JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - D. R. Kapoor was convicted by Mr. Amar Singh, Magistrate, first class, Lucknow, for an offence u/s 10 read with Section 13 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Ordinance No. XXXV of 1943, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,000. His appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed on the 1st November, 1944. He now comes to this Court in revision. 2. The facts material for the decision of this revision petition are briefly as follows: 3. On the 31st March, 1944, Miss Priscilla Christie, daughter of Mr. W. Christie, Chief Secretary to U. P. Government, went to a shop in Hazratganj known as Manocha Radios. D. R. Kapoor who was an employee of the shop sold her a wireless condenser for Rs. 4/8. Miss Christie wanted a knob for the condenser for which a sum of Rs. 1/8 was demanded but as she had at the time not sufficient money to pay for both the condensation the knob, she purchased only the condenser and left the shop. No cash memcrfot the sale of the condenser was either demanded or issued at the time. In the evening she returned to the shop with her father. Mr.. Christie asked the petitioner for the knob which was shown to him and, as in the morning, a sum of Rs. 1/8 was demanded for it. He offered to pay the price of the knob and demanded a .cash memo in respect of both the condenser and the knob. Kapoor, however, refused to issue a cash memo as according to him "the condenser did not belong to the shop stock but was separate and so no cash memo could be given." Mr. Christie thereupon brought the matter to the notice of the police and the petitioner was challenged. He was charged with having sold the condenser to Miss Christie for "an unreasonable price" and offered for sale the knob for an "unreasonable price". " A further charge was framed against him for refusal to give a cash memo for the transaction mentioned in the first charge when asked for it by the purchaser. He was" acquitted on the first charge but convicted on the second as stated above. His defence was that he was not a dealer and had not committed any offence. " A further charge was framed against him for refusal to give a cash memo for the transaction mentioned in the first charge when asked for it by the purchaser. He was" acquitted on the first charge but convicted on the second as stated above. His defence was that he was not a dealer and had not committed any offence. It was further pleaded on his behalf that inasmuch as the prosecution was instituted in contravention of Section 14 of the Ordinance, it was bad in law and his conviction which was based upon it, illegal. Both the Courts below repelled these contentions. 4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Government Advocate I have come to the conclusion that this application should be allowed. The charge- sheet was submitted by the police to. the City Magistrate on the 15th April, 1944, who took cognizance of the case on the 3rd of May when he fixed a date for hearing (20th May, 19.+4) and issued summons to the accused. There is a note by the City Magistrate recorded on the order sheet dated the 9th of May, 1944, suggesting to the District Magistrate that the case be sent to the Town? Rationing Officer for disposal as the prosecuting Sub- Inspector had asked for it to avoid delay. The case appears to have been put up before the District Magistrate with a note by some clerk that the sanction to prosecute was wanting. The note is as follows : N. B. D. M's sanction wanting. 5. Below it is found the following note by the District Magistrate. Prosecution sanctioned and case transferred to W. Amar Singh. 6. The case was accordingly tried by Mr. Amar Singh with the result to which reference has already been made. Admittedly, therefore, the prosecution in the present case, which was instituted by sub- mission of a charge sheet by the police on the 15th April, 1944, was initiated without any previous sanction. This was in contravention of Section 14 of Ordinance XXXV of 1943, which reads as follows : 14 Procedure No prosecution for any offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central or the Provincial Government, or of an officer not below the rank of a District Magistrate empowered by the Central or the Provincial Government to grant such sanction. 7. 7. It is clear that u/s 14 (1) the sanction of the proper authority is an essential preliminary to the institution of a prosecution, (2) the sanction must be obtained previous to the institution of the prosecution, and (3) that the provision is mandatory. 8. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there was a clear transgression of the provisions of this section in the present case, and his Counsel argued that the subsequent sanction accorded by the District Magistrate on the 9th May, 1944, could not be availed of to validate , the institution of the prosecution which was initially bad. The plea about want of sanction was urged before the Sessions Judge also and he made the following observations thereon ; .........It will be seen that the proceedings were certainly not instituted before a Court with the previous sanction of the District Magistrate but nevertheless the actual trial commenced and all the evidence was recorded after the sanction had been received. The proceedings taken before the sanction were certainly without any jurisdiction but not those after the sanction and it is on the basis of the proceedings after the sanction that the appellant has been convicted. 9. Reference was made by the learned Sessions Judge to the case of AIR 1939 1 (Lahore) and to the opinion of Blacker J. in AIR 1939 479 (Lahore) . He followed these cases and distinguished the case of Thakur Raghubar Singh v. The King Emperor 1944 O A (F. C.) 15 : AWR (F. C.) 16, decided by the Federal Court. He was of opinion that the decision of the Federal Court did not help the appellant before him. That was a case under the Insurance Act, and the sanction for prosecution accorded in that case was in general terms and not in respect of the charges which were actually framed. 10. The learned Government Advocate was conscious of the difficulty with which he was faced in supporting the conviction and adopted a line of argument somewhat different from that taken by the learned Sessions Judge, though he utilised . the argument of learned Sessions Judge also to support his contention. It was conceded by j him (hat the prosecution instituted by submission of the charge sheet on the 15th April, 1944, by the police was bad for want of sanction. the argument of learned Sessions Judge also to support his contention. It was conceded by j him (hat the prosecution instituted by submission of the charge sheet on the 15th April, 1944, by the police was bad for want of sanction. He argued, however, that this was a case whereof cognizance was taken by the Magistrate u/s 190 sub- Section (1) (c) and not sub-Section (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him the prosecution in this case was instituted by the District Magistrate by his order noted below the report by which his attention was drawn to they absence, of sanction to prosecute in this case. This raises a question which is more of fact than of law. I have given my best consideration to the arguments of learned Government Advocate but am unable to accept his contention. The facts are clear. The prosecution was instituted by submission of a charge sheet by the police on the 15th April, 1944: cognizance if the case was taken by the Magistrate on the 3rd. May, 1944: subsequently on the 9th May, 19+4, the District Magistrate, in view of the City Magistrate's request, transferred the case to Mr. Amar Singh. The words used by the District Magistrate are : Prosecution sanctioned and case transferred to Amar Singh. 11. It is impossible to interpret this as any- thing but that the case, whereof judicial coguizince had already been taken by the City Magistrate, was transferred from his file to that of Mr. Amar Singh. It could by no stretch of language be held to mean that on the 9th of May, 1944, the District Magistrate by recording this brief order directed the initiation of any fresh prosecution as' distinct from the prosecution already instituted and whereof cognizance had been taken by the City Magistrate. According to the learned Government Advocate institution of the prosecution and the grant of sanction were the same within the meaning of Section 14 of the Ordinance. I am clear that there is no warrant in the language of that Section 14 for such a contention. According to the learned Government Advocate institution of the prosecution and the grant of sanction were the same within the meaning of Section 14 of the Ordinance. I am clear that there is no warrant in the language of that Section 14 for such a contention. Thus the case must be determined on the assumption that the petitioner's conviction was based upon a prosecution instituted by the police on the 15th -.April, 1944, where- of cognizance was taken by the City Magistrate u/s 190 sub-section (1) (b) and not under sub-section (1) (c) as suggested by the learned Government Advocate. The ground having thus been cleared we have to consider whether on these facts the prosecution, which was admittedly instituted without the previous "sanction of the District Magistrate, could be validated by the accord of a subsequent sanction of the 9th of May, 1944. A clear distinction is to be drawn between the provisions of Section 14 of the Ordinance and those of Sections 196A, 197 and other similar pro- visions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The bar referred to in Section 14 of the Ordinance, as is clear from the language used, is directed against the institution of a prosecution which is not a judicial act while Sections 196A and 197 prohibit the Courts from taking cognizance of alleged offences unless the conditions prescribed are fulfilled. The bar contemplated by either of these sections has relation to the exercise of a jurisdiction vested in a Court of law. The sanction contemplated by Section 14 of the Ordinance, to use the language employed by the Federal Court, is essential to the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain proceedings, while the prohibition referred to in Sections 196A or 197 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Courts. The jurisdiction is already there: it has to be exercised only in specified circumstances and not otherwise. Thus there is an essential difference between the two prohibitions one is essential to invest the Court with jurisdiction to entertain proceedings, while the other has relation to the manner in which an existing jurisdiction has to be exercised. Accordingly the cases dealing with the bar contemplated by Sections 195A or 197 cannot be a proper guide for interpretation of Section 14 of the Ordinance. Reference was made by the learned Government Advocate to the case of Abdul Rahman v. Emperor (1935) 62 Cal 749. Accordingly the cases dealing with the bar contemplated by Sections 195A or 197 cannot be a proper guide for interpretation of Section 14 of the Ordinance. Reference was made by the learned Government Advocate to the case of Abdul Rahman v. Emperor (1935) 62 Cal 749. The observations made with regard to the Lahore cases apply with equal force to this case also. 12. It was held by the Federal Court in Raghubar Singh's case on an interpretation of Section 107 of the Insurance Act that when objection was pressed to the validity of the .sanction, it was the duty of the prosecution to establish that proper sanction had been obtained to the proceedings before the Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction. Their Lordships further observed : Unfortunately it appears not to have been considered in the Court below that the question of sanction might go to the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. Both the Court and the prosecution appear to have thought that the generality of the form of sanction might justify the further charges in respect of the later matters so long as the appellants were not prejudiced in their defence and the Court was of opinion that the appellants had not been so prejudiced. In our judgment this is not the right view to take of the matter. A valid previous sanction is essential to the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain proceedings. 13. Section 107 of the Insurance Act reads thus: Except where proceedings are instituted by the Superintendent of Insurance, no proceedings under this Act against an insurer or any director, manager or "other officer of an insurer or any person who is liable under sub-Section (2) of Section 41 shall be instituted by any person unless he has previous thereto obtained the sanction of the Advocate-General of the province where the principal place of business in ' British India of such insurer is situate to the institution of such proceedings. 14. Comparing the language of this section with that of Section 14 of the Ordinance we find a close similarity between the two the bar in either case is to the institution of proceedings and in either case It is incumbent to obtain the sanction of the proper authority previous to the institution of proceedings of prosecution, as the case may be. It must, therefore, be held that sanction to the institution of a prosecution is an essential preliminary before any Court can acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. To permit the sanction accorded by the District Magistrate in the present case on the 9th of May, 1944, long after the prosecution was instituted, would render nugatory the plain terms of Section 14 which insist that the sanction must be "previous" and not subsequent to the institution of the prosecution. It is clear therefore . that the institution of the prosecution in this instance, which was without previous sanction of the District Magistrate, was initially bad. This formed the basis of the subsequent proceedings which resulted in the petitioner's conviction. 15. Reference was made by the learned Government Advocate to Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As has been laid down by their Lordships in the case of Subrahamama Ayyar v. King Emperor (1903) 25 Mad. 61 Section 537 cannot be used to cure a clear illegality or a clear transgression of mandatory: provisions of a penal statute or Ordinance. 16. In view of the conclusions arrived at above on the question of sanction which goes to the root of the case and invalidates the entire proceeding which resulted in the petitioner's conviction, it is unnecessary to deal with the other points raised. The result therefore is that the application is allowed and the petitioner's conviction set aside. The fine, if paid, will be refunded.