that the transaction was made by Mst. Jaipal Kuar not with a view to obtaining money for satisfying Hannu Prasad's decree but mainly with the object of transferring the property to her younger sister in other words partly for necessity but largely with the object of benefiting her at the expense of the reversioners. We are accordingly in agreement with the Court below that legal necessity to the extent of Jagnu's decree alone existed. The Plaintiff's suit was, therefore, rightly decreed subject to the payment of that amount. The lower Court, however, on account of an error in calculation considered that Jagnu's decree was only for Rs. 472/6. In fact it was for Rs. 481/6, (Rs. 443/12- plus Rs. 37/10/- for costs) vide Ex. A2. 27. The Respondents have filed cross-objections. They challenge the correctness of the lower Court's decree in so far as it awards possession to the reversioners subject to the payment of the amount covered by it. 472/6. In fact it was for Rs. 481/6, (Rs. 443/12- plus Rs. 37/10/- for costs) vide Ex. A2. 27. The Respondents have filed cross-objections. They challenge the correctness of the lower Court's decree in so far as it awards possession to the reversioners subject to the payment of the amount covered by it. It is pointed out on their behalf that the suit against Hardeo Singh was instituted, and the decree was obtained after he had died, that it was, therefore: a nullity and that its payment could not constitute a lawful purpose for the alienation. We have already mentioned that the decree was probably obtained against the assets of Hardeo Singh, but assuming; that it was personal, the question, whether it was a nullity or not is hardly material. Ex. A2 would indicate that Jagnu's debt against Hardeo Singh was still due at the date of his death. Under the Hindu Law the widow is under a riligious obligation to discharge such debt, and the question is not dependent upon the validity of the decree, nor would it be any the less a proper purpose if it was barred by time in 1888. As this is the only basis upon which the Respondents challenged the lower Court's decision the cross-objections fail. 28. The result is that the decree of the lower Court is modified to this extent that in place of Rs. 472/6/- the figure Rs. 481/6/- shall be substituted. Except for this negligible modification, in all other respects the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objections are also dismissed with costs.