JUDGMENT S.R. Das, J. - This is an application on the part of Messrs. K.K. Dutt & Co., for review of taxation. The applicants acted as attorneys for one Jogendra Nath Chakraburty in this and several other suits filed in this Court. Jogendra Nath Chakraburty was the manager of a lady of the name of Mrs. Minnie Lal and it is stated that he was really a banamdar of that lady. The present suit was filed on a promissory note claiming a decree for an amount exceeding a little over Rs. 1000. At the hearing an ex parte decree was passed for Rs. 960 and costs. Decrees were passed also in other suits in which the applicants acted as attorneys for Jogendra Nath Chakraburty. Jogendra Nath Chakraburty has died since the dates of the decrees. The attorneys lodged several bills of costs for taxation under the several warrants of attorney. They got notice of the taxation issued to Mrs. Lal inasmuch as, it was alleged, she had undertaken to pay all costs to the solicitors. No notice was given to the heirs of Jogendra Nath Chakraburty. When the matter came up before the Assistant Taxing Officer, the attorneys put in a letter addressed to the Assistant Taxing Officer stating that they would not look to the heirs of Jogendra Nath Chakraburty for realisation of their costs. Thereupon the Assistant Taxing Officer proceeded with the taxation of the bill. He, however, disallowed all costs on two grounds: (a) that this was a suit cognisable by the Small Cause Court in which a decree had been passed for an amount less than Rs. 1000 and accordingly no costs can be allowed under S. 22, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, unless the Judge before whom the suit was tried gave a certificate that in his opinion the suit was a fit one to be brought in the High Court. There was no such certificate in this case and therefore no costs could be allowed on taxation; (b) that it was a suit on a contract and there was a possibility of there being a decree for less than Rs. 1000, therefore a possibility also that the Court would not give a certificate such as is mentioned in the proviso to S. 22, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, under S. 6 of chap. 1000, therefore a possibility also that the Court would not give a certificate such as is mentioned in the proviso to S. 22, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, under S. 6 of chap. 36, the attorney should have explained the position to the client and obtained a special instruction in writing from the client. That not having been done no part of the costs could be allowed on taxation. 2. The applicant carried in the bill before the Registrar. The Registrar upheld the decision of the Assistant Taxing Officer on three grounds: (a) that the decree had not been drawn up and filed, and therefore the Taxing Officer is unable to tax the bill under the decree; (b) that S. 22, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, had not been complied with and; (c) that Mrs. Minnie Lal was not the plaintiff nor the personal representative of the plaintiff and, therefore, the bill could not be taxed as against her merely because she had undertaken to pay the attorneys the costs of the suit. 3. As regards the first point of decision of the learned Registrar, I may point out that this was a taxation as between attorney and client under the warrant of attorney and therefore whether the decree had been drawn up and filed or not does not appear to me to affect the position. 4. As regards the second point both the Assistant Taxing Officer and the Taxing Officer relied on S. 22, Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. It appears from the minutes that the learned Judge did award costs to the plaintiff. The first part of S. 22 provides that no costs shall be allowed in certain cases. The proviso lays down that those provisions shall not apply if the Court certifies that the suit is one fit to be brought in the High Court. The Court is supposed to know the law and if the Court has in fact allowed the costs it might be deemed to have impliedly given the certificate, for without a certificate the Court could not have awarded the costs. The words 'decree for Rs. 960 and costs' appear to me to be a compendious mode of saying that the Court had done everything that would entitle it to make an order for costs. The words 'decree for Rs. 960 and costs' appear to me to be a compendious mode of saying that the Court had done everything that would entitle it to make an order for costs. If the order was formally drawn up, I have no doubt that the office would have drawn it up in the following manner namely: And the Court having certified that the suit is a fit one to be brought in the High Court it is ordered that the defendant do pay the costs. 5. Supposing that the Taxing Officer and the Assistant Taxing Officer are correct, namely, that the Court did not give a certificate then it follows that the Court had made a wrong order; for without the certificate the Court had no power to award costs. If the Court had made a wrong order that wrong order could only be set aside either by review or by appeal. It is not for the Taxing Officer to say whether the decree was right or wrong. He is to accept the decree as it stands and proceed thereon. 6. Section 22, in my opinion, is operative at the time when the decree is being passed. It directs the Court which tries the suit as to how it should deal with the costs. Once the Court has made an order for costs rightly or wrongly the taxing authorities have got to accept the decree and proceed thereon. Section 22, in my opinion, is not a rule of taxation; it is a provision of law directed to the Judge who is hearing the suit. The taxing authorities have only to assess the quantum of costs when it is allowed by the Court. Whether costs should be allowed or not is for the Judge to decide at the time of the trial. 7. The learned Taxing Officer has not relied on R. 6 of Chap. 36, to which reference was made by the Assistant Taxing Officer. I do not see how that rule has any application to this case. The first part of that rule authorises the Taxing Officer to allow all the reasonable costs. 7. The learned Taxing Officer has not relied on R. 6 of Chap. 36, to which reference was made by the Assistant Taxing Officer. I do not see how that rule has any application to this case. The first part of that rule authorises the Taxing Officer to allow all the reasonable costs. The second part directs that in a taxation as between party and party no costs, charges or expenses which appear to the Taxing Officer to have been incurred unnecessarily or by reason of negligence or mistake or in certain other circumstances should not be allowed. The third part directs that in a taxation as between attorney and client all such costs should be disallowed except on production of a special written authority given after the possibility of their disallowance is explained to the client. That in my opinion refers to particular items of costs in a bill which the Taxing Officer may consider to have been incurred unnecessarily or negligently or by mistake. When under the decree the Court has awarded costs to the plaintiff, I do not think, in assessing the amounts of the costs the taxing authorities can properly disallow all costs on the ground that all costs were unnecessary. If the Assistant Taxing Officer were correct, that written authority should have been taken in this case from the client then, I am afraid, in every suit on a contract, for whatever amount the claim may be attorneys will have to obtain written authority from the client along with the warrant of attorney, because in every such suit there is a possibility of a decree being passed for less than Rs. 1000. Nobody can say what the defence will be and what sum will be decreed. That cannot, in my view, be the meaning of R. 6. In these circumstances I cannot uphold this ground of decision of the Taxing Officers. 8. The learned Taxing Officer has also upheld the decision of the Assistant Taxing Officer on a ground not take a by the last-mentioned officer, namely, that there can be no taxation against Mrs. Lal as she is neither the plaintiff nor the legal representative of the plaintiff. I am entirely in agreement with the Taxing Officer on this point. If the solicitors have any claim against Mrs. Minnie Lal, that will be on an agreement of indemnity or whatever it is. Lal as she is neither the plaintiff nor the legal representative of the plaintiff. I am entirely in agreement with the Taxing Officer on this point. If the solicitors have any claim against Mrs. Minnie Lal, that will be on an agreement of indemnity or whatever it is. For that they will have to file a suit against her in Court. But that agreement in my opinion cannot entitle them to have the costs of this suit taxed under the warrant of attorney which was executed by Jogendra Nath Chakraburty. For these reasons I am prepared to uphold the decision of the Taxing Officer that there can be no taxation as against Mrs. Minnie Lal. The application must, therefore, be dismissed as against her. 9. Mr. S.C. Mitter appearing for the applicants frankly conceded that that is the correct position. But he now wants that the bill be taxed as against the legal representatives of the client. It is true that the attorneys gave a letter that they would not look to the heirs of Jogendra Nath Chakraburty for realisation of their costs. This was done because the attorneys were allowed by the Assistant Taxing Officer to proceed with the taxation as against Mrs. Lal. In view of the fact that there can be no taxation against Mrs. Minnie Lal Mr. Mitter has withdrawn that letter and I do not think that the heirs of Jogendra Nath Chakraburty can raise any question of estoppel against the applicants. 10. In these circumstances I direct that the bill may be taxed as against the legal representatives of Jogendra Nath Chakraburty. The Taxing Officer has rightly dealt with the question of costs before him and I do not interfere with that. In my opinion the applicants ought to pay-the costs of Mrs. Minnie Lal of the present application which I assess at Rs. 85.