JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan and Misra, JJ. - These appeals have been filed u/s 45 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act against an order of the learned Special Judge, Lucknow, u/s 11, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. There is an office report in both of them to the effect that they are defective in as much as a number of creditors have not been made parties. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the Respondents to the hearing on the ground that the defect renders the appeals incompetent. This is the view taken in a series of recent decisions of this Court vide for example Rameshwar v. Ajodhia Prasad 1941 O.A. 7l4 : A.W.R. (Rev) 694 : O.W.N. 998, Bishunath Prasad v. Sarju Saran Tewari 1941 O.A. 816 : A.W.R. (Rev.) 884 : O.W.N. 1115 , Jitendra Singh v. The Alliance Bank of Simla Limited 1941 O.A. 1074 : O.W.N. 1381 : 942 A.W.R. (CC) 39, Har Narain Prasad v. Ashiq Husain 1942 O.A. 73 : A.W.R. (CC) 93 : O.W.N. 127, Durga Prasad Singh v. Shamsher Bahadur Singh 1942 O.A. 131 : A.W.R. (CC) 152 : O.W.N. 205, Lakshmi Narain v. Satgur Nath 1942 O.A. 185 : A.W.R. (CC) 173 : O.W.N. 248, Abdul Moeed v. Lal Ashtbhuja Prasad Singh 1942 O.A. 204 : A.W.R. (CC) 192 : O.W.N. 268, Saubhagyavati Devi v. The Deputy Commissioner Rheri 1942 O.A. 2I7 : A.W.R. (CC) 205 : O.W.N. 300, Deputy Commissioner Fyzabad v. Chhedi Tewari 1942 O.A. 336 : A.W.R. (CC) 292 : O.W.N. 438 and Mohammad Tajammul Husain Khan v. Deputy Commissioner Bara Banhi in charge Bhatwamau Estate 1943 O.A. 240 : A.W.R. (CC) 108 : O.W.N 385. On behalf of the Appellants, however, it is contended that the decision of the appeal in their favour will not prejudice the creditors who have been omitted, and that the principle enunciated in the aforesaid cases, therefore, should not be applied. 2. The facts may be shortly stated. Two mahalsarais situate at Sibtainabad in mohalla Hazratgaoj in the city of Luckaow belonged to one Nawab Saltan Bahadur Who mortgaged them successively to a number of encumbrances, amongs them being Debi Dass, Syed Khurshed Husain, Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad etc. Lala Debi Dass purchased the mahalsarais subject to the encumbrances which subsisted on them in execution of a decree which was unconnected with his mortgage of 1st May, 1933. Lala Debi Dass purchased the mahalsarais subject to the encumbrances which subsisted on them in execution of a decree which was unconnected with his mortgage of 1st May, 1933. On 6th September, 1935, he applied u/s 4. In written statement u/s 8 filed on 12th December 1935 he omitted to include the mahalsarais in the list of his properties and he also omitted to mention the names of the persons whose mortgages over the mahalsarais still subsisted. On the objection of one of the creditors this property was however notified in due course in the Government Gazatte. On 19ch January, 1937, Nasir Husain, who had purchased the mortgages rights of Syed Khurshed Husain on 13th April 1932 by a registered sale deed preferred an application before the Special Judge claiming that the amount due under his mortgage was about Rs. 28,000, and the mahalsarais were subject to his mortgage charge which he prayed should be declared. The relief claimed by him fell u/s 11 of the Encumbered Estates Act, though the contents of the application fulfilled the requirements of a money claim u/s 9. 3. On 7th May, 1937, Nasir Husain followed up the aforsaid application by another which was to the same effect. A similar application was moved on 24th July, 1937, by Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad, Nasir Husain's objections u/s 11 were decided by an order, dated 26th July, 1937, and it was declared that the two mahalsarais were liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in liquidation of the landlord-applicants' debts subject to his charge. The, objections of Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad were disposed of likewise on 10th August, 1937. On 24th September, 1940, one of the mortgageees, namely Sri Thakur Radha Krishnaji Birajman Mandir Khala presented an application in the Court of the Special Judge pointing out that the orders, dated 26th July, 1937, and 10th August, 1937, were prejudicial to the interests of the idol, whose debt was prior to the debts of Nasir Husain, Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad, and that the effect of the order was to postpone the idol's rights to those of the subsequent encumbrancers. The property, it was said, was not worth more than Rs. 30,000, and it would not suffice even for the satisfaction of the charges which have been declared by the two orders. Certain other creditors also preferred applications more or less to the same effect. The property, it was said, was not worth more than Rs. 30,000, and it would not suffice even for the satisfaction of the charges which have been declared by the two orders. Certain other creditors also preferred applications more or less to the same effect. The learned Special Judge, who decided the objections of Nasir Husain, Mangla Charan aud Sitla Prasad, was meanwhile transferred. His successor by his order, dated 24th April, 1944, amended the earlier declaration of his predecessor so as to read that the property owned by the landlord applicant in the two mahalsarais, which was Table to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of his debts, was only this equity of redemption. He considered it necessary in the interest of justice to give to the various encumbrancers of that property an opportunity to present their claims as creditors, and in order to enable them to do so he adjourned the case for a mouth. 4. The import of this order is, to our mind, if it is read as a whole. It calls upon the encumbrancers to obtain adjudication of their debts u/s 14 and after that has been done, the entire interest of the landlord applicants would be freed from encumbrances and would be liable to attachment, sale etc. in liquidation proceedings. 5. Syed Nasir Husain had in the meantime died, and his legal representatives Mir Sajid Husain and others were brought on the record. First Civil Appeal No. 90 of 1941 was. filed by these representatives and First Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1941 was filed by Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad against the amending order, dated 21st April, 1941. 6. It is contended that the effect of the previous order was to carve out the charges of the Appellants alone and to leave the remaining interest in the mahalsarais for the benefit of those who have not been impleaded, whereas the order under appeal operates to diminish their interest in as much as the property is now available to them after it has satisfied all the subsisting encumbrances. We do not agree with the Appellants Learned Counsel. If the proceedings before the Special Judge had taken their normal course, all persons having claims not only against the person but also against the property of the landlord should have had them adjudicated and their liquidation would have taken place in the ordinary course. We do not agree with the Appellants Learned Counsel. If the proceedings before the Special Judge had taken their normal course, all persons having claims not only against the person but also against the property of the landlord should have had them adjudicated and their liquidation would have taken place in the ordinary course. The device of Nasir Husain, Mangla Charan and Sitla Prasad was calculated to keep these persons outside the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings thus permitting them to realise their dues in their entirety at contractual rates from the mahalsarais, and it prevailed. The amended order passed by the Special Judge on the contrary had the effect of giving these persons and the other encumbrancers an opportunity to present their claims for money u/s 9. In other words it put them on the same footing as the other creditors and took away the priority which the Appellants would have stood to gain in contravention of the Act. If the property be just sufficient to satisfy the encumbrancers by application of the general laws there is bound to be some simples for the other creditors by the application of the provisions of the Encumbered Estates Act. The order under appeal thus confers upon the general body of creditors a benefit which they will stand to lose, if it was to be set aside in their absence. We have, therefore, no doubt that the principle laid down by the aforementioned cases is fully applicable, and the omission is fatal to the maintainability of the appeals. 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants made an oral request that they be allowed to have recourse to Order 41, Rule 20 Code of Civil Procedure. for impleading in the appeals the creditors whose names have been omitted. It has repeatedly been ruled by this Court that in appeals u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act the parties not impleaded as Respondents within the prescribed period of limitation are not interested in the result of the appeal, and that they cannot be impleaded subsequently under Order 41, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure. since a valuable right which they have acquired by an appeal becoming time-barred would be lost to them. 8. These appeals must, therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.