JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is a debtors- landlords' appeal u/s 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act against an order of the Special Judge First Class, Lucknow, allowing the claimants respondents' objections u/s 11 of that Act. 2. The facts which gave rise to the objections are that on 23rd December, 1930, in execution of his simple money decree against Syed Jafar Mehdi for Rs. 990/6 Raghubar Diyal the predecessor-in- interest of Sheo Prasad and Debi Dutt, purchased his one anna share of village Hardaiya at a Court auction. Raghubar Dayal died subsequently on 6th March, 1933, and the sale certificate, Ext. Dl, was issued in the names of his sons Ram Sunder and Sheo Prasad on 13th January, 1934. On 29th January, 1934, delivery of possession was made to Ram Sunder and Sheo Prasad vide Ext. D2. On the coming into force of the Encumbered Estates Act Syed Jafar Mehdi applied for liquidation of his debts under that enactment. The proceedings were in due course transferred to the Special Judge in whose Court the debtors-landlords filed their written statement and showed therein the one anna share of village Hardaiya as their own property. They also entered the names of Ram Sunder and Sheo Prasad as their creditors. During the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of the Special Judge Syed Jafar Mehdi died and his legal representatives were brought on the record. On 8th November, 1937, Ram Sunder and Sheo Prasad filed their written statement given the aforesaid facts and alleging that by virtue of the auction sale the debt due to their ancestor was satisfied, and the plaintiff has wrongly entered them as creditors in his written statement. They claimed that the landlord-applicants had no right whatever in the one anna share of village Hardaiya and that it on the contrary belonged to Ramsunder and Sheo Prasad. They, however put up an alternative plea that if for any reason one anna share of the aforesaid village be not found to be their property, a decree for Rs. 1,620/14 be passed in their favour on the basis of their father's simple money decree dated 11th September, 1929. This was obviously a claim u/s II filed somewhat prematurely in view of the fact that no notice had so far been Issued under clause 1 of that section. 1,620/14 be passed in their favour on the basis of their father's simple money decree dated 11th September, 1929. This was obviously a claim u/s II filed somewhat prematurely in view of the fact that no notice had so far been Issued under clause 1 of that section. On 7th May, 1988, the notice was published in the Government Qosette calling for objections to the properties mentioned therein within three months from the date of the publication. The period of three month* expired on 7th August, 1988. No fresh objections were filed by Ram Sundar and. Sheo Prasad up to that date. On 6th October, 1938, a belated application, was preferred on their- behalf raising the objections that had already, been taken in their earlier statement on 8th November, 1987. When this application was laid before the Court on 7th October, 1938," the learned Counsel who appeared for the claimants, cot ceded that his application was time barred. It was therefore, rejected. On 81st January, 1939, another application was preferred. It appears that Ram Sunder fcad meanwhile died, and his interest had devolved upon his son, Debi Dutt. Sheo Prasad and Debi Datt, there- fore, joined in this petition, and they averred that the objections which were filed by them on 6th October, 1938, in respect of the one anna share in village Hardaiya were unnecessary in view of their previous written statement, dated 8th November, 1937. They said that the filing of the second application, dated 6th" October, 1988,* wa8 under a misapprehension, and the order passed by the Court in respect of it did not stand in their way. They prayed that the Objections embodied in their written statement of 1987 be decided, and it be held that the aforesaid share was not the property of Syed ' Jafar Mehdi and was not liable to sale or mortgage for his debts. In the proceedings dated 16th September 1939, the Counsel for the debtors-applicants stated that they did not oppose the application and agreed that the objections of the petitioners u/s 11, Encumbered Estates Act mentioned in the application be entertained in view of the fact that the objections bad already been taken in the earlier written statement. There was no opposition from any other, quarter, and the Special Judge, therefore, allowed the application and fixed a date for decision and disposal of the objections u/s 11. There was no opposition from any other, quarter, and the Special Judge, therefore, allowed the application and fixed a date for decision and disposal of the objections u/s 11. On 2nd March, 1940 the learned Special Judge after a consideration; of the evidence came to the conclusion that the aforesaid share in village Hardaiya had in fact been purchased by Raghubar Dayal feared December, 1930 and that it was not liable to attachment and sale etc for Jafar Mehdi's debt. He accordingly made a declaration to the above effect. 3. In the memo, of appeal filed in this Court on behalf of the debtors landlords it was alleged that the claim u/s 11 ought not to have been entertained in the absence of proof that there was sufficient cause for not making the objections with- in time. The order of the Special Judge was further impugned on the ground that in face of*the previous order dated lib October, 1938 it was not open to the Court below to pass the order under appeal. It also embodied an allegation in one of the grounds of appeal that the sale in favour of Raghubar was invalid as the entire property in the hands of Syed Jafar Mehdi was endowed by one Mir Fida Husain. It would appear from the attitude taken up by the learned Counsel for the landlords on 15th September, 1929, that none of these objections were taken before the Court below, and no contention was raised regarding the maintainability of the claimants' objections contained in the written statement of 8th November, 1937. The fact that a claim of the nature contemplated by Section 11 was combined with a claim as a creditor u/s 9 could not have the effect I of rendering it any the less an objection within the meaning of Section 11. The further fact that the objectors did not prefer a claim after the publication of the notice u/s 11 within time could not debar them from obtaining an* adjudication in respect of the case set up by them in their written statement on 8th November 1937. The further fact that the objectors did not prefer a claim after the publication of the notice u/s 11 within time could not debar them from obtaining an* adjudication in respect of the case set up by them in their written statement on 8th November 1937. The provisions of sub- Section (2) of Section 11 did not debar the Special Judge from entertaining it arid making a declaration if the written statement of 8th November 1937 wa3 in fact and in substance a claim u/s 11 as the period mentioned in Section 11 only prescribes a date up to which objections can be filed. It does not prescribe that the claim must be presented before the Court after" the publication of the notice. Our view in this behalf is supported by the decision of a Bench of this Court in Jham Singh v. Suraj Bakhsh Singh 1942 OA 249 : AWR (C C) 228 : RD 533. Another Bench of this Court in Bishwanath Singh v. Shivaratan 1942 OA 500 : AWR (C C) 342 : OWN 611, came to the same conclusion. . We may refer also to the decision of a Bench of the Allahabad High Court Ramman Lal v. Raghunath Shankar 1940 A W R (HC) 572: OA 1167 : 1941 R D 180 which is to the similar effect. The only distinction between the aforesaid cases and the one before us is that here certain belated objections purporting to be u/s 11 were preferred on 6th October, 1938 and were rejected on an admission of the claimants' counsel that they were time barred. In our opinion this does not make any essential difference since the rejection of the application dated 6th October, 1930 on a finding that it was time barred, does not operate to dispose of the prayer contained in the previous written statement dated 8th November, 1937. We think that in equity and in law the claimants were entitled to obtain an adjudication dl the rights as set up by them in 1937, and the rejection of their application of the 6th October, 19o8, did not debar them from falling back upon the earlier claim, the contents of which clearly show that their primary objection was to secure a declaration that the one anna share of village Hardaiya was not liable to sale etc. in liquidation of the landlords debts. in liquidation of the landlords debts. The allegations about the property being wakf was not pressed before. There appears nothing on the record to support it. 4. We think that there is not substance in this appeal. It therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.