JUDGMENT 1. In this case the four accused have been convicted and sentenced each to rigorous imprisonment for one year for an offence under sec. 3 of Ordinance XXXIII of 1943. The prosecution case is that acting on information, the Sub-Inspector Mittra P. W. 1, was on watch at the junction of Tarak Paramanik Road and Singhee Bagan Lane, accompanied by constable Surjadeo Singh, P. W. 4. They watched from 2 a. m. to 5 a. m. on the night of 19th January, 1944. At the latter time a lorry drove up and stopped outside a Kalwar's shop. The Sub-Inspector moved towards it with his constables whereupon the driver escaped but the accused Kaliprasad who was sitting nearest to the driver was caught. The constables who went in the back of the lorry captured Mohammad Hossain and Fakir Mondal. The third man Sohan escaped. He was tried along with the present accused and was acquitted. On the lorry were found nine ingots of tin stamped with the letters "U. S. A." The driver, the accused Basudeb was traced through the registered owner of the lorry and was identified as the man who was in fact driving the lorry at the time of the seizure. The defence of the accused is all to the same effect, namely that Basudeb was the driver and the other three were coolies and that they were working for a man Lachminarayan who was the real owner of the ingots and their connection with them was entirely innocent. 2. The accused were charged both under sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code and also under sec. 3 of Ordinance XXXIII of 1943. A formal charge was framed, however, only under sec. 3 of the Ordinance. 3. Evidence was given to show that these ingots are imported from China and brought down from Assam to be shipped to America for essential military purposes and that they belong to the Metal Reserve Company, a United States Government's organisation. Some of the ingots are allocated to the Indian Government and made over to the Director General of Munitions Production for military use in India. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate has accepted this evidence as proving that the ingots in question are military stores within the definition in the Ordinance and they are the property of the United States Government. Some of the ingots are allocated to the Indian Government and made over to the Director General of Munitions Production for military use in India. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate has accepted this evidence as proving that the ingots in question are military stores within the definition in the Ordinance and they are the property of the United States Government. He finds that the explanation given by the driver and the coolies in the circumstances is totally unsatisfactory and that "taking the surrounding circumstances into account, there can be no doubt that all these men knew that they were carrying and handling stolen goods. They have completely failed to establish that they were in lawful possession of these military stores." In other words, he has found against them in regard to their attempt to show lawful possession under the Ordinance by holding that in fact they knew that they were carrying and handling stolen goods." This latter finding is in itself a finding that they were guilty of an offence under sec. 411 or at any rate under sec. 414 of the Indian Penal Code. It is quite obvious that if the accused are guilty under either of these sections, they have failed to show lawful possession of the articles within the requirement of sec. 3. 4. Mr. Noad has challenged the findings of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate that these ingots come within the terms of sec. 3 mainly on two grounds. First, that the evidence does not show that the ingots are the property of the United States Government. Second, that the evidence does not show that they are military stores. We accept Mr. Noad's contentions on both these points. 5. As regards the first point we are not given sufficient information as to the status of the Metal Reserve Company or the nature of its constitution or dealings to be able to say that the property of the company is the property of the United States Government. The agents for shipping the ingots in Calcutta are Messrs. Volkart Brothers and one witness from that firm, S.K. Banerjee, (P. W. 2) does say that the ingots are the sole property of the United States Government, but the Court witness Mr. The agents for shipping the ingots in Calcutta are Messrs. Volkart Brothers and one witness from that firm, S.K. Banerjee, (P. W. 2) does say that the ingots are the sole property of the United States Government, but the Court witness Mr. C.W. Arrott, General Assistant to the Chief United States Purchasing Commission, merely says that the tin which comes to India from China is purchased by the United States Commercial Company which is an official agency of the United States Government and he was not asked to explain the position any further. The Metal Reserve Company was the predecessor of the United States Commercial Company in the contract on behalf of the. United States Government. 6. As regards the second point the evidence and the finding of the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate do not in our opinion amount to evidence or finding that these ingots are military stores. There may be many articles which are intended for essential military purposes which will not come within the definition of "military stores" as "articles intended for use in the equipment of or for supply to the naval, military or air forces, etc." The conviction, therefore of the accused under the Ordinance cannot be upheld. But as we have already pointed out, the learned Magistrate has in fact found that the ingots were stolen property and that the accused knew that they were carrying and handling stolen goods. The evidence of Mr. Arrott shows beyond doubt that the ingots are stolen property, they are identifiable by a lot number stamped on them by which Mr. Arrott states that he can definitely identify the ingots as belonging to the supplies imported by them. Appearing on behalf of the accused Mr. Noad has not sought to contend that the ingots are not proved to be stolen property. 7. As regards the question of knowledge, Mr. Noad has argued that it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that the driver and the other three accused were not innocently engaged as carriers in respect of these goods. In our opinion, so far as the driver is concerned, there cannot be any possible doubt in the matter. He was taking these goods at night. He was obviously left in charge of them and as soon as the police appeared he bolted. In our opinion, so far as the driver is concerned, there cannot be any possible doubt in the matter. He was taking these goods at night. He was obviously left in charge of them and as soon as the police appeared he bolted. From the nature of the goods and the time in which they were carried and his conduct no one can have any doubt that he at any rate, as the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate has found, knew that he was handling and removing stolen goods. Accepting his statement that he was not in fact the owner of the goods, the facts prove all the elements of an offence under sec. 414of the Indian Penal Code. 8. As regards the coolies, the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate has pointed out that there is no evidence worth the name to show that they were coolies excepting the evidence of a witness called for the defence to support this statement and this witness is the brother of the accused Kaliprasad. This witness admitted that when he heard of the arrest he did not go to the thana and explain the real state of affairs. He went to the police station but did not give out this story. These no doubt are fairly cogent reasons, taken with the circumstances that the articles were removed at night for delivery evidently at a Kalwar's shop. Nevertheless on the whole we think there may be some reasonable doubt about the matter, sufficient doubt that these accused at any rate should get the benefit of it and that the finding that they knew the goods were stolen and voluntarily assisted in dealing with them cannot with full safety be supported. 9. The result is that we alter the conviction in respect of the driver Basudeb Dhara to one under sec. 414 of the Indian Penal Code, maintaining the sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment. The appeals of the coolies (the other Appellants) are allowed and they are acquitted of the offence charged under Ordinance XXXIII and are discharged from their bail. The accused-Appellant Basudeb Dhara must surrender to his bail and serve out the remainder of his sentence.