JUDGMENT Misra and Walford, JJ. - The only question for determination in this appeal is one of jurisdiction. The suit was for possession of 5/7th share in riyaya grove No. 1106 and muafi plots Nos. 1107 and 1108 in village Burhagaon. district Hardoi. The facts have to be stated with reference to under mentioned family pedigree which was admitted between the parties. 2. The plots in suit were held by Gauri and on his death by his daughter Mst. Golha. She died in 1918. There is some indication on the record that she had sold the property to one Jaswant Singh (vide Ex. B10) but whether this was so or not is immaterial. The fact remains that Jaswant Singh was in possession after the death of Mst. Golha. Six of the reversionary heirs, namely Chhanga, Radba Kishan, Salik Ram, Ram Dayal, Beni and Samarjit, who were the sons of Gangu, Durjan and Mohan sued Jaswant Singh for possession in 1922. They impleaded Kishcri, the only other reversioner alive as a Defendant. Kishori pleaded that he was equally entitled with his cousins. By a compromise between the then Plaintiffs and Jaswant, which was followed by a decree for possession in favour of Chhanga and others, Kishori was discharged. His name was not entered in the village Khetaunis, and he along with Radba Kishan applied on 12th July, 1937, to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hardoi, u/s 39, U.P. Land Revenue Act, for correction of the entries-alleging that each of the two applicants was entitled to and was in possession of l/4th share, and in the remaining share the four sons of Mohan had l/4th, and l/4th belonged to Chhanga. Obviously they maintained that the reversion devolved not per capita but per stripes. The application was in due course sent to the Tahsildar for report, but neither there not subsequently the parties, though repeatedly summoned, put in their appearance. The application ought to have been dismissed but this was not done. The Tahsildar took the statement the Patwari, who supported the applicants' case and made a report that the correction prayed for was justified. The Sub-Divisional Officer approved of it and passed an order to that effect on 19th April, 1938, (Ex- B-3). The Khataunis were accordingly corrected as desired (Ex. B-12), Apparently all the reversioners were either not informed of the order or disregarded it. 3. The Sub-Divisional Officer approved of it and passed an order to that effect on 19th April, 1938, (Ex- B-3). The Khataunis were accordingly corrected as desired (Ex. B-12), Apparently all the reversioners were either not informed of the order or disregarded it. 3. A series of transfers took place in 1938, and the entire inheritance passed out of the reversioners' hand. The vendors in each case purported to sell a larger share than what they were entitled to. Thus Radha Kishan and the two surviving sons of Mohan (two of them Beni and Samarjit having died by that time) sold to MENDAI Udai Bhagai died childless i Si tal Badal died childless 1 Gauri j Mst. Golha died in 1918 Kedar died childless Chhabba Jiwan died childless Gangu Moti died childless Chhanga Durj an M'h an Maikoo died childless Thamman Kishori Radh'i Kishen (Defendant No. 4) Sita Ram (Died childless) Salik Ram Defendant No. 6. Ram Dayai Defendant No. 6 Beni Samlrjit. Jwala Prasad Plaintiff a 5/6th share. Kisbori sold a 1/4th share to Thames and Kunwar (Defendants Nos. 2 and 3), and Chbanga sold a l/3rd share to Ram Bbarose. The position after these tales, therefore, was that Jwala Prasad considered that he owned 5/6th of the plots, Thamman and Kunwar similarly thought that they had acquired l/4tb, and Ram Bharose was under the impression that he owned l/3rd. Jwala Prasad applied for correction of Khetauni in August 1938 and prayed that his name be entered to the extent of 5/6tb. Ram Bharose, Thamman and Kunwar bad already applied for substitution for their names in place of their vendors, and the 1 /4th share of Kisbori as well as the 1/4th of Chhanga was entered in their names in December 1938. The application of Jwala Prasad was, however, dismissed by an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, dated 31st March, 1939, (Ex. B4). It was said that the entries were in accordance with the order of 19lh April, 1938, (Ex. B3) and that they could not be questioned, as there was no obvious or clerical error. On 14th September, 1939, therefore, Jwala Prasad instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises. He realized that the seven reversionary heirs got the property of Gauri per capita, and that his purchase could, therefore, invest him with title to no more than 5/7th. He accordingly prayed for possession of that share only. On 14th September, 1939, therefore, Jwala Prasad instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises. He realized that the seven reversionary heirs got the property of Gauri per capita, and that his purchase could, therefore, invest him with title to no more than 5/7th. He accordingly prayed for possession of that share only. The three transferees of Kisbori and Changa as well as his own transferors were impleaded as Defendants. The main contest was put up by Kara Bharose, Thamman and Kunwar, and these three will alone be referred to hereafter as Defendants. A number of pleas were raised by them in defence, We are concerned at this stage only with plea that by the U.P. Land Revenue Act the decisions of the Sub-Divisional Officer given in correction of papers cases on 19th April, 1938 and 31st March, 1939 (Exs. B3 and B4) were final, and inasmuch as the revenue Courts had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the controversy as to the right of the Plaintiff, the present suit was not cognizable by Civil Courts. The Court of first instance accepted the Defendants' plea and dismissed the suit. The lower Court disagreed with the view of the learned Munsif, and as a result of its findings on other issues it passed a decree in the Plaintiff's favour. The Defendants came up in second appeal which was heard by one of us and was referred for decision to a Division Bench u/s 14(2) of the Ouch Courts Act in view of an apparent conflict between a recent decision of a single Judge of this Court, the soundness of which was questioned at the bar, and certain earlier cases decided by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh, this Court and the Allahabad High Court. 4. The Plaintiff came to Court in the right of his transferors, and his case was founded on the allegation that Radha Kishan and the sons of Mohan were entitled to 5/7th share in the plots, and that by reason of the transfers made in his favour in 1938 that share now belonged to him. The question which arises for consideration, as we have said above, is whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try such a suit is barred in view of the previous adjudication by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hardoi. The question which arises for consideration, as we have said above, is whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try such a suit is barred in view of the previous adjudication by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Hardoi. It is urged for the Appellants that there is such a bar imposed by Section 44 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 5. For the determination of the question at issue, we have to consider the scheme of the Act so far as the tenancy rights are concerned. Section 32 requires the preparation of five annual registered which are called record of rights. 6. Registers mentioned in Clauses (a) to (d) relate to proprietors, under-proprietors, sub-settlement holders and holders of revenue-free lands. Clause (e) contemplates a register of persons cultivating or otherwise occupying land. This register is known as khetauni jamabandi. The particulars required to be entered therein are specified in Section 55, and so far as they relate to Oudh, the entries have to show the nature and class of the tenant's or occupier's tenure as determined by the Oudh Rent Act, the rent payable by him and any other condition of tenure whether contained in a written lease or not. It is conceded that grove and muafi right must be entered in the record of rights provided for by Clause (e) of Section 32. Section 33 enjoins that the aforementioned registers must be maintained and amended annually or at such intervals as the Local Government may prescribe. Section 34 and the sections which immediately follow it lay down the procedure to be adopted for mutation of names in registers contemplated by Clauses (a) to (d) on account of transfers or succession. With these sections we need not concern ourselves. So far as the corrections in khatauni jama, bandi by reason of transfers or succession are concerned, they are made u/s 39(1) which runs thus (1) All transfers and changes affecting interest in land other than those referred to in Section 34 shall be recorded according to rule made u/s 234. 7. With these sections we need not concern ourselves. So far as the corrections in khatauni jama, bandi by reason of transfers or succession are concerned, they are made u/s 39(1) which runs thus (1) All transfers and changes affecting interest in land other than those referred to in Section 34 shall be recorded according to rule made u/s 234. 7. Under Clause (2) of that section: All disputed cases shall be reported to the Tahsildar, who shall make such inquiry as appears necessary, and shall submit his proceedings to the Collector, who, after such further inquiry as may be necessary shall, subject to the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, III of 1926, or the Oudh Kent Act, XXII of 1886, as the case may be, pass orders, and, if necessary, cause the annual registers to be amended. 8. Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 40 then provide that the disputes regarding entries in the annual registers should normally be decided on the basis of possession, but if this is not possible, they may be decided on a finding about prima facie title, it being apparently assumed that possession follows title. These clauses relate to all annual registers including that maintained under Clause (e) of Section 32. Clause (3) of Section 40 goes on to say (3) No order as to possession passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing his right to the property in any Civil or Revenue Court having jurisdiction. Explanation- The term possession, in this section, means possession based on succession or transfer or on such transfers and changes as dealt with in Section 39. 9. Section 41 deals with settlement of boundary disputes and it is irrelevant for our present purpose. According to Section 42 whenever there is a dispute respecting the class or tenure of any tenant, in Oudh, the Collector must determine the matter according to the principles and procedure contained in the Oudh Rent Act. Section 43 prescribes the procedure to be followed in cases of disputes about rents payable by tenants. According to Section 42 whenever there is a dispute respecting the class or tenure of any tenant, in Oudh, the Collector must determine the matter according to the principles and procedure contained in the Oudh Rent Act. Section 43 prescribes the procedure to be followed in cases of disputes about rents payable by tenants. Under Sections 42 and 43, therefore, the matters which fall for decision in Oudh are only those specified in Section 55, Section 233(1) which prohibits the institution of proceeding in Civil Courts, save as provided in Section 44, for classification of a tenant, or for determination of rent or terms of tenancy may be read along with these sections, and so reading the sections together it is clear that so far as the decisions in respect of khetauni jamabandis are concerned, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts is confined to matters specified in Section 55 by force of Section 238, Clause (1). 10. The next question is whether Section 44 operates to exclude either expressly or by necessary implication any other kind of suit connected with tenants. Section 44 runs thus All entries in the annual register made under Sub-section (3) of Section 33 shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved ; and subject to the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 40, all decisions under Sections 40, 41 and 42 shall be binding on all Revenue Courts in respect of the subject matter of the dispute: but no such entry or decision shall affect the right of any person to claim and stablish in the Civil Court any interest in land which requires to be recorded in the registers prescribed by Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 32. 11. The decisions by the Sub-Divisional officer of the application of Kishori and Radha Kishan on 19th April, 1938, by Ex. B3 and that of Jwala Prasad on 30th March, 1939, by Ex. B4 were, it is obvious, made u/s 40. If these decisions related to the correction of names in the annual registers contemplated by Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 32, the defeated parties could, it is obvious receives their rights in Civil Courts by force of Section 40(3) so far as question of possession is concerned and by Section 44 so far as ownership is concerned. If these decisions related to the correction of names in the annual registers contemplated by Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 32, the defeated parties could, it is obvious receives their rights in Civil Courts by force of Section 40(3) so far as question of possession is concerned and by Section 44 so far as ownership is concerned. But does it necessarily follow that if the dispute related to inheritance of tenancy or occupier's rights entered in the register under Clause (e) or other matters not covered by Section 233(1), the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred either expressly or by implication. We think it does not. That there is no express bar contained in this section is apparent on the face of it. The implied prohibition is sought to be read into it by the Appellants' Learned Counsel on the principle of inclusion units exclusion arteries, It is said that when the legislature expressly reserved the right to bring a civil action after an adjudication u/s 40 in respect of matters relating to annual registers prescribed by Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 32, it must be inferred that there was no such reservation in contemplation of the legislature as regards the disputes relating to any of the entries in the register prescribed by Clause (e). It is further urged that the primary entry in the register being that of the name of a tenant, the legislature did not intend that the right of a tenant, to be in possession of a holding in preference to another person, whose name finds place in the khetauni, should be made the subject matter of a civil suit. A perusal of Section 44 would show that so far as the right to sue in Civil Court is concerned, it is intended to be an enabling provision. A perusal of Section 44 would show that so far as the right to sue in Civil Court is concerned, it is intended to be an enabling provision. The prohibitory section, whereby the cognisance of Civil Courts is barred, is Section 233, and if it be permissible to apply the maxim invoked on Appellants' behalf, it is, to our mind, more appropriately applicable to Clause (i) The main reason for our view, however, is that the legislature could not include in Section 44 a provision to the effect that no entry or decision under Sections 40, 41 and 42 shall affect the right of any person to claim or establish in Civil Court any interest in land which requires to be recorded in the register prescribed by Clause (e) of Section 32, since such inclusion would have occasioned a violent conflict with Section 233(i), Again if it was intended to oust from the cognizance of Civil Courts disputes as to succession or transfer of tenancy rights, Clause (i) of Section 233 would have either been in consonance with that intention or would have been omitted in its entirety. 12. It is well-known that disputes between rival tenants are within the competence of Civil Courts in spite of correction proceedings under Sections 39 and 40. In Mst. Lachhmin v. Ram Singh (1921)24 O.C. 15 was held by the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners that the decision of a rent Court may be final on a question relating to the nature of a tenancy, but where the tenancy is denied and a rival title is set up whether as a co-tenant or as a co-under proprietor, the decision of the Revenue Court is not final, and the question of the rival title can form the proper subject of adjudication in the Civil Court. 13. It was further held that as between persons claiming to be co-tenants under a title derived from a common ancestor, the question is really one of inheritance and the Civil Court is not debarred from entering into it. 14. In Lalman and Another Vs. 13. It was further held that as between persons claiming to be co-tenants under a title derived from a common ancestor, the question is really one of inheritance and the Civil Court is not debarred from entering into it. 14. In Lalman and Another Vs. Fazal Muhammad Khan and Another, AIR 1925 All 200 Stuart, J. (afterwards Sir Louis Stuart), while dealing with khetauni entries in respect of sir lands in the province of Agra, said that Section 40 shows that where a certain person is in possession, the entry must be made on the basis of possession and the question can be reopened upon the basis of title in either a Civil or Revenue Court. 15. The learned Judge also referred to the provisions of Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure. and expressed the view that in a case where the previous proceeding was confined by statute to the question of possession, a subsequent proceeding in which the question of title is raised is not barred by res judicata. 16. In Kashi Prasad v. Ambika Prasad 1930 A.L.J. 756 Mukerji and Bennett, JJ. laid down that on reading Sections 39, 40 and 42 together it was clear that a suit between rival tenants was cognisable by a Civil Court, for where the question is who is the tenant, Section 42 has no relation to such a dispute. So long, therefore, as the landlord's interests are not affected or in other words the class of tenure or the liability to pay the rent agreed upon or other conditions of the grant are not questioned, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would remain intact. Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure. confers upon Civil Courts the power to entertain all suits of a civil nature, and according to the explanation appended to that section a suit In which the right of property is contested is a suit of that nature. It is hardly disputable that all objects, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, which could be the subject of ownership, are properties as there conceived. That a grove or a muafi land is property within the meaning of the explanation is clear, and a suit in which a right to such property is claimed on the basis of succession or transfer would seem, therefore, to be a suit of a civil nature. That a grove or a muafi land is property within the meaning of the explanation is clear, and a suit in which a right to such property is claimed on the basis of succession or transfer would seem, therefore, to be a suit of a civil nature. The cognisance of such a suit is, in our view, neither expressly nor impliedly barred by the U.P. Land Revenue Act or by an other law in force. 17. The Appellants' Learned Counsel, however, relies upon the decision in Bildeo Saithwar v. Bindeshri Prasad A.I.R 1923 All 639, Shoember Singh and Another Vs. Shoember Singh, AIR 1927 All 780 , Sarbati and Others Vs. Zaminpal and Others , Raja Avadhosh Singh v. Lachhman Singh (1983) 10 O.W.N. 1138, Deputy Commissioner in charge of Qlla Partabgarh Estate v. Wali Mohammad 1936 O.W.N 426 and Ram Darshan v. Hari Shankar 1943 OA 2 : O.W.N. 20. Raja Avadhosh Singh's case is hardly relevant, Our examination of the remaining cases reveals that excepting Sarbati and Others Vs. Zaminpal and Others and Ram Darshan v. Hari Shankar 1943 O.W.N. 20 which we will take up later, none of the decisions cited supports the Appellants' contention. In Baldeo Saithwar v. Bindeshri Prasad A.I.R 1923 All 639 certain land was recorded as being held in grove-holder's right, and this classification of the right was sought to be challenged in Civil Court. Walsh and Pullan, JJ., repelled the attempt. In doing so they referred to Section 44. We venture to think that what they might have referred to more plausibly. If we may say so, was Clause (i) of Section 233. In Sarbati and Others Vs. Zaminpal and Others , the real contest between the parties related to occupancy tenancy. The matter had been decided by revenue Courts u/s 42 which relates, as we have already said, to the class or tenure of a tenant and in which the dispute is between the landlord and a teoaut. Obviously the dispute could not be reopened in Civil Court. In Deputy Commissioner in charge of Sarbati and Others Vs. Zaminpal and Others the Defendants were admittedly recorded an non-occupancy tenants in respect of some plots. The Plaintiffs on the other hand claimed that they were gabzedars. Obviously the dispute could not be reopened in Civil Court. In Deputy Commissioner in charge of Sarbati and Others Vs. Zaminpal and Others the Defendants were admittedly recorded an non-occupancy tenants in respect of some plots. The Plaintiffs on the other hand claimed that they were gabzedars. The Revenue Court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were occupancy tenants of certain area and at a certain rent, and it ordered that the plots covered by this area be entered in their names as such. In respect of the rest Defendant's names were retained as non-occupancy tenants. The Plaintiffs then came to the Civil Court claiming that they were occupancy tenants of the remaining area also, The Court of first instance as well as the Court of first appeal held that such a suit was hot congaisable by a civil Court. Sir Carlton Moss King and Nanavutty. JJ. referred to Section 42 and to the other sections of the enactment. They observed that the question was one of determination of class of tenancy, the decision in respect of which was, u/s 42 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, to be governed by the procedure prescribed for trial of suits u/s 108, Clause 6 of the Oadh Rent Act. By the opening words of Section 108, Oudh Rent Act, courts other than courts of revenue were prohibited from taking cognizance of a suit for establishing a right of occupancy, and it was, therefore, held that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts was barred by reason of that provision as well as of Section 233, Clause (1) U.P. Land Revenue Act. The decision does not support the argument advanced before us on Appellants behalf. Nevertheless it was cited before Madaley J. in Ram Darshan v. Hari Shankar 1943 O.A.2: O.W.N. 20. where the controversy was the same as here namely whether A or B was rightfully entitled to a grove. The revenue Courts had decided in favour of one party and the other sought the re-decermination of his title in civil Court. Section 44 was invoked as constituting a bar to the trial of the matter, and the contention was upheld on the strength of the bench ruling. The revenue Courts had decided in favour of one party and the other sought the re-decermination of his title in civil Court. Section 44 was invoked as constituting a bar to the trial of the matter, and the contention was upheld on the strength of the bench ruling. The attention of the Court was not drawn to the fact that the head-note did not clearly bring out the reason for the decision and that its language implied a great deal more than what was really decided by the Division Bench. In Sarbati's case there had been an adjudication- by the revenue Court about some boundary disputes u/s 41 and a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the matter could not be redetermined by a civil Court by reason of Section 44. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the Bench decision in Sheomber Singh's case, We have already pointed out that the decision of the Revenue Court which was sought to be reviewed there, was one given u/s 42 and related to the class of tenure. It was, therefore, quite distinguishable. We observe that in some of the cases to which reference has been made above language of wider import has occasionally been used. We think, however, the decisions in these cases must be read in the light of the faces therein involved. 18. In the case before us the controversy relates to the impenitence of a grove and muaft lands. In the correction of paper proceedings in Revenue Courts some persons names were entered in the cheating. and the names of other legitimate heirs or their transferees were omitted. The defeated party came to Civil Court to establish his predecessor's right of inheritance and to in force his own title based on the sales of 1938. On these facts we are clear that the jurisdiction of civil Court was not barred and we are satisfied that the view expressed by the lower Court is correct. This appeal must, therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.