JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - Lalta Prasad Baqqal files this revision application from the order dated the 17th August, 1944, passed by a Magistrate of the first class, Bahraich, ordering a de novo trial under Section 6 of Ordinance No. XXXV of 1943 which provides for the prevention of hoarding and profiteering. He applied to the Additional Sessions Judge against that order but his application was dismissed. 2. The short facts are that on the 22nd February last year, Lalta Prasad was arrested by the police and was prosecuted under rule 81 sub-rule 4 of the Defence of India Rules, after obtaining the necessary sanction of the District Magistrate. The offence consisted in selling three bags of cement at Rs, 12 per bag although the price fixed by the Company was Rs. 3-10-0 only. The prosecution evidence was produced but before any charge was framed under rule 81, sub-rule 4, it was discovered that the applicant was not guilty under that rule but that he had committed an offence under rule 6 of the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance. Accordingly a charge was framed under rule 6 of the said Ordinance. An objection was however raised on behalf of the accused that under rule 14 of the said Ordinance, the applicant's prosecution was void without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate. This objection was raised on the date which was fixed for the defence evidence. The Prosecuting Inspector thereupon obtained an adjournment in order to enable him to obtain sanction. On the 15rh August, 1944, the District Magistrate passed the order. Prosecution sanctioned. Upon this order being filed, the Prosecuting Inspector requested the Magistrate to try the case de novo. This request was granted on the 17th August, and this order forms "the subject-matter of the present revision application 3. The learned -.Magistrate relied on the provisions of Sections .'.21, 229 and 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in support of the view taken by him that although no previous sanction had been obtained for the prosecution of the applicant under the Ordinance for the prevention of hoarding and profiteering, the subsequent sanction validated the proceedings and conferred jurisdiction upon him to try the applicant. He also held that no prejudice was occasioned to the applicant as a fresh trial will proceed against him. 4. He also held that no prejudice was occasioned to the applicant as a fresh trial will proceed against him. 4. I am of opinion that the order passed by the Magistrate directing a de novo trial is vitiated by reason of the absence of' sanction antecedent to the initiation of the applicant's prosecution. Rule 14 of the Ordinance lays down Procedure No prosecution for any offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be instituted except with the previous sanction of the Central or the Provincial Government, or of an officer not below the rank of a District Magistrate empowered by the Central or the Provincial Government to grant such sanction. 5. This rule leaves, no manner of doubt that unless the previous sanction of the District Magistrate has been obtained, proceedings in a prosecution under the Ordinance cannot be instituted. That no such previous sanction was obtained is not denied. It follows, therefore, that the applicant's prosecution was void ab initio and no subsequent sanction could validate what was invalid at its inception. 6. In Thakur Raghubar Singh v. The King Emperor 1944 O A (F C) 15 : A W R (F C) 15 , their Lordships of the Federal Court of India set aside the conviction on the ground that no valid sanction to the proceedings in which the appellants were prosecuted had been obtained. That was a complaint u/s 104 of the Insurance Act (1938) and before any prosecution could be started, the sanction of the Advocate General u/s 107 of the Act was necessary. Such a sanction had been obtained but no sanction had been obtained in respect of the second complaint which followed the first under the same sanction regarding other items. Their Lordships held that it is not the right view to take that the generality of the form of the sanction in question justified the further charges in respect of later matters inasmuch as the accused were not prejudiced in their defence. A valid previous sanction is essential to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the proceedings. It is clear, therefore, that without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction vested in him to proceed with the prosecution of the applicant under the Ordinance. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure invoked by the Magistrate in support of his view are clearly inapplicable. It is clear, therefore, that without the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction vested in him to proceed with the prosecution of the applicant under the Ordinance. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure invoked by the Magistrate in support of his view are clearly inapplicable. Section 227 sub-Section 1 provides that any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. The Magistrate had framed no charge under rule 81 sub-rule 4 of the Defence of India Rules. Before that stage arrived, the Public Prosecutor intimated to the Court that the applicant could not be prosecuted under that Rule and that he was really guilty of an offence under the Ordinance. There was, therefore, no question of altering or adding to any charge already framed. In this view Sections 229 and 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have no bearing/ The argument that the accused is not prejudiced as he will have the advantage of a de novo trial is effectively met by their Lordships of the Federal Court of India in Thakur Raghubar Singh's case. As the prosecution of the applicant was void in law, all proceedings taken against him by the Magistrate are bad in law and must be quashed. 7. I accordingly allow the revision application and quash all the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.