JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - This is an application by the Government of Bengal under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which provides, so far as is relevant, as follows: Any party to an arbitration agreement desiring to challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits. The material facts are: On July 19th, 1943 the Respondent, S. L. Puri, agreed to sell to the Government of Bengal 10,000 maunds of gram dhall and a like quantity of grain. In confirmation of these sales, two documents came into existence which the Respondent, Mr. Puri alleges, are contracts between himself and the Government of Bengal and which, the Government deny, have any existence as such in law. It is. necessary only to refer to one such document as they are identical save in immaterial matter. The document is contained in the Government's printed form. It is headed " Government of Bengal," is in the form of a letter addressed to a seller confirming the purchase made from him by the signatory on behalf of the Government. Then follows the description and other necessary details of the goods sold and concludes with a provision that any dispute will be submitted for arbitration to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The document is signed by Mr. A. K. Ghose, describing himself as the Food Grains Purchasing Officer, Bengal. On the face of it. the document is a binding and good contract. It is immaterial to dissertate at length, but dispute having arisen between Mr. Puri and the Government regarding the deliveries of both lots of goods. Mr. Puri has commenced or is about to commence, arbitration proceedings before the Bengal Chamber of Commerce pursuant to the concluding provision in the document. I repeat that the document is one which is printed and brought into existence at the instance of the Government and it is their own printed document. 2. It is contended on behalf of the Government of Bengal that the document is not a contract in law and consequently there is no arbitration agreement and there can. be no arbitration between the parties. The contention is based upon the provisions of sec. 175 sub-sec. 2. It is contended on behalf of the Government of Bengal that the document is not a contract in law and consequently there is no arbitration agreement and there can. be no arbitration between the parties. The contention is based upon the provisions of sec. 175 sub-sec. (3) of the Government of India Act, which, so far as is material, provides that all contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of a province shall be expressed to be made by the Governor of the Province and that all such contracts shall be executed by such persons and in such manner as he (the Governor) may direct or authorise. 3. Exception is taken against the existence, in law, of any contract with Mr. Puri on the ground, and solely on the ground, that the document does not purport to be a contract expressed to be made by the Governor it is expressed to be made by the Government of Bengal. It is not surprising that the learned Advocate-General in no way sought to defend or justify this technical point being taken. Nevertheless, if it is a sound point, the Provincial Government are entitled to avail themselves of it in order to avoid their liability. Whatever one may think of the propriety or morality of their conduct, that does not arise in this Court. 4. When a statute provides a particular method by which a contract should be made, there must be compliance with the provisions of the statute. This is manifest from authorities in England as well as in India. In H. Young & Co, v. The Mayor and Corporation of Royal Leamington Spa I. L. R. (1883) A. C. 517. I statute provided that where the subject matter of a contract exceeded 750 in value, the contract must be under seal; and it was" held that when a contract was not under seal, it was a bad contract and not en forcible. This decision was cited with approval in this Court in Kessoram Poddar & Co. v. Secretary of State for India I. L. R. (1926) Cal. 969. 5. The contract, the subject of this application, is not expressed to be made by the Governor, which is the method by which sub-sec. (3) of sec. 175 of the Government of India Act provided shall be the method by which a province must contract. 6. Mr. v. Secretary of State for India I. L. R. (1926) Cal. 969. 5. The contract, the subject of this application, is not expressed to be made by the Governor, which is the method by which sub-sec. (3) of sec. 175 of the Government of India Act provided shall be the method by which a province must contract. 6. Mr. Meyer on behalf of Mr. Puri, referred to the General Clauses Act, 1897, sec. 3, sub-sec. (43) (a). This provides that " Provincial Government " shall mean, in a Governor's Province, " the Governor," and he argued that since the contract is headed " Government of Bengal," by reference to the General Clauses Act, the interpretation should be given that this means the Governor of the Province and, therefore, the contract was impliedly made by the Governor. I regret I cannot accept this argument for two reasons; (a) sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act provides that the meanings given in that section shall apply to the General Clauses Act and all Central Acts and Regulations. The Government of India Act is not one of these enactments and provisions: (b) The General Clauses Act does not define " Governor of the Province " (which is the expression in sec. 175, Government of India Act) as meaning the " Provincial Government," but the definition is the converse. 7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent took exception to the form of the petition. He argued that it is defective in its verification. The petition is affirmed by Mr. V. K. Rai who, in fact, is a member of the Indian Civil Service and an officer of the Provincial Government holding the appointment of Deputy Controller, Civil Supplies, Procurement and Purchase, whatever that office may be, and he states in the averment that paragraphs 1 to 6 of the petition are based on information received and believed to be true, paragraphs 1 to 6 contain substantially the relevant facts. Mr. Meyer contended that this is not in accordance with the provisions of Or. 19, r. 3 of the CPC which enables a deponent to an affidavit to state what he believes are true, provided the grounds of his belief are given. He pointed out that the petition in the present application is in effect and in substance an affidavit and is the evidence upon which the Court acts, in applications under sec. 19, r. 3 of the CPC which enables a deponent to an affidavit to state what he believes are true, provided the grounds of his belief are given. He pointed out that the petition in the present application is in effect and in substance an affidavit and is the evidence upon which the Court acts, in applications under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act. While there is some justification for this argument, I do not think, in the present instance, that it can. prevail for this reason. I have before me the contracts-they have been put before me by learned Counsel on behalf of the Respondent and it is manifest from those contracts that they are not in accord with the statutory requirements laid down in sec. 175, sub-sec. (5) of the Government of India Act. 8. I regret having to come to the conclusion to which I am forced and that is to hold that this petition must prevail and the relief sought must be accorded. Costs are a matter in my discretion. I exercise my discretion against the applicant. There will be no order as to costs.