JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - This is an application in revision by three debtor applicants u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act who filed their application u/s 4 on the 27th October, 1936. On the 6th November 19H6 this application was sent by the Collector to the Special Judge, and the applicants filed their written statements u/s 8 on the 2nd March 1937. In the application u/s 4 as well as in the written statements the properties of the three applicants were jointly mentioned. No specification of shares was given. Out of 28 debts set forth in the list 23 were mentioned as joint of the applicants, or of applicant land the predecessor-in- interest of applicants 2 and 3. Publication in the Gazette Was made, and written statements of the claims of the creditors were filed some time about July 1937. At that time some of the creditors raised the objection that these three persons could not make a joint application because they were not members of a joint Hindu family or heirs of a de- ceased creditor. These objections however do not appear to have been pressed. In December 1901 a decision was arrived at in respect of the claims of seven of the creditors. On the 10th February 1942 three sets of creditors put in the application, which is printed at page 4, before the Special Judge. This application is to the effect that it is not open to the three applicants to make a joint application and that an issue should be framed and the application u/s 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act be held to be not maintainable. The learned Special Judge found that the application was not maintainable and gave the applicant debtors an opportunity to amend it u/s 4 (a) of the Act. 2. It is against this direction to amend the application that the applicants have come in appeal. 3. There can be no doubt that the application was defective, vide Sheikh Abu Bakar v. Sheikh Myian Subhani 1941 AWR (Rev) 258 : OA (Sup).207 : RD 246 with which we agree : Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act contemplates joint applications by (1) members of a joint Hindu family and ('2) heirs of a deceased debtor. 3. There can be no doubt that the application was defective, vide Sheikh Abu Bakar v. Sheikh Myian Subhani 1941 AWR (Rev) 258 : OA (Sup).207 : RD 246 with which we agree : Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act contemplates joint applications by (1) members of a joint Hindu family and ('2) heirs of a deceased debtor. Apart from these two categories there might be another possible case of a joint application and that would be where all the debts of the applicants are joint though their properties may be separate. But the existence of one joint decree or debt cannot entitle persons holding different properties and owing other different debts of their own to join in one application under1 Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act. 4. The question, however, arises whether it is not too late to amend the application now. The difficulties are these. Supposing that this appeal is dismissed and the order directing the applicants to amend their application u/s 4 is allowed to stand and that they amend their application : they can only amend it by two of them withdrawing from this application and leaving the third. , Seven joint decrees have already been passed, and in satisfaction of these decrees all the properties of the "three applicants are liable. u/s 14 (7) of the Act these decrees are deemed to be decrees of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and are binding upon the parties, but all subsequent decrees after the amendment, will be decrees against au individual whose property alone will be liable: The "Special Judge will therefore have to send two inconsistent lists of property for the satisfaction of two different sorts of decrees to the Collector. This is contrary to the scheme of the Act. If on the other hand, the debtor applicants refuse to amend their application and this results in the dismissal of that application by the Special Judge, another difficulty arises. We are of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal u/s 8 (8) of the Act is incurred only if (1) the written statement referred to in Section 8 (I) is not filed, or (2) the information referred to in the proviso has not been given. It is not incurred by a defect in the written statement or by a defect in the application u/s 4. It is not incurred by a defect in the written statement or by a defect in the application u/s 4. Therefore Section 43 will not apply to this dismissal. Section 44 (2) which refers to dismissal generally does not deal the disabilities laid by Section 7 upon the creditors but only with those laid upon the debtor applicant. ft would appear therefore that the dismissal of the application on account of this detect would not result in the quashing of all proceedings sub- sequent to the order of the Collector or to the removal of the disabilities laid upon the creditors. It cannot be denied that the Act is very defective at this point. 5. It is no doubt on account of these and perhaps other difficulties also which would arise, that the Board of Revenue has refused to invalidate applications u/s 4 after the stage of decrees being passed had been reached: Jagatpal Singh v. Har Saran Singh 1939 A W R (B R) 84 : 1938 R D 946, Thakur Badri Narain Singh v. Mahesh Narain Singh 1939 AWR (B R) 83 : OWN 81, and Angne v. Wilayat Husain 1942 OA (Sup) 45 : AWR (Rev) 45, (1942 Oudh App 45) and Bolnshwar Rai v. Guchmi Singh 1942 OA (Sup) 162 : A W R (Rev) 142 (1942 Oudh App 162). 6. The respondents' learned Counsel has asked us to get out of these difficulties' by using the drastic method of setting aside the decrees already passed by our inherent powers. He has cited Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah (1913) 35 All. 331 (PC). But the mistake made by the Court whose order was there under appeal was a mistake of a very different order. The decision "was vitiated by applying to a dead man orders and rules applicable only to a mere defaulter". In Mt. Champa Devi Vs. Mt. Asa Devi, AIR 1938 All 8 , it was held in an Encumbered Estates Act case that a Court has inherent power to cancel its invalid orders. 7. We are of opinion, however, that it would not only be improper but also illegal to wipe out by our inherent powers all the proceedings and the decrees passed in the present case up to date. 7. We are of opinion, however, that it would not only be improper but also illegal to wipe out by our inherent powers all the proceedings and the decrees passed in the present case up to date. We therefore think that we should adopt the principle followed by the Board of Revenue and refuse to hold that this application is invalid in view of the fact that decrees u/s 14 have al- ready been passed. We think that, even if the applicants amended their application, confusion would follow, and that therefore the corollary of our refusal to invalidate the application is that we should cancel the orders of the lower Court directing the applicants to amend it. We have full powers u/s 46 of the Act to make this order. 8. We therefore allow this application and set aside the order of the Court below. We return the case to the lower Court which will proceed with the application in its present form. Parties will bear their own costs in this Court.