JUDGMENT Misra and Kaul, JJ. - These two-appeals No. 99 of 1943 and No. 100 of 1943, preferred against two decrees passed by Mr. Brijnath Zutshi, Special Judge, first Grade, Sultanpur, in two claims preferred in connection with an application u/s 4 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act in the Court of the Special Judge, first grade, Bara Banki raise the same points for determination and it will be convenient to dispose of them by one common judgment. Though the original application u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act was forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, it appears that under the orders of this Court these two claims, which were numbered as 98/7 and 98/10, (hereinafter referred to as claim No. 7 and claim No. 10) were transferred to the Court of Mr. Zutshi, Special Judge, first grade, Sultanpur, and were decided by him. 2. The facts material for the purposes of these appeals are as follows Raja Pirthipal Singh was a taluqdar of Bara Banki district. He owned what is known as Surajpur estate. On the 19th October, 1936, he along with his minor son, Kunwar Mahendra Pratap Singh, made an application to the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act. This application was forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the Special Judge, first grade, Bara Banki, for disposal u/s 6 of the Act. The usual proceedings were taken in the Court of the Special Judge, and a notice as required by Section 9, calling upon all persons having claims in respect of private debts against the person or the property of the landlord, was published. In response to this notice among others were preferred two claims decrees passed wherein form the subject matter of these two appeals. Both these claims were preferred on the same date, the 30th of March, 1937. Claim No. 7 was preferred by Beni Madho, Gopal Das, Basant Rai and Radey Shiam. Beni Madho died since and is now represented by the other claimants who were members of a joint family with him. The decree in regard to this claim formed the subject of appeal No. 99 The other claim (No. 10) was preferred by Lala Bhola Nath, Sita Ram, Ram Sarup, Secretary Baldeo Das Trust, Lala Girdhari Lal, and Damodar Das. Beni Madho died since and is now represented by the other claimants who were members of a joint family with him. The decree in regard to this claim formed the subject of appeal No. 99 The other claim (No. 10) was preferred by Lala Bhola Nath, Sita Ram, Ram Sarup, Secretary Baldeo Das Trust, Lala Girdhari Lal, and Damodar Das. Lala Girdhari Lal died before the claim was decided and the names of his legal representatives, Lala Jagannath, Inder Chand, Pratap Chand and Kashmiro Bibi, were substituted on record. The decree in this claim is the subject-matter of appeal No. 100. Both these claims were based on decrees previously obtained by the creditors against the Raja. The decrees on which the claims were also produced. While proceedings were pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Bara Banki, Raja Pirthipal Singh died on the 15th August, 1938. On his death possession of taluqa Surajpur was taken over by Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, under the provisions of the Court of Wards Act, on behalf of the. deceased Raja's minor son, Mahendra Pratap Singh, who was his heir and successor. On the 19th September, 1938, the Deputy Commissioner made an application in each of these two claims stating that Raja Pirthipal Singh, taluqdar of Surajpur, having died superintendence of the ilaqa had been taken over by the Court of Wards on behalf of the deceased Raja's minor son, Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh, with him- self, (Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki) as manager. The application in each case which purported to have been filed under Order 22 of the CPC prayed "that the Deputy Commissioner. Bara Banki, in charge of the Surajpur ilaqa be made the representative of the deceased." These applications were considered by the Special Judge on the 17th November, 1938, in presence of the creditors and the following order wan pressed. The application for substitution of names in place of one of the deceased applicant is not opposed. Applicant No. 2 is his heir and representative. Let this be noted on the record as the estate of the applicant is now under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, the name of Deputy Commissioner as manager will be substituted in place of the de- ceased applicant. Written statement and the register be amended. The application for substitution of name has been decided today. 3. Let this be noted on the record as the estate of the applicant is now under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, the name of Deputy Commissioner as manager will be substituted in place of the de- ceased applicant. Written statement and the register be amended. The application for substitution of name has been decided today. 3. It appears that both these claims were then fixed forbearing on the same date, the 10th January, 1938. There were a number of hearings in both these cases. On the 22nd April, 1939, Mr. K. S. Hajela, Government Pleader, on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner, made the following statement in claim No. 7: Raja Pirthipal Singh received only Rs. 22,750 in respect of the first loan and Rs. 28,913 in respect of the second loan and not the amount mentioned by the pleader for the claimants. Raja Pirthipal Singh paid Rs. 59,484-11-0 in respect of the debts in suit both before and after the decree. Pirthipal Singh was indebted to the claimant besides the loans in suit and in respect of that' he paid to the claimants the sum of Rs 25,000. I plead reduction of interest under the Usurious Loans Act and the fact that the claimants cannot ignore the decree as amended under the Agriculturists' Relief Act. I take up no other pleas. 4. In claim No. 10 the following issues were framed on the 10th May, 1939, in the presence of Mr. Hajela, Counsel for the Deputy Commissioner, and A. M. Khan, General Agent: 1. Does the decree dated the lath September, 1932, contravene the provisions of Section 14 of the Encumbered Estates Act ? 2. Is the rate of interest charged on the loans usurious ? If so, what is the reasonable rate of interest to which the claimants are entitled? 3. What was the original amount advanced as a loan by the claimant ? 4. 2. Is the rate of interest charged on the loans usurious ? If so, what is the reasonable rate of interest to which the claimants are entitled? 3. What was the original amount advanced as a loan by the claimant ? 4. What was the amount paid by late Raja Pirthipal Singh to the claimants in respect of the debt in suit Then we find the following in the Special Judge's proceedings: Counsel for the claimants states: The plea involved in issue 2 is not open to the applicant debtor as successor of late Raja Pirthipal Singh who did not take up the plea of the interest being usurious during the trial of the suit filed by the claimants against him which resulted in the decree dated the 12th September, 1932. Sd. Y. A. RIZVI A. S. J. Counsel for the applicant debtor states: The original debtor, Raja Pirthipal Singh, did not take up the plea in the suit as stated by the Counsel for the claimant but the plea is open now to my client. Sd. Y. A. RIZVI A.S.J. Issue 5. Is the plea involved in issue 2 not open to the applicant-debtor ? 6. To what amount are the claimants entitled? 5. On the 7th October, 1939, a notice as required by Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act was pub- listed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, in the Gazette calling upon all persons having claims, including decrees for money, against the ward or his property to notify the same in writing to him within six months from the date of the publication of the notice. The period of six months expired on the 7th April, 1940. The cases were taken up by the Special Judge (or Additional Special Judge) on a number of dates on which proceedings were re- corded. It appears that no special steps were taken by the claimants in these two claims (Nos. 7 and 10) in response to this notice. On the 30th April, 1942, Mr. K. S. Hajela, Government pleader, Bara Banki, made the following application in each of these two cases: ............... (1) That on the death of Raja Pirthipal Singh, Surajpur estate was taken under the charge of Court of Wards. 7 and 10) in response to this notice. On the 30th April, 1942, Mr. K. S. Hajela, Government pleader, Bara Banki, made the following application in each of these two cases: ............... (1) That on the death of Raja Pirthipal Singh, Surajpur estate was taken under the charge of Court of Wards. (2) That on the publication of the notice u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act in the U. P. Government Gazette dated 7th October, 1939, the claimants above-named did not notify their claim to the applicant u/s 17, Court of Wards Act, hence u/s 18 of the U. P. Court of Wards Act the claim put in by the claimants should be deemed to have been discharged. (3) The applicant prays that he may be allowed to amend the replication filed by Raja Pirthipal Singh by adding the contents of para 2 as this ground rose long after the filing of the replication and that the plea raised in para 2 above be decided before proceeding with other issues in the claim. The application for amendment in spite of strong opposition from the claimants was allowed the same day. On the 6th July, 1943, an application by way of reply to the Government Pleader's application of the 30th April, 1942, was filed in each of the two cases whereof Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 run thus : 3. That as the Deputy Commissioner himself nude an application for substitution of name in place of the debtors and he knew full well about the suits of the creditors which were pending from. before, the answering creditors continued to think in good faith that they had no need to serve a notice upon him u/s l7KCourt of Wards Act 4. That if the Court be of opinion that it was necessary to serve a notice upon him, u/s 17 of the said Act, then, under the circum- stances, mentioned in Paragraph 3, the answering creditors are entitled to got the benefit of the pro- visions of Section 20, and so the answering creditors' suit is fit to be entertained and decreed. 5. That the debtor has filed this application in the Court very late, in order to .harass and to take illegal advantage, and so it is fit to be dismissed with costs and the creditors are entitled to get a decree. 5. That the debtor has filed this application in the Court very late, in order to .harass and to take illegal advantage, and so it is fit to be dismissed with costs and the creditors are entitled to get a decree. In view of amendment of pleadings allowed by the Court two fresh issues were framed: 7. Is the claim not maintainable in view of Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act as alleged 8. Was there sufficient cause for the claimant not to prefer their claim u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act as alleged ? If so its effect ? 6. Mahendra Pratap Singh, minor son of Raja Pirthipal Singh, on whose behalf Superintendence of the ilaqa had been assumed by the Court of Wards, died on the 19th September, 1942. An application was made in each case by the claimants intimating to the Court the fact of his death and praying that a note to that effect be made on the record. It appears that by this time claims Nos. f and 10 were transferred from the Court of Special Judge, Bara Banki, to the Court of Special Judge, first grade, Sultanpur, Mr. B. N. Zutshi. The following order was recorded by him on the 3rd October, 1942: It is admitted that Thakur Mahendra Pratap Singh died the 19th September, 1943, and also that the proceedings in this case be continued against the Court of Wards u/s 46 of the Court of Wards Act. None has applied so far for being brought on record as representative. Let the proceedings be therefore continued. 7. Proceedings thus continued in both the claims and terminated in a decree for Rs. 87,366-12-6 with interest and costs in claim No. 7, and for Rs. 3,27,422-11-0 with interest and costs in claim No. 10. The present appeals-have been preferred by the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, as manager, Court of Wards, Surajpur estate, against the said decrees. 8. Though a number of grounds were taken in the memoranda of appeal the arguments at the time of hearing were confined to grounds Nos. 1 to 4 only which are common in both appeals. These grounds relate to the decision of the Court below on questions which formed the subject' matter of issues Nos. 8. Though a number of grounds were taken in the memoranda of appeal the arguments at the time of hearing were confined to grounds Nos. 1 to 4 only which are common in both appeals. These grounds relate to the decision of the Court below on questions which formed the subject' matter of issues Nos. 7 and 8 in the two claims, These deal with the maintainability of the claim in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act and the question whether, in the circumstances of these cases, there was sufficient cause for the claimants not to prefer their claims u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act. The lower Court held that in the circumstances of the two claims before it, there was good and sufficient cause for the claimant's failure to notify the claims, and the claims were accordingly decreed. 9. It appears to have been argued by the learned Counsel for the Deputy Commissioner before the Special Judge that the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 were mandatory and failure to observe them could not be condoned. The same argument was repeated in this Court by the learned Government Advocate. 10. Mr. Siraj Husain who appeared for respondents m claim No. 7 (and whose arguments were adopted by Mr. P. D Rastogi in appeal No. 100) contended in reply that in the first place the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 did not apply to claims in respect of which resort had by the creditor already been had to Court before assumption of the management of the estate by the Court of Wards, secondly that in the circumstances of the claims under consideration, there was compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act and lastly that in case it be held that there was failure on the part of the present creditors to notify their claims, there was good and sufficient cause for such failure, and the lower Court rightly applied Section 20 of the Act. 11. In view of the limited scope of the arguments addressed to us, it is unnecessary to refer other materials on record except the evidence of two witnesses, Lala Basant Rai in claim No. 7, and Ram Das, general agent, in claim No. 10. We will do so when dealing with the third proposition advanced by Mr. Siraj Husain. 12. 11. In view of the limited scope of the arguments addressed to us, it is unnecessary to refer other materials on record except the evidence of two witnesses, Lala Basant Rai in claim No. 7, and Ram Das, general agent, in claim No. 10. We will do so when dealing with the third proposition advanced by Mr. Siraj Husain. 12. We agree with the learned Government Advocate that the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Court of Wards Act are mandatory, and the failure of any claimant to notify his claim as required by Section 17 has the result of its being deemed for all purposes and on all occasions, whether during the continuance of the superintendence of the Court of Wards or afterwards, to have been duly discharged. It may be stated at once that we cannot accept the broad proposition put forward by Mr. Siraj Husain that the provisions of Section 18 of the Act do not apply to debts in respect of which resort has been had to Courts before the assumption of superintendence of the estate of a disqualified proprietor by the Court of Wards. An answer to this argument is found in the provisions of Section 20 of the Act which lays down that nothing in Sections 18 and 19 shall be construed to prevent any person Iron instituting or continuing in any competent Court any suit or proceeding in respect of any claim which has been disallowed in whole or in part by the Collector u/s 18 or by the Court of Wards u/s 19(1). The use of the words "continuing in any competent Court" clearly contemplates a case where the matter has already been put in Court before the Court of Wards assumed management of the estate. He argued that Section 20 was controlled by Section 21 and that the expression "continuing in any competent Court" used in Section 20 should be deemed as applicable only to proceedings in execution of decrees to which reference was made in the subsequent section. We can see no good reason for so limiting the scope of the plain meaning of the explicit language used in Section 20. The words used are "continuing in any competent Court any suit or proceeding in respect of any claim." They cannot be limited in their application only to proceedings in execution of decrees. 13. We can see no good reason for so limiting the scope of the plain meaning of the explicit language used in Section 20. The words used are "continuing in any competent Court any suit or proceeding in respect of any claim." They cannot be limited in their application only to proceedings in execution of decrees. 13. We will now turn to an examination of the part of his argument. In this connection it will be convenient to recapitulate a few facts to which reference has already been made. The two claims in question were both filed on the 30th March, 1937, Raja Pirthipal Singh died on the 15th August 1938 (?). On the 19th September, 1938, an application was made in each of the two claims by the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, to be made a "representative of the deceased." These applications were allowed and substitution of name was ordered. The applications purported to be made under Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After a number of hearings to which it is unnecessary to refer, the Government Pleader on the 22nd April, 1939, gave a detailed statement about the Deputy Commissioner's defence to the claim, and wound up by stating that he took up "no other pleas." On the 7th October, 1939, a notice u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act was published in the Gazette calling upon all- persons having claims, including decrees, for money against the ward or his property to notify the same in writing to him within six months from the date of the publication of the notice. On the 30th April, 1942, after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of the publication of this notice, Mr. K. S. Hajela, Government Pleader, applied for amendment of the replication filed by Raja Pirthipal Singh and raised the plea about failure of the claimants to notify their claims as required by Section 17. It will be seen from what has been stated above that it was an extraordinary position to adopt. A statement of claim together with the decrees on which it was based was already before the Court in each of the two cases long before the superintendence of the |estate was assumed by the Court of Wards. On the death of the applicant landlord (Raja Pirthipal Singh) the Court of Wards stepped in. A statement of claim together with the decrees on which it was based was already before the Court in each of the two cases long before the superintendence of the |estate was assumed by the Court of Wards. On the death of the applicant landlord (Raja Pirthipal Singh) the Court of Wards stepped in. On behalf of the Court of Wards the Deputy Commissioner approached the Special Judge and applied "to be made the representative of the deceased." He not only examined the claims of the creditors in the two cases but put forward his defence. After all this had taken place, a notice u/s 17 was published and after the expiry of six months from the date of the publication of the notice, these new pleas were raised. 14. It was contended by Mr. Siraj Husain in this Court (though the argument does not appear to have been put forward or. behalf of the claimants in the same clear cut form in the Court below) that in spite of the fact that no formal statements of the two claims in writing, accompanied by copies of relevant decrees, sent by the claimants in the two appeals to the Deputy Commissioner after the publication of the notice, in the circum- stances of these cases it was obvious that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 17. The relevant port in of Section 17 is as follows : (1) On the publication of a notification under 'Section 15 the Collector specified in the order of assumption, or any other Collector whom the Court of Wards may appoint in this behalf, shall publish in the gazette a notice in English and in the varnac(sic)r calling upon all persons having claims; including decrees, for money whether secured by mortgage or not, against the ward or his property to notify the same in writing to such Collector within six months from the chte of publication of the notice : Provided that if the claimant be at the date of notice a minor or insane or an idiot, the said period of six months shall begin to run in accordance with the rules contained in Section 8 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, "Provided further that if the claimant be at the date of the said notice absent from British India, the said period shall begin to run from the date of his return to British India. (2) The notice shall also be published at such places and in such other manner as the Court of Wards may be general or special order direct, (3) Every claimant shall, together with his statement of claim, present full particulars thereof. Provided that in the case of a decree vt shall be sufficient to file a certified copy of the same, together with particulars showing the extent to which the decree has been satisfied. 15. It will be seen that the section does not prescribe any special mode for notifying claims except that the notifications should be in writing. As regards claims based on decrees it is sufficient to file a certified copy of the decree together with particulars showing the extent to which it has been satisfied. Clearly all these requirements were complied with in the case of the two claims with which we are concerned in these appeals. The particulars of the claims were contained in the written statements filed by the/two sets of claimants before the Special Judge. Copies of the decrees on which the claims were based were also produced. The Deputy Commissioner himself applied to be nude a party to these proceedings. The particulars of the claims were contained in the written statements filed by the/two sets of claimants before the Special Judge. Copies of the decrees on which the claims were based were also produced. The Deputy Commissioner himself applied to be nude a party to these proceedings. The learned Government Advocate attempted to draw a distinction between the main case under the Encumbered Estates Act which was registerad- in the Court of the Special Judge first grade, Bara Banki, on receipt of Raja Pirthipal Singh's application u/s 4 of the Act from the Collector, and the two claims NOS. 1 and 10 in that case. So far as we could follow his argument he contended that the Deputy Commissioner applied to be made a party to the main case and not to these two claims. This is hardly accurate. It is true that the application was made by the Deputy Commissioner to be made a party to the main case. But thereby he naturally became a party to everyone of the claims which were put forward by the various claimants in that case. There is no force in the contention that the Deputy Commissioner did not apply to be made a party to these two claims in particular. Not only was the Deputy Commissioner a part to the proceedings in both these claims but he contested them. Section 6t of the Act gives the Court of Wards power to make rules consistent with this Act for (a) regulating the management of property under the superintendence of the Court Wards; and (b) Generally for the guidance of all persons in all proceedings under this Act and for carrying out the provisions of this Act. 16. In exercise , of these powers there was made rule 17, of Court of Wards Manual ; All claims which are not filed in time will-be considered discharged for (all time u/s 18 unless the claimant can show good cause for failure to comply with the provisions of Section 17 and the Collector decides to receive the claim after the prescribed period under the first proviso to Section 18. No orders regarding the allowance or disallowance of claims should, therefore, be passed in the case of the claims included in list C, referred to in rule 16. No orders regarding the allowance or disallowance of claims should, therefore, be passed in the case of the claims included in list C, referred to in rule 16. If it is intended to reject a claim on the ground that it was filed after the prescribed period it should not be received at all. It is improper to receive a belated claim and then subsequently to disallow it on the ground that it was notified after the period fixed in the notice u/s 17 had expired. An explanation of the claimant for not filing his claim in time should not ordinarily he considered sufficient unless the cause shown is one beyond the claimant's control, e.g. that he was absent from home at a distance, that he was seriously ill or that he entrusted the matter of giving notice to an agent who died and whose death did not come to the claimant's knowledge in time. Mere carelessness on the part of the claimant should not be considered sufficient. Creditors whose claims lutve eonte informally to the knowledge of the Collector before the formal charge of the estate is assumed should have their attention drawn to Section 17 if they fail to present their claim even after a consider- able period of the notice has expired. Collectors are prohibited lioin entering into any negotiations regarding the settlement of claims which have not been filed at all, or which they have refused to receive on their being filed after the expiry of the due period. Such claims will be ordinarily resisted by the Court of Wards. 17. It requires the Deputy Commissioner to draw the attention of creditors whose claims have come informally to his knowledge, even before the for- mal charge of the estate is assumed, to Section 17 in case they fail to present their claims even after a considerable period of the notice has expired. No action under this rule is suggested to have been taken by the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, in respect of either of the two claims before us. It cannot be denied that the existence of the two claims in question had come to the knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner. In fact the claims were being contested on his behalf in a Court of law and it he failed to draw the attention of the claimants. It cannot be denied that the existence of the two claims in question had come to the knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner. In fact the claims were being contested on his behalf in a Court of law and it he failed to draw the attention of the claimants. concerned to the-provisions of Section 17, as he was bound to do this rule, we take it that it was because the claims had already been notified, or at any rate he believed that they were notified as required by Section 17. Though we should not be understood to hold that a wrong belief on the part of the Deputy Commissioner as regards compliance by creditors with the provisions of Section 17 would able such claimant from the consequences of his failure to notify his claim we are satisfied that in the present case there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law, and the Deputy Commissioner was right in not taking any action under the IT of the Manual in respect of these two claims. 18. It might possibly be argued that because these claims were put forward in the Court of the Special Judge before the assumption of the management of the estate by the Court of Wards, and long before the publication of the notice u/s ,17, therefore they did not meet the requirements of that section. We are, however clear that it is permissible to claimants against a ward to notify their claims to the Deputy Commissioner even before the publication of. the notice. The words "within six months from the date of publication of the notice" in Section 17 only indicate the limit of time upto which a notice under that section should ordinarily be given. They do not necessarily imply that a claimant must notify his claim to the Collector after the publication of the notice u/s 17 in the gazette. It was held by a Bench of this Court in the case of Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Govind Prasad 1940 OA 325: AWR (CC) 412 : OWN 862 with reference to similar words in Section 9U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, that the phrase "within three months from" in Section 9 (I) only prescribes the date of publication of the notice as the date by reference to which the last day of limitation is to be calculated. It does not prescribe -a kind of compartment of time, and enact that any written statement in order to be presented within time must be presented between the first and the last day of that compartment of time. We hold in the circumstances of the present case that there was notification of these claims to the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 17 on several hearings in the Court of the Special Judge after the 11th November, 1938, when he was made a party to the Encumbered Estates Act case. In the absence of any special mode prescribed for notifying claims u/s 17 it is sufficient if information is given to the Deputy Commissioner in respect of any claim in writing, and in the case of a claim based on a decree already passed, a copy of the decree together with particulars "showing the ex- tent to which the decree has been satisfied is brought to his notice. Both these requirements were fulfilled in the present case. It might be urged that in this case no action was taken by the claimants by putting themselves in communication with the Deputy Commissioner. Any information which reached the Deputy Commissioner in respect of the particulars of these claims and the decrees on which they were based was through the medium of the Court. We are clear that the requirements of Section 17 are met whether the particulars of a claim and the documents on which it is based are brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner directly by the claimant or this is done through the medium of a Court. Section 17 is intended, as is clear from the heading of Chapter IV of the Act in which it occurs, to provide a machinery to enable the Court of Wards to ascertain the debts of the ward: it was never intended to defeat honest claims. We are confirmed in this opinion by rule 17 found in the Court of Wards Manual to which attention has already been drawn in another connection. We are confirmed in this opinion by rule 17 found in the Court of Wards Manual to which attention has already been drawn in another connection. It casts a duty upon the Deputy Commissioner that even if a claim comes informally to his knowledge before the formal charge of the estate is assumed, and the creditor fails to present his claim after a considerable period of the notice u/s 17 has expired, he should draw the attention of such creditor to the provisions of that section. It will be an abuse of law to permit the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 to be utilised for j defeating claims which have been found to be good I and honest by Courts long before the Court of Wards was in any way associated with the estate against which it is sought to enforce them. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circum- stances of the present two claims, and the proceedings in the Court of the Special Judge, we are satisfied that there was sufficient notification of both these claims to the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, so as to meet the requirements of Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act. 19. It was next contended by the respondent's learned Counsel that in case his contention that the claims had been notified as required by Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act was not upheld there was good and sufficient cause for the claimant's failure to notify them. It appears that the claim- ants, while the case was pending in the Court below, were not quite clear as to the effect of the proceedings in the Court of the Special Judge to meet the requirements of Section 17 of the Court of Wards Act. Accordingly on the 6th July, 1942, they made an application, to which reference has already been made on pages 6 and 7 of this judgment, that they believed in good faith that in the circumstances of the claims in question, they had no "need to serve a notice upon the Deputy Com- missioner u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act." In proof of the fact that they believed in good faith that no further notice was necessary it was sought to establish that they had taken legal advice on this matter and acted on that advice. Lala Basant Rai, one of the claimants in claim No. 7 examined himself as a witness and stated that he did not notify his claim to the Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki, because he was advised by his Counsel, the late Mr. Radha Krishna (who was subsequently a Judge of this Court) that as proceedings were pending in the Court of the Special Judge, and the Deputy Commissioner was a party to the same a fresh notice was not necessary. In the other case Ram Das, general agent, pledged his oath that he was given similar advice by the same Counsel. The learned Special Judge who recorded their evidence did not choose to act upon it. On the question of credibility of a witness, where the issue involved is simple, we are not prepared to substitute our own .opinion for the view taken by the trial Judge. The question whether there was good and sufficient cause for the failure of the creditors in these two claims to notify their claims to the Deputy Commissioner must therefore be determined apart from .this evidence. The circumstances of the case have already been stated that it is unnecessary to tecapitulate them. The Deputy Commissioner was a party to the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act case : he was contesting both these claims: his Counsel attended numerous hearings between the date on which the Deputy Commissioner was made a party and the 7th April, 1942, the date on .which the-period prescribed by the notice u/s 17 expired the particulars of the claim were made known to the Deputy Commissioner through the medium of the Court : through the same medium the decrees on which the claims were based were brought to his notice: the decrees were actually on the record of the case. We agree with the learned Special. Judge that in these circumstances there was good and sufficient cause for the failure of the claimants to send any separate notice in respect of their claims to the Deputy Commissioner, and they are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20 of the Court of Wards Act. The finding on this question is not of much importance in view of the conclusion arrived at by us on Mr. Siraj Husain's second contention that there was sufficient compliance by the claimants in these cases with the provisions of Section 17. 20. The finding on this question is not of much importance in view of the conclusion arrived at by us on Mr. Siraj Husain's second contention that there was sufficient compliance by the claimants in these cases with the provisions of Section 17. 20. It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the question whether failure of the Deputy Commissioner to take action under rule 17 of the Court of Wards Manual deprived the Court of Wards of the plea that no suit can lie in respect of the debts to which these two claims relate This question was not argued before us in fact no reference to rule 17 of the Court of Wards Manual was made at the Bar. But reference was made to the case of Mst. Ketki v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, Manager, Court of Wards, Nanpara Estate decided by a Bench of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh Where it was held on the interpretation of Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act that when a claimant puts in a claim late the Collector should write to him and ask why he did not, put in his claim within the right time and what was the cause of his failure. If the Collector fails to take proper action u/s 18, the Court of-Wards is deprived of its right to rely on the plea in bar of the claim. It is true that in the case of Mst. Ketki v. Tin Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich, Manager, Court of Wards, Nanpara Estate, Mst. Ketki had notified her claim to the Collector after the expiration of the period of notice u/s 17. In the present case as we know no notice, apart from such as the Deputy Commissioner had through becoming a party to the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, .was given. But an argument like that which was addressed to the Bench of the Judicial Commissioner's Court in Mst. Ketki's case could possibly be urged on the basis of rule 17 in the present case, we however, refrain from expressing any opinion* on the matter. 21. The case of Bakhtawar Singh v. Balwant Singh decided by a Bench of. Allahabad High Court was similar to that before us. The plaintiffs (Bakhtawar and others) purchased certain property from the defendant (or a sum of Rs. ,2,600. 21. The case of Bakhtawar Singh v. Balwant Singh decided by a Bench of. Allahabad High Court was similar to that before us. The plaintiffs (Bakhtawar and others) purchased certain property from the defendant (or a sum of Rs. ,2,600. Prior to the sale the defendant, had entered into a contract with Kanjit and Bhudat to sell the same property to them. After the purchase by the plaintiffs, Raujtt and Bhudat brought a suit fur specific performance of the contract Of sale careered into by defendant. That suit war, contested by the plaintiffs, but was decreed with the result that in execution of the decree Ranjut and Bhudat got possession of the property' sold to the plaintiffs. In the sale deed executed by the defendant in the plaintiff's favour there was a stipulation to the effect that if for any reason the property sold passed out of the plaintiffs' possession, they would be entitled to realise the sale consideration paid by them with interest at one per cent per mensem. The plaintiffs, admittedly out of Rs. 2,600 received Rs. 1,900. They claimed the balance of Rs. 700 and Rs. 930-2 on account of costs incurred in defending the suit filed by Ranjit and Bhudat. After the institution of the suit the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of the property of Balwant Singh and a notice u/s 17 of the Court of Wards Act was issued. After the property of the defendant had been taken charge of by the Court of Wards the Collector was made a party to the suit and service of notice of the suit was effected on him. The Collector by means of a letter requested the Civil Court to allow six months' time with a view to enable him to defend the suit. A written statement was filed by the Collector. By the time the written statement was filed the period fixed by the notice issued u/s 17 had expired, and it was not disputed that the plaintiffs had not, as required, preferred their claim with particulars thereof to the Collector. A plea to the a (1920) 7 O L J 589 at p. 609. 8 Bakhtawar Singh and Others Vs. Balwant Singh, AIR 1927 All 599 . effect that failure to notify the claim u/s 17 entailed the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit' was raised on behalf of the Collector. A plea to the a (1920) 7 O L J 589 at p. 609. 8 Bakhtawar Singh and Others Vs. Balwant Singh, AIR 1927 All 599 . effect that failure to notify the claim u/s 17 entailed the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit' was raised on behalf of the Collector. It was held by that in the circumstances of the ca3e the creditors were entitled to the benefit of Section 20. Their Lordships observed that after the property of the defendant had been taken charge of by the Court of Wards, the Collector was informed of the feet of the institution of the suit. He must have known the basis of the plaintiff's claim. Being cognizant of this fact he asked the trial Court to adjourn the case with a view to enable him to defend the suit. The time prayed for by him was granted. These being the facts there is no escape from the conclusion that the Collector knew the particulars of the claim of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs having already sued in a court of law might have bona fide believed that it was not at all necessary for them to notify their claim to the Collector. The Cases to which these appeals relate are much stronger. All that the learned Government Advocate could say with regard to this case was that it did not lay down good law. We are unable to agree with him. The learned Special Judge has found it as a fact that the claimants believed bona fide that it was not necessary for them to notify their claims to the Collector afresh. We are satisfied that he was fully justified in coming to that conclusion. 22. Reference was also made to the "case of Collector of Meerut Vs. Chaudhary Risal Singh , where it was held that failure on the part of a plaintiff to give notice of his claim u/s 17 to the Collector on the ground that he did not know that his claim came within the purview of words "claim for money" might entitle him to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20. 23. Reliance was placed during arguments by the learned Government advocate upon a number of cases, but as they do not decide the point which arises for consideration before us we will content ourselves with only making a passing reference to them. 23. Reliance was placed during arguments by the learned Government advocate upon a number of cases, but as they do not decide the point which arises for consideration before us we will content ourselves with only making a passing reference to them. The case of Collector of Bulandshahr, Manager of Fatima Begam's Estate v. Sagar Mal 1943 AWR (H C) 203 : A I R 1942 All. 379, decided that a Collector u/s 19, was not "an agent duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of that expression as used in Section 19 of the Limitation AGI. The case of Daulat Shah v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich (1931) 9 OWN 824, deals with the question of admissibility of a document not produced before the claim before the Collector. It has no relation to the facts of the case before us. Another case referred to by the learned Government Advocate was Maqsood Ali v. Deputy Commissioner, Bara Banki (1928) 5 OWN 927. That decision deals with the interpretation of Section 54 of the Court of Wards Act. The last case, we shall notice, was a decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh in Shao Dayal v. Deputy Commissioner, Kheri (1925) 2 OWN 322. It held that where a creditor claims a debt in the course of an inquiry conducted u/s 9 of the Court of Wards Act, but fails to notify his claim within six months of the notice u/s 17. the suit for recovery of the debt against the Court of Wards is not maintainable, the attendance of a creditor and setting up of a claim by him u/s 9 not being a good and sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to Section 20 of the Act. This decision has no bearing on the cases before us. 24. Having given our most careful consideration to these two appeals we are satisfied that they are without substance and we dismiss them with costs.